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CROSS-APPELLANT ZANDRA PERKINS 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. COMMENTS ON PERKINS* STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. The jury found, based upon the evidence admitted into evidence 
at trial, that Zandra Perkins breached her contract with First General Services 
and that First General Services did not breach its contract with Perkins. That 
verdict is based upon substantial evidence. Although Perkins seems to 
suggest to this Court at page 14 of her initial Brief that there was insufficient 
evidence to support that verdict, she does not identify the sufficiency of the 
evidence of Perkins' breach of contract as an issue on appeal and wholly fails 
to marshal the evidence as required when challenging factual issues on 
appeal. Thus, that question is not before this Court for review. 
2. First General Services began actual repair and restoration work 
on May 22, 1990. Record, 5319-5320. Thereafter, First General Services 
received its first payment from Bear River on June 12, 1990. Record, 2937 
and Plaintiffs Exhibit 7. It received its second payment on July 31, 1990 for 
work performed at the Perkins home. Record, 2937. Only after July 13, 1990 
when Perkins requested First General Services convert her carport into a 
garage and bill the insurance company and after the July 31 , 1990 payment 
was made, were instructions given by Marsha Smith not to make any more 
payments to First General Services. Record, 3958-3959. 
3. Marsh Smith, Perkins sister who had been granted Perkins' power 
of attorney, testified that she wrote a letter to Bear River and instructed Bear 
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River not to pay any contractors, including First General Services. Record, Id. 
Perkins suggestion at page 14 of her brief that First General Services has 
mislead this Court in its citation to that record is absurd. 
4. In ruling on the post-trial motions Judge Wilkinson stated on the 
record that he would have would have decided this case differently. Record, 
5158-5160. The information provided to this Court in footnote 5 of First 
General Services' initial brief illustrates that the trial judge had a potential 
conflict of interest and bias favoring Ms. Perkins' which would explain his 
disagreement with the jury's verdict and may explain his irrational, arbitrary 
and improper reduction in attorney's fees to First General Services. The very 
appearance of a conflict should properly be considered by this Court as a 
factor in reviewing the correctness of Judge Wilkinson's decision on the 
reduction of the Jury's award of attorney's fees to First General Services. 
5. In paragraph 4 of her statement of facts, Perkins admits that the 
question of attorney's fees to be awarded to the prevailing party under the 
Perkins/First General Services' contract should be submitted to the jury. 
Accordingly, she cannot assert in good faith assert that the rule of Goldberg 
v. Jay Timmons & Associates, 896 P.2d 124, 266 Utah Adv. Rpts. 8 (Utah App. 
1995) does not apply in this case to compel this Court to reinstate the jury's 
award of fees to First General Services for the reasons set forth below. 
6. Perkins conveniently omits mention at paragraph 9 of her 
statement of facts that the question by Mr. Bostwick regarding the fire at the 
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Hillsden residence was only in connection with his examination of Ms. Perkins 
regarding her experience in hiring contractors, and whether she had ever 
requested a payment bond from any contractor. Mr. Bostwick did not even 
attempt to discuss who started the Hillsden fire and there was no indication 
in Mr. Bostwick's questions nor in Ms. Perkins1 answers that would indicate 
that Ms. Perkins had in fact started the fire at her Hillsden residence. Record, 
3172-3176. Ms. Perkins successfully sued the contractor on the Hillsden 
home for damages in a lawsuit tried without a jury to Judge Wilkinson. Ms. 
Perkins did not request a payment bond from that contractor. Subsequent to 
the termination of First General Services' contract on the home in Murray, 
Perkins hired CPH Restoration, Inc., to replace First General Services and with 
whom Perkins had no previous experience. Notwithstanding her dispute with 
the contractor on the Hillsden fire and her alleged bad experience with First 
General Services, Perkins did not request CPH to provide a payment bond. 
Later CPH left the project and Perkins hired Leo Thorup to complete the 
restoration work on the Murray home. Perkins did not require a payment 
bond of Leo Thorup. Moreover, prior to the subject fire in May of 1990, 
Perkins had another fire at the Murray residence involving a storage shed 
located by the rear of the carport. In connection with that fire she contracted 
with Leavitt Restoration to perform restoration work. Ms. Perkins did not 
require a payment bond from Leavitt Restoration. Record, 3172-3178 and 
3891-3893. As explained in argument below, those facts are probative of the 
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question of whether Perkins requested a payment bond from First General 
Services as asserted in her counterclaim. At a minimum those facts bore 
directly on Perkins' credibility and were properly admitted in evidence. 
7. Mr. Bostwlck's statements to the jury illustrating that the fallacy 
of Perkins' assertion that she required a payment bond from First General 
Services as a condition of contracting on the Murray home, even though she 
never requested a contractor bond either before or after her relationship with 
First General Services were proper argument to the jury and were not unduly 
prejudicial to Perkins under the circumstances of this case. 
B. ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT UNDER THE CASE OF 
GOLDBERG V, JAY TIMMONS & ASSOCIATES, 896 P.2d 124 (UTAH 
APR 1995). 
1. At the beginning of the trial, counsel for First General Services 
attempted to have the issue of attorney's fees submitted to the court for 
determination after the jury reached the issue of liability. However, counsel 
for Perkins refused at that time. Record, 5286. 
2. Despite First General Services' efforts to have the issue of 
attorney's fees submitted to the court after determination by the jury of the 
issue of liability, Perkins required that the issue be submitted to the jury for 
determination. Further, Judge Wilkinson instructed the jury as to his 
intention to submit the issue of attorney's fees to the jury. Record, 4 8 2 1 -
4822. 
3. First General Services put on evidence of its attorney's fees 
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incurred through the second day of trial as required by Perkins. Record, 
4819-4842. 
4. Although Perkins had required First General Services to submit 
its attorney's fees to the jury, she attempted to have the quantum of her 
attorney's fees stipulated to. Bear River and Perkins agreed to the amount of 
their respective attorney's fees which were being claimed. However, since 
Perkins insisted that the quantum of First General Services' attorney's fees be 
submitted to the jury, First General Services insisted that Perkins put on her 
evidence as to attorney's fees and submit the issue to the jury. Record, 3993-
4001, 4013-4016 and 4239. 
5. As did First General Services, Perkins had her counsel testify with 
as to the issue of her attorney's fees regarding the First General Services 
portion of the case. That evidence was required specifically so the jury could 
determine the liability for and quantum of attorney's fees. Record, 4239-4251. 
6. Perkins drafted the Special Verdict Form which requests the jury 
to specifically find the amount of attorney's fees to be granted to either First 
General Services or to Perkins depending upon the jury's determination of 
liability. Record, 1489-1494. 
7. At the hearing on Per kin's objection to the form of judgment 
proposed by First General Services, Judge Wilkinson instructed counsel to 
prepare a Judgment which conformed to the jury verdict in every respect, 
including the amount of attorney's fees awarded by the jury to First General 
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Service. Record, 5108. 
8. At no time during the trial or during the post-trial motions did 
Perkins challenge the jury's award of attorney's fees to First General Services 
on the basis that the attorney's fees should have been determined by the court 
rather than the jury. Rather, Perkin's claim was that the fees were not 
supported by substantial evidence. Record, 1617-1644 and 1756-1772 
9. At no time during the trial nor during the post-triad motions did 
Judge Wilkinson indicate or rule that he was treating the jury's verdict as 
advisory only on the issue of attorney's fees. Judge Wilkinson asked whether 
he could arbitrarily reduce the award of attorney's fees. And, despite counsel 
for First General Services and Perkins stating that the court could not 
arbitrarily reduce the fees, Judge Wilkinson chose to do just that. Record, 
5112- 5171. 
ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLANT FIRST GENERAL SERVICES' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
APPEAL AND OPPOSITION TO PERKINS APPEAL RELATING TO THE 
ATTORNEYS FEES ISSUES. 
(I) The Jury s verdict is binding on the parties as to attorney's 
fees. The court below abused its discretion in granting, in 
part, Perkins' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
On June 1, 1995, this Court announced its decision in Goldberg v. Jay 
Timmons & Associates, 896 P.2d 124, 266 Utah Adv. Rpts. 8 (Utah App. 1995). 
In Goldberg, the plaintiffs sued the defendants alleging that defendants had 
breached certain restrictive covenants in constructing their home on a lot in 
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Deer Valley, Utah. The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief. The 
case, including the plaintiffs' claim for an injunction were tried to a jury by 
agreement of the parties. The jury found that no violation of the restrictive 
covenants had occurred and did not reach the issue of relief to be afforded the 
plaintiff. In its post-trial motions, plaintiff argued for the first time that 
because the case concerned only equitable issues, the jury had served in an 
advisory capacity only and that the trial court was free to disregard the verdict 
and enter its own findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court 
accepted the plaintiffs argument as to the advisory nature of the verdict and 
entered judgment for plaintiffs notwithstanding the verdict, and granted the 
requested injunctive relief. The sole issue before this Court on appeal in 
Goldberg was whether the trial court erred in designating the jury's verdict as 
advisory and ruling contrary to that verdict. This Court determined that such 
a question was one of law which turns on the interpretation of Rule 39(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which is reviewed for correctness. In 
Goldberg, upon facts not materially distinguishable from the present case, this 
Court held that the trial court incorrectly deemed the jury's verdict advisory 
and non binding, and ordered the jury's verdict reinstated. 
In that decision, this Court, citing Utah Supreme Court authority, stated 
in pertinent part as follows: 
[i]n actions not triable by right by a juryU the court . . . with the 
consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has 
the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right, [citations 
omitted] 
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In Goldberg, the following facts were persuasive to this Court, all of 
which and more are present in the case at bar: 
1. Both parties stipulated to a jury trial without limiting their 
stipulation to reserve any particular claims for trial to the bench. 
2. The trial court did not upon its own motion or initiative find that 
a right of trial by jury did not exist prior to the trial. 
3. The proceedings went forward as if the entire case were being 
tried by jury as a matter of right. 
4. Certain jury instructions read: "It is your exclusive province to 
determine the facts in the case, and to consider and weigh the 
evidence for that purpose," and remind the jury again "You are the 
exclusive judge of the facts." 
5. After the jury verdict was read, the trial court instructed defense 
counsel to prepare an order consistent with the jury's verdict 
against plaintiffs. 
6. At no time did counsel or the court seek to limit the jury 
instructions or the judgment order to only the legal claims nor did 
they express anything inconsistent with recognition that the 
equitable claims were being reserved for final determination by the 
court. Record, 1461-1462. 
7. The first suggestion from the court that the jury verdict was not 
binding was in a minute entry responding to plaintiffs' and 
defendants' post-trial memoranda. 
This Court considered item 3 to be more important in comparison to 
some of the others. 266 Utah Adv. Rpts. at 9. 
Under the circumstances in Goldberg, this Court concluded that if the 
trial court had intended of its own initiative to use the jury's verdict as 
advisory as provided under Rule 39 of the U.R.C.P., then the court should 
have notified the paries before the trial began. 266 Utah Adv. Rpts. at 10. The 
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reason for this rule is clear and unmistakable. As indicated in authorities 
cited by this Court in Goldberg, it would be unfair and inequitable to permit 
a party to wait and see what the jury's verdict will be before making 
application to the court to employ an advisory jury. That rule announced in 
Goldberg applies directly in the present case. 
In the present case the following facts demonstrate that the jury's verdict 
was not advisory as to attorney's fees to be awarded to First General Services 
and should be reinstated: 
1. Like claims for injunctive relief, an award of attorney's fees is a 
determination equitable in nature and is generally left to the 
discretion of the trial court. See e.g., Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). 
2. Perkins, through her counsel, insisted that the issue of First 
General's attorney's fees be submitted to the jury on the testimony 
of Darrel Bostwick and the other parties so stipulated. Record, 
3476-3497, 3938-3939, 3993-4001, 4013-4015, 4125, 4239-
4252, and 5286-5287; Perkins' Brief at 15. 
3. The court permitted the issue of First General Services' recovery 
of attorney's fees to be submitted to the jury in accordance with 
Perkins' demand and made no statement, and provided no notice 
at the time it decided to allow submission of the issue to the jury 
that the jury's verdict would be considered only advisory on the 
issue of attorney's fees between First General Services and 
Perkins. Record, 3476-3497, 3938-3939, 3993-4001, 4013-
4015, 4125, 4239-4252, and 5286-5287. 
4. Following the instructions of the court to submit the attorney's fee 
issue to the to the jury, the proceedings went forward as if the 
entire case were being tried by jury as a matter of right. Id., Jury 
Instruction No. 38 (Record, 1461), and Jury Instruction No. 39 
(Record, 1462). 
5. Following the close of the evidence, the jury was instructed 
concerning the determination of reasonable attorney's fees. 
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Record, 1420-1488. 
6. Perkins' prepared the special verdict form which provided for 
specific findings as to attorney's fees to be awarded between 
Perkins and First General Services which form was adopted by 
order of the court without any change as to the pertinent 
provisions. Record, 1411-1419 and 1489-1494. 
7. There was no mention or suggestion by the trial court that it 
intended to use the jury's verdict as to fees awarded to First 
General as advisory only, even through the post-trial motions. 
Record, 5161. 
8. It is only now, on appeal, that Ms. Perkins attempts to support 
the trial court's arbitrary reduction of the jury award on the basis 
that the attorney's fees are solely the provence of the court. 
As this Court ruled in Goldberg, so should it rule in the present case. 
If the court below had intended to use the jury's verdict regarding attorney's 
fees awarded to First General Services as merely advisory, then the court 
should have notified the parties of is intent before Mr. Bostwick took the 
witness stand at the close of First General's case-in-chief. The court below 
had no such intent. Most importantly the trial court did not notify the parties 
as this Court has required. Thus, the court below abused its discretion when 
it granted Perkins' Motion for Judgment N.O.V., in part, to reduce the jury's 
award of attorney's fees to First General Services. 
Because all of the appropriate elements are present in this case, this 
Court should reverse the lower court's order to grant Perkins' Motion for 
Judgment N.O.V. in part, and remand to the court below with instructions to 
reinstate the entire jury verdict awarding First General Services attorney's fee 
in the amount of $52,522.53 through the second day of trial, plus post-
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judgment interest thereon. 
(II) First General Services was not required to apportion its claim 
for attorney's fees relating to defense of Perkins1 
counterclaims because each of her claims is inseparably 
related to First General Services' principal claims for breach 
of contract and mechanic's lien foreclosure, to both of which 
attorney's fees provisions apply. 
Ms. Perkins' argument that First General Services cannot recover any 
attorney's fees because First General Services failed in its proof to apportion 
its attorney's fee claims between its affirmative claims and Perkins' 
counterclaims is without merit under the very case decisions which she cites 
to this Court. 
For example, Perkins relies on the seminal Utah Supreme Court decision 
in Stubbs v. Hemmert 562 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977).1 In Stubbs, defendant 
contracted to purchase real property (including a building), and provided 
plaintiff with a promissory note and mortgage to secure payment of the 
purchase price. In connection with the sale, the parties had executed an 
earnest money and exchange agreement which provided that the seller 
(plaintiff) could remove all equipment and shelving from the building except 
1
 In each of the other Utah cases cited by Perkins for the proposition 
that a party seeking fees for defending against a counterclaim must 
apportion its fees to each such claim, the court in turn cites Stubbs as a 
principal basis for its decision relating to recovery of attorney's fees. See 
e.g. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992); Utah Farm 
Production Credit Ass's v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981); Imperial-Yuma 
Production Ass'n v. Hunter, 609 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1980); and Nelson v. 
Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978). Like Stubbs, Each of those cases is 
materially distinguishable from the present case on its facts. 
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two walk-in coolers with their cooling equipment. The plaintiff sued to collect 
on the promissory note and to foreclose the mortgage. The defendant asserted 
a counterclaim for breach of the earnest money and exchange agreement. All 
claims and issues were resolved prior to trial except as to defendant's 
counterclaim and the amount of attorney's fees allowable to plaintiff in 
connection with its foreclosure action. The trial court entered judgment for 
defendant on his counterclaim, and awarded attorney's fees to plaintiff 
incurred in connection with the foreclosure claim. Plaintiff appealed seeking, 
inter alia., additional attorney's fees incurred in defending against the 
counterclaim. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the award of attorney's fees relating to 
the foreclosure action, but dismissed the appeal for additional fees incurred 
in defending against the counterclaim. In so ruling the Court stated as 
follows: 
The plaintiff was not successful in his defense of the 
counterclaim and that counterclaim did not relate to 
collecting the note nor the foreclosure of the property. We 
see, therefore, no error in this case in the amount which 
the Court awarded for attorney's fees to plaintiff. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Perkins1 suggestion, that in all cases where the contract for recovery of 
attorney's fees does not specifically address the defense of the opponent's 
counterclaim(s) the claimant must apportion fees between the principal claim 
and the defense of counterclaim(s), is incorrect and misleading. In essence, 
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if the counterclaim has the effect of creating an offset to the principle claim, 
apportionment may be required. However, if the counterclaim has the effect 
of defeating the principle claim, apportionment should not be required. 
In each of the cases cited by Perkins in support of that theory, there was 
either some type of collateral agreement which was the basis for the 
counterclaim, the fee provision included fees for defense of counterclaims, or 
the counterclaim was otherwise totally unrelated to the fee claimant's principal 
claim. For example, in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (1992), the 
Mall sued to regain possession of real property from a hold-over tenant under 
a written lease agreement providing for recovery of fees in the event the Mall 
had to sue to evict. The defendant counterclaimed, asserting that the Mall had 
breached a separate oral promise, and for declaratory judgment as to the 
amount of rent due. The Court determined that the counterclaims were not 
related to the claim to regain possession of the premises. Because the Mall 
had not apportioned its evidence of fees between the claim to regain possession 
and the defense of the unrelated counterclaims, the trial court's fee award was 
vacated. 
In Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981), the 
plaintiff had loaned the defendant money to finance the operation of his 
business in consideration of the defendant having provided a promissory note 
and security interest in real and personal property. Later, the parties made 
a separate loan agreement under which the lender failed to provide funding as 
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agreed. The lender sued to foreclose the first note and security interest. The 
borrower counterclaimed for damages stemming from the lender's failure to 
fund the loan under the second agreement. The trial court entered judgment 
for plaintiff on its foreclosure action subject to a set-off of damages stemming 
from the lender's breach of the second loan agreement. The plaintiff appealed 
asserting that the court erred by allowing defendant to set-off damages against 
the lender's judgment, and by failing to award attorney's fees to the lender. 
Specifically relying on its decision in Stubbs, the court in Cox concluded that 
the counterclaim under the second loan agreement was unrelated to the 
foreclosure action so that the lender was required to apportion its proof of 
attorney's fees between its principal claim and defense of defendant's 
counterclaim. Because the lender had failed to apportion its fees, the trial 
court's denial of any attorney's fees to the lender was affirmed. 
In Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978), the parties entered into 
a written agreement for the sale of certain business assets. In connection with 
payments of the sale price, the buyer issued 57 promissory notes to seller, 
each representing an instalment of the purchase price. Each note provided for 
recovery of "all costs of collection including a reasonable attorney's fees." The 
buyer sued for declaratory relief as to the validity of the contract for sale, for 
modification of the contract to include certain oral covenants made during 
negotiations, for damages for breach of the contract, and for breach of 
subsequent oral contracts. The seller counterclaimed seeking judgment to 
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accelerate payments under the written contract due to default of the buyer. 
The court concluded that the paries intended the notes to pay and extinguish 
the obligations under the contract and that the acceleration clause and the 
buyer's guarantee clause under the contract were superseded and 
extinguished by the notes. That ruling was affirmed on appeal. With respect 
to attorney's fees, the Supreme Court found that the claims on the underlying 
contract were unrelated to seller's claims to recover under the Notes. Because 
the seller failed to provide evidence as to what portion of its fees were incurred 
in connection with the claim on the notes and which portion related to the 
acceleration claim under the contract, defendant was not entitled to recover 
attorney's fees. 
Contrast the foregoing cases with Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance 
Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah App. 1993), also cited by Perkins in the 
present case. In Ross, plaintiff leasing company attempted a hostile takeover 
of Equitable by attempting to purchase the stock owned by Mr. Ross. The 
CEO and president of Equitable opposed the attempted sale of stock. After 
extended negotiations, the parties resolved their dispute when the selling 
group agreed to sell their stock to Equitable in exchange for cash and 
Equitable preferred stock convertible to case. Equitable prepared a form of 
agreement and sent it to the selling group making the offer of settlement 
contingent on acceptance of their form of agreement. The selling group 
rejected the form of agreement, and returned instead its own written offer to 
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Equitable. Equitable signed the agreement and sent it back to the sellers, 
when it was then signed by the sellers. The signed agreement provided for the 
recovery by the prevailing party any and all attorney's fees incurred in defense 
or pursuit of any action for breach of the agreement. When the time came for 
the sellers to endorse and transfer the stock, Mr. Ross refused which led to the 
lawsuit filed by Equitable. In that case Ross counterclaimed seeking 
rescission of the agreement. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Equitable and 
awarded attorney's fees to Equitable under the contract. The summary 
judgment and award of fees were affirmed by this Court on appeal. In 
affirming the judgment and awarding of attorney's fees this Court did not 
reach the issue of whether the counterclaim was related or not related to the 
prevailing party's principal claims because of the specific language of the fee 
provision. It appears from the facts, however, that the counterclaim was 
directly related to the enforceability of the contract and the plaintiffs rights to 
recover damages for its breach. Under the circumstances of Ross, 
apportionment of fees between principal claims and counterclaims was not 
required under the rule of Stubbs v. Hemmert. What is clear from these 
authorities is that the merits of Perkins' argument that First General Services 
is entitled to no fees because it failed to apportion, or alternatively that this 
case should be remanded for a new trial regarding First General Services' 
attorney's fees turns on the legal question of whether Perkins' counterclaims 
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were related to the principal claims of First General Services such that proof 
of apportionment of fees was not required by First General Services. The 
counterclaims of Ms. Perkins arose from the same set of operative facts and 
were inseparably connected and related to First General Services' principal 
claims so that no proof of apportionment was required. Since there were 
attorney's fees provisions in both the contract and in the mechanic's lien 
statute, no apportionment is necessary. The trial court so ruled and this 
Court should affirm that ruling. Record, 5162. 
Ms. Perkins argument relating to her counterclaims in this case is 
misleading. In the present case, First General Services sued Perkins for 
breach of contract arising from the access and authorization card, and to 
foreclose its mechanic's lien under Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18. In 
response to those claims, Perkins originally counterclaimed against First 
General Services claiming (1) breach of contract arising from the access and 
authorization card; (2) fraud and deceit; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) 
slander of title; (5) conversion; (6) unjust enrichment; and (7) constructive 
trust. Record, 37-48. Thereafter, Perkins amended her counterclaim to 
eliminate her claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust, 
and to include a demand for a jury trial not earlier made in the original 
counterclaim and third-party complaint. Record, 572-591. Contrary to the 
assertions in Perkins' initial brief to this Court, Perkins' counterclaims for 
conversion, unjust enrichment and constructive trust were eliminated from 
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this case by Perkins early on and are of no consequence in this Court on 
appeal. 
a. Counterclaim for Breach of Contract. 
In this case First General Services bore the burden of proving that it had 
a contract with Perkins, what the material terms of that contract were, that it 
performed as required under the contract, and that Perkins breached the 
contract by failing to make payment to First General Services in the amount 
of $10,658.47. In her counterclaim on the contract, Perkins was required to 
prove that she had a contract with First General Services, what the material 
terms of that contract were, that she performed as required under the 
contract, that First General Services failed to perform as required contract 
which failure of performance resulted in damages to Perkins. 
In her amended counterclaim for breach of contract, Perkins alleges as 
follows: 
1. Perkins entered into a contract with First General Services under 
which First General Services was to perform certain cleaning, 
remodeling and renovation work to repair and restore Perkins' 
property which had been damaged by fire. 
2. First General Services failed to perform the terms of the contract. 
First General Services performed shoddy and negligent repair, 
restoration and cleaning work throughout the property 
(unacceptable work results). 
3. First General Services breached the contract by not completing 
the work in a workmanlike manner by July 1, 1990 as promised. 
4. First General Services breach of the contract caused Perkins' to 
incur damages in the amount of $40,000 to properly complete the 
contract work. 
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Record, 580-581. 
It was undisputed at trial that there arose a contract between Perkins 
and First General Services under the access and authorization card prepared 
by First General Services and signed by Perkins. The dispute centered upon 
the terms of the contract relating to: (1) First General Services' obligation to 
provide a bid to Perkins within 3 days; (2) First General Services' obligation to 
provide a payment bond; and (3) the date on which the work was to be 
completed, and upon whether First General Services performed the appropriate 
quality and quantity of work required by the contract. Given that dispute on 
the contract, the facts required to be proved by First General Services to 
prevail on is claim and those required to meet Perkins' counterclaim cannot 
be meaningfully separated. The facts relating to the counterclaim are part and 
parcel of, and inseparably connected to, First General Services' principal claim 
under the contract. An apportionment of attorney's fees incurred in opposing 
the breach of contract counterclaim is impossible as a practical matter, and 
is not required in this case in any event under the rule of Stubbs because the 
counterclaim is related to the principal claim. 
b. Counterclaim for Fraudulent Misrepresentation. 
The essence of Perkins' counterclaim for fraud is based upon terms that 
Perkins claims were included as part of the contract. Perkins alleges that First 
General Services would provide a payment bond in connection with the work 
it proposed on Perkins' home. In this counterclaim, Perkins asserted that she 
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would not have entered into the contract had she known no bond would be 
provided as part of the contract. Record, 581-582. In her prayer for relief 
Perkins' sought compensatory damages sufficient to discharge the liens of 
subcontractors and for punitive damages of $30,000. Record, 589. The issue 
was First General Services' alleged failure to provide a payment bond as 
promised under the contract. That issue is inseparably connected and related 
to whether First General Services performed under the contract so as to be 
entitled to damages stemming from Perkins' breach. The substance of the 
fraud claim cannot be meaningfully separated from the contract claim for 
purposes of apportioning attorney's fees since the duty for which Perkins 
claims a breach arises as part of the contract as she alleges it. Perkins' breach 
of contract and fraud claims are both based upon the payment bond issue. 
The jury found that a payment bond was not required by the contract and, 
therefore, there was no duty upon which to base a claim for fraud. For the 
same reasons as with Perkins' breach of contract counterclaim, no 
apportionment of fees relating to the fraud claim is required under the rule of 
Stubbs. The fraud claim is part and parcel of the underlying contract dispute. 
c. Counterclaim for Negligent Misrepresentation. 
As with the fraud claim, Perkins' negligent misrepresentation claim is 
not materially distinguishable from her breach of contract claim. In her claim 
for negligent misrepresentation, Perkins alleges that First General Services 
misrepresented that: (1) it would provide a payment bond; (2) all work would 
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be completed by July 1, 1990; (3) First General Services was competent to 
perform the work; (4) First General Services would submit a bid within 3 days; 
and (5) the access and authorization card would permit First General Services 
to begin removing debris but not to undertake substantive repair work.2 
Record, 582-583. As with the fraud claim, the elements which Perkins claims 
were negligently misrepresented were elements which Perkins alleged were part 
of the contract between First General Services and Perkins. In order to prevail 
on its own breach of contract claim and defeat Perkins' breach of contract 
claim, First General Services had to convince the jury that the alleged 
misrepresentations were in fact not part of the contract terms. 
Each of the subjects of this counterclaim were also the subjects of 
proving the terms of the contract between First General Services and Perkins. 
Proof of the terms of the contract was part and parcel of First General Services' 
principal contract claim and of the proof needed to meet Perkins' contract 
claim. Effort expended and fees incurred to meet the negligent 
misrepresentation counterclaim is the same as for proving First General 
Services' own contract claim and cannot be meaningfully separated. Under 
the rule of Stubbs, because of the relationship of the negligent 
misrepresentation claim to the contract claims, no apportionment as to 
attorney's fees was required. 
2
 Alleged misrepresentation (5) is inconsistent on its face with 
Perkins' allegation that she had a contract with First General Services to 
perform the substantive work on the property. 
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d. Counterclaim for Slander of Title. 
The essence of Perkins' slander of title claim is that First General 
Services was not entitled to file or maintain a mechanic's lien because it had 
been overcompensated for the work actually performed. Record, 584-585. 
In any case wherein a contractor sues to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the 
lien succeeds or fail depending in large part on whether the contractor is 
successful in proving the reasonable value of the work that was performed, the 
performance under the contract, and that payment has not been made for the 
work performed and/or materials provided. A claim for slander of title of 
necessity fails if the contractor proves he performed under the contract and 
has not been paid the reasonable value of the labor and materials provided as 
part of the improvement of the property. Thus, the proof required of First 
General Services to foreclose the mechanic's lien, automatically disposes of 
Perkins' slander of title counterclaim. No additional or separate proof was 
required of First General Services in order to defend against the counterclaim 
for slander of title. Because of the close relationship and interdependence 
between the mechanic's lien foreclosure claim and the slander of title 
counterclaim, no apportionment of attorney's fees is required of First General 
Services under the rule of Stubbs. 
The proof of facts relating to Perkins' various counterclaims was 
inseparably connected and related to proof of First General Services principal 
claims for breach of contract and mechanic's lien foreclosure. Under the 
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circumstances of this case, no evidence as to apportionment of attorney's fees 
was required of First General Services. First General Services is entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorney's fee under both the contract and the mechanic's 
lien statute, including the full amount of the jury's award plus additional fees 
incurred after the second day of trial as was stipulated to by counsel and 
approved by the court below during the trial of the case. 
(Ill) The court below abused its discretion by ignoring the Jury's 
verdict as set forth above, and by failing to award any fees to 
First General Services since the second day of trial. 
For the reasons set forth in part I of this argument set forth above, it 
was clear error and an abuse of discretion for the court to treat the jury's 
verdict as to attorney's fees recoverable by First General Services against 
Perkins as advisory only. The jury's verdict as to award of attorney's fees was 
and is binding on the parties under the circumstances of this case, is 
supported by substantial evidence, and should be reinstated in this case. 
Similarly, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to award 
any attorney's to First General Services after the second day of trial for the 
reasons set forth in First General Services initial brief. Perkins' argument to 
the contrary is without merit under the facts of the case and the controlling 
authorities. 
First General Services reserved the right to supplement its request for 
attorney's fees by affidavit. All counsel stipulated to that reservation of right. 
And, most importantly, the trial court approved the reservation and the 
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stipulation relating to supplemental request for attorney's fees. Record, 4842. 
Failure to allow First General Services to supplement its attorney's fees request 
by way of affidavit was contrary to the trial court's own ruling, is patently 
unfair, and is an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
(IV) The court below abused its discretion when it ordered First 
General Services to pay attorney's fees incurred by Frampton 
in foreclosing Frampton's mechanic's lien. 
This Court's decision in Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990), 
upon which Perkins' relies in its argument supporting the judgment on 
Frampton's attorney's fees is materially distinguishable from this case on its 
facts, and is therefore inapposite to the disposition of the present appeal. 
Specifically, Hoth did not involve or contemplate the effect of an owner's claim 
of negligence against the subcontractor in the performance of the subcontract 
work upon the obligation of the contractor to make final payment to the 
subcontractor or to indemnify the owner for attorney's fees incurred by the 
subcontractor to foreclose its lien in the face of the negligence claim. In the 
present case, although Frampton's affirmative claim was relatively small, 
Perkins asserted a negligence claim against Frampton which exceeded 
$10,000. Had Perkins not asserted the negligence claim, the Frampton claim 
would have been paid by First General Services and consolidated with First 
General Services' lien as was done with the Butterfield Lumber lien. Under the 
circumstances, Perkins acted at her peril in connection with payment of 
attorney's fees to foreclose Frampton's lien when she asserted her 
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unmeritorious claim of negligence. No duty to indemnify Perkins for 
Frampton's fees may properly be visited upon First General Services under the 
circumstances of this case. 
The Utah mechanic's lien statute states that attorney's fees in the case 
of a subcontractor's lien should be apportioned according to the right of the 
case. Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-17 . First General prevailed on all of the 
claims between it and Perkins. First General Services did not dispute the 
validity of Frampton's mechanic's lien but defended on the basis that it could 
not determine the validity of Perkins' negligence claim against Frampton. 
Frampton proved its mechanic's lien and thereafter successfully defeated 
Perkins' negligence claim. Under the circumstances, it was an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion to require First General to indemnify Perkins for 
Frampton's attorney's fees incurred in pursuing its mechanic's lien. The "right 
of the case" demands that Perkins be responsible to pay the attorney's fees 
incurred by Frampton as a result of her assertion of an unmeritorious 
negligence claim against Frampton. 
For these reasons and those set forth in First General Services' initial 
brief, the judgment ordering First General Services to indemnify Perkins and 
to pay attorney's fees incurred by Frampton to foreclose its lien should be 
vacated by this Court. 
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B. RESPONSE TO PERKINS' INITIAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF HER 
APPEAL. 
(I) Evidence of the Hillsden fire was relevant to First General 
Services claims and the probative value of the Hillsden fire 
evidence outweighs any prejudicial impact of that evidence so 
that admission was proper and required under Ride 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Ms. Perkins' counterclaims for breach of contract, fraud, and negligent 
misrepresentation all rely on her assertion that First General Services had 
promised to provide a payment bond in connection with its work on the 
Murray home, and then failed to provide the bond, causing subcontractor liens 
to be filed against Perkins' home. That assertion, if true, was potentially 
dispositive of both First General Services' claims for breach of contract and 
lien foreclosure, as well as the corollary claims alleged by Ms. Perkins. 
Accordingly, all competent evidence probative of whether a bond was promised 
by First General Services was crucial to the proper disposition of the case 
between First General Services and Zandra Perkins under Rule 401 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
During First General Services' case-in-chief, Eugene Peterson, President 
of First General Services who contracted with Perkins, testified that Ms. 
Perkins never spoke to him about providing a payment bond and never 
required a bond to be provided. He further testified that he did not promise 
or otherwise represent to Perkins or anyone that First General Services would 
provide a payment bond. Record, 2861-2866. As a result of Mr. Peterson's 
testimony, Perkins' assertion regarding a promise to provide a bond was 
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reduced to a simple credibility contest between she and Mr. Peterson. 
Accordingly, all competent evidence probative of Ms. Perkins' credibility on the 
bond issue was admissible under Rule 401. 
During her cross-examination by counsel for First General Services 
concerning the bond issue, Perkins' was asked leading questions to confirm 
that (1) she had experienced a fire at her Hillsden residence. (2) that she had 
hired a restoration contractor to performed restoration work in connection with 
that fire; (3) that she had not required a bond from that contractor; and (4) 
that she had experienced problems with the first contractor which led to a 
lawsuit. No other evidence was adduced by First General Services from Ms. 
Perkins concerning the Hillsden fire. Record. 3172-3178. 
In that same line of questioning. Ms. Perkins also confirmed that earlier 
in 1990 she had also experienced a previous fire at her Murray home which 
involved the storage shed located by the carport. In connection with that fire 
she contracted with a restoration contractor to perform repair and replacement 
work, and did not require the contractor to provide a payment bond. Perkins 
then also testified that after terminating First General Services from the 
Murray home project at the end of July 1990. she hired a second and later a 
third contractor to finish the work. And, despite the alleged egregious 
problems encountered with First General Services. Ms. Perkins did not require 
or obtain a payment bond from either of the subsequent contractors who 
worked on the Murray home. Obviously, the fact that with all the contractors 
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hired on all of these fires she claims to have only required a payment bond 
from First General Services is probative of the credibility of her claim regarding 
the payment bond. 
Interestingly, Perkins does not challenge the admissibility of evidence 
regarding her failure to request a bond on for the storage shed fire, or as to the 
two subsequent contractors on the Murray house fire. That suggests that 
Perkins does not seriously contest the admissibility of the fact that she had a 
previous fire at her Hillsden residence. Her challenge is essentially only that 
evidence that she set the Hillsden fire is unduly prejudicial. First General 
Services did not evince or discuss in any way the fact that she set the Hillsden 
fire. As between First General Services and Perkins, that claim cannot stand 
because no such evidence was admitted in connection with the First General 
Services case. The limited evidence of the Hillsden fire as elicited by First 
General Services is clearly relevant and is not unduly prejudicial to Ms. 
Perkins. 
To the extent Ms. Perkins claims the evidence as to who set the Hillsden 
fire admitted in connection with Bear River's defense contaminates the entire 
case regardless of who elicited the evidence is likewise groundless. This 
lawsuit began as essentially an uncomplicated contract /mechanic's lien 
dispute between Perkins and First General Services. Perkins dramatically 
complicated and escalated the case when she chose to join her insurance 
company, Bear River, as a third-party defendant, and to seek damages for bad 
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faith adjustment of her claim by Bear River. She should not be permitted to 
avoid the natural consequences of her choice to broaden and escalate the 
litigation beyond its original scope. When she joined Bear River in this 
lawsuit, she made the choice to air all of the disputes and issues relating to 
those disputes before the jury. In doing so, Perkins acted at her own risk that 
some prejudicial fact raised in the case against Bear River might also persuade 
the jury against her in her case against First General Services. 
Further, with regard to Bear River's defense, the fact that Ms. Perkins 
set the Hillsden fire, that Bear River knew such fact, and that knowledge did 
not affect the way Bear River adjusted the claim was critical to Bear River's 
case. It evinces not only a lack of bad faith on the part of the insurance 
company but when coupled with the constant misleading and false claims 
submitted by Perkins and Bear River's payment of over $95,000 in on Perkins' 
claim is strong evidence of Bear River's good faith adjustment of Ms. Perkins' 
claim. Thus, there can be no credible claim by Ms. Perkins that the Hillsden 
fire evidence is not relevant. To deny Bear River that pivotal aspect of its 
defense would have been clear reversible error. Judge Wilkinson recognizing 
this fact repeatedly ruled that as long as Perkins' bad faith claim remained in 
the case, the evidence that Ms. Perkins set the Hillsden fire was admissible. 
In addition, as observed by Judge Wilkinson, such evidence had little or 
no effect. He said, "I do know that , as it came in, the impact it had on the 
Court was a lot less than this Court anticipated it would be . . . it did not have 
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any impact at all." The reason it had little or no impact was the careful way 
in which Bear River elicited the evidence and did not dwell on it. Accordingly 
the evidence was properly admitted by the trial court and considered by the 
jury in rendering its verdict against Ms. Perkins. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence on which Perkins' relies is a 
narrow exception to the general proposition of Rule 401 favoring the admission 
of all probative evidence, even if the evidence is particularly damming as 
against one of the litigants. The Utah Supreme Court has explained that 
evidence is only unfairly prejudicial if the evidence "has a tendency to 
influence the outcome of the trial by improper means, if it appeals to the jury's 
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or 
otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on something other than the facts 
of the case. " See e.g. Terry v. Zion's Coop. Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 
314 (Utah 1979); State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231 (Utah App. 1989). That test 
is not satisfied in this case. Thus, the exception of admissibility contained in 
Rule 403 does not apply and the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the 
Hillsden fire evidence must be affirmed. 
Further, the ruling on admissibility by Judge Wilkinson was a matter 
well within the discretion of the trial court. Moreover, this Court has long 
recognized that no such ruling ought to be disturbed on appeal unless there 
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Bartlev, supra. Both prior to the trial 
and repeatedly during the trial the court carefully considered the evidence 
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sought to be admitted, and the arguments of all parties relating to the 
admissibility of the evidence relating to the Hillsden fire. The court heard the 
very argument raised yet again by Perkins on appeal. That argument has not 
and will not attain any degree of merit merely by its constant repetition. A 
careful reading of the record of the motion in limine and the trial court's order 
on that motion will demonstrate the careful consideration given by the court 
in weighing the probative value of the evidence with its possible prejudicial 
impact. It would have been reversible error in this case only if the trial court 
had excluded all mention of the Hillsden fire as Perkins has requested. The 
admission of the evidence as allowed by the trial court was based on a careful 
balance of all competing interests and was well within the court's discretion 
under Rule 403. That ruling should be affirmed and Perkins' appeal based 
upon Rule 403 dismissed by this Court. 
(II) Admission of evidence of the Hillsden fire was not reversible 
error under the circumstances of this case because the Jury's 
verdict is supported by sufficient evidence unrelated to the 
Hillsden fire from which the jury could reasonably have 
reached its verdict. 
Zandra Perkins' assertions that the evidence admitted in this case 
relating to fire at her Hillsden home was unfairly prejudicial is fatally simplistic 
when the record is viewed as a whole. The case between First General Services 
and Zandra Perkins turned on the credibility of the witnesses. The record in 
this case is full of numerous and blatant inconsistencies on the part of Zandra 
Perkins and her supporting witnesses. From any one of those inconsistencies 
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the jury could have properly found Perkins' position to be without merit. In 
fact, the jury instruction so state to the jury. Jury Instruction No. 3, Record, 
1423 and Jury Instruction No. 5, Record, 1425. 
For example, First General Services provided evidence that on July 13, 
1990, Zandra Perkins requested First General Services to convert the existing 
carport into a garage and bill the insurance company for the expense of the 
conversion during a face-to-face meeting at her home in Murray. It was only 
after First General Services' refusal to engage in such wrongful conduct that 
Perkins and her sister Marsha Smith, who had Perkins' power of attorney, 
began to complain about the timeliness or quality of First General Services 
work. 
On direct examination, Perkins testified that she was never in Utah or 
Salt Lake City between May 31, 1990 and August 13, 1990. However, the 
Power of Attorney she executed in favor of Marsha Smith states in the Notary 
Jurat that Perkins signed the document in Salt Lake City on June 12, 1990. 
That evidence clearly raises serious doubt regarding the reliability of Perkins' 
testimony. Record, 5008-5009. Thereafter, on her direct examination and 
cross-examination, Marsha Smith, one of Ms. Perkins' key witnesses, gave 
critical testimony which was materially and inexplicably different from that 
given by Marsha Smith in her deposition. First, while attempting to 
corroborate Ms. Perkins' testimony that she was not in Salt Lake City during 
the material part of the summer of 1990. However, when confronted with her 
- 3 4 -
deposition testimony could not explain why she had testified therein that Ms. 
Perkins returned to Salt Lake City periodically. Record, 3907. In addition, the 
date Marsha Smith claimed to have met Mr. Peterson of First General Services 
was materially different. Record, 3884-3885. When confronted with her 
deposition testimony that she did not receive any magazines from Mr. Peterson 
discussing First General Services' qualifications, Marsha Smith changed her 
trial testimony. Record, 3885-3886. In her deposition and during the trial, 
Marsha Smith gave no less that five different answers regarding the time 
within which the project was to be performed. Record, 3886-3889. 
Part of the delay in processing Perkins' claim was due to many of her 
submittals to Bear River being over-reaching and in many instances materially 
false. Neither Ms. Perkins nor Marsha Smith would take responsibility for 
these portions of the claim. In fact, it showed a tremendous lack of credibility 
when during Bear River's cross-examination of Marsha Smith, she stated that 
she did not know what was included in the additional living expense claim 
because she had typed it but did not read it. Record, 3989-3992. Marsha 
Smith admitted that at least some of the costs Ms. Perkins was claiming on the 
additional living expense claim were not actually incurred. Record, 3989. 
Counsel for Perkins repeatedly elicited testimony from Ms. Perkins' 
witnesses only to have that testimony change during cross examination or 
after an object. From testimony of follow-on subcontractors testifying of 
allegedly shoddy work by First General Services when they had no knowledge 
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of what work First General Services in fact performed at the Murray home to 
statements attributed by Mr. Peterson of First General Services by Ms. Perkins' 
neighbor when the neighbor learned about such alleged statements, not from 
conversations with Mr. Peterson but from hearsay representations by Marsha 
Smith. These examples are but a small part of the evidentiary and credibility 
problems Ms. Perkins and her witnesses created for her at the trial of the case. 
By the time the trial was concluded, the jury simply could not believe Ms. 
Perkins or her witnesses. Regardless of the evidence that Ms. Perkins set the 
Hillsden fire, there was ample evidence from which the jury could have, and 
in fact did base its verdict in favor of First General Services, and Bear River. 
Thus, even if this Court were to determine that the evidence that Ms. 
Perkins set the Hillsden fire were admitted in error, such admission would be 
harmless since there are ample facts in the record to support the jury's verdict. 
In the case of State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme 
Court repeated the long-standing rule that the fact that some evidence 
perhaps should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, such errors can be harmless when there is substantial other 
evidence in the record supporting the verdict and there is no substantial 
likelihood that the outcome would have been different without the evidence 
objected to. More recently with regard to Rule 403 admissibility, the Utah 
Supreme Court cited State v. Hamilton and stated that, "Specifically, we must 
find that the ruling in favor of admissibility was beyond the limits of 
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reasonability." State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rpt. 23 (Utah 1994). 
Further, in order to make a determination of the potential prejudicial 
effect of the error claimed by Ms. Perkins, this Court "must look beyond the 
mere fact of error and consider in totality all the evidence and proceedings 
below." Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Steffensen 
v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah App. 1991), affirmed, 
862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993)). Ms. Perkins bears the burden of marshaling the 
evidence for this Court but has wholly failed in that obligation. 
Therefore, the jury verdict in favor of First General Services and against 
Zandra Perkins should be affirmed and Ms. Perkins' appeal dismissed. 
(Ill) Statements made by counsel for Bear River in the opening 
statement were not unduly prejudicial and were cured by 
special instruction to the Jury both shortly after opening 
statements and against as part of the Jury instructions. 
Initially, the claim of Zandra Perkins regarding the statements made by 
counsel for Bear River during Bear River's opening statement may appear to 
be one which does not involve Appellant First General Services. However, to 
the extent that Ms. Perkins is attempting to have the entire case remanded for 
a new trial on the basis of such statements by counsel for Bear River, First 
General Services will address the issue briefly here. 
As noted in Section B(I) above, the fact that any allegedly prejudicial 
statement was made by counsel for Bear River should be of no consequence 
to the case as between First General Services and Perkins. What was a 
straight forward and relatively small breach of contract and mechanic's lien 
- 3 7 -
case was dramatically complicated and escalated by Ms. Perkins when she 
brought the third-party complaint against Bear River for significantly larger 
amounts of money. The fact that such litigation and trial strategy failed to 
achieve its hoped for results should not form the basis for Perkins to claim 
error with regard to the case between First General Services and Perkins. 
The allegedly improper statements were made by Mr. Henry Heath 
regarding what are clearly false and fraudulent claims submitted by Perkins 
against the Bear River insurance policy for damages resulting from the subject 
fire. However, the record shows that there was nothing improper about the 
statements which were made. The term fraud was used only a handful of time 
during Mr. Heath's opening statement, and only then in relation to specific 
instances of false or overstated claims by Ms. Perkins. Record, 2837-2854. 
Only after the conclusion of Mr. Heath's opening statement did Perkins object. 
Record, 2854, 5326-5334, 2966-2977, 3110-3116, and 3216-3222. 
At that time, Judge Wilkinson reviewed the matter carefully and 
conservatively decided to prohibit Bear River from using the term "insurance 
fraud" with the Jury. The court, however, did not order Bear River to refrain 
from pointing out portions of Perkins' claim that were false. It is important to 
note that Perkins does not, not can she, assert that at least some of the claims 
submitted were false. In fact, Ms. Perkins' sister, Marsha Smith, who had her 
power of attorney, admitted during Bear River's cross examination that 
portions of the claim which she submitted were in fact false. See Record, 3989 
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as just one example. Bear River knew them to be false and, therefore, properly 
scrutinized other aspects of Ms. Perkins' claim to make sure that Ms. Perkins 
was indeed entitled to the amounts and the items she claimed. 
This problem was magnified due to the fact that Ms. Perkins had made 
a claim for replacement cost of the storage shed and certain items she asserted 
were stored therein when the shed was destroyed by a fire two months before 
the subject fire. Ms. Perkins submitted to Bear River the price quote provided 
her by Leavitt Restoration. Bear River made a joint check to Ms. Perkins and 
Leavitt Restoration for the work to replace the storage shed and its contents 
and to repair the gable end of the carport damaged by the fire. However, Ms. 
Perkins altered the check to make it appear that she was an employee of 
Leavitt Restoration and negotiated the check without Leavitt Restoration's 
signature. Ms. Perkins did not replace the storage shed and many of the items 
she claimed were in stored therein. Ms. Perkins paid Leavitt Restoration only 
a fraction of the amount of its bid to do the work and kept the remainder of 
the insurance proceeds which were paid on a replacement cost basis. 
This experience coupled with Perkins clear over reaching and false 
claims, some examples of which are discussed in Section B(II) above, was 
properly pointed out to the jury during the opening statement and during the 
evidentiary portion of the case as part of Bear River's defense of Perkins' 
claims. 
Further, if there was anything improper about the use of the work fraud 
- 3 9 -
in Bear River's opening statement, that error was timely and effectively cured 
by the trial court when the parties developed and the court read a limiting 
instruction to the Jury. Record, 3221-3222. That limiting instruction was 
also included in the Jury instructions at the end of the case. Record, 1488. 
Thus, based upon the discussion above and under the circumstances 
of the case, the use of the word fraud with regard to the claims submitted by 
Ms. Perkins was proper. Perkins failed to timely object to the references to 
fraud. Out of an abundance of caution, the trial court determined that it 
would prohibit Bear River from referring to fraud but allowed Bear River to 
show the nature and pervasive extent of the false claims and statements made 
by Ms. Perkins with regard tot the claims which she filed with Bear River as 
a result of the subject fire. Further, even if the reference by Bear River was 
improper, such error was effectively cured by instruction from the court based 
upon language developed jointly by counsel for Perkins and Bear River. That 
limiting instruction was timely read during the proceedings and again at the 
time of instructing the Jury. Therefore, Zandra Perkins' appeal based upon 
Bear River's reference to fraud is without merit and should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the facts and arguments set forth above, Appellant First 
General Services hereby requests that this Court provide the following relief: 
1. Vacate the trial court's order of September 23, 1993 granting 
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Zandra Perkins' Motion for Judgment N.O.V. and reinstate the 
jury's attorney fee award in favor of First General Services and 
against Zandra Perkins in the amount of $52,522.33 for services 
rendered through the second day of trial; 
2. Reverse the trial court's denial of First General Services' Motion 
to Supplement Award of Attorney's fees incurred after the second 
day of trial; 
3. Remand the case to the trial court with instructions to award 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred by First General Services 
during the remainder of the trial after the second day, during 
post-trial motions and on appeal in this Court according to the 
guidelines of Dixie States Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 
1988) as instructed by this Court in Quinn v. Quinn, Jr., 820 
P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992); 
4. Reverse the trial court's order that First General Services pay to 
Frampton attorney's fees incurred in connection with Frampton's 
mechanic's lien claim against Ms. Perkins and remand the case 
to the trial court with Instructions to order Ms. Perkins to pay 
attorney's fees incurred by Frampton on account of Frampton's 
mechanic's lien claim; and 
5. Deny Zandra Perkins' appeal based upon the issues of the 
Hillsden fire evidence and the reference to insurance fraud by 
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counsel for Bear River during its opening statement. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th of November, 1995. 
WALgTM> & BABCOCK 
Darrel J. B 
Jeffery R. Pr 
Attorneys for Appellant 
First General Services, Inc. 
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APPENDIX 
PERKINS; CONT CRS-EXAM BY HEATH 
TIME. 
THE COURT: SHE DID STATE IT HAD BEEN SUBMITTED 
TO BEAR RIVER, AND THE COURT WOULD EXHIBIT NO. 82. 
MR. HEATH: MAY WE SHOW IT TO THE JURY? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
Q EXHIBIT NO. 62 HAS TO DO WITH RENTAL. OF CELLULAR 
TELEPHONE; IS THAT CORRECT^ 
A YES. 
D DID YOU WHAT, HAVE YOUR SISTER'S CELLULAR TELEPHONE 
OR THE TIME SHE SPENT ON HER CELLULAR TELEPHONE'" 
A IT WAS BOTH. 
Q SO THIS IS FOR BOTH YOUR USE AND HER USE OF MARSHA S 
CELLULAR TELEPHONE: IS THAT CORRECT? 
A I DON'T KNOW WHOSE PHONE IT WAS. IT WAS A PHONE, 
MR. HEATH: YOUR HONOR, MAY WE APPROACH THE 
BENCH? I'M NEARLY FINISHED WITH THIS WITNESS. 
THE COURT: YES. 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD 
OUT OF THE HEARING 01- THE JURY:) 
MR. HEATH: YOUR HONU^, I VE BEEN TRYING TO GET 
A RESPONSE FROM MR. CAMPBt.LL AE In WHAT 1 HEY RE GOING TO DO 
REGARDING PROOF OF ATTORNEYS FLEf IN CONNECTION WITH THE BAD 
FAITH CLAIM. 1 HAVE SUGGESTED i r J OIL V BE HANDLED EITHER BY 
SUBSEQUENT HEAPING, IF" "• MEF 'E ' L ^ f .NDKvG OF BAD ^V.ITH, OR IF 
THEY'RE GOING TO PUT ON EVIDENLt i - H T T U P N L Y S FEES IN THIS 
CASE, AND I NEED TO CROSS-EXAMINE ZAKDRA PERKINS CONCERNING 
THAT, AND WE ?^\EED TO HAVE THE ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE INCURRED OR 
WHO ARE MAKING A CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES BEFORE THE COURT. 
NOW THEY HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR ATTORNEYS OR 
EVEN THEMSELVES AS TO TESTIFY ON IT. 
I SUBMIT WHAT THEY'RE TRYING TO DO IS TO PUT IT 
IN THROUGH DERK RASMUSSEN, WHICH OF COURSE WE WILL OBJECT TO. 
BUT I CAN RESERVE THAT IF THE COURT NEEDS TIME TO DISCUSS IT 
WITH COUNSEL. I DON'T WANT T O — . 
MR. CAMPBELL:- MR. HEATH TALKED TO ME ABOUT 
THIS THIS MORNING, JUDGE. AND WE WERE GOING TO COME IN TO SEE 
YOU BEFORE COURT BEGAN. I THINK WE'RE GOING TO HAVE PUT OUR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON TO SHOW THAT THEY'RE REASONABLE, AND IF MR. 
HEATH THINKS THAT HE HAS QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER THEY'RE 
REASONABLE OR NOT, THEN HE S GOING TO HAVE TO TAKE ISSUE WITH 
THEM.-
BUT I THIMI-- WE PROBABLY HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY 
OF PUTTING THEM ON, AND I'M GOING TO HAVE TO TAKE THE WITNESS 
STAND MYSELF, JUST LIKE—. 
MR. MARTINSON: CAN I INQUIRE, IS HE ASKING TO 
HAVE BROUGHT IN EVERY ONE OF THE ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE INCURRED 
FEES THAT HAVE WuRKED ON THIS" 
MRL CAMPBELL: THAT'S WHAT HE SAY'S HE S GOING 
TO HAVE: TO DO. 1 WOULDN T WAN"} TO DO "rHAT. I WOULD BE 
WILLING TO PROFFER STIMULATION -^' TO WHAT THEY WOULD SAY WITH 
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REGARD TO THEIR TIME. 
MR. BOSTWICK: NO. 
MR. HEATH: I WOULDN'T ACCEPT THAT, BECAUSE I 
THINK THERE'S A LOT OF INITIAL WORK ON THIS THAT ISN'T 
JUSTIFIED. THIS ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES CLAIM IS AN 
EXAMPLE OF THE KINDS OF PROBLEMS WHY THIS COULDN'T BE 
RESOLVED. I CAN RESERVE ATTORNEYS FEES. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I THINK YOU OUGHT TO GO. IF 
YOU'RE GOING TO ASK THEM, THIS WITNESS, WITH REGARD TO 
ATTORNEYS FEES, LET'S ASK HER. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD 
IN THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
O (BY MR. HEATH) NOW IS IT MY UNDERSTANDING THAT AS 
PART OF YOUR CLAIM, YOU'RE CLAIMING CERTAIN ATTORNEYS FEES 
HAVE BEEN INCURRED IN THIS CASE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
G WHO S THE FIRST ATTORNEY YOU RETAINED? 
A VICTOR LAWRENCE. 
Q NOW WHEN DID YOU RETAIN VICTOR LAWRENCE? 
A APPROXIMATELY OCTOBER OF 90. 
0 DID YOU RECEIVE ANY BILLS, ANY STATEMENTS FROM HIM? 
A 1 DON'T RECALL. 
0 HAVE ANY STATEMENTS FROM MR. LAWRENCE BEEN FURNISHED 
TO MR. RASMUSSEN CONCERNING MR. LAWRENCE S FEES? 
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PERKINS: CONT CRS-EXAM BY HEATH 
1 A PROBABLY JUST CANCELLED CHECKS. I DON'T RECALL. 
2 Q SO THE ONLY THING MR. RASMUSSEN WOULD HAVE 
3 PERTAINING TO MR. LAWRENCE ' S ^EES WOUi-D BE CHECKS THAT YOU MAY 
4 HAVE PAID MR. LAWRENCE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
5 A HE MAY HAVE STATEMENTS, I DON•T RECALL. 
6 D HAVE YOU FURNISHED HIM STATEMENTS? THAT'S WHAT I'M 
7 TRYING TO FIND OUT. I'M TALKING ABOUT ITEMIZED STATEMENTS SO 
S WE CAN KNOW WHAT MR. LAWRENCE DID ON YOUR BEHALF TO JUSTIFY 
9 HIS FEE. 
I MAY HAVE. 
WHEN DID YOU DO THAT. IF YOU MAY HAVE-
WHEN OTHER DOCUMENTS WEN1 OUT. 
HOW MUCH DID MP. LAWRENCE CHARGE IN FEES? 
ti,000. 
HOW MUCH WAS HE CHARGING PER HOUR? 
I BELIEVE IT WAS *15. 
AND YOU HAVE A STATEMENT SHOWING WORK THAT HE DID 
IS EACH DAY TO JUSTIFY THE HOURS HE PUT IN? 
I DON'T HAVE IT, MO. 
DID YOU EVER RECEIVE ONE? 
I BELIEVE SO. 
Q WHEN WOULD YOU HAVE RECEIVED THAT? 
A PROBABLY OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER. 
Q WHO WERE THE NEXT ATTORNEYS YOU RETAINED-

























PERKINS: CONT CRS-EXAM BY HEATH 
A '90. 
MR. HEATH: WHEN DID YOU TERMINATE MR. 
LAWRENCE"1 
A WHEN THE COMPLAINT HAD TO BE FILED, AND THAT WOULD 
HAVE BEEN IN JANUARY OF '91. 
Q WHO DID YOU HIRE AT THAT TIME? 
A THE ATTORNEYS THAT FILED THE COMPLAINT WERE HAWKINS 
& PROBASCOu 
Q AND HAVE YOU FURNISHED ANY DOCUMENTATION TO MR. 
RASMUSSEN SETTING FORTH THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS FEES FROM— 
THAT YOU WERE BILLED FROM HAWKINS i, PROBASCO? 
A I BELIEVE SO. 
Q WHAT FORM WAS THAT IN, IF YOU FURNISHED IT TO MR. 
RASMUSSEN? WERE THESE BILLS FROM HAWKINS AND PROBASCO SETTING 
FORTH THEIR HOURLY CHARGES AND THE HOURS THEY ACTUALLY WORKED 
ON YOUR CASE? 
A 1 BELIEVE SO. 
Q WHO WERE THE NEXT ATTORNEYS? 
A CAMPBELL, MAAK & SESSIONS. 
Q BY THE WAY, WHAT WAS HAWKINS ?< PROBASCO CHARGING YOU 
PER HOUR? 
A 1 BELIEVE IT WAS -J 50 OR -1-80 AN HOUR. 
0 DO YOU KNOW WHICH? 
A I'M NOT REALLY CER1A1N. 
Q WOULD IT SHOW ON THE DOCUMENTS YOU GAVE MR. 
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PER*- IUSZ corn CRS-EXAM BY HE-TM 
r AS~ JuSSEN~ 
A 1 B E L I E V E S O , YEE. 
O WHEN DID YOU HIRE CAM-BELL, MAAI- ^ SESSIONS TO 
REPLACE HAW!- INS i PROBASCO^ 
A THAT WOULD H-VC PEEfM FEB:'UAR> OP 19*2. 
P NOw "HE EASE WAS SET FOP TRIAL AT THAT TIME, WASN'T 
IT"' 
A IN FEBRUARY-
O NO, I"! WAS SET FOR TRIAL --T THE TIME THAT CAMPBELL, 
MA At ?< SESSIONS WERE HIRED; IN PACT I THiNj- IT WAS SET FOR 
A P R J L OR MAV OF ^'2, ISN T THAT CORRECT^ 
A NOT TO Mv f NOwLEDGE. 
O YOU WERE NEVER INFORMED OP THAT"' 
A I DON'T RECALL T H A ^ THAT WOULD BE THE CASE. 
O WHAT HOURLY RATE DID CAMPBELL
 s MAA*- ?- SESSIONS 
CHARGE YOU"' 
MR. CAMPBELL: THERE S GOING TO BE EVIDENCE ON 
ALL OF 1H35. AS I TOLD THE COURT, LAWRENCE IS GOING TO BE 
HERE T U M D K R U W "JO TESTIFY BPILFL- A.Lil, bur-»EFOP\ FROM THE FI^' OF 
HAWF INS & PROBASCO, AND 1 W1L: 0 U'E TESTIMONY IN CONNECTION 
WITH THIS AS WELL . IT WIL.L -. L l't I'EFl'RE THE COURT. 
MR. HEATH; 7H- ^r-F__ZM WE HAVE 1" TNESE PF ] OR 
ATTORNEYS WEL'E NEVER 3 DL ^ " ] • . ' » .1 w ' VESSEL, ^MD WE vE N d h 
HAD AN OPPuFTUMT- "0 DE; " * . n ... NJW WE P'E Vn '^  IS "PIN" 
AND WE RE GET" INC- " JT-" V" ', "* »!•" ^ A31 MINUTE 0" WUA"' 
iMir.V""RE -JUiNb i .j PC TO ~'i:.DVE~ i *••:£! F\ A' fOF-'^ LY'- FEEz>. =:U IN ANY 
EVEN-1", I M ENTITLED TC AS^ HER THE SAME 3 U E:/" I 0 \ TO "I ML C_:T 
WHAT—. 
MR* CAMPBELLr SHE CLEARL_Y KNEW THE ATTORNEYS 
FEES WERE PAR" OF THE d-AI^i OF BAD FAITH ASAINST THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY-
THE COURT: YOU MAY ASf HEP WHAT SHE'S PAID. 
Q (BY MR. HEATH) WHAT HOURLY RATE DID YOU PAY 
CAMPBELL, MAAK t, SESSIONS? 
A THERE'S ONE RATE FOR MR. CAMPBELL AND ANOTHER HOURLY 
RATE FOR MR. MARTINSON, AND 1 HONESTLY DON'T RECALL WHAT THAT 
IS. 
Q FOR EITHER ONE OF THEM? 
A I DON'T OFFHAND. 
Q HAVE YOU BEEN FURNISHED WITH A DETAILED BILL OF WHAT 
THE SERVICES WERE THEY PROVIDED? 
A YES. 
Q HAS THAT BEEN PROVIDED TO MR. RASMUSSEN? 
A I BELIEVE SO. 
MR. HEATH: YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN 
PROVIDED WITH ANY OF THESE BILLINGS. WE WOULD MAKE A REQUEST 
AT THIS TIME THAT WE BE PROVIDED WITH THAT. 
THE COURT: FINISH WITH THIS WITNESS, COUNSEL. 
Q WERE YOU AWARE OF THE FACT THAT THIS CASE WAS SET 
FOR TRIAL IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR"' 
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P E R K I N S : uQftT CRS-EXAM f.Y HEATH 
f i J f-i N Li M ft V - ]. 9 9 3 7" 
MR. HEATH: VES. 
A YES-
Q THEN IT WAS POSTPONED BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS? 
MR. CAMPBELL: WAIT A MINUTE, YOUR HONOR. 
THAT'S NOTHING TO DO WITH—THAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ANY 
ISSUE IN THIS CASE, AND COUNSEL KNOWS IT. 
THE COURT: WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO? 
MR. HEATH: WE'RE COUNTERCLAIMING WITH—. 
MR. CAMPBELL.: WITH REGARD TO THE CONTINUANCE 
OF THIS CASE? 
THE COURT: I'M GOING TO SUSTAIN, COUNSEL. I 
DON'T WANT TO GET INTO IT. 
MR. HEATH: CAN WE HAVE THE RECORD SHOW, YOUR 
HONOR, THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A CLAIM FOR DELAY, FOR ANY 
CONTINUANCES, THAT WERE NOT REQUESTED BY THE PARTIES, OTHER 
THAN MS. PERKINS' ATTORNEYS? 
THE COURT: OTHER CLAIMS FOR CONTINUANCES? 
MR. HEATH: CLAIMS AS PART OK THE BAD FAITH 
CLAIM. I BELIEVE THERE'S A CLAIM THAT BEAR RIVER HAS DELAYED 
IN MAKING PAYMENTS ON THIS CASE. 
MR. CAMPBELL: JUDGE, I TOLD THIS COURT, I T G L D 
YOUR HONOR AND THIS JURY AT THE OPENING STATEMENT, THAT THE 
BAD FAITH BREACH TOOK PLACE IN NOVEMBER 0^ 1990, NOT IN 
JANUARY Or 93. 
102 
3483 
THE CGURTs THERE WOU;_D BE NO C;_AIM. 
MR. CAMPBELL: NO CLAIM. 
THE COURT: YOU'VE GOT IT. 
MR. CAMPBELL: FOR BAD FAITH BREACH ON THE PART 
OF BEAR RIVER AFTER—I MEAN THE BREACH TOOK PuACE IN NOVEMBER, 
FIVE OR BIX MONTHS AFTER THE FIRE. 
MR. HEATH: CAN WE HAVE A STIPULATION ON THE 
RECORD, YOUR HONOR, THAT THEY'RE MAKING NO CLAIM FOR ANY BAD 
FAITH AFTER NOVEMBER OF 1990; IS THAT YOUR STIPULATION? 
MR. CAMPBELL: OUR STIPULATION IS THAT'S THE 
DATE WHEN THE BAD FAITH TOOK PLACE, YES, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. HEATH: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, WHEN YOU REACH A 
CONVENIENT POINT, WE'LL TAKE OUR NOON RECESS. 
MR. HEATH: LET'S DO IT NOW. 
THE COURT: MEMBERS OF THE JURY, AT THIS TIME 
WE WILL TAKE A RF .ISS. I AGAIN ADMONISH YOU AS YOU LEAVE THE 
COURTROOM: PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS THIS MATTER AMONG YOURSELVES 
OR WITH ANYONE YOU MAY BE TALKING TO. PLEASE RETURN TO THE 
COURTROOM TODAY BY 2:00 O'CLOCK. 
(WHEREUPON, AT THE HOUR 11': 00 NOON, THE 
PROCEEDINGS STOOD IN NOON RECESS; AFTER WHICH, 
AT THE HCUR OF 2:00 P.M., THE FOLLOWING 
PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD l\l CAMERA, OUT OF THE 
PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
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MR. CAM^BEL_LS I HAVE A MOT I fin TO MAI- E, IF IT 
PLEASE ~HE COURT., ROECR"1" CAMPBELL POR THE DE-ENI" ANT
 HND 
THIRD-PAPTV PL AI NT I-P. COMES NOW TO LANDP'A PERR INS AND MOVES 
THIS COURT POP A MISTRIAL OF* THE GROUNDS AND FO* THE REASONS 
THAI THE CROSS-E>ANIMATION B\ MR. HEATH THIS MORNING—-
THE COURT: DIDN T YOU MAI- E THIS AT THE BENCH 0 
MR. CAMPBELL: NO, I DIDN T--WELL, I DID NOT. 
I INDICATED TO THE COURT THAT I WOULD MA*E ONE, YES- THAT THE 
CONDUCT OF COUNSEL FOR BEAR RIVERS NAMELY MR. HENRY HEATH, HAS 
PREJUDICED IRREPARABLY THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE, 
AND ALONG THE LINE OF 1 HE E KAMI MA"1" 3 ON 3 
MENTIONED TO THE COURT, HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO IMPEACH THE 
EXPERT TESTIMONY O^ RASMUSSEN, WI- WAS A WITNESS NESTERDAV TO 
BE CALLED WITH REGARD TO RASMUSSEN S CONCLUSIONS. AS TO THE 
ITEMS THAT WERE IN HIS VIEW AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGE? IN OTHER 
WORDS, WITHOUT IMPEACHING AN ACTUAL EXHIBIT OF HIS. 
AND I TOLD THE COURT 1 WAS GOING TO ADDRESS 
THAT ISSUE. THERE WERE A SERIES OP QUESTIONS THAT RMN TO THAT 
ISSUE. 
AND I HAD THE UNDERSTANDING ON THE ONE HAND 
THAT THE COURT AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITH ME, BUT IN REGARD TO 
THE GUEST]ONb MR. HEATH ASfED, 1 THIN! ^HEV WERE HIGHLY 
PREJUDIC1AL AMD 1MPROPEP. 
THE SECOND ARGUMENT AND SECOND PRONG ON THE 
MOTION, YOUR HONOR, IS THAI MR. HEATH ATTEMPTED ~0 EMBARRASS 
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ME AND REQUIRED ME TO GET TO M\ PEET TO OBJECT WITH REGARD TO 
THE CONTINUANCE GRANTED BY THE COURT IN JANUARY UP TO THE 
PRESENT TIME, AND OBVIOUSLY THE IMPLICATION OP THAT WAS THAT 
THIS WAS A CONTINUATION THAT WAS CAUSED BY PERKINS, AND THAT 
WE WERE GOING TO CLAIM ATTORNEYS PEES POP THE EXPENSES 
INVOLVED WITH THE CONTINUANCE* 
AND THE PACT OP THE MATTER IS, YOUR HONOR, AS 
THE COURT KNOWS, I WAS THE ONE THAT REQUESTED THAT 
CONTINUANCE- IT WAS BASED ON A HEALTH CONDITION, A BACK-
CONDITION, THAT WOULD HAVE PROBABLY RESULTED IN ANY EVENT IN A 
CONTINUANCE HAD WE TRIED TO GO THROUGH WITH THE CASE, AS I 
RECALL MY CONDITION APPROXIMATELY 90 DAYS AGO. 
BUT THAT WAS A TERRIBLY IMPROPER THING POR MR. 
HEATH TO DO. IT WAS DONE INTENTIONALLY TO TRY TO SUGGEST TO 
THIS JURY THAT BEAR RIVER SOMEHOW HAS HAD TO PUT UP WITH A 
CONTINUANCE AS WELL AS OTHER ALLEGATIONS THAT ITS MADE. 
THE COURT WELL KNOWS THAT THAT WAS AN ISSUE 
THAT WAS BEFORE THE COURT. IT WASN'T AND ISN'T AN ELEMENT OP 
DAMAGE IN THE CASE. WE'RE NO"! GOING TO C L A J M IT TO BE A 
DAMAGE IN THE CASE, YET IT WAS LIVELY PREJUDICIAL TO OUR 
INTEREST BECAUSE THIS JURY RIGHT NOW, JUDGE, IS IN THE FIFTH 
DAY OP WHAT WE TOLD THEM WAS GOING TO BE A FOUR TO FIVE DAY 
CASE, AND IT LOOK'S TO ME LIKE 1 "i L> GOING TO THREE WEEKS THE 
WAV THE EXAMINATION IS GOING. 
THIS WITNESS HAS [<I LN OF J THE STAND NOW FOR FIVE 
loS 
HOURS WITH MR. HEATH-
THE COURT: FINISH VCJR MOTION., 
MR. CAMPBELL: 1 AM FINISHING MY MOTION. I'M 
TELLING YOU WHY I THINK IT'S PREJUDICIAL, JUDGE. IT'S HIGHLY 
PREJUDICIAL, BECAUSE THIS JURY HAS HEARD—AND I THINK. IS 
LARGELY FED UP WITH THIS CASE RIGHT NOW, AS PERHAPS THE COURT 
IS, AND A FEW OF COUNSEL DECIDES. 
BUT IT HAS BEEN PROTRACTED AND EXTENUATED TO 
THE POINT THAT WHERE A QUESTION SUCH AS MR. HEATH PUT WITH 
REGARD TO THE CONTINUANCE SIMPLY REFLECTS THAT IF A 
CONTINUANCE HAD GONE, IF THE CASE HAD GONE FORWARD AT THAT 
TIME, THIS JURY WOULDN'T BE HERE. 
SO I THINK IT IS—1 MAKE THE STATEMENT WITH 
REGARD TO THE LENGTH OF THE TRIAL BECAUSE IT IS HIGHLY 
PREJUDICIAL FOR HENRY TO HAVE REQUIRED ME TO GET UP TO MAKE AN 
OBJECTION AS TO THAT. 
1 'M SURPRISED IT WAS DONE. I THINK", WHILE THE 
COURT SUSTAINED THE OBJECTION AND WOULDN'T LET IT GO IN, THE 
QUESTION HAD ALREADY BEEN ASKED. THEM HE CAME BACK AND ASKED 
ABOi'T A QUESTION INVOLVING WHEN THE CLAIM FOR BAD FAITH BEGAN 
TO RUN. 
THE COURT: HENRY? 
MR. HEATH: MY RESPONSE FIRST OF ALL TO THE 
QUESTIONS RELATING TO RASMUSSEN S REPORT, THOSE QUESTIONS WERE 
DESIGNED TO DETERMINE THE BASIS FOR HER KNOWLEDGE AND THE 
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BASIS OF MR. RASMUSSEN'S IN-ORMAT JON, WHETHER HE RELIED UPON 
INFORMATION GIVEN TO HIM BY ZANDRA PERKINS, AND THE QUESTIONS 
WERE DESIGNED TO DETERMINE WHAT HER KNOWLEDGE WAS WITH REGARD 
TO INFORMATION AND RASMUSSEN'S REPORT, SPECIFIC ITEMS, CHECKS 
WHICH SHE HAD WRITTEN, ITEMS SHE HAD, INFORMATION SHE HAD 
PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED THAT SHE HAD PROVIDED AS THE BASIS FOR 
INFORMATION FOR MR. RASMUSSEN'S REPORT; INVOICES, CHECKS, 
ETCETERA. 
SO I THINK I CERTAINLY WAS ENTITLED TO FIND OUT 
AS TO SPECIFIC ITEMS IN THAT REPORT, WHETHER OR NOT SHE 
UNDERSTOOD IT GAVE HIM INFORMATION THAT IT SHOULD BE INCLUDED 
IN THE CLAIM. 
AND I THIN*- THAT'S HIGHLY PROBER, AND WE ASSERT 
THAT IT'S PROPER EXAMINATION, AND THE COURT AGREED WITH IT IN 
THE COURT'S RULINGS. 
AS FOR THE QUESTION ABOUT CONTINUANCES—AND 
YOUR HONOR, ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF BAD FAITH IS THE CLAIM OF 
DELAY OCCASIONED IN THIS CASE. 
AND UNTIL THE STATEMENT WAS MADE BY MR. 
CAM! nCLL THAT THEY'RE NOT CLAIMING ANYTHING AFTER NOVEMBER, 
1990, THAT'S THE FIRST TIME THAT STATEMENT HAS E^EV< BEEN MADE, 
EITHER OFF OR ON THE RECORD. 
FOR THEM TO COME IN AND MAKE I": LOOK LIKE THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY HAS DRAGGED THIS ON TO 1993, REFUSING TO f:AV 
WHAT SHE'S DEMANDING, I L O U L D ANTICIPATE THAT THAT COULD WELL 
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BE THAT QUE PART OF THE CLAIM D^ BAD FAITH, BUT WHEN DELAY IS 
PART OF THE ISSUE, WHETHER IT IS OR NOT, CERTAINLY THE 
DUPLICATION OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND THE REASONABLENESS OF THE 
ATTORNEYS FEES, BEAR RIVER SHOULD NOT BE CHARGED FOR THE FACT 
THAT ATTORNEYS FEES MAY HAVE BEEN ADDITIONALLY ACCRUED BECAUSE 
THE CASE WAS POSTPONED ON TWO OCCASIONS FOR WHATEVER REASON. 
SO THAT CERTAINLY IS A PROPER QUESTION TO FIND 
OUT WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY IT WAS THAT THE CASE WAS CONTINUED. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR—ARE YOU THROUGH? 
MR. HEATH: SO THE COURT HAS HEARD THE 
QUESTIONS, THE COURT HAS MADE PROPER RULINGS, AND WE'LL SUBMIT 
IT. 
MR. CAMPBELL: MY RESPONSE TO THAT ISSUE, YOUR 
HONOR, IS THAT THE QUESTION THAT RUNS TO THE ELEMENT OF 
CONTINUANCES IS A MATTER WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT, 
AND COUNSEL IS GOING TO SEE TO IT THAT BEAR RIVER DOESN'T PAY 
ONE MORE CENT THAN WHAT A REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEE SHOULD BE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. WE WOULD BE ENTITLED TO THAT. 
BUT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THIS COURT IN ITS 
DISCRETION GRANTED THE CONTINUANCE, AND REALLY CAME UPON THE 
STIPULATION OF COUNSEL, OF EVERYBODY; THERE WAS NO OPPOSITION 
TO THE CONTINUANCE. 
IT WAS GENUINELY REQUIRED. IT HAD NO PART IN 
THIS CASE. BUT IT NOW DOES HAVE A PART. WE'VE GOT TO GET UP 
AND EXPLAIN IT, AND 1 THINf- YOUR HONOR THAI IT WAS HIGHLY 
10U 
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PREJUDICIAL FOR COUNSEL TO DO IT. 
NOW I WANT TO MAKE ONE ISSUE CLEAR "HAT MR. 
HEATH HAS ADDRESSED YOUR HONOR, AND THAT RUNS TO BOTH THE 
MOTION THAT I HAVE MADE FOR MISTRIAL IN THIS CASE, AND IT ALSO 
RUNS TO THE OTHER ISSUE. 
WE ARE NOT—WE DO NOT CLAIM THAT THE DAMAGES 
WERE CUT OFF IN NOVEMBER, 1990, AND THAT NOTHING THAT WAS DONE 
THEREAFTER BY WAY OF ADJUSTMENT TO THIS CLAIM BY BEAR RIVER IS 
COMPENSABLE. WE CERTAINLY DO—WE SAY THAT THE CAUSE OF 
ACTION, THE BREACH, THE BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE BREACH OF 
THE CONTRACT AND THE BAD FAITH TOOK PLACE IN NOVEMBER OF 1990. 
I TOLD THE COURT THAT. I TOLD THE JURY THAT. 
THEY UNDERSTAND THAT. BUT WE CERTAINLY ARE, BY SAYING THAT, 
WE ARE NOT SAYING THAT WE'RE MOT ENTITLED TO ANY DAMAGES AS A 
RESULT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THAT BREACH AFTER THAT DATE. 
WE DO CLAIM THAT WE'RE ENTITLED TO THEM. 
THAT'S THE REASON WHY ATTORNEYS FEES ARE A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT, 
A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT. BUT WE CERTAINLY DO NOT CLAIM 
DUPLICATE ATTORNEYS FEES OR FEES THAT WOULD NOT HAVE RESULTED 
BUT FOR A REASONABLE PROSECUTION OF THE CASE. 
AS FAR AS THE TIMELINESS OF THE CASE—THAT IS 
TO SAYM THE AMOUNT OF TIME I T S TAKEN TO GET THE CASE TO 
TRIAL, AND THE TIME OF TRIAL---THAT S NOT GOING TO BE A PART OF 
OUR CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. 
THE COURT: OF COURSE I VE RULED AND STILL 
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1 THINK I'M CORRECT IN ALLOWING HJh TO C-LiESTIGN THE WITNESS, 
2 WHICH YOU TOOK EXCEPTION TO. AC FAR AS THE CONTINUANCE MATTER 
3 IS CONCERNED, THAT WAS STOPPED BEFORE ANYTHING WAS SAID AS FAR 
4 AS THE CAUSE OF THE CONTINUANCE, AND IT REALLV DIDN'T GO ON 
5 ANY FURTHER THAN THAT. SO I DON'T THIN:-" YOU'RE PREJUDICED AS 
6 A RESULT OF THAT. 
7 THEREFORE THE COURT WOULD DENY THE MISTRIAL 
8 MOTION ON BOTH GROUNDS. NOW WHERE ARE WE AS FAR AS COMPLETING 
9 THE CASEv 
10 MR. HEATH: 1 M JUST ABOUT THROUGH. 
11 THE COURT: THEN HOW MANY? 
12 MR. CAMPBELL: WE'VE G O T — . 
13 THE COURT: YOUR CASE^ 
14 MR. CAMPBELLS YES, OUR CASE IN CHIEF. 
15 THE COURT: HOW LONG WILL YOU TAKE NOW? 
16 MR. MARTINSON: SIX OR SEVEN WITNESSES. 
17 THE COURT: HOW LONG"" 
IS MR. CAMPBELL: WELL, JUDGE, MARSHA SMITH WILL 
19 MOT BE A SHORT ONE, THE OTHER WITNESSES WILL PROBABLY BE 
20 HALF-AN-HOUR, PLUS OR MINUS, APIECE. 
21 MR. MARTINSON: W_7*i TUE EXCEPTION OF LEO 
22 THORUP, AND THAT WILL BE LUNGER. 
23 MR. LAM^BELL: LfU WILL BE LONGER THAN THAT-
24 THE COURT: WHA ! ».:*f VOu SAYING"" 
25 MR. CAMPBELL: : 7 
1 ANOTHER DAY, AND THAT'S ASSUMING THE SORT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 THAT 3 CONDUCTED WITH THEIR WITNESSES. WITH FIRST GENERAL'S 
3 WITNESSES. IF HENRY TAKES FIVE PLUS HOURS ON MARSHA SMITH, I 
4 THINK WE CLEARLY ARE GOING TO BLOW THROUGH NEXT WEEK. 
5 THE COURT; WE'RE NOT. HOW LONG ARE YOU GOING 
6 TO TAKE; HOW LONG IN YOUR CASE? 
7 MR. HEATH: WE'RE GOING TO MOVE IT AS QUICKLY 
S AS WE CAN. 
? THE COURT: HOW LONG? 
10 MR. HEATH: I HOPE WE CAN DO IT IN A DAY. IT 
11 DEPENDS, HOWEVER, ON WHAT WITNESSES THEY PUT ON, HOW MUCH 
12 WE'RE ALLOWED TO ASK THEM ON CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
13 MR. SMITH: I'LL BE LESS THAN HALF-AN-HOUR, IF 
14 THAT. 
15 THE COURT: OKAY. AS I SAY, I CANNOT TRY THIS 
16 CASE NEXT WEEK. 
17 MR. CAMPBELL: I WONDER THIS—. 
IS THE COURT: WE HAVE TO FINISH IT BY' THURSDAY 
19 NIGHT. SO PLAN ON STAYING IN "I HE EVENINGS FROM NOW ON THE 
20 REST OF THE TIME. 
21 MR. CAMPBELL: WELL., I WAS GOING TO ASK THE 
22 COURT, IN LIGHT OF WHAT 1 SEE HS A REAL TIME PROBLEM, IT'S 
23 GOING TO GET DOWN TO HURTING EVERYBODY, AND PROBABLY THE 
24 THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT IS GOING TO FIND THAT THE CLAIM THEY 
25 HAVE HAS BEEN SQUEEZED OUT. HENRY AND 1 WERE GOING TO COME IN 
1 AND TALr L 'TJh \ 'uU T»- I£ AF E P N O O L H K J L " H._^ ^ UL= U-*«_''J_1 u-'-^'i ~"ij 
2 HANDLE ^ T T O R N E / S ^ E E S . I ^ v 0'., WOUi-D ^-WEF tlr " HAVE A T T O R ^ E T E 
3 FEES, THAT ISSUE—THAT IE TC SA> ., INDICATE THAT WE APE 
4 CLAIMING ATTORMEVS FEES, BUT LEAVE TH-,T ISSUE O^ T^E AMOUN^ OF 
5 ATTORNEYS PEES JP TO THE COLE! . i-ZTH PEbrjR: TO T H E C L A I M OF 
6 PERf INS AGAINST BEAR RIVER, I M WILLING T[I DO THAT, BECAUSE — 
7 AND THE REASON I AN A! THIS POINT IS BECAUSE IT £ PROBABLY 
S GOING TO SAVE US A COUPLE OF HOURS OF TRIA_ TINE. 
9 1 HAVEN T HAD A CHANCE TO EVEN TALf WITH HENP* 
10 AT SOME LENGTH, I VE O N L V TRIED ONE OTHER RAD FAITH INSURANCE 
11 CLAIM. HOW IS THE COURT GENERALLY HANDLING THOSE 3N THE PAST"" 
12 THE COuRTi WELL, 1 VE HAD CASE-—. 
13 MR. CAMPBELL: HAVE YOU TAI- EH EVIDENCE OH 
14 ATTORNEYS FEES OR DO YOU WANT THEM SIMPLY A S — . 
15 THE COURT: MOST OF THE ONES I VE HANDLED HAVE 
it JUST BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ON AFPI DAVITS AND THE COURT'S 
J 7 MADE "HE DETERMINATION AS t~AR AE HTTORNF>E. FEES. 
IS MR. HEATH: M / POSITION ON I"1 IS THAT IF THERE 
3'"' IS A FINDING OF BAD ~AITHM THEN THAT CAN BE SET FOP A 
DO SUBCEOUERT HEARING BEFORE vOUP H O N O P . WF C E F T A I N L T W O U L D N T 
21 WAN1 TO INDICATE AT THIS POINT THAI WE D BL WILLING TO DO IT 
ZT BY H F F 1 D A V I ~ \ I THIN* THE LAW RCOU;RES--nND BOD I NOWS THIS— 
23 AN A F F J D A ' J T , PLUE SOME TESTIMONY ON REAC-ONABLENEEE-
24 1 M NOT REAlL^' SO CONCERNED ADOljT CA^PE-ELL , 
20 MAAf .1 SESSIONS ATTORNEYS FEES., BUT I AM AS TO THE PEOPLE WHO 
WON'T BE BEFORE THIS JuR\ . 
AND 50 I *JC::JL_D CERTAINLY B E — I WOULD GO AL_ONG , 
FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT—. 
THE COURTs I COULD GIVE YOU A HEARING OR 
AFFIDAVIT, EITHER WAK IT'S THE SA^lE THING. 
MR. HEATH: AND IF THERE'S NO FINDING OP BAD 
FAITH? 
THE COURT: THEN, YES, THEY'LL BE OUT. 
MR- POSTWICK2 WE'VE ALREADY PUT ON A WITNESS 
ON ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE CONTEXT OF PERL INS. THEY MAY PUT ON 
EVIDENCE OF THEIR FEES THAT THEY'RE CLAIMING UNDER THE 
MECHANIC C LIEN STATUTE- 1 Al LEAST WOULD BE INQUIRING AS TO 
THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THE FEES IN RLL--..TI OIMEHI •" TO WHAT THEY'RE 
CLAIMING FOR THE MECHANIC'S LIEN, SO THE JURY CAN GET THE 
PROPER PERSPECTIVE GF THE FEES EXPENDED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN 
THIS CASE. 
MR. SMITHS I THIN!-: WI^H RESPECT TO THE 
MECHANIC'S LIEN, AS I READ THE STATUTE, THAT'S A DECISION ~C\F; 
THE JUDGE TO MAKE WITH THE ADVICE OF THE JURV. IF THE JUDGE 
WANTS TO—SO FAR AS WE'RE CONCERNED, 1^. RELATIONSHIP TO 
ATTORNEYS FEES—HAVE AN AFFIDAVIT, 1 THINK THAT WOULD SUFFICE 
IF THE COURT S GOING TO A L L O W US TO DO THAT. 
THE COURT: I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THAT. 
MR. BOSTWICf : THAT S OH THE MECHANIC'S LIEN 
STATUTE. BUT FIRST G E N E R M L SERVICES HAS A CLAIM FOR FEES ON 
6 THE PARTIES STIPULATE OTHERWISE. THE DEFENDANT CHOSE NOT TO 
7 DO THAT AND INSISTED ON TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, SO WE HAD NO 
S CHOICE BUT TO DO THAT. 
9 THE COURTs YOU SAY THAT—. 
10 MR. BUSTWICK: I HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO REQUIRE 
1i THAT OF THEM. 
12 MR. CAMPBELL- WHAT WE CAN PROBABLY DO IS THIS, 
13 BECAUSE WE'RE ENTITLED BECAUSE OF THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS, THE 
14 STATUTE, THAT ENTITLES US TO—-ENTITLES PERKINS TO RECIPROCAL 
15 CONSIDERATION OF ATTORNEYS FEES. WE'RE GOING TO ASK FOR THEM 
16 AGAINST FIRST GENERAL ON THE BREACH OP CONTRACT CLAIM, AND 
17 WHAT I WOULD BE WILLING TO DO IS TO SUBMIT--TO CARVE OUT OF 
IS THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS FEES THE AMOUNTS ALLOCABLE TO 
19 FIRST GENERAL'S PART OF THE CLAIM AND GIVE THOSE TO YOU, IF 
20 YOU'RE WILLING—-I M SURE THEY'RE GOING TO BE VERY MUCH LESS 
21 THAN £50,000. 
22 MR. BOSTWICK: AND THAT'S THE WHOLE POINT. 
23 WE'VE BEEN INVOLVED IN THIS CASE—-
24 THE COURT: YOU WANT ATTORNEYS FEES AS FAR AS 
25 YOUR PART OF IT? 
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JURY TO KNOW AT LEAST THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF FEES BO THEY CAN GET 
A FEEL FOR THE WAY THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCTED THJB CASE. 
THE COURT: YOU SAY "THE TOTAL AMOUNT 
INVOLVED"? 
MR. BOSTWICK: THE JURY NEEDS TO KNOW—. 
THE COURT: BETWEEN THE TWO? 
MR. BOSTWICK: BECAUSE WE'VE CAUGHT UP IN THIS 
ENTIRE ISSUE AND HAVE HAD TO HOLD ONTO THE TIGER'S TAIL, IF 
YOU WILL, AND THE FEES THEY'RE GOING TO CLAIM FOR THE 
MECHANIC'S LIEN OR BREACH OF CONTRACT DON'T TELL THE WHOLE 
STORY FOR THIS. 
MR. CAMPBELL: THE PRIMARY CLAIM, AS THE COURT 
CAN TELL, AMD THE EVIDENCE AND EVERYTHING ELSE, IS THE CLAIM 
AGAINST BEAR RIVER. AND AS FAR AS THE WORK THAT HAS BEEN 
DONE, I'LL HAVE TO TAKE A LOOl AT IT. BUT I'M REASONABLY 
CONFIDENT THAT IT'S NOT GOING TO ExGEED 115,000 FOR THE AMOUNT 
OF WORK THAT'S BEEN DOME IN .. CNNEC 1 ] ON WITH THE RESISTANCE OF 
FIRST GENERAL S CLAIM. 
THE COURT: RlL.nl OFT HAND, MY IMMEDIATE 
REACTION IS I WOULD REOuIRE iuO TR fUT ON YOUR ATTORNEYS FEES 
AS FAR A S — 
MR. CAMFBE_L: rlf.i.l l«ENERAL~ 
THE OOURT: - i'U* ,<S F *-w AS YQU AND HENR> ARE 
CONCERNED, IF YOU CAN ST 3 ~"Jt r • -,ND AGREE THAT IT CAN BE 
! It-
ENTEREL AT ,- SUBSEOuE'^T •-iE'ufrlNG, EITi-ER THAT C.r- S'JBMITTEI U^ 
AFFIDAVITS. , THEN I LL GG ALONG WITH THAT. 
MR. CAMPBELL: GOOD. 
THE COURT: I D O - - . 
MR. HEATH: M R E YOU PRE"REr TO DO T H M T ON THE 
RECORD NOW AG FAR AS OUR CONCERN-
MR. CAMPBELL: I WANT TO TAL. TO HIM, THEN I 
WILL. WE'LL DO IT B\ THE RECESS. 
THE COURT: J DO INTEND TO START *EEPING VOL 
LATE AT NIGHTS. WE VE GOT FINIEh THIS CASE THIS WEEF -
THERE'S NO WAN. 
MR. HEATH: HOW LATE" 
THE COURT: PROBABLY AT LEAST 6:00H MAYBE 7:00. 
MR. HEATH: IS THAT GOING TO START TONIGHT"" 
THE COURT: WELL—. 
MR. HEATH: AS FAR AS WHEN WE HAVE WITNESSES'* 
THE COURT: 3 II LT, E TO GET A JUMP ON IT SO 
WE RE NOT PUSHING ]T ON THE LMSI DAT . 
MR. BOSTWICl- i THIS WILL IMPACT OUR ABILITY TO 
DISCUSE JURi INSTRUCT]ONS. 
THE COURT: HA.'L N OU 1 ALf ED ABOUT INSTRUCTIONS 
MR. BOS^WJO
 : WE L L R E L U J N G 10 MEET TONIGHTt 
THE COURT: \ SU ,'t '-3T A_ NIGHT A^TER 7:0u. 
M R. C A M F' B L, : W P! , P U <\ " W E D U n H 1 S , Y 0 U R 
HONOR. Jh\ LIGHT OF WHA1 "i H-I LuUR" JUST INDICATED, WE WILL 
1 ]f 
(WHEREUPON, UN THE 28TH DAY OF APRIL, 1993, THE 
FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED IN THE PRESENCE 
AND HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
THE COURT: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT ALL 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY ARE PRESENT. YOU MAY CALL YOUR NEXT 
WITNESS, COUNSEL. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, MAY IT PLEASE THE 
COURT, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE DISCUSSION WITH YOUR HONOR AT 
THE CLOSE QF WHATEVER IT WAS LAST EVENING, THE PARTIES HAVE 
ARRIVED AT AN UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENT, AND I WOULD SUBMIT 
THIS TO THE COURT AS A STIPULATION OF FACT. IF I MAY APPROACH 
THE BENCH, YOUR HONOR. 
(WHEREUPON, A DISCUSSION WAS HAD OFF THE RECORD 
AND OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY; AFTER 
WHICH, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED IN 
OPEN COURT:) 
THE COURT: THEN I WON'T READ IT RIGHT NOW. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, IT WOULD BE THE 
STIPULATION THAT WITH REGARD TO THE ELEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FEES, 
AS THAT RELATES TO THE CLAIMS OF ZANDRA PERKINS AGAINST BEAR 
RIVER MUTUAL, AND ON THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT, AND AS TO 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES ON THE COUNTERCLAIM, THAT THE FOLLOWING 
WOULD BE EVIDENCE. 
THAT AS OF SUNDAY' EVENING AT ABOUT 11:30 AT 
NIGHT THE ATTORNEYS FEES THAT HAD BEEN EXPENDED BY MS. PERKINS 
AS TO BEAR RIVER WOULD BE $99,597 IN ATTORNEYS FEES, AND 
$12,059.18 COSTS, OR A TOTAL—THOSE COSTS, YOUR HONOR, ARE 
FILING FEES, BUT PRINCIPALLY DEPOSITION COSTS, THE DEPOSITION 
TRANSCRIPTS, FOR A TOTAL OF $111,656.18. 
THAT WITH REGARD TO THOSE FEES EXPENDED BY MS. 
PERKINS AS TO FIRST GENERAL SERVICES IN DEFENDING AGAINST 
THEIR POSITION, AND IN PROSECUTING THE CLAIMS, THE TESTIMONY 
WOULD SHOW THAT THE ATTORNEYS FEES WOULD BE $5,700 AND THE 
COSTS ARE $642.59, OF THE SAME TYPE; THAT IS TO SAY, THAT I'VE 
JUST DEFINED, FOR A TOTAL OF $6,342.59. 
THAT WOULD BE THE TESTIMONY, YOUR HONOR, 
SUBMITTED. I THINK WE'LL BE ABLE TO SAVE VIRTUALLY A HALF DAY 
OF TESTIMONY BY PUTTING THIS STIPULATION BEFORE THE COURT, AND 
WE DO SO. 
MR. HEATH: YOUR HONOR, ON BEHALF OF BEAR 
RIVER, WE WOULD STIPULATE THAT WERE THEY TO CALL WITNESSES TO 
TESTIFY, THAT WOULD BE A TESTIMONY. WE WILL NOT REQUIRE THEM 
TO PUT ON THAT EVIDENCE. OF COURSE OUR STIPULATION DOES NOT 
ADMIT ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF THOSE FEES. 
MR. CAMPBELL: AN WE UNDERSTAND THAT. 
MR. BOSTWICK: YOUR HONOR, WE AGREE WITH THE 
STIPULATION WITH REGARD TO THE EVIDENCE SHOWING THOSE NUMBERS. 
HOWEVER, WE DO REQUIRE EVIDENCE ON THE REASONABLENESS AND WHAT 
WAS DONE IN CALCULATING THOSE FFES. 
THE COURT: MEMBERS OF THE JURY, YOU'VE HEARD 
4 
THE STIPULATION STATED BY COUNSEL- THAT WILL BE EVIDENCE. 
THERE WILL BE MORE TOLD TO YOU ABOUT IT AS FAR AS INSTRUCTIONS 
ARE CONCERNED WHEN THE COURT INSTRUCTS YOU ON THE LAW. YOU 
MAY PROCEED. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I HAD ASSUMED WE WERE GOING TO— 
WELL, MAYBE I COULD INQUIRE, YOUR HONOR: COUNSEL FOR FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, ARE THEY CONTENDING THAT THE SUM OF 
4:5,700.50 IS NOT REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES AS TO THEIR CLAIM 
AGAINST PERf INS" 
MR. BQSTWICf : FIRST GENERAL SERVICES' POSITION 
IS THAT THE AMOUNT OF *5,700 DOES NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT THE 
AMOUNT OF EFFORT THAT THE ATTORNEY'S FOR PERf INS HAVE USED ON 
THIS CASE, AND THE JURY HAS A RIGHT TO UNDERSTAND HOW THAT 
FIGURE WAS ARRIVED AT. 
THE COURT: ARE YOU STILL ASf ING THEM TO PUT ON 
EVIDENCE" 
MR. BOSTWICf : YES, WITH REGARD TO HOW THE FEES 
WERE COMPUTED AND THE REASONABLENESS ISSUE, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: Of AY. I DON'T f NOW WHAT TO SAY. 
YOU MAY CALL YOUR WITNESS. 
MR. CAMPBELL: IT WILL HAVE TO BE ME. 
THE COURT: ARE WE PREPARED TO GO ON THIS RIGHT 
NOW OR CAN WE GO ON WITH OTHER WITNESSES, IF YOU RE NOT—I 
THOUGHT WE HAD A STIPULATION TO COVER THIS AS THE LAST THING 
WE DID LAST NIGHT. APPARENTLY NOT. 
AND THEN-
MR. CAMPBELL: I HAVE MY WITNESSES READY TO GO. 
THE COURT: WHY DON'T WE GO WITH THE WITNESSES 
MR. CAMPBELL: MILTON BECK. 
(WHEREUPON, MIL=IQN-QJL_BECK, HAVING FIRST BEEN 
DULY SWORN TO TELL THE TRUTH, ASSUMED THE 




Q I'M SORRY, YOUR HONOR; I DIDN'T—I FORGOT MY GLASSES 
THIS MORNING. STATE YOUR NAME, PLEASE. 
A MILTON Q. BECK. 
Q WHERE DO YOU RESIDE? 
A 814 SOUTH WOODWARD DRIVE, MURRAY, 84107. 
Q WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION? 
A I'M A PUBLIC ADJUSTOR. 
Q AND WOULD YOU TELL US WHAT THAT WORK CONSISTS OF? 
A A PUBLIC ADJUSTOR IS A PERSON WHO IS LICENSED BY THE 
STATE TO ADJUST LOSSES WHERE THERE ARE DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF 
THE HANDLING OF INSURANCE CLAIMS. 
G WOULD YOU TELL US, PLEASE, WHAT YOUR BACKGROUND AND 
EDUCATION IS" 
A I GRADUATED FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH IN 1958 WITH 
A BACHELOR'S DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. I THEN WENT TO THE 
<\A<\\ £ 
1 THINGS. 
2 Q THAT'S ALL I HAVE. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
3 MR. MARTINSON: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
4 THE COURT: YOU MAY CALL YOUR NEXT WITNESS. 
5 MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, BECAUSE OF THE 
6 STIPULATION ON ATTORNEYS FEES, AND APPARENTLY THE 
7 UNWILLINGNESS OF FIRST GENERAL TO—. 
8 THE COURT: COUNSEL, DO YOU HAVE ANOTHER 
9 WITNESS OTHER THAN YOURSELF? 
0 MR. CAMPBELL: NO, I MEAN WE DO, YES, BUT 
1 BESIDES MYSELF. 
2 THE COURT: WILL YOU CALL HIM? 
3 MR. CAMPBELL: IT'S GOING TO BE A LONG WITNESS. 
4 THE COURT: WE'RE GOING TO BE GOING ON. 
5 MR. CAMPBELL: MAY WE HAVE A SHORT RECESS? 
6 THE COURT: YES, BUT NOT RIGHT NOW. CALL YOUR 
7 WITNESS. 
8 MR. CAMPBELL: WE WOULD CALL DERK RASMUSSEN. 
9 (WHEREUPON, DERK_RASMUSSEN, HAVING FIRST BEEN 
0 DULY SWORN TO TELL THE TRUTH, ASSUMED THE 





5 Q WOULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME, PLEASE, AND SPELL YOUR 
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AT THE HOUR OF 4:00 P.M., THE FOLLOWING 
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED IN THE PRESENCE AND 
HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
THE COURT: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT ALL 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY ARE PRESENT. YOU MAY CALL YOUR NEXT 
WITNESS, COUNSEL. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, PERKINS, DEFENDANT 
AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT PERKINS WOULD REST OUR CASE AS TO 
BEAR RIVER, REST OUR CASE WITH RESPECT TO FRAMPTON, AND WE 
HAVE PREPARED TO REST OUR CASE WITH REGARD TO FIRST GENERAL. 
APPARENTLY COUNSEL IS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE STIPULATED 
AMOUNT OF *5,700 AS ATTORNEYS FEES. 
THE COURT: WOULD YOU COME FORTH AND BE SWORN. 
MR. CAMPBELL: IF I HAVE TO I GUESS I'LL HAVE 
TO. 
< WHEREUPON, ROBERTAS .__CAMPPELLA_ JR^ JL.ESQLURE , 
HAVING FIRST BEEN DULY SWORN TO TELL THE TRUTH, 
ASSUMED THE WITNESS STAND AND TESTIFIED UPON 
HIS OATH AS FOLLOWS:) 
QI8iQI_iXAMINATIQN 
HY-MR^ -MARIINSON: 
Q WOULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS FOR THE 
RECORD, PLEASE. 
A ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR."' 
0 AND YOUR CURRENT ADDRESS"' 
228 
CAMPBELL: DIP EXAM BY MARTINSON 
A MY HOME ADDRESS? 
Q BUSINESS ADDRESS. 
A 201 SOUTH MAIN STREET. IT'S ONE UTAH CENTER 
BUILDING, 13TH FLOOR. 
Q WHAT'S YOUR CURRENT PROFESSION? 
A I'M A LAWYER, A TRIAL LAWYER. 
Q WHERE DO YOU PRACTICE? 
A WELL, MY PLACE OF BUSINESS IS IN SALT LAKE CITY. 
THE AREA—THE COURTS IN WHICH I PRACTICE ARE LOCATED IN THE 
INTERMOUNTAIN AREA, THE WESTERN UNITED STATES, AND IN SELECTED 
CASES THAT ARE PENDING IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND EUROPE. 
Q LET'S BACK UP. ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE UTAH STATE 
BAR? 
A I AM. 
Q IN WHAT COURTS—. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, GET TO THE QUESTION BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
Q COULD YOU GIVE US THE BACKGROUND OF YOUR LEGAL 
EDUCATION, PLEASE? 
THE COURT: COUNSEL—. 
A I WAS EDUCATED—. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, I APPRECIATE ALL THAT, BUT 
WE DON'T NEED IT. GET TO 1 HE". UUESTJON BEFORE THE COURT AS FAR 
AS ATTORNEYS FEES. 
CAMPBELL: DIR EXAM BY MARTINSON 
Q (BY MR. MARTINSON) MR. CAMPBELL, HOW MANY YEARS HAVE 
YOU BEEN PRACTICING LAW? 
A SINCE 1956. 
Q FROM THAT DATE TO THE PRESENT, APPROXIMATELY HOW 
MANY NUMBERS OF TRIALS HAVE YOU—. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, I CAN'T SEEM TO GET IT 
OVER: GET TO THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT ON ATTORNEYS FEES. 
MR. MARTINSON: YES, YOUR HONOR. I APOLOGIZE. 
I THOUGHT THIS WAS NECESSARY, TO LAY FOUNDATION FOR HIS 
OPINION AS TO THE REASONABLENESS. 
MR. BOSTWICK: WE'LL STIPULATE TO FOUNDATION. 
THE COURT: I APPRECIATE IT, UNLESS YOU FEEL 
IT'S ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY THAT THIS INFORMATION GO TO THE 
JURY. I'D LIFE TO BYPASS IT AND GET ON WITH IT. 
MR. MARTINSON: THIS WILL TAKE A SECOND TO GO 
THROUGH, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
Q (BY MR. MARTINSON) BRIEFLY, MR. CAMPBELL, HOW MANY 
TRIAL CASES HAVE YOU TRIED IN YOUR CAREER AS A TRIAL LAWYER? 
A JURY TRIALS OR IN TOTO? 
Q TOTAL TRIALS. THEN THE JURY C A N — . 
A OVER 425. 
Q HOW MANY OF THOSE ARE JURY TRIALS"" 
A ABOUT 90 PERCENT OF THEM. 
Q HAVE YOU HAD AMY' INVOLVEMENT WITHIN THE BAR ON THE 
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QUESTION OF REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEYS FEES? 
A YES, I HAVE. 
O DESCRIBE THAT BRIEFLY, PLEASE. 
A I'VE PREPARED FOR AND HAVE BEEN CALLED AS AN EXPERT 
WITNESS ON REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEYS FEES AT VARIOUS TIMES, 
AND I WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF 
THE STATE BAR OF UTAH IN 197S THROUGH '81, AND A SUBSTANTIAL 
PORTION OF THE WORK ON THAT COMMITTEE INVOLVED A REVIEW OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COMPLAINTS BY CLIENTS WITH REGARD TO 
ATTORNEYS FEES CHARGED BY LAWYERS. 
G WHEN WERE YOU RETAINED IN THE PERKINS MATTER, MR. 
CAMPBELL? 
A WE WERE RETAINED IN FEBRUARY OF 1992. 
Q COULD YOU GIVE US JUST A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE 
WORK THAT YOUR LAW FIRM HAS DONE WITH REGARD TO THE PERKINS 
MATTER SINCE THAT DATE? 
A WHEN I SAID "WE," I MEAN THE FIRM, CAMPBELL, MAAK & 
SESSIONS. 
Q OKAY. 
A AND THE WORK OF THE FIRM SINCE WE'VE UNDERTAKEN 
REPRESENTATION OF ZANDRA PERKINS HAS BEEN TO AMEND THE THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINT, AMEND THE ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, THE AMENDED THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
AGAINST BEAR RIVER, TO RESPOND BY WAY OF DISCOVERY IN THE FORM 
OF WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION, 
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DEPOSITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN. 
WE HAVE HAD TO ATTEND THOSE DEPOSITIONS, 
PREPARE WITNESSES, PREPARE OUR CLIENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
DEPOSITIONS, AND TO ATTEND A NUMBER OF HEARINGS BEFORE HIS 
HONOR, JUDGE WILKINSON, ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PRE-
TRIAL HEARINGS, AND MOTIONS IN LIMINE RELATIVE TO ISSUES OF 
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT ON THE UPCOMING TRIAL, AND TO 
PREPARE FOR TRIAL. 
Q THANK YOU. PERMISSION TO APPROACH THE WITNESS? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
Q MR. CAMPBELL, WOULD YOU GIVE THE COURT AND JURY AN 
IDEA OF WHAT THAT IS, EXHIBIT NO. 118? 
A THIS IS A COMPILATION, A RUNNING COMPILATION, MONTH 
TO MONTH, OF THE WORK UNDERTAKEN BY THE FIRM OF CAMPBELL, MAAK 
?•/ SESSIONS, AND IT REFLECTS THE LAWYER WHO DID THE WORK, THE 
AMOUNT OF TIME THE LAWYER DID ON THE WORK, AND THE STATEMENT 
AS TO WHAT THE WORK REFLECTS; THAT IS TO SAY, THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THE WORK. 
G TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, DOES THIS EXHIBIT NO-
U S ACCURATELY REFLECT A DESCRIPTION OF THE WORK AND THE 
NUMBER OF HOURS CONTRIBUTED BY VARIOUS PEOPLE LISTED IN THE 
PERKINS MATTER? 
A YES. IT'S A STATEMENT OF WORK THAT—OR, OF DAILY 
ENTRIES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE BY LAWYERS WORKING IN THE CASE, 
MYSELF INCLUDED: MICHAEL ROBERTS AND JOHN MARTINSON. 
CAMPBELL: DIR EXAM BY MARTINSON 
IN PRINCIPAL REGARD, IT'S THOSE THREE 
INDIVIDUALS. RELATIVELY LITTLE OF MY TIME WAS THERE UNTIL THE 
CASE REACHED THE TRIAL COURT; THAT IS TO SAY, UNTIL IT REACHED 
THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
Q AND WITH REGARD TO THE NUMBER OF HOURS THAT ARE 
REFLECTED OR LISTED ON EXHIBIT NO. 118, CAN YOU GIVE THE COURT 
AND JURY AN OPINION AS TO THE NECESSARY AND REASONABLE NUMBER 
OF HOURS, TOTAL NUMBER OF HOURS, IN THIS CASE? 
A WELL, THE NUMBER OF HOURS ARE SET OUT. IT'S AN 
ITEMIZATION DAY BY DAY, TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, OF WORK 
PERFORMED. THE WORK WAS REASONABLY NECESSARY IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE PREPARATION OF THE ISSUES THAT ARE BEFORE THE COURT, 
AND MY UNDERSTANDING, AND THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY DUPLICATION 
OF EFFORT OR EXPENDITURE OF UNNECESSARY TIME. 
Q LET ME ASK YOU THE SAME QUESTION WITH REGARD TO 
ATTORNEYS FEES, THE COMPILATION OF FEES THAT ARE BEING—HAVE 
BEEN INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THOSE HOURS. I'LL BE ASKING YOU 
THE SAME QUESTION WITH REGARD TO REASONABLENESS AND THE 
NECESSITY OF THOSE FEES IN CONNECTION OR WITH THE CONTEXT OF 
THIS CASE. 
A THE FEES'? 
Q THE ATTORNEYS, TOTAL ATTORNEYS FEES. 
A WELL, YOU MEAN THE TOTAL ATTORNEYS FEES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE TOTALITY OF THE CASE? 
Q CORRECT. 
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A IT WAS MY JUDGMENT THAT THE ATTORNEYS FEES THAT ARE 
SET OUT IN EXHIBIT NO. 13 8, AND THE TIME THAT HAS BEEN 
REQUIRED TO PUT THIS CASE FORWARD, HAS BEEN REASONABLY 
NECESSARY AND IS REASONABLE UNDER CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS FOR 
BILLING RATES OF THE UTAH STATE BAR AND OF THE PROFESSION IN 
THIS AREA OF THE COUNTRY. 
O FINALLY, AS TO THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PERI- INS 
SUIT, WILL YOU PLEASE GIVE US YOUR OPINION AS TO THEIR 
NECESSARY AND REASONABLE NATURE"1 
A ARE YOU TALf ING ABOUT COSTS RELATING TO FIRST 
GENERAL"1 
0 GLOBALLY, THE ENTIRE CASE. 
A I DON'T \ NOW OF ANY COSTS THAT WEREN'T ABSOLUTELY 
ESSENTIAL IN THE TAi- ING OF DEPOSITIONS, ORDERING COPIES OF 
DEPOSITIONS THAT HAVE BECOME NECESSARY. THAT'S THE BULfr OF 
THE EXPENSE. THE COPIES IN TERMS OF FACSIMILE TRANSMITTALS, 
MAILING COSTS, THOSE ARE DIRECT CHARGES IN WHICH THERE IS NO 
MARfUP OR PROFIT; AT LEAST OUR FIRM DOESN'T ENGAGE IN THAT. 
AND I DON'T BELIEVE IT'S CONTEMPORARY FOR ANYBODY IN THIS 
AREA, AT LEAST LAWYERS, TO MARf UP DIRECT COSTS. WE HAVE NOT 
DONE THAT, PASS-THROUGH COSTS. 
0 WITH REGARD TO THE PORTION OF HOURS, FEES AND COSTS 
ATTRIBUTABLE OR ALLOCABLE TO FLRI INS' DEFENSE OF CLAIMS BY 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES AND THE FROSECUTION OF THE PERtlNS 
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST FIRST hLNLRAL SERVICES, HAVE YOU MADE ANY 
4 
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1 DETERMINATION AS TO THAT ALLOCATION? 
2 A YES, I HAVE. 
3 Q HAVE YOU HAD EXPERIENCE IN THE PAST WITH BREAK OFFS 
4 OR ALLOCATING MATTERS? 
5 A YOU MEAN IN THIS MATTER? 
6 Q IN THAT MANNER, I N — . 
7 A IN THIS MANNER, YES; MONTHLY, I DO. 
8 Q BASED ON YOUR REVIEW OF WORK ATTRIBUTABLE TO FIRST 
9 GENERAL SERVICES, EITHER THEIR CASE IN CHIEF OR THE 
10 COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST THEM, WHAT AMOUNT HAVE YOU ARRIVED AT AS 
11 REASONABLE AND NECESSARY AS AN AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS FEES? 
12 A $5,700. I THINK THAT'S IT; $5,700. 
13 Q AS TO THE COSTS? 
14 A THE COSTS, AS I HAVE ALLOCATED, THEY'RE £642.59. 
15 Q AND DO YOU HAVE AN OPINION AS TO THE REASONABLENESS 
16 OF THESE ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS WITH REGARD TO THE $50,000 
17 AMOUNT I THINK FIRST GENERAL SERVICES HAS TESTIFIED TO? 
IS A YES, I DO. 
19 G WHAT IS YOUR OPINION? 
20 A I THINK THEY ARE REASONABLE IN DEFENSE IN THE UTAH 
21 STATE BAR, AND THESE COSTS WERE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO DEFEND 
22 THE MECHANIC'S LIEN CLAIM AND COUNTERCLAIMS OF FIRST GENERAL 
23 SERVICES. THEY WERE ALSO NECESSARY IN PROSECUTING THE 
24 COUNTERCLAIM FOR FRAUD AND BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST FIRST 
25 GENERAL, AND WHAT I HAVE DONE IN ALLOCATING THESE AMOUNTS WAS 
CAMPBELL: DIR EXAM BY MARTINSON 
TO TRY TO DETERMINE ANY WORK DONE BY ANY LAWYER IN THE FIRM AT 
ANY GIVEN MOMENT, WHETHER THAT WORK WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF 
FIRST GENERAL OR WAS IT NECESSARY IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
CLAIMS AGAINST BEAR RIVER. 
AND I'VE MADE AN ALLOCATION TO ABOUT—IN MY 
JUDGMENT, AND YOU HELPED ME IN DOING THAT, BUT I REVIEWED YOUR 
WORK AND WE HAVE ONLY ALLOCATED THAT WHICH—TO BEAR RIVER, 
WHERE THERE WERE SPECIFIC ENTRIES. 
Q THANK YOU, MR. CAMPBELL. NQ FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
GBQSS=EXAMINATIQN 
Q A FEW QUESTIONS, MR. CAMPBELL. WHAT IS YOUR BILLING 
RATE? 
A MY PERSONAL BILLING RATE? $210.00 AN HOUR. I THINK 
THAT WAS—YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT WHAT IT IS PRESENTLY? 
Q PRESENTLY. 
A YES. YES, THAT'S WHAT IT WAS. 
Q MR. ROBERTS? 
A I BELIEVE MR. ROBERTS WAS $90.00 AN HOUR, AND MR. 
MARTINSON WAS $90.00 AN HOUR. 
G AND WHEN YOU MADE AN ALLOCATION OF THESE FEES I N — 
WELL, I BELIEVE THESE WERE INCURRED BY YOUR FIRM THROUGH 
SUNDAY NIGHT; WAS THE $98,480 THE NUMBER? IS THAT CORRECT? 
AND 45 CENTS? 
A ARE YOU TALI- ING ABOUT TOTAL FEES? 
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0 TOTAL FEES, YES. 
A -£96,000, YES; 4^8,480. 
D IN ADDITION TO THAT, THERE WAS ANOTHER LAW FIRM 
INVOLVED, HAWf INS ?• PROBASCO, THAT INCURRED FEES OF 
APPROXIMATELY £"16,800" 
A 4:817.00, YES. THAT IS NOT PART OF THE £5,700 THAT 
IS BEING SUBMITTED AS PART OF THE ATTORNEYS FEES ALLOCATION. 
O AND THAT WAS MY QUESTION. THERE WAS NO EFFORT TO 
ALLOCATE ANY OF THE HAWf INS OR PROBASCO FEES TO FIRST GENERAL 
SERVICES" 
A NONE. 
0 DO YOU f NOW IF ANY OF THAT WORf—WAS THAT £16,000, 
WAS ANY OF THAT INCURRED AS A RESULT OF CLAIMS RUNNING BETWEEN 
FIRST GENERAL AND ZANDRA PERf INS" 
A I CAN'T ANSWER THAT WITHOUT SPECULATING ABOUT IT. 
O IF YOU f NOW. 
A I DON'T fNQW. I'VE LOOf ED AT THEIR STATEMENTS, AND 
I THINf IT'S RATHER CLEAR THAT THEY WERE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE 
FROM ITS INCEPTION IN 1990 UNTIL FEBRUARV, 1992, BUT I THINf I 
WOULD B E — I T WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO COMMENT ON 
SOMEBODY ELSE'S SERVICES. 
O CERTAINLY. AND YOU ARE AWARE THAT THERE WERE—THERE 
WAS AT LEAST A DEPOSITION OF EUGENE PETERSON DONE DURING THAT 
TIME THAT HAWf INS AND FROBASCO WERE ABOARD" 
A I M NOT AWARE OF THAT. 
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1 0 SO OF THF 4-5,750.50 IN FEES AND—EXCUSE ME, *642.59 
2 PERI- INS IS CLAIMING FOR FEES AND COSTS AGAINST FIRST GENERAL 
3 SERVICES DEAL SOLELY WITH FEES AND COSTS INCURRED BY YOUR 
4 FIRM""1 
5 A YES, THAT'S TRUE. IT CERTAINLY COULD BE MORE. 
6 D I GUESS THAT'S THE QUESTION THAT I HAVE. WERE ANY 
7 FEES AND COSTS ALLOCATED WITH REGARD TO THE TIME AND EFFORT 
8 SPENT IN DEPOSITION OF ZANDRA PERI- INS TOWARDS FIRST GENERAL 
9 SERVICES'" 
10 A I THINI- THERE WAS SOME, YES. 
11 D LEE STOTT^ 
12 A I THINI- THERE WAS SOME, YES. 
13 O JEFF LEAVITT-
14 A I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT ALL OF THE CONTRACTORS THAT 
15 WERE TAfEN, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A RELATIVE ALLOCATION OF 
16 TIME. 
17 0 LET ME READ A FEW NAMES OF PEOPLE WHOSE DEPOSITIONS 
IS WERE TAfEN: LEE STOTT, HAROLD SCHREIBER, GENE PETERSON, MILT 
19 BECF , LEO THORUP, MARI- JOHNSON, MARSHA SMITH, ZANDRA PERf INS. 
20 A YOU'VE READ ALL THE DEPOSITIONS^ 
21 Q WELL, NO; THERE ARE SOME THAT ARE NOT THERE. 
22 A I COULDN'T SAFELY ANSWER THAT, COUNSEL, WITHOUT 
23 LOOf ING AT THEM ONE BY ONE-
24 C« IN FACT YOU DIDN'T ATTEND ANY OF THOSE DEPOSITIONS, 
25 DID YOU MR. CAMPBELL"' 
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A NO, I DID NOT, PURPOSELY. 
Q AND CAN YOU SAY FROM HAVING REVIEWED DEPOSITIONS 
WHETHER ANY OF THOSE DEPOSITIONS DID NOT INVOLVE ANY FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES ISSUES? 
A THERE WERE PARTS OF THEM THAT DID NOT. 
Q PARTS OF EACH DEPOSITION? 
A YES, THAT'S WHY THERE WAS NO ALLOCATION TO FIRST 
GENERAL WITH REGARD TO THOSE. 
Q BECAUSE IT WAS OVERLAP? 
A WELL, NO, THAT WASN'T YOUR QUESTION. THERE WASN'T 
OVERLAP. THERE WERE AREAS THAT WERE DISCRETE AS TO FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, AND THERE WERE AREAS OVERLAP, THOSE THAT 
WERE SPECIFICALLY ALLOCATED ON FOR FIRST GENERAL. WE'VE 
TRIED—I'VE TRIED TO MAKE A JUDGMENT AND DID SO AS TO THOSE. 
THOSE THAT DID NOT AND RAN TO THE QUESTIONS OF BEAR RIVER'S 
CLAIMS, CLAIMS AGAINST BEAR RIVER, WERE NOT ALLOCATED TO FIRST 
GENERAL. 
Q SO IS IT SAFE TO SAY THAT WHENEVER THERE APPEARED TO 
BE SOME OVERLAP, YOU DID NOT ALLOCATE ANY OF THAT TO FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES^7' 
A THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A PORTION AT ANY ONE TIME THAT 
WOULD HAVE BEEN. I TRIED TO USE A FACTOR OF SAY 10 TO 15 
PERCENT. 
Q I AM AWARE OF A COUPLE OF OTHER ATTORNEYS IN THIS 
MATTER THAT MS. PERKINS RETAINED. ARE THERE ANY FEES FIGURED 
0. A ? S 0 
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INTO THIS FOR MR. DAN BIRCH? 
A I JUST TOLD YOU THAT THE ONLY FEES THAT ARE PARTS OF 
THIS $5,700 ARE FEES OF CAMPBELL, MAAK Z< SESSIONS. I CANNOT 
SPEAK AND WON'T SPEAK FOR ANY OTHER LAWYERS. 
Q THAT WOULD BE THE SAME FOR ED ROBBINS AND VICTOR 
LAWRENCE AS WELL? 
THE COURT: THAT'S BEEN ASKED AND ANSWERED, 
COUNSEL. 
Q SO THE JURY HAS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING, THEN, AND TO 
KIND OF SUM UP, FOR THE PROSECUTING OR DEFENDING OF A $10,600 
MECHANIC'S LIEN CASE, AND PROSECUTING COUNTERCLAIMS OF AT 
LEAST $111,000, PERKINS IS $5,700.05 IN ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
$642.59 IN COSTS THROUGH SUNDAY NIGHT OF THIS WEEK; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. BOSTWICK: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
MR. MARTINSON: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY STEP DOWN. ANY FURTHER 
WITNESSES? 
MR. MARTINSON: NO, YOUR HONOR, BUT I HAVE ONE 
MINOR HOUSEKEEPING MATTER, AM EXHIBIT I NEGLECTED TO HAVE 
ENTERED, IF I COULD, RATHER QUICKLY. 
THE COURT: WHAT IS IT? 
MR. MARTINSON: NO. 19, THE SUBCONTRACTOR'S 
COPY OF—EXCUSE ME, YES. 1 BETTER—IF I COULD, I ALSO HAD 
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BETTER HAVE DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT NO. 118 ENTERED. MAYBE WE 
COULD DO THAT FIRST. I WOULD MOVE IT. 
MR. BOSTWICK: MO OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION TO 19? 
MR. BOSTWICK: I DON'T BELIEVE THERE WAS 
SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION TO OFFER IT. 
THE COURT: WE'LL DISCUSS THIS LATER. WE'LL 
RESERVE THAT RIGHT NOW. YOU MAY CALL YOUR NEXT WITNESS, 
COUNSEL. 
MR. BOSTWICK: I HAVE A MOTION TO MAKE AT THE 
APPROPRIATE TIME. 
THE COURT: AND I'LL RESERVE THAT TO YOU. 
MR. SMITH: AND I HAVE A MOTION TO MAKE AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THEIR CASE IN CHIEF. 
THE COURT: AND I'LL RESERVE THAT TO YOU. 
MR. HEATH: MAY WE ALSO^ 
THE COURT: YOU MAY RESERVE YOURS ALSO. 
MR. HEATH: WE WOULD CALL RAY ORGILL. 
(WHEREUPON, RAY_ORGILL, HAVING FIRST BEEN DULY 
SWORN TO TELL THE TRUTH, ASSUMED THE WITNESS 
STAND AND TESTIFIED UPON HIS OATH AS FOLLOWS:) 
DIRiQI_EXAMINAJION 
l!Y_!L1B'jL__dEATH: 
Q TELL US YOUR NAME, PLEASE. 
A RAYMOND ORGILL, 0-R-G-1-L-L. 
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FIRE? 
A I BELIEVE IT WAS—I DON'T KNOW. IT WAS AFTER 
MEMORIAL DAY SOMETIME. 
Q WOULD THAT HAVE BEEN THE FOLLOWING TUESDAY? 
A I DON'T KNOW. IT WAS AFTER MEMORIAL DAY SOMETIME. 
Q DOES THE 29TH REFRESH YOUR RECOLLECTION? 
A I COULDN'T TELL YOU THE DATE- IT WAS AFTER MEMORIAL 
DAY. 
Q COULD YOU PLEASE TURN TO PAGE 27 OF YOUR DEPOSITION? 
LOOK FOR ME, IF YOU WILL, ON LINE 3 TO BEGIN: 
QUESTION: I'VE INDICATED TO YOU—LET'S 
START OFF WITH A DISCUSSION ABOUT YOUR 
CONTACT WITH FIRST GENERAL SERVICES. I 
BELIEVE YOU INDICATED THAT THE FIRST 
CONTACT YOU HAD WITH ANYBODY FROM FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES WAS THE DAY THAT ZANDRA 
WAS GOING BACK TO ARIZONA AND THAT YOU 
WERE INTRODUCED TO MR. PETERSON AND YOU 
EXCHANGED BUSINESS CARDS AND YOU GAVE HIM 
YOUR HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER; IS THAT 
CORRECTS 
AMD WOULD YOU PLEASE READ YOUR RESPONSE ON LINE ND. 10? 
A MY RESPONSE 19, "THAT S CORRECT." 
Q SO WHICH IS IT""' IT WAS THE MEETING ON THE 22ND? 
A IT WAS ON THE 22ND. 
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0 SO YOUR DEPOSITION TESTIMONY IS INCORRECT; IS THAI 
WHAT YOU'RE TELLING THE JURY TODAY" 
A I'M TELLING YOU THAT I MET WITH HIM OH THE 22ND. 
D DID YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITV TO REVIEW YOUR 
DEPOSITION AND MAI- E CORRECTIONS"' 
A 1 DID. 
0 DID VOL! CORRECT THAT ENTRY" 
A I DIDN'T. 
0 DURING THAT EIRST MEETING, DID YOU RECEIVE ANY 
MAGAZINES FROM MR. PETERSON RELATING TO FIRST GENERAL 
SERVICES' QUALIFICATIONS TO DO THE WORt" 
A NO, I DIDN T. 
0 WOULD YOU TURN OVER TO PAGE ^3, MA AM. I'M SORRr, 
EXCUSE ME; IT S PAGE 40. LOOI 1NG ON LINE 7, THE OUESTJON I 
BELIEVE POSED TO YOU BY MR. RINGWOOD IS: 
GUESTION: YOU EARLIER MENTIONED MR. 
PETERSON SAJD HE WOULD BE ABLE TO PUT THE 
HOME BAC1- IN THE SAME CONDITION IT WAS 
BEFORE THE FIRE. 
WHAT S YOUR ANSWER, MA'AM-
A ANSWER: YES. 
0 PLEASE READ ON FURTHER. 
A ANSWER: NO, HE DROUGHT ME A MAGAZINE TO 
SHOW TESTAMENTS ON HOW WELL HE WAS fNOWN 
AND THE I- IND OF WHR HL PlD. 
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Q DOES THAT REFRESH YOUR RECOLLECTION, MA'AM? 
A I THOUGHT—I GUESS I MISUNDERSTOOD YOUR QUESTION. I 
THOUGHT YOU SAID DID I RECEIVE THEM. I SAW THEM, BUT I DID 
NOT KEEP THEM. 
G YOUR TESTIMONY IS YOU DID NOT TAKE THEM? 
A I DID NOT TAKE THEM WITH ME. 
Q DID YOU READ THE ARTICLES? 
A I DID NOT. 
MR. BOSTWICK: MAY I APPROACH THE WITNESS, YOUR 
HONOR? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
MR. BuSTWICK!: I'M LOCKING FOR EXHIBIT MO. 3. 
I SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT NO. 3. 
HAVE YOU EVER SEEN THAT ARTICLE, MA'AM-
A I CAN'T SAY THAI I'VE SEEM THIS ARTICLE. 
Q WELL, REFER TO THE SECOND COLUMN OF THE FIRST PAGE, 
JUST—NO, IN THE ARTICLE, MA'AM. NOT QUITE HALFWAY DOWN. 
THERE'S A SENTENCE THAT STARTS, "JOBS AVERAGE." DO YOU SEE 
THAT ENTR*', THE WORD "JOBS" APPEARS AT THE RIGHT HAND SIDE OF 
THE COLUMN? WOULD YOU PLEASE READ THAT? 
A TELL ME WHERE IT IS-
C' THE SECOND COLUMN, NOT OU3TE HALFWAY DOWN. THAT 
COLUMN WHERE IT SAYS, "KEEPS JOBS ON SCHEDULE." 
THE COURT: SHOW HER, COUNSEL. 
MR. BOSTWIO : IHnNI YOU, YOUR HONOR. LET ME 
O O C r 
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POINT THAT OUT TO YOU. RIGHT HERE. WOULD YOU PLEASE READ 
THAT SENTENCE, BEGINNING WITH "JOBS AVERAGE"? 
A JOBS AVERAGE SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS AND THE 
MID-POINT FREQUENTLY IS THE LOW POINT. 
Q IS IT NOT TRUE THAT'S WHERE YOU GOT THE IDEA THAT 
THIS PROJECT WOULD TO SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS? 
A DEFINITELY NOT. 
Q NOT FROM MR. PETERSON? 
A 1 GOT IT FROM—THAT'S NOT WHAT HE SAID. 
Q YOU TESTIFIED EARLIER TODAY THAT MR. PETERSON 
TESTIFIED THAT—OR, TOLD YOU THAT THE PROJECT WOULD TAKE FROM 
FOUR TO SIX WEEKS- IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
G DO YOU RECALL ANYTHING DIFFERENT IN YOUR DEPOSITION, 
MA'AM? 
A NO. 
Q PLEASE TURN TO PAGE 102 OF YOUR DEPOSITION. EXCUSE 
ME, IT'S THE BOTTOM OF 101. MY QUESTION AS WAS POSED TO YOU: 
QUESTION: WAS THERE ANY SPECIAL CONCERN 
OF YOURS OTHER THAN TO GET THE PROJECT 
COMMENCED" 
PLEASE READ YOUR ANSWER ON THE TOP OF PAGE J 02. 
A ANSWER: YES, I WANTED TO GET THE PROJECT 
FINISHED, DIDN'T Wf^ Nl TO LEAVE ] T LAGGING 
ON SIX TO EIGHT WEEfS. 
SMITH; CRS-EXAM BY BOSTWICK 
Q FOUR TO SIX OR SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS, WHICH IS IT? 
A WHICH WAS THE COMMITMENT. 
Q IN YOUR DEPOSITION, YOU SAY SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS-
TODAY YOU TESTIFIED FOUR TO SIX WEEKS. I'M ASKING WHICH IT 
IS. 
MR. CAMPBELL: IF THE COURT PLEASE, THAT 
MISCHARACTERIZES THE WITNESSES'S STATEMENT. 
MR. BOSTWICK: WHICH STATEMENT? 
THE COURT: I'LL OVERRULE. SHE MAY ANSWER THE 
QUESTION. 
A IT'S DEFINITELY SIX WEEKS. 
Q SO YOUR TESTIMONY TODAY IS THAT IT'S DEFINITELY SIX 
WEEKS, NOT FOUR Tfj Six, NOT SIX TO EIGHT, BUT DEFINITELY SIX 
WEEKS? 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO OBJECT 
TO THAT. THAT ISN'T WHAT THE DEPOSITION SAYS. 
MR. BOSTWICK: THAT'S WHAT SHE SAID. 
MR. CAMPBELL: NO, THE DEPOSITION IS PLAIN ON 
ITS FACE. SHE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS, BUT 
THAT ISN'T WHAT SHE SAID IN HER DEPOSITION THAT PETERSON SAID 
TO HER AS A REPRESENTATION. ' 
THE COURT: I'LL ALLOW THE QUESTION TO STAND. 
YOU M A Y — . 
MR. BOSTWICf : I'LL RE-ASK IT. EARLIER TODAY 
YOU SAID FOUR TO SIX WEEKS- HH YOUR DEPOSITION \OU SAID SIX 
r\ A f\ *-v ^ 
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TO EIGHT. RIGHT NOW YOU'VE SAID SIX WEEKS., WHICH IS IT? 
A MR. BOSTWICK, IT COULD HAVE BEEN FOUR TO EIGHT 
WEEKS. I CAN'T TELL YOU. 
Q YOU SIMPLY DON'T KNOW. 
A NO, I KNOW HE MADE A COMMITMENT THAT THIS HOUSE 
WOULD BE DONE BY THE FIRST WEEK IN JULY. 
Q DID HE MAKE A COMMITMENT TO YOU THAT THIS WOULD—NOW 
IT'S THE FIRST OF JULY? 
A THE FIRST WEEK IN JULY, MR. BOSTWICK. 
G ARE YOU AWARE THAT FIRST GENERAL SERVICES WERE NOT 
ALLOWED TO COMMENCE WORK DUE TO THE FIRE INVESTIGATION UNTIL 
JUNE 8TH OF 1990? 
A I'M NOT AWARE OF THAT AT ALL. 
0 IF THEY WEREN'T ALLOWED TO DO THAT, TO START WORK 
UNTIL JUNE 8TH OF J 990 , EIGHT WEEKS WOULD PUT THEM INTO 
AUGUST, WOULD IT NOT? 
A I WASN'T AWARE OF ANYTHING, MR. BOSTWICK. 
Q AND THAT'S NOT WHAT I'M ASKING YOU. I'M ASKING YOU 
IF YOU WERE THAT IF THEY WERE ALLOWED TO--NOT ALLOWED TO START 
WORK UNTIL JUNE 8TH, EIGHT WEEKS WOULD PUT THEM INTO AUGUST, 
WOULD IT NOT? 
A I GUESS IT WOULD. 
Q YOU TESTIFIED EARLIER THAI THE MEETING WAS AT T H E — 
THE FIRST MEETING WAS WHEN YOU WERE GOING OVER TO PICK UP YOUR 
SISTER ZANDEA; IS THAI CORRECT^ 
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MAY 22, 1990? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q YOU'VE TESTIFIED ABOUT A NUMBER OF THINGS THAT WERE 
REPRESENTED IN THAT FIRST MEETING. ABOUT HOW LONG DID THAT 
FIRST MEETING LAST OR AT LEAST YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THAT 
MEETING? 
A I WAS THERE ABOUT 15 MINUTES, I THINK. 
Q LET'S GO OVER THE THINGS YOU TALKED ABOUT. YOUR 
TESTIMONY WAS THAT MR. PETERSON SAID HE WAS LICENSED AND 
BONDED? 
A YES. 
G AT THAT POINT YOU DIDN'T HAVE ANY IDEA WHAT BONDING 
MEANT IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE CONSTRUCTION PROJECT, DID YOU? 
A DO YOU WANT ME TO TELL YOU WHAT 1 THOUGHT IT MEANT? 
Q MY QUESTION IS—IT REQUIRES A YES OR ND ANSWER. AT 
THAT TIME YOU DIDN'T HAVE ANY IDEA WHAT BONDING, IN THE 
CONTEXT OF CONSTRUCTION, MEANT, DID YOU? 
A I DID. 
Q HOW DID YOU HAVE THAT UNDERSTANDING? HAD YOU 
ACQUIRED A BOND FROM ANY OTHER CONTRACTOR THAT YOU HAD HIRED 
BEFORE? 
A WHERE WOULD THEY BE WORKING? 
Q ANY CONTRACTOR YOU HAD HIRED BEFORE- HAVE YOU EVER 
HIRED A BONDED CONTRACTOR-
A I DIDN'T KNOW. 
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Q DID YOU HELR YOUR SISTER IN THE RESTORATION OF HER 
HOME ON HILLSDEN DRIVE? 
A YES. 
Q YOU NEVER REQUESTED OR RECOMMENDED THAT A BOND BE 
REQUIRED FROM A CONTRACTOR FOR PERFORMING WORK THERE, DID YOU? 
A NO. 
Q WITH REGARD TO WATER DAMAGE THAT YOU HAVE TESTIFIED 
RESULTED FROM WHAT YOU CLAIM TO BE THE SWAMP COOLER, YOU HIRED 
CONTRACTORS TO DO THAT WORK ON BEHALF OF YOUR SISTER ZANDRA, 
DIDN'T YOU? 
A YES. 
Q YOU DIDN'T REQUIRE BONDS FROM THEM, DID YOU? 
A I DIDN'T NEED TO-
Q AND THAT WASN'T THE QUESTION. YOU DIDN'T REQUIRE 
IT, DID YOU? 
A I DIDN'T NEED IT. 
Q WITH REGARD TO CPH THAT DID THE WORK AFTER FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES WAS TERMINATEDs YOU DIDN'T REQUIRE A BOND 
FROM THAT COMPANY, EITHER, DID YOU? 
A THEY WERE REFERRED TO ME. I DIDN'T MEET THEM. 
Q YOU DIDN'T WORK WITH THEM BEFORE, DID YOU? 
A THEY WERE REFERRED TO ME. 
THE COURT: MA AM, ANSWER HIS QUESTION. 
A WHAT AM I DOING? 
THE COURT: ANSWER HIS QUESTION. 
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1 Q YOIJ HAD NEVER WORKED WITH CPH BEFORE, DID YOU? 
2 A NQm 
3 Q AND WITH REGARD TO LEO THORUP OR ANY OF THE OTHER 
4 CONTRACTORS THAT YOU HIRED, WITH RELATIONSHIP TO THIS 
5 PARTICULAR FIRE, YOU NEVER REQUESTED A BOND OF ANY OF THOSE 
6 CONTRACTORS, DID YOU? 
7 A I DIDN'T KNOW—I DIDN'T—I DIDN'T NEED ONE. 
S Q ZANDRA DIDN'T EVER REQUEST YOU TO REQUIRE A BOND OF 
9 ANY OF THOSE CONTRACTORS, DID SHE? 
10 A I DON'T KNOW. 
11 Q YOU TESTIFIED THAT MR. PETERSON SPOKE ABOUT THE 
12 QUALIFICATIONS OF HIS COMPANY AND THEIR ABILITY TO DO WORK; IS 
13 THAT CORRECT? 
14 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
15 Q DO YOU FIND IT UNUSUAL FOR A CONTRACTOR TO TOUT 
16 CAPABILITIES OF A COMPANY IN ORDER TO GET BUSINESS? 
17 A I FOUND THAT VERY UNUSUAL. 
IS Q YOU DID? 
19 A YES. 
20 Q YOU'RE IN BUSINESS, ARE YOU NOT? 
21 A I WORK. 
22 Q DOES YOUR COMPANY ADVERTISE ITS SERVICES? 
23 A NO. 
24 G YOU HAVEN'T EVER KNOWN A COMPANY' TO ADVERTISE ITS 
25 SERVICES? 
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IN THAT TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN YOURSELF AND MR. 
PETERSON, THAT MR. PETERSON INDICATED HIS INTENT TO PUT THE 
SWAMP COOLER IN THE ATTIC? 
A HE DID, YES. 
Q LET'S GO BACK TO YOUR DEPOSITION. ON PAGE 102, IF 
YOU WOULD TURN TO THAT, PLEASE. WITH REGARD TO YOUR SISTER'S 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROJECT, SHE'S TESTIFIED EARLIER THAT SHE 
WAS NOT IN SALT LAKE CITY BETWEEN I BELIEVE THE DAY AFTER 
LABOR DAY UNTIL AUGUST THE 13TH. IS THAT CONSISTENT WITH YOUR 
RECOLLECTION? 
A THE DAY AFTER LABOR DAY? 
Q EXCUSE ME, MEMORIAL DAY. I'M SORRY. IT WAS MAY, 
RIGHT AFTER THE FIRE. 
A UNTIL—. 
Q AUGUST 13TH. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q I'LL DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO PAGE 102. ON LINE 7 I 
ASKED THE QUESTION: 
QUESTION: WAS ZANDRA LIVING IN THE HOME 
AT THE TIME? 
YOUR ANSWER, MA'AM? 
A ANSWER: ZANDRA WAS IN ARIZONA BUT SHE WAS 
BACK IN SALT LAKE PERIODICALLY. 
MR. CAMPBELL: GO AHEAD. 
A ANSWER: SHE HAD NOWHERE TO STAY, NOWHERE 
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TERMS OF OUR CASE, WE'RE GOING T O — I THINK WE CAN FINISH OUR 
CASE, COME VERY CLOSE TO FINISHING IT, TOMORROW; IF WE CAN GET 
TO IT. IF NOT TOMORROW, THE FIRST THING THURSDAY MORNING IF 
WE CAN GET TO IT BY 5:00 O'CLOCK, DEPENDING ON HOW MUCH 
CROSS—. 
THE COURT: WHAT ARE YOU ASKING ME, JUST TO LET 
THEM GO? 
MR. CAMPBELL: I THINK 1 OUGHT TO KEEP ONE OF 
THEM. 
MR. HEATH: PERHAPS WE COULD HAVE SOME 
INDICATION OF HOW LATE YOU INTEND ON GOING TONIGHT. 
THE COURT: HOW LATE WILL YOU STAY. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I HAVE TO GO. 
MR. HEATH: I'LL TELL YOU MY POSITION ON THAT, 
I DONT THINK WE OUGHT TO GO BEYOND 7:00 O'CLOCK. I THINK 
THERE'S TOO MUCH OF AM IMPOSITION ON THE JURY. THEY CAN'T 
CONCENTRATE LONGER THAN THAT. WE HAVE OUR CASE NOW TO BE PUT 
ON, AND WE OUGHT TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE TO MEET 
WITH WITNESSES IN THE EVENING. WE STILL HAVE A LOT OF WORK TO 
DO. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I HAVE A QUESTION OF THE 
ATTORNEYS FEES, AND I THINI WE'RE GOING TO SUBMIT THAT BY 
STIPULATION, EXCEPT WHAT MAYBE COUNSEL FOR FIRST GENERAL HAS. 
BUT I THINK OTHER THAN THAT, I'LL KEEP ONE WITNESS. IF YOU 
WANT ME TO, I LL DO THAT. ] DON T WANT TO KEEP TWO OUT THERE. 
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THE COURT: DO YOU THINK WE'LL FINISH TOMORROW, 
FINISH YOUR CASE, DO YOU THINK B Y — . 
MR. HEATH: I THIN!: AT THE LATEST BY NOON 
THURSDAY, BUT THERE'S A POSSIBILITY WE COULD FINISH IT BY 
TOMORROW. I THINK THAT MAY BE TOO OPTIMISTIC. 
THE COURT: KEEP ONE OF YOUR WITNESSES. KEEP 
ONE OF YOUR WITNESSES. 
MR. CAMPBELL: ALL RIGHT. 
(THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED IN THE 
PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
MR. CAMPBELL: THANK YOU, JUDGE. WE'LL SAVE 
SOME MONEY. 
O (BY MR. HEATH) MS. SMITH, I'D LIKE YOU NOW TO 
ADDRESS ONE OTHER AREA OF THE POLICY WHICH HAS TO DO WITH THE 
CLAIM RELATING TO THE ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES. DO YOU 
RECALL ASSISTING YOUR SISTER IN PUTTING TOGETHER A CLAIM FOR 
ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES? 
A YES. 
Q DO YOU RECALL MAKING A REQUEST OF BEAR RIVER TO MAKE 
SOME PAYMENTS CONCERNING ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES? 
A I RECALL SUBMITTING SOME THINGS. 
Q I'LL SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS EXHIBIT NO. 
105TD, TD105, AND ASK YOU IF YOU HAVE EVER SEEN THAT LETTER. 
MR. CAMPBELL: DO WE HAVE A COPY" 
MR. HEATH: LET ML TAI E THAT, IF 3 MAY. WAS 
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A UN THE HANDWRITTEN INVOICE, THIS ONE? 
Q YES. 
A YES. 
G WHAT DOCUMENTS—I'M ASKING NOW FOR ACTUAL INVOICES 
AND SALES SLIPS. WHAT ITEMS DID SHE REPLACE? 
A SHE HAS REPLACED THE HARDWARE QH THE DOORS. 
Q THAT GOES TO THE DWELLING. I'M ASKING YOU ABOUT THE 
CONTENTS-
A I DON'T KNOW. I CAN'T-~~YOU KNOW, IF I SAW THEM, I 
COULD TELL YOU WHICH ONES THERE WERE. BUT I CAN'T TELL BY 
THIS. 
Q AS YOU'RE SITTING HERE TODAY, DO YOU REMEMBER ANY 
ITEM, TV SET OR COUCH OR ANY ITEM SHE'S ACTUALLY REPLACED FOR 
WHICH YOU HAVE SUBMITTED—AND SHE CAN ANSWER WHAT SHE 
SUBMITTED—BUT ONLY AS TO WHAT YOU SUBMITTED TO BEAR RIVER? 
A I HAVEN'T. 
Q OKAY. NOW ISN'T IT CORRECT THAT ON BEHALF OF YOUR 
SISTER, YOU DIRECTED BEAR RIVER NOT TO RAY ANY CONTRACTORS, 
PERIOD? 
A NO. 
Q DIDN'T IN FACT YOU SEND A LETTER TO BEAR RIVER 
STATING SO, THAT SHE SHOULD NOT PAY ANY CONTRACTORS WITHOUT 
YOUR AUTHORIZATION? 
A WITHOUT MY AUTHORI 2ATION, THAT ' S CORRECT. 
Q NOW THE NEXT QUESTION IS: DID THAT INCLUDE FIRST 
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GENERAL SERVICES? 
A YES. 
Q HAVE YOU EVER AUTHORIZED. ON BEHALF OF YOUR SISTER, 
BEAR RIVER TO PAY—TO MAKE ANY PAYMENTS TO FIRST GENERAL 
SERVICES IN ADDITION TO WHAT THEY HAVE PAID? 
A . NO, NOR WHAT THEY PAID. 
Q SO WHEN IT COMES TO SETTLING THE DWELLING ASPECT OF 
THIS CLAIM, WOULDN-T YOU AGREE THAT BEAR RIVER WOULD NOT BE 
ABLE TO SETTLE THE DWELLING ASPECT OF THE CLAIM UNTIL Y O U — 
EXCUSE ME, MS. PERKINS AND FIRST GENERAL SERVICES RESOLVE 
THEIR DIFFERENCES? 
A NO, I WOULDN'T AGREE WITH THAT. 
Q ARE YOU SAYING THAT BEAR RIVER WOULD BE OBLIGATED TO 
PAY ALL OF MR. THORUP AND OTHER CONTRACTORS, AND THEN ALSO 
PERHAPS PAY MORE TO FIRST GENERAL SERVICES OR WHATEVER THE 
COURT SAYS; IS THAT YOUR POSITION ON BEHALF OF YOUR SISTER? 
MR. CAMPBELL: THAT CALLS FOR A LEGAL 
CONCLUSION. I OBJECT TO IT. 
MR. HEATH: I THINK WE'RE ENTITLED TO KNOW-
MR. CAMPBELL: I'M SAYING THAT EVEN AS PART OF 
THEIR CASE IN CHIEF, SHE'S NOT SPEAKING AT THIS POINT FOR 
ZANDRA PERKINS AS PART OF THEIR CASE IN CHIEF. 
MR. HEATH: WELL, I THINK WE'RE ENTITLED TO 
KNOW WHETHER SHE FELT AT THrtl 1 J ME , IN NOVEMBER OF 1990, 
WHETHER BEAR RIVER WAS IN ANY PuSITION TO SETTLE THE DWELLING 
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A I DIDN'T—I M SORRY, 114, 
O REFERRING TO ThlE HOOKER VACUUM ON THE BOTTOM OF THE 
PAGE, PAGE NO. 2. 
A I DON'T \ NOW THAT THAT S STILL IN THE HOME. I 
REMEMBER GIVING THAT TO THEM. 
Q IT'S NEVER BEEN REPLACED, HAS IT""* 
A 1 DON T I- NOW. 
D HAVE YOU EVER, ON BEHALF OF YOUR SISTER, SUBMITTED 
ANY INVOICE OR ANY SALE DOCUMENTS SHOWING IT'S BEEN REPLACED" 
A I HAVE NOT, BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN SHE HASN'T. 
O IS IT YOUR TESTIMONY HERE THAT YOU SUBMITTED THE 
INFORMATION CONTAINED ON E>HJB1T NO. 1 US RELATING TO ROOM AND 
BOARD INVOICED FROM YOUR MOTHER TO ZAND*A. THAT THAT 
INFORMATION WAS CORRECT, THAT SHE ACTUALLY HAD INCURRED THOSE 
EXPENSES"* 
A SHE PREPARED THOSE ON THE ADVj.CE OF LEGAL COUNSEL. 
0 AND THAT S NuT THE MIJFSTION. MY f'UESTION IS: THE 
INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THAT E\'hJPJT I JUST REFERRED TO, IS 
THAT INFORMATION CORRECT, WERE THuSE EXPENSES INCURRED BY 
ZANDRA WITH YOUR MOTHER " 
A NOT ALL OF THEM. 
O WHEN CUUNSEL TOLD ruU TO SUBMIT THOSE, DIDN'T YOU 
UNDERSTAND THAT THAT I N F O R M M T L U N WA- NOT CORRECT"' 
A I D1DN T PAY ANY M M L N T J O N , FRANILY, AT THE TIME. 
0 YOU JUST WENT HHEAl tLINDLY AND SUBMITTED THAT 
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WITHOUT ASKING WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS AN ACCURATE STATEMENT; IS 
THAT WHAT YOU WOULD HAVE THIS JURY BELIEVE? 
MR. CAMPBELL: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR, ARGUMENT. 
THE COURT: I'LL SUSTAIN. 
Q (BY MR. HEATH) ARE YOU TELLING ME THAT YOU SUBMITTED 
THIS, WENT TO THE TROUBLE OF FAXING IT, WENT TO THE TROUBLE OF 
PUTTING IT ON A WORKSHEET, AND NEVER CONSIDERED WHETHER OR NOT 
IT WAS ACCURATE? 
A I TYPED IT. I DID NOT FIGURE IT MYSELF. I — IS THAT 
WHAT YOU WANT ME TO SAY? 
Q I WANT YOU TO TELL THE TRUTH. 
A THAT'S WHAT I'M DOING, MR. HEATH. 
Q YOU'RE TELLING ME THAT YOU DIDN'T CONSIDER WHETHER 
OR NOT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS EXHIBIT WAS ACCURATE 
WHEN YOU SUBMITTED IT? 
A I SIMPLY TYPED THAT. I DID NOT CONSIDER IT. I DID 
NOT ADD IT. I DID NOT—I SIMPLY TYPED IT. 
Q WHEN YOU TYPED "USE OF STUDY FROM 5-19 TO 10-22, 158 
DAYS," AND YOU PUT THAT AMOUNT IN THERE, YOU JUST TYPED THAT, 
YOU DIDN'T CONSIDER WHETHER IT WAS TRUE OR NOT? 
A I DIDN'T PREPARE THAT DOCUMENT. I SIMPLY TYPED IT. 
Q YOU, HOWEVER, KNEW THAT SHE WASN'T THERE DURING THAT-
PERIOD OF TIME-, ISN'T THAT CORRECT? ALL THAT TIME? 
A I KNEW THAT SHE WAS NOT THERE. I KNEW SHE HAD 
THINGS—. 
BMITHs RECRS-EXAM BY HEATH 
Q YOU TESTIFIED RELATING TO THESE DOCUMENTS AS 
CONTAINED IN EVIDENCE BY EXHIBIT NQS. Ill, THE FAX COVER 
SHEET, THAT YOU HAD NO INTENTION OF SUBMITTING A MISLEADING 
CLAIM TO BEAR RIVER ON BEHALF OF YOUR SISTER; IS THAT YOUR 
TESTIMONY? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q DID YOU ALSO THINK BEAR RIVER WOULD JUST IGNORE 
THAT? IS THAT CORRECT? 
A I DON'T KNOW. 
Q DIDN'T YOU EXPECT BEAR RIVER TO RELY UPON THAT? IN 
FACT DIDN'T YOU DEMAND THAT THEY PAY THAT? 
A I DID NOT DEMAND IT. 
Q DIDN'T YOUR SISTER, AT ONE TIME IN JANUARY., AS A 
MATTER OF FACT, WHEN SHE WAS BACK HERE FROM LAW SCHOOL, DEMAND 
OF MR. BLOOM THAT THE ENTIRE LIMITS OF *17,OOO OF THE 
ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES BE PAID WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF 
TIME? 
MR. CAMPBELL: THERE'S NO FOUNDATION FOR THIS 
WITNESS T O — . 
MR. HEATHs I'M ASKING IF SHE KNOWS. 
MR. CAMPBELL: WELL, HE DIDN'T ASK HE SHE 
KNOWS. HE ASKED, "ISN'T IT A FACT?" 
THE COURT: SUSTAINED. YOU MAY REPHRASE THE 
QUESTION. 
Q ARE YOU AWARE OF THE FACT THAT SUCH A CONVERSATION 
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TOOK PLACE BETWEEN ZANDRA AND MR, BLOOM PERTAINING TO HER 





Q MS. SMITH, I WANT YOU TO LOOK AT EXHIBIT NO. 113. I 
NOTE THAT THIS IS THE JOB INVOICE FROM NELSON PLUMBING. J 
NOTICED THAT THE INVOICE IS ADDRESSED TO ZANDRA PERKINS. 3510 
SOUTH 640 WEST. NOW THAT'S WHERE THE FIRE OCCURRED, RIGHTS 
A YES. 
Q THAT'S WHERE THE TENANT WAS RESIDING AT THIS PCI^T? 
A YES. 
Q ARE YOU TELLING ME YOUR RECEIVED THIS LETTER, ^-IS 
INVOICE? 
A I RECEIVED IT FROM THE TENANTS, YES. 
G THE TENANTS GAVE IT YOU? 
A YES. 
Q THEY DIDN'T SEND IT TO MS. PERKINS? 
A NO. 
Q WHEN DID YOU RECEIVE IT? 
A I CAN'T TELL YOU THE DATE. I DON'T KNOW; IN ~:~E Tn 
SUBMIT IT TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
Q ONE FINAL QUESTION: ARE YOU SURE THAT THAT ~l-
LOMDITIONING UNIT, SWAMP COOLER, WAS NOT TURNED ON FRC" --E 
TIME MR. FRAMPTON COMPLETED IT IN JULY UNTIL THE WATER DAMAGE 
OCCURRED IN JANUARY? 
A IT WAS NEVER TURNED ON WHEN I WAS THERE. 
Q WELL, ARE YOU SURE THAT IT WASN'T TURNED ON? I KNOW 
YOU SAID YOU HAD NEVER TURNED IT ON, BUT ARE YOU SURE NO ONE 
ELSE TURNED IT ON? 
A NO ONE TURNED IT ON, TO MY KNOWLEDGE. 
MR. SMITHS THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
MR. CAMPBELL: NO QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: MEMBERS OF THE JURY, WE WILL TAKE 
OUR EVENING RECESS. I AGAIN ADMONISH YOU THAT YOU'RE FREE TO 
GO ABOUT YOUR ACTIVITIES THIS EVENING, RETURN TO YOUR HOMES. 
PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS THIS MATTER AMONG YOURSELVES OR WITH 
ANYONE YOU MAY BE TALKING TO. PLEASE RETURN TO THE COURTROOM 
TOMORROW MORNING BY 9:00 O'CLOCK. THE JURY MAY BE EXCUSED AND 
THE COURT WILL REMAIN IN SESSION. 
(WHEREUPON, THE JURY WAS EXCUSED FROM AND LEFT 
THE COURTROOM-, AFTER WHICH, THE FOLLOWING 
PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD IN CAMERA, OUT OF THE 
PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
THE COURT: LET'S PUT SOME STUFF ON THE RECORD. 
I KNOW IT'S LATE, BUT YOU WANTED TO PUT THAT STIPULATION ON 
THE RECORD. I HAVE A COUPLE OF GUEST IONS, TOO. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, THE NEXT PART OF THE 
CASE IN CHIEF OF PERKINS WILL BE TO STATE TO THE COURT WHAT 
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THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS IS THAT Ms, 
PERT INS HAS INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CLAIM AGAINST DEAR 
RIVER FOR ITS DAD FAITH IN HANDLING OF THE CONTENTS AND 
DWELLING ASPECTS OF THE INSURANCE CLAIM, AND IN THAT 
CONNECTION, YOUR HONOR, THE TESTIMONY WOULD SHOW THAT—AND WE 
WOULD PROFFER EVIDENCE TO SHOW, THAT THE LEGAL EXPENSES OF THE 
FIRM CAMPBELL, MA AC* i< SESSIONS, UP THROUGH I BELIEVE—IF THIS 
I S — I F 1 M NOT IN ERROR ON THIS, BUT I THIN* THIS IS THROUGH 
THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEEf , MONDAY OF THIS WEE* , TOTALS 
4:^6,480.45, TOTAL FEES. TOTAL COSTS ON THE PART OF CAMPBELL, 
MAALI- V SESSIONS, THE COSTS ARE *9,184. 
I WOULD PROPOSE, YOUR HONOR, WITH REGARD TO 
THAT, WE HAVE ALLOCATED THOSE TOTAL FEES TO BEAR RIVER, IN THE 
AMOUNT 4-6,042 AND COSTS; 4 6,042.5°. 
WE ARE PREPARED TO TESTIFY AS 10 HOW WE ARRIVED 
AT THE ALLOCATION FIGURE- THERE ARE ADDITIONAL FEES, YOUR 
HONOR. THE TuTAL FEES I WOULD SUBMIT TO THE COURT OF ALL OF 
THE ATTORNEYS, INCLUDING CAMFE'ELL, MAAET *. SESSIONS, INCLUDING 
THAT OF PROBASCO AND ALL OF THE FEES IN THE INITIAL 
ATTORNEYS--1 SHOULD SAY EXCLUSIVE OF 1 HE LAWRENCE FEES, BUT 
INCLUDING THE PROBASCO, WE WOULD SUBMIT THOSE ARE 4:105, 3u0, 
ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST -MOO:; ACTUALLY 4:105,297. 
AND ALSO COSV OF 4:12,701. AND I HAVE 
INDICATED TO MR. HEATH IN CONNECTION WITH THAT THAT THE FIGURE 
WOULD BE, THAT THAT FIGURE UIOLU D HE AFTER A -Tl 0,000 DISCOUNT 
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AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THAT, BECAUSE HE'S HAD A CONCERN ABOUT 
OVERLAPPING OF FEES BETWEEN COUNSEL. 
WE HAVEN'T INCLUDED ANY OF THE LAWRENCE FEES-
AMD DISCOUNTED THE FEES OF PROBASCO $10,000. THAT IS THE 
NATURE OF THE PROFFER THAT I SUBMIT TO THE COURT. WHAT I 
WOULD ASK THEREFORE TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY IB THE FACT THAT THE 
FEES THAT ARE—WHAT I WOULD THEREFORE WOULD SUBMIT, YOUR 
HONOR, THE EVIDENCE THAT WOULD GO TO THE JURY IS IB THAT 
ZANDRA PERKINS' FEES HAVE BEEN A TOTAL OF $105,300—OR, 
$297.95; $12,701.18; OF WHICH $5,700 IN FEES WOULD BE 
ALLOCATED TO FIRST GENERAL AND $642.59 WOULD BE ALLOCATED IN 
COSTS TO FIRST GENERAL. 
THE TOTAL COSTS, AS I'VE INDICATED, ARE 
$12,701.18. THAT WOULD BE OUR PROFFER. WE WOULD SUBMIT THAT 
BY WAY OF STIPULATION. 
AND WE PROBABLY, YOUR HONOR, CAN HAVE THAT 
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY WAY OF A WRITTEN STIPULATION THAT 
THE COURT CAN READ TO THE JURY, IF THE COURT ACCEPTS THE 
STIPULATION. IF IT'S NOT STIPULATED TO, WE'LL HAVE TO PUT ON 
EVIDENCE AND CALL INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS. 
MR. BOSTWICK: SO I UNDERSTAND, THE OUT-OF— 
WELL, OUT OF THE TOTAL $lo5,000, THE TOTAL THAT YOU'RE 
ALLOCATING IB ONLY $5,700 TO FIRST GENERAL'? 
MR. CAMPBELL: THAT'S ALL WE CAN FIND. WE 
WOULD ALLOCATE THAT TO THIS PHASE, TO FIRST GENERAL. 
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MR. HEATH: YOUR HONOR, ON BEHALF OF BEAR 
RIVER, WE WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO THE PROFFER BY MAKING A 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT„ AND THAT IS TO CALL THE COURT'S 
ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT WE HAVE FILED AS AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE A DEFENSE THAT THE LITIGATION BROUGHT BY MS. PERKINS 
BY WAY OF THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST BEAR RIVER IS 
WITHOUT MERIT AND IS NOT BROUGHT IN GOOD FAITH. 
AND WE SUBMIT, YOUR HONOR, THAT THAT IS A 
MATTER THAT THE COURT WOULD DETERMINE AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
THE EVENT THE JURY VERDICT IS IN FAVOR OF BEAR RIVER ON THE 
CASE IN CHIEF-
IN OTHER WORDS, THAT'S NOT A MATTER THAT WILL 
BE PRESENTED TO THE JURY, UNLESS THE COURT ADVISES US OR 
COUNSEL TELLS US THEY'RE NOT WILLING TO STIPULATE TO THAT 
FACT,, 
THE REASON THAT'S MATERIAL AT THIS POINT IS 
THAT IF THAT IS THE CASE, AND WERE THE COURT TO FIND 
EVENTUALLY THAT PERKINS CASE IS WITHOUT MERIT, AND WAS NOT 
BROUGHT IN GOOD FAITH, WE THEN WOULD BE ENTITLED TO PUT OH 
EVIDENCE OF ATTORNEYS FEES. WE'LL ONLY STIPULATE TO THE 
PROFFER SUBMITTED BY PERKINS IF PERKINS, THROUGH COUNSEL, WILL 
STIPULATE THAT WE WOULD BE GRANTED THE SAME RIGHT; THAT IS TO 
SUBMIT THE MATTER TO THE COURT BASED ON AFFIDAVIT, BASED UPON 
ITEMIZATION OF COUNSEL'S FEES, WITHOUT HAVING TO CALL A 
WITNESS TO TESTIFY CONCERNING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE FEE. 
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AND IF THAT SUBMISSION THAT WE MAKE IN RESPONSE 
TO THE PROFFER IS ACCEPTABLE TO COUNSEL FOR PERKINS, WE THEM, 
YOUR HONOR, WOULD STIPULATE TO THE PROFFER OF PERKINS 
REGARDING ATTORNEYS FEES RELATING TO THE ALLEGED BAD FAITH. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, OUR RESPONSE TO THAT 
IS I HAVE NOT SEEN ANY OF STRONG & HANNI'S BILLS OR COSTS, AND 
I DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY ARE. WHAT I'M PREPARED TO SAY IS WE 
WILL LOOK AT THE—IF THE ULTIMATE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT IS 
THAT MY CLIENT DOESN'T PREVAIL ON CLAIMS AGAINST BEAR RIVER, 
AND BEAR RIVER WANTS TO PURSUE, AS I UNDERSTAND—THEY HAVEN'T 
DONE IT, NO COUNTERCLAIM IN THIS CASE AGAINST THE THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT, BUT I F: THEY WANT TO PURSUE A CLAIM UNDER THE 
STATUTE ON THE BASIS THAT MY CLIENT'S CLAIM IS A FRIVOLOUS 
CLAIM, WHAT I UNDERSTAND HENRY TO BE SAYING IS THAT HE WANTS 
OUR STIPULATION WITH REGARD TO PUTTING HIS TIME AND EXPENSES 
BEFORE THE COURT BY WAY OF AN AFFIDAVIT, 
AND I'VE TOLD HIM I'LL BE HAPPY TO DO THAT, BUT 
I HAVEN T SEEN THEM. RIGHT NOW, OBVIOUSLY I CAN'T STIPULATE 
TO SOMETHING I HAVEN'T SEEN, BUT I'M PREPARED AT LEAST IF WE 
GOT THAT FAR, I'M PREPARED CERTAINLY TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT 
AVOIDING THE NECESSITY OF REQUIRING SOMEBODY ELSE TO COME IN 
AND TESTIFY AS TO THE REASONABLENESS. 
I THINI:." THAT'S WHAT HE'S AFTER. 
MR. HEATH: IN FAIRNESS TO MR. CAMPBELL, IT'S 
CORRECT THAT HE HAS NOT SEEN OURS. WE HAVE NOT PREPARED AN 
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AFFIDAVIT NOR AN ITEMIZATION OF OUR FEES, NOR HAVE WE SEEN HIS 
ITEMIZATION OF FEES. WE HAVE ACCEPTED AT FACE VALUE WHAT HE 
HAS TOLD US. 
PERHAPS WE COULD RESOLVE THIS BY SAYING THAT IN 
NO EVENT WOULD WE CLAIM A FIGURE HIGHER THAN WHAT HE IS 
CLAIMING AGAINST BEAR RIVER- WOULD THAT SATISFY YOU? AND WE 
CERTAINLY—I THINK THAT'S A GENEROUS PROFFER, BECAUSE WE'VE 
BEEN INVOLVED IN THIS CASE BEFORE EVERYONE. 
MR. CAMPBELLS I'M PREPARED TO SAY WHAT I HAVE-
JUST SAID TO THE COURT I'M PREPARED TO DO, TO LOOK AT MR. 
HEATH AND STRONG & HANNI'S EXPENSES, AND IF THEY ARE 
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED, WE WILL NOT HAVE ADDITIONAL EXPERT 
WITNESSES TO TESTIFY AS TO REASONABLENESS IN CONNECTION WITH 
ANY POTENTIAL AND AT THIS POINT SPECULATIVE, CERTAINLY, 
CLAIMED BY BEAR RIVER. 
MR. HEATH: AND WE'RE NOT HERE TO DISCUSS THE 
MERITS OF THE CLAIM. 
MR. CAMPBELL: NO. 
MR. HEATH: I THOUGHT WE WERE TRYING TO DO THIS 
TO SAVE TIME. THAT'S WHY WE'RE PROFFERING IT THIS WAY. IF 
NOT, IF THE PROBLEM HE HAS IS THAT HE HASN'T SEEN OUR FEES, I 
CAN UNDERSTAND THAT, EXCEPT THAT I HAVEN'T SEEN HIS FEES, 
EITHER. 
AND THE PROBLEM I HAVE WITH THAT IS THAT WHAT 
HE'S STATED IS NO STIPULATION AT ALL, BECAUSE IF HE DISAGREES, 
THEN IN ANY RESPECT WITH WHAT OUR AFFIDAVIT SAYS, THEN I TAKE 
IT WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO PUT ON EXPERTS REGARDING 
REASONABLENESS OF OUR FEES. 
MR. CAMPBELL: WHY DON'T YOU LET ME SEE YOUR 
FEES OVER THE NIGHT AND MAYBE WE CAN—-
THE COURTs MAYBE, BUT WHERE ARE WE? 
MR. CAMPBELL: THAT'S WHAT I'M TRYING TO AVOID. 
WE'VE GOT ABOUT HALF A DAY OF ATTORNEYS FEES' TESTIMONY, AND 
THAT'S WHY WE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE WAY TO 
HANDLE IT. I STILL THINK IT IS. 
MR. HEATH: AND I'M NOT GETTING A DIRECT ANSWER 
FROM COUNSEL. HE'S JUST SAYING, "WE'LL LOOK AT IT BUT WE 
WON'T COMMIT TO DO IT." 
I HAVEN'T SEEN HIS, I'VE TAKEN IT ON FACE 
VALUE. I KNOW ABOUT WHAT WE HAVE IN OUR CASE, AND I CAN 
UNDERSTAND THAT HE WOULD HAVE A SIMILAR AMOUNT. NOW WE MAY 
NEED TO DISCOUNT OURS TO GET TO THAT LEVEL. I HAVE ATTEMPTED 
TO BE REASONABLE AT THIS LATE HOUR. I WOULD SUBMIT THAT WE 
WON'T ASK FOR MORE THAN WHAT HE S ASKING. WE'VE BEEN ON THE 
CASE MORE THAN A YEAR LONGER„ 
MR. CAMPBELL: I VE DONE THE BEST I CAN AT THIS 
POINT. 
MR. HEATH: AS HA'-'E I . 
THE COURT: WELL--- . 




THE COURT: YOU HAVEN'T SEEN IT, BUT HE'S 
GIVING YOU SOMETHING TO LOOK AT, THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE MORE 
THAN YOURS. 
MR. CAMPBELL: IF I LOOKED AT THAT, THEN I'LL 
BE HAPPY TO RESPOND TO THAT. 
THE COURT: YOU'RE LOOKING AT IT NOW. YOU'RE 
LOOKING AT IT NOW. YOU SAY YOU DON'T WANT TO RESPOND NOW? 
MR. CAMPBELL: WELL, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE WHAT 
HIS DOCUMENTATION LOOKS LIKE TO SEE WHAT THE FEES ARE. I HAVE 
GIVEN. HIM THE AMOUNT OF OUR FEES, AND WE'RE PREPARED TO GIVE 
HIM A STATEMENT, A RUNNING ACCOUNT, OF EVERY HOUR WE'VE SPENT 
ON THIS CASE AND ALSO THE COSTS. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND THAT, BUT HE'S 
SUBMITTED THAT HE'S GIVING YOU SOMETHING TO LOOK AT. HE'S 
TELLING YOU IN OPEN COURT THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE MORE THAN 
YOURS. 
MR. CAMPBELL: ALL I CAN STILL SAY, YOUR HONOR, 
IS THAT I WOULD LIKE TO FIND OUT—MR. HEATH, YOU TELL THE 
COURT HOW MUCH YOUR FEES ARE. 
MR. HEATH: I THINK THEY'RE GREATER THAN YOURS. 
I CAN'T SAY ON THE RECORD FOR SURE WHAT THEY ARE. MY 
UNDERSTANDING IS THAT WE ARE—WE'VE BEEN WORKING A YEAR-AND-A-
HALF LONGER THAN YOU HAVE. WE VE GONE THROUGH FOUR SETS OF 
ATTORNEYS- BUT I'M WILLING TO REDUCE THEM, IF THEY ARE, TO 
YOUR LEVEL. THAT'S ALL I'M SAYING,. 
MR. CAMPBELLS HOW MUCH ARE THEY? 
MR. HEATH= I CAN'T TELL YOU WHAT THEY ARE-
MR. CAMPBELLS AND THAT GIVES US A PROBLEM. 
MR. HEATHs THEY WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 
*125,OOO, SOMEWHERE IN THAT RANGE. I CAN'T SAY FOR SURE, 
THOUGH, BECAUSE THE LAST BILLING WAS THE QUARTERLY BILLING 
THAT WAS DONE, AND ANYTHING SINCE THEN FOR TRIAL PREPARATION 
FROM THE FIRST OF APRIL THROUGH NOW, I MEAN THEY'RE INPUTTED 
INTO THE COMPUTER, AND I GUESS, YOU KNOW, WE CAN GET THAT IF 
THAT'S NECESSARY. BUT I'M TELLING YOU, BOB, THAT I'M 
REASONABLY CERTAIN THEY'RE IN EXCESS OF WHAT YOU'RE CLAIMING. 
MR. CAMPBELLS WITHOUT REPRESENTATION, YOUR 
HONOR, I THINK—AND I WANT TO BE SUPPORTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
THE STIPULATION, I'M WILLING TO AGREE THAT THAT WOULD BE NOT 
UNREASONABLE. 
MR. HEATHs WITHOUT AN UNDERSTANDING, AND IF WE 
NEED TO SUPPORT IT, RATHER THAN GO TO ALL THE PROBLEM OF 
PREPARING AN AFFIDAVIT, IF IT'S NOT NECESSARY, WE WOULD 
STIPULATE TO IT, YOUR HONOR, AND IF COUNSEL NEEDS TO SEE I T — . 
MR. CAMPBELLS WELL, I THINK FOR PURPOSES OF 
THE STIPULATION AT THIS POINT—. 
THE COURTs AND I APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS ON 
THAT. COUNSEL, I HAVE A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS. THE DOCUMENTS 
THAT ARE COMING IN HAVE BEEN BLOWN UP, AND OF COURSE I TOOK 
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1 THAT MAY ULTIMATELY BE AWARDED TO FRAMPTON AGAINST FIRST 
2 GENERAL. WE WOULD SIMPLY REQUEST THE COURT TO RESERVE THE 
3 ISSUE OF THOSE PAYMENTS, THOSE PAYMENT ITEMS, UNTIL THE SAME 
4 TIME FRAMPTON ADDRESSES THAT, WE ANTICIPATE, AS FAR AS THAT 
5 CROSS-CLAIM. 
6 THE COURT: THAT'S FINE. 
7 MR. BOSTWICK: AND THE LAST THING, YOUR HONOR, 
8 IS THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF WITNESSES IN THIS CASE. I 
9 SUGGEST THAT WE MAY WANT TO CONSIDER INVOKING THE EXCLUSIONARY 
10 RULE ON WITNESSES. 
11 THE COURT: THAT'S UP TO YOU. IF YOU MOVE FOR 
12 I T — . 
13 MR. BOSTWICK: I'M MAKING A MOTION TO DO SO. 
14 MR. CAMPBELL: I WOULD JOIN IN IT, YOUR HONOR, 
15 UNDER RULE 615 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
16 MR. BOSTWICK: THAT'S IT, YOUR HONOR. 
17 THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING, MR. HEATH? 
18M MR. HEATH: YOUR HONOR, LET ME IDENTIFY FOR THE 
19 COURT'S PURPOSES, WE HAVE FOLKS FROM BEAR RIVER HERE WHO WILL 
20 NOT BE WITNESSES; COUNSEL, THEY WERE ON THE WITNESS LIST, THE 
21 ORIGINAL LIST. 
22 1 THE COURT: DON'T HAVE THEM STEP OUT YET, MR. 
23 BOSTWICK. 
24 MR. HEATH: SO YOU UNDERSTAND, THEY WILL BE 
25 SITTING THROUGH PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL ADVISING US, AND WE WILL 
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1 THE TIME; THEREFORE, I WOULD DENY THE MOTION AND LET MY RULING 
2|| STAND, THE PRIOR RULING, AND ALLOW THEM TO DO IT, IF THE CLAIM 
FOR BAD FAITH IS STILL PRESENT. 
AND, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IT IS. ANYTHING ELSE? 
511 MR. BOSTWICK: I HAVE A COUPLE OF OTHER ISSUES, 
6 YOUR HONOR. THIS IS JUST HOUSEKEEPING MATERIALS, REALLY. ONE 
7 IS THAT THERE ARE ISSUES OF ATTORNEYS FEES BETWEEN PERKINS AND 
8 FIRST GENERAL SERVICES. WE WOULD SUBMIT, AND HOPEFULLY 
9 COUNSEL WOULD AGREE, TO TENDER THAT DECISION ON THE QUANTUM OF 
10 THE ATTORNEYS FEES TO YOUR HONOR FOLLOWING THE DECISION BY THE 
11 JURY ON THE LIABILITY ISSUE. 
12 THE COURT: AND DO YOU HAVE A STIPULATION TO DO 
13 THAT? 
14 MR. BOSTWICK: THIS IS JUST TRYING TO GO 
15 THROUGH AND STREAMLINE THINGS. WE CAME UP WITH THAT; I DON'T 
16 KNOW THAT THAT'S ACCEPTABLE TO COUNSEL. 
17 MR. CAMPBELL: I HAVEN'T EVEN HEARD ABOUT IT. 
18 I'M HAPPY TO TALK TO COUNSEL ABOUT IT, BUT I DON'T KNOW WHAT 
19 THEY'RE PROPOSAL IS. 
20 MR. BOSTWICK: BEFORE WE END OUR CASE IN CHIEF, 
21 WE'LL WORK THAT OUT WITH COUNSEL. IN ADDITION, FRAMPTON'S 
22 CASE, WE'VE DISCUSSED RESERVING COUNTERCLAIM ISSUES AGAINST 
23 FRAMPTON TO A VERY DISCREET PORTION OF THE TRIAL, YOUR HONOR. 
24 I WOULD ALSO INDICATE THAT THE PAYMENT HISTORY OF FIRST 
25) GENERAL SERVICES TO FRAMPTON WILL 3EAR ON THE ATTORNEYS FEES 
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SECRETARY. WHAT THAT INDICATES IS THAT A CARBON COPY OR JUST 
A COPY WAS SENT TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY ON 5-24-90. 
Q THE DATE THAT YOU TESTIFIED YOU RECEIVED IT IN THE 
MAIL? 
A YES. 
Q AND AFTER YOU RECEIVED THE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION 
CARD, WHAT DID THAT MEAN TO YOU? 
A THAT MEANT THAT WE WERE AUTHORIZED TO DO THE WORK. 
MR. CAMPBELL: EXCUSE ME, I'M SORRY. JUST SO 
WE HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING AS TO HOW WE'RE GOING TO WORK IN THE 
COURTROOM, COUNSEL HANDED A DOCUMENT TO THE JURY, AND I HAVE 
NO OBJECTION OF HIS DOING IT, BUT I THINK COUNSEL OUGHT TO GET 
PERMISSION FROM THE COURT BEFORE DOING SO. 
MR. BOSTWICK: AND I APOLOGIZE, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: DO IT, COUNSEL. THANK YOU. 
MR. BOSTWICK: THANK YOU, MR. CAMPBELL, FOR 
BRINGING THAT UP. NOW WITH REGARD TO YOUR INITIAL WALK-
THROUGH ON THE 22ND OF MAY WITH ZANDRA PERKINS, DID YOU 
UNDERTAKE AT THAT POINT IN TIME TO DO ANYTHING FOR MS. PERKINS 
WITH REGARD TO THE FIRE RESTORATION? 
A YES, WE WERE--SHE WAS VERY ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE 
DEBRIS CLEANED UP, SO WE ORDERED, IN HER BEHALF, A DUMPSTER 
WHICH WAS DELIVERED THAT SAME DAY. 
Q FROM WHOM DID YOU ORDER THAT DUMPSTER? 
A FROM ACE DISPOSAL. 
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1 Q ANYTHING ELSE YOU UNDERTOOK TO DO THAT DAY? 
2 A SHE HAD AN HEIRLOOM, A PIECE OF A DISH, PIECE OF 
3 GLASS, THAT WAS DAMAGED, WHETHER BY FIRE OR--I'M NOT SURE. I 
4 DON'T BELIEVE IT WAS DAMAGED BY FIRE. BUT SHE HAD AN HEIRLOOM 
5|| PIECE OF GLASS DAMAGED, AND WE TOOK THAT WITH THE PURPOSE OF 
6| GETTING IT REPAIRED. 
7 Q AT MS. PERKINS' REQUEST? 
8 A AT MS. PERKINS'S REQUEST. 
9 Q DID YOU TAKE THE PIECE OF GLASS TO BE REPAIRED THAT 
10 DAY? 
11 A YES, WE DID. 
12 Q WHERE DID YOU TAKE THAT? 
13 A I WENT TO BEEHIVE GLASS. 
14 Q BEEHIVE GLASS ACTUALLY REPAIRED THAT GLASS? 
15 A YES, THEY DID. 
16 Q WHY WOULD YOU UNDERTAKE TO DO EVEN THAT MUCH WORK 
17 PRIOR TO RECEIVING THE ACCESS AND AUTHORIZATION CARD? 
18 A WELL, OUR COMPANY TRIES TO BE HELPFUL. WE SEE 
1911 OURSELVES AS A SERVICE INDUSTRY, AND WHEN WE CAN HELP PEOPLE, 
201 WE FEEL THAT WE'LL BENEFIT IN THE LONG RUN. 
21 Q WERE YOU CONCERNED ABOUT GETTING PAID FOR THAT WORK? 
22 A NO. THE DUMPSTER, WHOEVER SHE CHOSE TO BE THE 
23 CONTRACTOR OBVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE NEEDED IT, AND WE COULD HAVE 
24 MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THAT TO BE PAID IN ANY EVENT. 
25 IF WE DIDN'T GET PAID, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN OUT 
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1 THE SECOND MOTION, YOUR HONOR, I WANT TO SUBMIT 
2 TO THE COURT IS THAT COUNSEL TALKED, THROUGHOUT HIS OPENING 
31 STATEMENT, ABOUT INSURANCE FRAUD, ONE FRAUD LED TO ANOTHER, 
4 AND THIS CASE WAS COMPOUNDED BY INSURANCE FRAUD BY MS. 
5|| PERKINS. 
6|| AND, JUDGE, THERE IS NO ALLEGATION IN THIS CASE 
7|| THAT HAS BEEN RAISED BY ANY OF THE CLAIMS THAT BEAR RIVER HAS 
8 MADE OR AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OR DENIAL TO THE COMPLAINT 
9 OF PERKINS THAT THERE WAS INSURANCE FRAUD ON THE PART OF 
10 MS.PERKINS. THAT'S AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, AND THAT'S NOT 
11 ONLY AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, THAT'S A SEPARATE, INDEPENDENT 
12 CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THAT ISN'T BEFORE THE COURT. 
13 AND ACCORDINGLY, THIS QUESTION OF "INSURANCE 
14 FRAUD" THAT HAS--AS THE COURT KNOWS, THAT'S A WORD OF ART, AND 
15| IT HAS SPECIAL MEANING BEFORE THE COURT. THERE IS NO DOUBT 
16 THAT IT WOULD BE PREDICATE EVEN FOR A COMPENSATORY CLAIM AND 
17 FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR THAT MATTER. 
18 BUT THEY HAVE NOT RAISED THAT, JUDGE. LOOK AT 
19 THEIR ANSWER TO THE COUNTERCLAIM. THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
201 OF ZANDRA PERKINS, THE THING THAT BEAR RIVER FILED, THEY 
2111 HAVEN'T RAISED INSURANCE FRAUD AS AN ISSUE. 
22| NOW COUNSEL'S STATEMENTS, YOUR HONOR, WERE 
23 HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY, AND HE HAS SUGGESTED THAT MY CLIENT HAS 
24 SOMEHOW ENGAGED IN AN ELABORATE SCHEME TO DEBUNK THIS COMPANY, 
25|| NOT JUST SIMPLY IN CONNECTION WITH THAT NEGOTIATION, THAT THE 
147 
005328 
1 NEGOTIATIONS WERE INCORRECT, BUT THAT MY CLIENT DEFRAUDED BEAR 
2 RIVER, AND THAT THAT'S THE BASIS FOR THEIR DEFENSE. 
3 THAT ISN'T BEFORE THE COURT. THERE'S NOTHING 
41 BEFORE THE COURT. WE HAVE NO OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE THAT SORT 
5| OF A DEFENSE, AND I WOULD ASK THE COURT FOR TWO FORMS OF 
6 RELIEF AS A RESULT OF WHAT BEAR RIVER SAID TO THE JURY THROUGH 
7|| MR. HEATH'S OPENING STATEMENT. 
8|| NO. 1, I WOULD MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL. I THINK 
9 THAT THE QUESTION OF INSURANCE FRAUD ON THE PART OF MY CLIENT 
10 IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE, AND IT NEVER HAS BEEN, UP TO 
11 THIS MOMENT. 
12 AND, SECONDLY, IF THE COURT DENIES THAT, 
13 CERTAINLY TO ADVISE THE JURY THAT INSURANCE FRAUD IS NOT A 
14 PART OF THIS CASE. THEY SHOULD DISREGARD ANY PART OF THE 
15 OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. HEATH THAT RELATED TO INSURANCE FRAUD 
16 OR ANY ASPECT OF INSURANCE FRAUD, AND THE CASE SHOULD PROCEED 
17| ON THE BASIS THAT BEAR RIVER SIMPLY CLAIMS THAT MS. PERKINS 
18 SUBMITTED STATEMENTS THAT WERE EITHER NOT JUSTIFIED OR WERE 
19|| ERRONEOUS OR WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR INVESTIGATION. 
20 THANK YOU. 
21 MR. HEATH: I'D LIKE TO RESPOND TO THE LATTER 
22 MATTER FIRST. MR. CAMPBELL HAS NOT READ OUR RESPONSE TO THE 
23| THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT. THE DEFENSE, IF I MAY, PARAGRAPH NO. 
24 48, BY THE WAY, OF OUR FURTHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, SAYS THAT 
25 PERKINS INTENTIONALLY AND KNOWINGLY SUBMITTED OR CAUSED TO BE 
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SUBMITTED FALSE INSURANCE CLAIMS PERTAINING TO THE TYPE AND 
VALUE OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY DAMAGE, AND ALSO 
PERTAINING TO ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES, WITH THE INTENT THAT 
BEAR RIVER WOULD RELY THEREON. PERKINS IS BARRED TO THE 
EXTENT THEREOF FROM ANY RECOVERY HEREUNDER AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT'S A RECITATION OF 
INSURANCE FRAUD OR INSURANCE FALSE REPRESENTATION UNDER THE 
LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY. IT'S TAKEN ALMOST IDENTICALLY FROM 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY, AND I CAN UNDERSTAND NOW WHY MR. 
CAMPBELL WAS OBJECTING SO MUCH TO MY OPENING STATEMENT, 
BECAUSE HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE FACT THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN 
IN IT FROM THE TIME WE FILED OUR ANSWER. 
WITH REGARD TO THE ALLEGATION THAT MR. 
CAMPBELL--TKAT BY VIRTUE OF THE STATEMENT I MADE PERTAINING TO 
THE SET FIRE, THE COURT HAS UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. MR. 
CAMPBELL HAS NOT. WE'RE SAYING THAT THEY'RE ALLEGING THAT 
BEAR RIVER IS IN BAD FAITH IN HANDLING THIS CLAIM, AND WE'RE 
SAYING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE INFORMATION THEY HAD ABOUT THE 
SUSPICIOUS NATURE OF THIS CLAIM, ABOUT PRIOR FIRES INVOLVING 
PERKINS' PROPERTY, BEAR RIVER WAS WILLING TO SET THAT ASIDE 
AND HANDLE THIS CLAIM AS THEY WOULD ANY OTHER, BUT FOR OTHER 
PROBLEMS. 
THEREFORE IT'S EVIDENCE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF 
THE COIN THAT IN FACT THEY WERE IN GOOD FAITH, THEY DIDN'T 





THEY DIDN'T USE THAT EVIDENCE AS PERHAPS SOME INSURANCE 
211 COMPANIES WOULD, TO ARBITRARILY DENY THE CLAIM 
3 THEREFORE WE THINK IT SHOWS THAT BEAR RIVER WAS 
4 REALLY CONSIDERING THE INTERESTS OF ITS INSURED IN MAKING THAT 
5|| DETERMINATION. 
6 N 0 W H A D T H E
 EVIDENCE DEVELOPED, WE DON'T SUBMIT 
7 THAT IT WOULD-OF COURSE IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT, BUT THE 
8I POINT OF THE MATTER IS WE'RE NOT CLAIMING THAT WAS GROUNDS FOR 
9|| DELAY. WE'RE NOT RAISING IT THAT WAY. 
MR. CAMPBELL MISSES THE POINT. IF THEY'RE 
GOING TO ALLEGE THAT WE'RE IN BAD FAITH, WE HAVE A RIGHT TO 
12|| ALLEGE THAT WE'RE IN GOOD FAITH, AND ALL THE THINGS THAT WE 
13 DID IN HER INTEREST TO TRY TO PEC0L7E THIS THING, BY PAYING 
14 THE MONEY THAT WE DID. 
15|| THAT'S THE VERY APGUMENT THAT WAS MADE TO THE 
16 COURT BEFORE, AND THE COURT HEAPL THAT BEFORE, AND HAS RULED 
17| ON IT. AND THAT'S WHY IT'S MATERIAL: IF THEY'RE GOING TO 
18 CONTINUE TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF ~~l FAITH, WE'RE ENTITLED TO 
19|| RAISE THE ISSUE OF WHAT WE DII ?Zr-r.Z. 
20 THE COURT: CO'J^ .IEL, V;HAT DID YOU READ FROM 
21 THERE? WAS THAT YOUR ANSWER? 
22 MR. HEATH: C'J? ~ 7..E?, YOUR HONOR. FOR THE 
23 RECORD, IT'S THE ANSWER TO 3Z.-? --y
 l ? / U T U A L I N S U R A N C E COMPANY 
24 TO THE AMENDED THIRD-PARTY CC"?1 :.:,
 : o T H E AMENDED THIRD-
251 PARTY COMPLAINT OF ZANDRA PE?:-! . :: /IAS — 
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1 MR. CAMPBELL: I HAVE A COPY OF IT RIGHT HERE, 
2 AND I HAD IT WHEN I MADE MY OPENING STATEMENT. IT'S DATED THE 
311 5TH OF FEBRUARY, 1991. 
4| MR. HEATH: NO, THE ONE WHERE YOU FILED THE 
5|| AMENDED WAS THE 19TH OF AUGUST. THAT'S--. 
6| MR. CAMPBELL: I HAVE THE FIRST ONE. 
7|| THE COURT: IS IT THE SAME LANGUAGE? 
8 MR. CAMPBELL: I THINK IT IS THE SAME LANGUAGE. 
9 YES. IF THE COURT PLEASE, IF I MAY JUST ADDRESS THE LAST 
10 ISSUE, FRANKLY I FIND MR. HEATH'S ARGUMENT ENIGMATIC. THE 
11 STATEMENT THAT SOMEHOW, BECAUSE THERE'S AN ALLEGATION OF BAD 
12 FAITH, THAT MS. PERKINS' CONDUCT IN '87 IS RELEVANT, CAN ONLY 
13 STAND THE TEST OF THE ARGUMENT, IT'S A CLAIM THAT THERE'S 
14 SOMETHING THAT THEY DID IN ADJUSTING THAT CLAIM THAT WOULD 
15 HAVE BEEN OTHER THAN WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN IF THIS '87 
16 FIRE HADN'T BEEN PRESENT. 
17 BUT THEY DON'T CLAIM THAT, JUDGE. THEY CLAIM 
18| THAT THEY HANDLED THIS CASE JUST LIKE ANY OTHER CASE, AND THEY 
1911 DISREGARDED THE '87 FIRE. SO HOW COULD IT POSSIBLY BE 
2011 RELEVANT? I THINK IT'S ENIGMATIC. 
21 THEY HAVE NOT CLAIMED THAT TO THE COURT, AND 
22 THEY HAVE MISLEAD THIS COURT IN CONNECTION WITH MOTIONS IN 
23i LIMINE ON THIS ISSUE. I THINK THE COURT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD, 
24 AND I THINK YOUR HONOR'S STATEMENT THAT WE READ FROM, YOUR 
25 HONOR, THE BENCH REMARKS, INDICATED THAT YOU THOUGHT IT HAD 
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1 SOME CONNECTION, IT HAD A TIE-IN TO THE BAD-FAITH CLAIM. 
2 IT DOESN'T HAVE ANY TIE-IN, DOES IT, TO THE 
3l BAD-FAITH CLAIM? WE KNOW THAT NOW, OUT OF THE WORDS OF 
41 COUNSEL HIMSELF. 
5 NOW AS TO THIS SEVENTH DEFENSE THAT HENRY JUST 
6|| READ TO THE COURT, ON THE FIRST--ON THE ANSWER TO THE THIRD-
7J PARTY COMPLAINT, THIS DOESN'T ALLEGE INSURANCE FRAUD AT ALL. 
8I IT SHOWS FRAUD IS A DISCRETE CAUSE OF ACTION, AND IT IS PLEAD. 
9 IT'S NOT AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, BUT IT IS PLEAD AS A SEPARATE 
10 CAUSE OF ACTION. THEY HAVEN'T DONE THAT. 
11 HERE ALL WE HAVE, WHAT THEY HAVE SAID IS THAT 
12 PERKINS INTENTIONALLY AND KNOWINGLY SUBMITTED FALSE INSURANCE 
13 CLAIMS. THAT IS NOT INSURANCE FRAUD UNDER THE SUBSTANTIVE AND 
14 CONTROLLING LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH. IT IS NOT. 
15 IT IS N O T — I T IS NOTHING MORE THAN SAYING SHE 
16 SUBMITTED ERRONEOUS CLAIMS, BUT IT IS NOT INSURANCE FRAUD, OR 
17 THAT CLAIMS, AS MR. HEATH SAID, MAY BE. THEY WEREN'T 
18| FRAUDULENT, MAYBE THEY WERE SIMPLY MISUNDERSTOOD OR THEY WERE 
1911 ERRONEOUS, OR THEY WEREN'T SUBMITTED FOR THE PURPOSES OF 
2011 INDUCING A "FRAUDULENT INSURANCE CLAIM." 
21 AND THAT'S THE CONCERN I HAVE, JUDGE, IS THAT 
22 USE OF THE WORD "A FRAUDULENT CLAIM" ON THE PART OF MY CLIENT, 
23 BECAUSE THAT ISN'T AN ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT, AND THEY CAN'T 
24 MAKE IT AN ISSUE RIGHT NOW BECAUSE WE'RE NOW IN THE MIDDLE OF 
25 TRIAL AND COUNSEL REALLY RELIED EXTENSIVELY—HE ARGUED 
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INTENSELY AND REPETITIVELY, REDUNDANTLY, THAT THIS CASE WAS 
ABOUT "INSURANCE FRAUD" OF MY CLIENT. 
THAT SIMPLY ISN'T THE CASE. I THEREFORE STAND 
ON THE MOTION, YOUR HONOR, FOR A MISTRIAL, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE TO ADMONISH THE JURY. 
THE COURT: THE COURT WILL DENY THE MOTION FOR 
MISTRIAL. THE COURT IS SOMEWHAT CONCERNED AS FAR AS THE 
WORDING OF THE ANSWER AND THE USE OF THE TERM "FRAUD," 
"INSURANCE FRAUD." 
I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE CASES SAY AS FAR AS— 
COUNSEL, WHAT DO THE CASES SAY AS FAR AS WHAT MUST BE PLEAD TO 
PLEAD A DEFENSE AS FAR AS INSURANCE FRAUD IS CONCERNED? YOU 
TOLD ME YOU TAKE THAT STRAIGHT FROM THE POLICY; THAT DOESN'T 
NECESSARILY MEAN TO ME THAT THAT IS A PROPER PLEADING OR THAT 
THAT'S PLEADS INSURANCE FRAUD. 
I GUESS WHAT I'M SAYING IS THIS: IF EITHER ONE 
OF YOU—AND I DON'T WANT YOU TO PUT A LOT OF WORK INTO IT — BUT 
IF EITHER ONE OF YOU HAVE ANY CASES WHERE INSURANCE FRAUD HAS 
BEEN REFLECTED, WHERE IT'S GONE UP, WHERE THEY HAVE RULED ON 
IT AS FAR AS WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN PLEAD, I WOULD BE WILLING TO 
LOOK AT THEM. 
AND IF I'M PERSUADED THERE'S NOT—THAT IT WAS 
AN IMPROPER USE OF THE TERMINOLOGY, THEN I WOULD INSTRUCT THE 
JURY AS YOU HAVE ASKED, MR. \~:-!?5ElL. 
IF I'M NOT PERf.-CEC, THEN OF COURSE I WOULD 
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ALLOW IT TO STAND, AND MR. HEATH—IF HE CAN'T PROVE IT, IT MAY 
COME BACK TO HAUNT YOU, AS YOU WELL KNOW. 
MR. HEATH: I CERTAINLY OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO USE 
THE TERM "INTENTIONALLY AND KNOWINGLY SUBMITTED OR CAUSED TO 
BE SUBMITTED FALSE INSURANCE CLAIMS." 
THE COURT: AND I DIDN'T SAY YOU COULDN'T SAY 
THAT, BUT THE TERM "FRAUD" CONNOTES MORE TO ME, CONSIDERABLY 
MORE. 
MR. CAMPBELL: IT'S A CRIME, AMONG OTHER 
THINGS. 
THE COURT: IT CAN BE A CRIME, AND I'M NOT 
SAYING IT COULD BE A CRIME IN THIS CASE, BUT IT CAN BE. DO 
WHAT YOU WANT. IF YOU WANT TO SUBMIT CASES TO ME, I DON'T 
WANT A LOT OF BIG MEMORANDA; JUST SOMETHING BASIC, AND THAT 
WOULD BE FINE, IF NOT, IF YOU DON'T, THEN I'LL ADMONISH THE 
JURY AND WE'LL HAVE TO GET TOGETHER ON THE WORDING AS FAR AS 
THE ADMONITION OF THE JURY. 
I DON'T KNOW HOW—IF IT'S GOING TO COME UP 
AGAIN, IF YOU NEED TO DO IT BY TOMORROW MORNING OR NOT. 
AS FAR AS OTHER MATTERS ARE CONCERNED, NO, I 
THINK I UNDERSTAND WHAT'S GOING ON ON THAT, AND I UNDERSTAND 
WHAT BOTH OF YOU ARE SAYING. I'M STILL OF THE OPINION THAT AS 
LONG AS THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS THERE FOR BAD FAITH, THEY HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO BE ABLE TO RELY ON THAT, THAT TESTIMONY, AND IN 
THAT EVENT I WOULD DENY THE MOTION ON THAT. 
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1 MR. CAMPBELL: WE'RE GRATEFUL TO THE COURT. I 
2 THINK THE REASON WHY I HAVE RAISED IT, MADE SO MUCH OF IT, I 
31 THINK WE'RE IN AN AREA OF REVERSAL ERROR, AND I WANTED TO GIVE 
4| THE COURT THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK AT THE ISSUE. I APPRECIATE 
5|| THE COURT'S TIME. 
6 THE COURT: AND I APPRECIATE YOUR CALLING IT TO 
7|| MY ATTENTION. SEE YOU IN THE MORNING. WHY DON'T YOU COME AT 
8 ABOUT TEN MINUTES TO. 
9 MR. SMITH: I WON'T BE HERE AT 9:00; I HOPE THE 
10 COURT WILL PROCEED WITHOUT ME. 
11 MR. CAMPBELL: WE'LL ENTER YOUR DEFAULT AT 
12 FIVE-AFTER. (LAUGHTER) 
13 (WHEREUPON, AT THE HOUR OF 5:20 P.M., THE 











25|| (TRANSCRIBED BY ALISON HOLLADAY) 
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1 RELATED DOCUMENTS, THEN YOU GO TO THE NEXT LEVEL OF PROOF, AND 
2 THAT IS TO DETERMINE WHAT PROPERTY OF LIKE KIND AND QUALITY--
3 AND THAT'S A TERM OF ART YOU WILL HEAR THROUGHOUT THIS--
4 PROPERTY OF SAME VINTAGE, PROPERTY OF SAME KIND. 
5 FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU HAVE A VOLKSWAGEN THAT'S IN 
6 THE CARPORT AT THE TIME, HYPOTHETI CALLY SPEAKING--THAT'S NOT 
7 THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE--AND THAT IS DAMAGED, YOU CAN'T 
8 REPLACE IT WITH A CADILLAC. YOU HAVE TC REPLACE IT WITH A 
9 VOLKSWAGEN OF LIKE KIND AND QUALITY. WE'LL TALK MORE ABOUT 
0 IT, BECAUSE SHE HAD A SPECIAL PROVISION IN THE POLICY WHICH 
i WE'LL TALK ABOUT LATER, BUT THIS IS WHERE ITU, ADJUSTER AND THE 
2 INSURED SIT DOWN AND WORK TOGETHER. 
3 AND MR. DIG WILL TEE l"\i\ I HAT THE FIRST TIME HE 
4 MET ZANDRA PERKINS, HE EXPLAINED THESE THINGS TO HER. 
5 SHE ADMITTED IN HEK DEPOSITION THAT SHE HAD 
6 READ THE POLICY, AND CERTAINLY HAYING A ,.AV> DEGREE SHE COULD 
7 UNDERSTAND, AND THAT'S V":' EEAEEY !AM, i> IE I 1 CU LT TO UNDERSTAND 
8 WHAT THAT MEANS. \OU TRLl-.vRc AN IXYENEOR'i. THEN YOU 
9 SUBSTANTiATE WHAT E O U ' K A L C L A I M ] X A IN SOME WA\ THAT'S 
0 AGREEABLE. 
1 IT OFTI, N : x \ 0 L \ LS A M A T T E K Or NEGOTIATION 
2 BETWEEN THE INSURANCE AGENT OK AL-^US'ii.i , A;. THE CASE MAY EL, 
3 AND THE INSURED TO I) ET i K;•' i N i WHAT T.ii- VAEEFS TRULY A R E , 
•\ EECAUSE THIS IS AN ARE\ V' L1 E i'HLKi. CAN EE SOME INSURANCE 
T A :. EPA Cu . 
1 IF A PERSON, FOR EXAMPLE, CLAIMS SOMETHING THAT 
2 DOESN'T EXIST, THEN FOR EXAMPLE I HAVE SOMETHING DESTROYED IN 
3 A FIRE THAT DOESN'T EXIST, THEN THE INSURANCE COMPANY HAS TO 
4 LOOK AT THAT CAREFULLY AND CONSIDER THAI. 
5 THEN WE GET INTO AN AREA OF FRAUD, AND WE 
6 MAINTAIN IN THIS AREA THAT IN FACT SOME OF THAT HAPPFN1D IN 
7 THIS CASE, THAT AS WE STARTED LOOKING THROUGH THESE 600 SOME-
3 ODD ITEMS, THERE WERE THINGS IN THERE THAT WERE NOT DAMAGED OR 
9 WERE NOT IN THE HOME OR, AS A MATTER OF FACT, SHE SUBMITTED 
10 DIFFERENT INVENTORIES AND THEY WERE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE 
11 ANOTHER. AND WE BELIE\ED THAT THAT DEMONSTRATED ACTIAL FRAUD 
12 uN HER PART AND AN AT TEMP I TO DEFRAUD THE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
IZ ANOTHER THING IS TO SEND TO US WITHIN 60 DAYS 
1M AFTER OUR REQUEST A SIGNED, SWORN PROOF OF LOSS, ET CETERA. 
15 NOW THAT'S SOMETHING THAT THE INSURANCE COMPANY EXPECTS. THAT 
16 IS THAT IF YOU HAVE A LOSS, PARTICULARLY JF YOU'RE CLAIMING A 
17 LARGE LOSS LIKE , :V L , TiIAT /Ol ACTUALLY SIGN A FORM UNDER 0,Vi ii 
18 SAYING, "1 AF11RM THAT THIS ,S JUL LOSS I LXI IRILNCED, " AND 
19 THEN YOU IDENTIFY WITH THAT LOSS THE ITEMS YOU'RE CLAIMING. 
20 LN THIS CASE SHE SIGNED TWO, PERHAPS TI1RIE 
2 1 PROOFS OF LOSS, LiJT THEY WERE SIGNED IN BLANK. THEY DIDN'T 
22 REALLY RFLATI TO uiP U W V 1IRECTIY). 
j . - AS A > VI ! I R v;l FACT, ONE OF THEM, BEAR R1YLR 
2 ivi gU]RI'D--SHF, DF>AND1D ,V. 2\ ^ C ! IUORI UIF POUJ>F\TFD HFR 
2 ", C L \ i Y , AND BEAR R 1 \ ER V A S WILLI NG TO DO TH VI I Y GOOD FA J Til \. 
3 9 
1 AN EFFORT TO MOVE THIS CASE ALONG. 
2 SO THOSE ARE SOME OE THE REQUIREMENTS THAT THE 
3 POLICY MAKES UPON AN INSURED. I WON'T TAKE TOO MUCH LONGER ON 
4 T H I S , B U T Y O U ' L L S E E T H I S . 
5 A N O T H E R P R O V I S I O N OF T H E P O L I C Y R E Q U I R E S OR 
6 E X P L A I N S HOW Y O U A D J U S T A L O S S , H O W YOU S E T T L E I T . WE W I L L 
7 PAY, ADJUST ALL LOSSES, UNLESS THERE'S SOME OTHER PERSON NAMED 
8 IN T H E P O L I C Y , T H E LOSS W I L L BE P A Y A B L E 60 DAYS A F T E R WE 
9 RECEIVE YOUR PROOF OF LOSS. 
0 THAT HAS TO BE, OBVIOUSLY, A CORRECT PROOF OF 
1 LOSS; WE DON'T PAY YOU IF YOU SEND A PIECE OF PAPER IN AND 
2 IT'S U N S I G N E D , A N D IT HAS TO BE DO <, LAMENT F D . 
3 A ND T H E N A F T E R WE R E A C H AN A G R E E M E N T W I T H Y O U . 
4 OBVIOUSLY, WE DON'T PAY IF WE DON'T HAVE AN AGREEMENT. THAT 
5 D O E S N ' T M E A N WE C A N A R B I T R A R I L Y — AN D BEAR R I V E R D O E S N O T DO 
6 T H A T , A N D IT D O E S N ' T M A K E ANY E C O N O M I C E E N S F FOR T H E M TO BE 
7 A R B I T R A R Y , B E C A U S E KEEN' *i CI ~" INTO E L T I A A T T O N L I K E T H I S IT 
8 E N D S UP A L O T M 0 R E E \ P E E E, ; V 1. ; i! A \ A E 11 i R V. 1 A I . 
9 YOU 'LE I ; . 
0 B E L I E V E , THA T B E A R R i YF E 
i PAID M U C H ?;OKL T H A N T H E Y 
2 SO TIIOS! AE: E;tVi ..w.E EA- ..'. 1 N .1 'j N S . Tli 1 A I 
AND T H E E V I D E N C E W I L L S H O W , WE 
A: E i \ r <:\'Y\1 E A C E W A E D A , A C T U A L L Y 
.YE E:v;YEN T H E C L A I M W A S W O R T H . 
P R O V I S I O N T H A T WE W O U L D :. 
IT J S Till: PoE.I CY PRC\ : A • •,.= . 
Y;:l 10 PA\ SPECIAL ATTENTION TO 
\. Wl- !)j \v)T PE-YIDE COVERAGE, 
• INTENTIONALLY CONCEALED OR 
1 MISREPRESENTED ANY MATERIAL FACT OR CIRCUMSTANCE. 
2 WE CLAIM THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE 01 IVI LNT1 ON \L 
3 CONCEALMENT, INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION. 
4 NOV, IN EVERY CASE YOU MAY HAVE A MISTAKT, AND 
5 THERE, TO THE EXTENT THAT SHE IS ABLE 10 SATISFY LL THAT S O L 
6 OF THESE ERRORS WERE MISTAKES, THEN THIS WOULD NOT APPL^. 
7 BUT IN ORDER FOR YOU TO FIND UNDER THIS SECTION 
8 THAT THLRE IS NO COVERAGE, YOU HAVE TO BE VERY SUBSTANTIALLY 
9 SATISFIED AND CONVINCED THAT SHE KNEW THAT SHE WAS DOING 
0 S0MFTH1NG THAT WAS FRAUDULENT, AND THE COURT WILL INSTRUCT \ol 
1 AS 10 WIL.T OUR BURDEN OF PROOF IS AND JUST WHAI v,'E H W E TO DC 
2 TO C 0 N \ I N L E .01. 01 I HAT FACT. 
3 THIS SECTION HAS TO DO WITH THE REQIIREMEVI j: 
A THE INSURED TO LIVE UP TO THE PROVISIONS OE THE POLICE . YOl 
5 KNOW, MANY PLCPLE THINK THAT AN INSURANCE POLICE IS GUARANTEE, 
6 THAT THEY WIL1 V\\ ANYTHING THAT PEOPLE \SK FOR. SOMETl^LI 
7 OBVIOlSLY--. 
8 A1R . C A M F B I I L : T H I S I S NOT v . P I N T N i , S I A I F M N i \ 
9 AS TO WHAT THI E W D I N C L I S ( , 0 I N G TO B E . I T I S A R G L M E N I , ANw I 
0 HAVE TO O B J E C T . 
MR. H L A l l l : " i ^ l R O B J L C I I O N I S W E L L - i V k F N . I l l , 
2 THE E V I D E N C E WTLL SIIOv, T H \ I SHE HAD NOT L I \ L L UP TO THE POL I f . 
> P R O V I S I O N S i BEAR R 1 \ t R ' ., P v L 1 ^  THAI SHE HAD IN VANY 
< F A R T I C U L A R S , AND \, t ' EL 1 ( . \ ' I I E ; S E O U T . 
"J ' : v »: i , , \ . ; i i ; : . i s G O I V r o B T A V A J ^ K 
» i 






















CONTENTION IN THIS CASE, ZANDRA PERKINS HAD PAID AN EXTRA 
PREMIUM SO THAT SHE WAS NOT ONLY ENTITLED TO THE DEPRECIATED 
CASH VALUE OE ANY PROPERTY THAT WAS DAMAGED, BUT SHE WAS 
ENTITLED TO HAVE THAT PROPERTY ACTUALLY REPLACED. 
SO IF POR EXAMPLE SHE HAD A CARPORT THAT NEEDED 
TO BE REPLACED, THE INSURANCE COMPANY WOULD NOT DEPRECIATE 
THAT DOWN, THEY WOULD PAY THE ACTUAL EXPENSE THAT WOULD GO 
INTO REPLACING THAT CARPORT; NOT WHAT IT WOULD HAVE COST TO 
BUILD THE CARPORT THAT WAS 20 YEARS OLD. 
IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A NEW CARPORT. THE SAME 
WAY WITH ITEMS OF PERSONA!. PROPERTY INSIDE THE HOUSE. 
THEY WOULD PAY POR ITEMS 01 PERSONAL PROPERTY 
INSIDE THE HOUSE IE THEY'RE DESTROYED, IF THE^ CAN'T BE 
REPAIRED. THEY WOULD PAY THE REPLACEMENT COST. 
BUT THERE IS A REQUIREMENT IN THAT, AND THAT IS 
THAT THE INSURED ACTUALLY REPLACE TEEM. JF THE INSURED 
CHOOSES TO KEEP Till:. PROPERTY, AS IN i'li'iS -X^i., MUCH OF T IM-
MATERIAL WAS CLEANED AND KEPT. THEN IN ORDER FOR THEM TO 
QUALIFY TO GET WHAT WL 'ALL REPLACEMENT COST, THEY HAVE TO 
ACTUALLY REPLACE IT. N< 
HUT MANY ITEMS HAVE NOT-
PROOF OF REPLACEMENT. 
NOTICE THAT WHEN YOU b\ 
DAMAGED TABLE, YOU LKlX 
HAVE BOUGHT I r, THAT :•. 
HEY REPLACE lY AND FIX THE HOME, 
A REPLACED, AND THEY HAVE TO SHOW 
T H IS IS V. HER C AN INSURED IS PUT o A 
;>.!ETi!l'Nv. TO PIT [.ACE, FOR EXAMPLE A 
. THE RECi;PT 'J HAT SHOWL THAT YOU 
1 IT IS E S S E N T I A L L Y A TABLE OF LIKE KIND AND Q U A L I T Y ~ - Y O U CAN'T 
2 REPLACE A THIN TABLE WITH A MAHOGANY TABLE OR WHATEVER—AND WE 
3 WILL PAY THE A C T U A L R E P L A C E M E N T C O S T . BUT YOU HAVE TO R E P L A C E 
4 IT F I R S T . 
5 IF YOU C H O O S E NOT TO DO T H A T , THEN YOU ONLY GET 
6 A C T U A L CASH V A L U E . 
7 AND THE A C T U A L CASH V A L U E IS D E T E R M I N E D BY 
8 C O N S I D E R I N G THE C O N D I T I O N OF THE P R O P E R T Y AT THE T I M E , AND 
9 D E T E R M I N I N G W H A T THE D E P R E C I A T E D V A L U E 01 THE PROPERTY WAS AT 
0 THE T I M E . 
1 T H E R E WILL BE T E S T I M O N Y THAT MR. DIO A T T E M P T E D 
2 TO SETTLE THIS CASE AND MADE AN OFFER AT ONE TIME TO SETTLE AI 
3 LEAST THE PORTION R E L A T I N G TO THE C O N T E N T S iiY SU G G E S T I N G A 
4 FORMULA THAT ALLOWED THE PAYMENT OF ONLY 50 PERCENT OF THE 
5 REPLACEMENT COST OF THOSE ITEMS. 
6 T H E R E WILL BE T E S T I M O N Y THAT D E P R E C I A T I O N UNDER 
7 T H O S E C I R C U M S T A N C E S IS P R O B A B L Y TOO H I G H , BUT MR. U [ 0 WJLL 
8 EXi'LAiN TO YOU WHAT HL WAS T H I N K I N G A B O U T WHEN HE A L L O C A T E D 
'J THAT 50 PERCENT. 
0 T H E R E WAS A L U M P - S U M TYPE T H I N G ; THEY S A I D , 
1 "YOU HAVE GOO ITEMS H E R E , R A T H E R T H A N GOING T H R O U G H AND 
2 R E Q U I R I N G YOU TO D O C U M E N T EVERY S P E C I F I C ITEM, RATHER THAN 0:; 
3 ' T H R O U G H AND TRY TO D E T E R M I N E A C T U A L R E P L A C E M E N T COST OF L \ Y..XV; 
•i JTEM, RAT!;:K THAN M A K I N G YuU R E P L A C E EVFKY ITEM, WE WILL oiSLE 
5 YwU 5 0 P E R C E N T . 
4 3 
1 THIS IS THE BEGINNING POINT OF THE NEGOTIATION. 
2 WELL, THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT THAT, AND 
3 NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN, AND AS A RESULT OF THAT, BEAR RIVER 
4 BROUGHT IN AN INDEPENDENT ADJUSTER SAYING, "LOOK, IF YOU 
5 CAN'T — IE MR. DIO'S NOT BEING RESPONSIVE TO YOUR REQUESTS, 
6 WE'LL HAVE AN INDEPENDENT ADJUSTER/' AND HE BENT OVER 
7 BACKWARDS AS BEAR RIVER TRIED TO SETTLE IT ON THE BASIS OF 30 
8 AND EVEN 2 5 PERCENT I BELIEVE. DON'T HOLD ME TO THAT FIGURE, 
9 BECAUSE MR. BRAD BLOOM, WHO WILL TESTIFY, THAT HE HAD 
0 INSTRUCTIONS FROM BEAR RIVER TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO SETTLE THE 
1 CASE WITHIN REASON. 
2 AND HE WENT TO THE POINT 01--ON THIS, 01' TRYING 
4 AND NOW AS WE GET INVOLVED IN THE EVIDENCE, AND 
5 WE GET PREPARING FOR TRIAL, WE FIND OUT THAT MANY OF THESE 
6 ITEMS THAT SHE WAS CLAIMING SHE PATS FOR WERE ACTUALLY CLEANED 
7 AND RETURNED AND ARE STILE IN THE HOME. 
8 LET ML MIAMI ON TO I 0\: , IF I MAY, AN AREA WHLRL 
9 WE BELIEVE THE REAL FRAUD EXISTS IN THIS CASE, NOT THAT IT 
0 DOESN'T IN OTHERS. ONE AM TH1 COVERAGES UNDER THE POLICY I 
MENTIONED TO 1 O L. A L. k ii A i.» ; . A , . *. 
A D D I T I O N A L L I V I N G FAN MM 
; v ; f..1 i RE!'- E R R E D TO I T , 
\ E U ; A A \ K Y EY V I R T U E or IUY 
I R i 
Til . S HOME 
A Ak I N S , AY TEE : M A ' , WAS NOT 
S i - i X i . i AN F , EL C A U S E T H A T CVT 
n o o J *% 
1 DOWN TREMENDOUSLY ON HER ACTUAL LIVING EXPENSES AS A RESULT OF 
2 THE FIRE. 
3 SHE HAD A LOT OF THINGS THERE, BUT SHE WAS 
4 LIVING IN ARIZONA AT THIS POINT. SO HER ADDITIONAL LIVING 
5 EXPENSES WERE NOT THE SAME AS IF SHE HAD BEEN LIVING THERE. 
6 SHE DIDN'T HAVE TO GO OUT AND FIND ANOTHER HOME TO LIVE IN, 
7 DIDN'T HAVE TO GO OUT AND FIND A HOTEL TO STAY IN. IN FACT 
8 SHE CAME BACK FROM ARIZONA TO SEE WHAT THE FIRE WAS, TO SEE 
9 WHAT THE DAMAGE WAS . 
0 NEVERTHELESS, DURING THE COURSE OF TRYING TO 
1 RESOLVE THIS CASE, BEAR RIVER CONTINUALLY WAS BOMBARDED WITH 
2 DEMANDS THAT ILLY DETERMINE ARE TOTALLY UNREASONABLE. 
3 HERE'S AN EXAMPLE OF ONE SUCH DEMAND. THIS IS 
4 --IT DOESN'T SHOW UP HERE VERY WELL, BUT THIS IS SIGNED BY 
5 CLEA PERKINS HERE. SHE--BY THE WAY, WE SUBPOENAED HER, AND 
6 THE EVIDENCE WILL BE THAT SHE'S NOT PHYSICALLY ABLE TO COME 
7 AND TEST I FY . 
S Mk. CAMPBELL: THAT'S NOT EVIDENCE, IV THE 
9 COURT PLEASE, THAT'S JUST SIMPLY IMPROPER ARGUMENT. 
0 MR. HEATH: WELL, WILL SHE BE HERE? 
1 MR. CAMPBELL: I'M NOT CCI.NC TO GET U? AND 
2 RESPOND TO lii'iS IN THE M.DDLE (; F OPENING STATEMENTS. 
3 THE COURT: DON'T START ASKING QUESTIONS. MOVF 
OVER IF. 
Mk . i l E A T i i : I N ANY L \ E N T , T H E Y :>UBN 
1 B I L L , THEY S U B M I T A B I L L TO BEAR R I V E R , ASKING HER TO PAY HER 
2 MOTHER $ 5 0 PER DAY FOR ROOM AND $ 2 0 PER DAY FOR BOARD DURING 
3 T H I S P E R I O D OF T I M E , MOST OF WHICH SHE WAS NOT EVEN L I V I N G IN 
4 SALT L A K E , NOT EVEN AT HER M O T H E R ' S HOME. 
5 AT HER D E P O S I T I O N , M S . P E R K I N S E X P L A I N E D THAT 
6 BY S A Y I N G , " W E L L , MY MOTHER K E P T A ROOM A V A I L A B L E FOR ME AT 
7 HOME, T H E R E F O R E I B E L I E V E $ 5 0 A DAY I S R E A S O N A B L E . " 
8 AND THEN WE SEE THAT THAT COMES TO A TOTAL OF 
9 $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . S H E ' S I N C L U D I N G $ 2 0 A DAY FOR BOARD, FOR FOOD, THAT 
0 SHE WOULD HAVE TO BUY HER FOOD WHETHER SHE HAD F I R E OR N O T . 
1 AND SHE WAS BUYING HER FOOD DOWN IN A R I Z O N A . 
2 " ANT THE ONLY T I M E DURING THAT WHOLE P E R I O D SHE 
3 WAS L I V I N G AT HOME WAS DURING THE MONTH OT A U G U S T . SO FOR 
4 ABOUT 3 0 D A Y S , SHE WAS L I V I N G WITH HER MOTHER, BUT S H E ' S 
5 C L A I M I N G THAT ROOM AND BOARD DURING T H I S WHOLE P E R I O D OF T I M E 
0 
1 
x. A. x li J^ A i 
P E R I O D OT THE F I R E IN MAY AND I N T O O C T O B E R 
NOW I HE ONLY T I M E SHE AC DUALLY WAS WITH HER 
MOTHER DURING THAT P [". E ; •: I) YE TIME WAS .0 DAYS AT THE MOS1. SHE 
MAY HAVE COME BACK A FEW T I M E S , AND SO I I SHE CAME BACK A FEW 
T I M E S , MAYBE YOU COUL1 
D E P O S I T I O N , SEE WAS o : 
SHE RETURNED 10 r C K T i . ; 
• v ? • r ' * • - - \ ' •• ? • '• - r M r x- ' -
.PA I D HER i i k Al i; IT - :N 
1. SHE 
S : T . BUT SHE S A I D IN HER 
IN A U G U S T . I N SEPTEMBER 
AS ;'N LAV S C H O O L , AND YET 
' S v.HY BEAR R I V E R H A S N ' T 
-"» b 
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1 IN ADDITION TO THAT, HER MOTHER CLAIMS THAT--AS 
2 SHE PREPARED THIS, A CHARGE FOR THE USE OF HER LAUNDRY 
3 FACILITIES IN HER HOME DURING THAT SAME PERIOD OF TIME, 136 
4 D A Y S . 
5 AND APPARENTLY THAT'S EVERY DAY OF THE WEEK, 
6 BECAUSE SHE SAYS, "WE DON'T DO LAUNDRY ON SUNDAY." 
7 AND YET BEAR RIVER'S BEEN BILLED FOR I HE 
8 C L E A N I N G OF T H E S E C O N T E N T S BY P R O F E S S I O N A L L A U N D E R E R S , A T 
9 LEAST TWO AND MAYBE THREE FOR CLEANING VARIOUS THINGS. 
10 SHE'S CLAIMING A TOTAL OF $1,346.40, CLAIMING 
11 T H V T Til J S L A L N D i n F A C I L I T Y W A S U S E D A T O T A L OF 136 D A Y S D L ? I N , 
12 T H A T T I M E EEE 1 C I ) . Z A N D R A W A S N ' T E V E N L I V I N G T H E R E . 
13 NOW W I T H R E G A R D EG T H E D W E L L I N G , W E B E L I E VI 
J 4 THERE IS SIGNIFICANT FRAUDULENT CLAIMS WITH REGARD TO THE 
15 DWELLING. MS. PERKINS SAID, AND COUNSEL HAS SAID HIRE IN 
16 OPENING STATEMENT, THAT THEY HAVE MALE NO CLAIM FOR THE 
17 i,llLi>:\0 ;'i ELI G A R A G E . W E L L , O B V I O U S L Y T HE G A R A G E IS ,,N 
18 1 M P R O V E M E N F . A B E T T E R } L N T . B U T 11 \ OU Li L I E N CLOSLL": To :::: 
19 L V I D E N C L OF M R . R A S M U S S E N , Y O U L O O K A T AR'l N O B L E , liii 
20 TESTIMONY iFOM THEM, BEAR RIVER HAS BEEN BILLED FOP THE TC7AL 
21 \ M O U N T , N O ; J U S T D A M A G E S EC 'INL C A R P O R I , R E P L A C E M E N T , L I ! :u, 
22 THE WALL THAT WENT ALONG SIDE THE CARECNT IN ORDER Ff MAi : 
23 iTHS .N ; N ^ ..AI AGE . 
24 \ 0 ^ ' L L .i.A-. '; i .> • 1 : (-NAi >)\ 'PH I'll \T >,l\ I"HL 
2 5 C O N C R E T E W O R K , Y O U ' L L S L r P L v i U R L ^ O r I11L C O N C R E T E W O R K , 1" I 
4 7 
1 MARSHA SMITH, MS. PERKINS' SISTER, ASKED THEM IF THEY WERE 
2 GOING TO REPLACE THE CONCRETE IN THE PATIO. 
3 THEY SAID, "NO." SHE SAID, "IT'S STAINED BY 
4 THE FIRE." SHE SAID THAT IT NEEDED TO BE ACID-WASHED AND 
5 CLEANED. DIDN'T WANT TO PUT CONCRETE IN THE CARPORT, BAD 
6 CONCRETE IN THE MAIN, SO THAT SHE SAID, "WHILE YOU'RE DOING 
7 THAT, DO THE WHOLE THING." 
8 IT WAS EXPLAINED BY CPU THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE 
9 COVERED UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY, AND ZANDRA IN HER 
0 DEPOSITION SAID IT WAS NOT SUBMITTED TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
1 WE SEE THE BILL. AS WE SEE THE ACCOUNTING 
2 REPORT, THAT IN PACT 'J T WAS, AND AS RECENTLY AS WITHIN THE 
3 LAST TWO WEEKS WHEN WE FINALLY GET THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THEIR 
4 CLAIM FROM MR. RASMUSSEN, WE SEE THAT IT'S NOW INCLUDED. 
5 THAT'S WHY THIS CASE HASN'T SETTLED, BECAUSE WE 
6 CAN NEVER GET-- . 
7 MR. CAMPBELL: IE THE COURT PLEASE, THAT IS NOT 
8 OPENING STATEMENT AS TO WHAT--. 
9 THE COURT: I WOULD SUSTAIN, COUNSEL. 
0 MR. CAMPRELL: THAT'S TOTALLY IMPROPER, AND THE 
1 JURY OUGHT TO BE SO ADVi SEP . 
2 MR. LEVEL: THE EVIDENCE W]LL SHOW--. 
3 ' THE cOCi- i : COUNSEL, I'ON ' I DWELL ON THE 
•'-* SETTLEVr;;U oiTUATJON. 
5 MR. iii\i:;: ; C u L u c . T rOR THAI, V U U R ' H ^ N O R , 
1 AND COUNSEL. BUT THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT BEAR RIVER HAS 
2 NOT RECEIVED, IN ANY FORM OF DOCUMENTATION, EVEN FROM 
3 MR. RASMUSSEN WHO'S GOING TO COME IN HERE AND TESTIFY WHAT HE 
4 BELIEVES THE VALUE OF THE CLAIM IS, A CLAIM WHICH IS FREE OF 
5 FRAUD, A CLAIM WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE, AND A 
6 CLAIM WHICH INCLUDES THE ITEMS THAT WERE ACTUALLY DAMAGED. 
7 LET ME TALK TO YOU A LITTLE BIT ABOUT BEAR 
8 RIVER WITH REGARD TO FIRST GENERAL SERVICE. BEAR RIVER DOES 
9 NOT HAVE ANY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH FIRST GENERAL SER\JCE. 
0 MR. DIO WILL SHOW YOU THAT HE CARRIES AROUND, IN HIS 
J EXPERIENCE, PEOPLE WHO HAVE SUFFERED A FIRE, THEIR HOME, THEY 
2 DO WANT RECOMMENDATIONS, AND HE HAS CARDS OF SEVFRAL 
': CONTRACTORS, AND OTHER CONTRACTORS IN FACT WILL COME IN HI Rl 
4 AND TESTIFY CONCERNING THE BID WHICH WAS SUBMITTED ON BEHALF 
5 OF FIRST GENERAL SERVICE. 
6 AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHEN MR. DIO ARRIVED 
7 AT THE PROPERTY, THERE WAS A PERSON ALREADY THEkE. BLAINE 
6 OSTLER, WHO WAS THERE INSPiL'IINC THE DAMAGES FOR THE PURPOSE 
^ Ol--HE'LL BE C\LLED TO TESTIFY, AND HE WAS THERE INSPECTING II 
0 FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRYING TO SUBMIT A BID, AND WAS PREPARED TO 
J DO SO. 
2 M R . D I O C A L L E D H I M AND A S K E D H I M I E HE WAS 
j G O I N G f O S U B M 1 I A B I D . AND nl S A I D , " N O . I WENT O i l A M -
i j ' i k M N S HAD A l l U . A L * H l R I D i i R M G E N E R A L S E R V I C E . " 
i i i \ l i,I v L o i N , 1 H A T ' S V. l i t KL I H F TWO C I D S C u \ i 
'.9 
ft n a M o 
1 IN; THERE ACTUALLY WERE NOT TWO. TWO PEOPLE LOOKED AT THE 
2 PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE OF BIDDING. 
3 AND BEAR RIVER'S POSITION IS THAT THEY WILL PAY 
4 ANYONE WHO SUBMITS A REASONABLE BID. THEY RESERVE THE RIGHT 
5 TO REVIEW THE BID, AND ALSO THATTS REFERRED TO AS A SCOPE 
6 SHEET, TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT THE ITEMS THAT THEY'RE ACTUALLY 
7 ASKING FOR ARE ACTUALLY INCLUDED IN THE POLICY. 
8 IF THEY ARE REPLACING THEM WITH MATERIALS IN 
9 LIKE KIND AND QUALITY AND ET CETERA, ET CETERA. 
0 BEAR RIVER'S BEEN PUT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD 
1 PLACE BECAUSE AS MR. DIO TRIED TO RESOLVE THIS, ZANDRA PERKINS 
2 TERMINATED FIRST GENERAL SERVICE. THEY HAVE THEIR DISPUTE 
3 ONGOING. IN FACT THAT'S HOW THIS LITIGATION GOT STARTED. 
4 FIRST GENERAL SERVICE SUBMITTED A BILL, A SCOPE 
5 SHEET, A BID, EARLY ON FOR A SUM WHICH BEAR RIVER AGREED TO. 
6 AND ULTIMATELY BEAR RIVER HAS PAID MORE THAN 
7 THAT. WHAT HAPPENED IS MS. PERKINS FIRED FIRST GENERAL 
8 SERVICE. IT RESULTED 1 \ .*. 1.07 OF DC i :. ! "C A 1 I 01\ . WE MENTIONED 
9 LEO THORPE WHO CAME IN AND oOMPLETED THE HOME. THE EVIDENCE 
0 WILL SHOW THAT THERE KERF V\NV CONTRACTORS WHO CAME IN. LEO 
1 THORPE SAYS HE HAD A GEN! F\:. C • NNTK ACTORS LICENSE, BUT AS A 
2 MATTER OF FACT Vi \ ^ i) I L - ti ' ' BILLS WERE ACTUALLY TYPED BY 
3 ZANDRA PERKINS. THEY 11 \! Li-'EE ASSOCIATION. 
4 III:, o\ \ •• =..|. •••.<,ANION, TEST: EI El) TO THAT, AND 
5 THE1! V.'LRL ACQUAINTED i. i . .. . TOILER. AND \S A MATTER.oF FACT 
1 THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT THORPE HIMSELF DID VERY, VERY 
2 LITTLE IF ANYTHING ON THE JOB. 
3 CONTRACTORS CAME ON, SOME OF THEM HAD 
4 SUBCONTRACTORS, OTHERS WERE SUBCONTRACTORS THAT HAD NOTHING TO 
5 DO WITH LEO THORPE, BUT ALL OF THIS ADDED TO THE COST OF 
6 COMPLETING THE DWELLING. 
7 THEN WHEN YOU TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE 
8 IMPROVEMENTS AND THE BETTERMENTS, THEN THEIR CLAIM COMES UP 
9 HIGHER THAN WHAT BEAR RIVER IS OBLIGATED TO PAY. 
0 BEAR RIVER IS OBLIGATED TO PAY THE REASONABLE 
1 REPAIR OF THE DWELLING TO ITS LIKE KIND AND QUALITY. THEY 
2 RECEIVED A VALID BID, A SCOPE SHEET, FROM FIRST GENERA], 
3 SERVICE, THEY STOOD READY TO PAY IT, ULTIMATELY THEY PAID 
4 FIRST GENERAL SERVICE $20,000. 
5 LET ME SAY THAT THEY DID THAT IN AN EFFOk'j To 
6 GET THE PROJECT GOING. ZANDRA PERKINS WAS IN PHOENIX AT THE 
7 TIME, A CALL CAME To THEM INDICATING THAT SHE HAD AUTHORIZED 
8 GENE PETERSON TO ACCEPT THOSE MONIES, AND HE WILL SO TESTiF"* 
u
 HE HAD APPROVAL FROM HER, AND AS A RESULT OF THAT, BEAR PiVER 
0 SAID, "WELL, YOU NEED TO GET GOING," AND SOME OF THAT MONEY 
1 WENT TO PAY LABRET'S INTERIORS WHO FURNISHED CARPET AND 
2 DRAPES, AND $18,000 OF IT Wi\T TO HIS SUBS FOR THE WORK HE iE\ E 
> DONE. THE WiD WAS MUCH HiGiii.k THAN THAT, IN THE AREA UPWARD:; 
OF $M()fO()() TO REPAIR THE DWH.EING, AND BEAR RJYER FELT THAT 
liiOSL VWO i WMENTS OF $ 20 . t;-•• • . $10,000 ONE TIME AND $10,000 
n?ftsn 
1 ANOTHER TIME, WOULD HELP MOVE THE PROJECT ALONG, EVEN THOUGH 
2 THERE HADN'T BEEN ADEQUATE DOCUMENTATION CONCERNING OTHER 
3 PARTS OF THE CLAIM. 
4 INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, IN THE MIDDLE OT JULY OF 
5 1990, ZANDRA PERKINS CAME BACK TO UTAH., HAD A CONVERSATION 
6 WITH MR. PETERSON ABOUT THE PROJECT, WHAT WAS HAPPENING. 
7 MR. PETERSON'S TESTIMONY WILL BE THAT UP TO 
8 THAT TIME HE HAD HAD VERY LITTLE OR ANY COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS 
9 WORK, BUT THEN HE STARTED TALKING ABOUT WHAT HE WAS GOING TO 
0 DO TO COMPLETE THE PROJECT, AND THEN THERE WAS A CONVERSATION 
1 --AND I CAN'T QUOTE IT VERBATJM--BIT MR. PETERSON WILL COME 
2 CLOSE TO THAT, AT LEAST IN SUBSTANCE, AND THAT IS THAT SHE 
3 ASKED HIM, "IS THERE ANY WAV TO FINISH THE GARAGE AND HAVE IT 
4 INCLUDED IN THE INSURANCE CLAIM';" HE SAID, "ABSOLUTELY NOT," 
5 HE WOULDN'T DO THAT. 
6 HE SAID AFTER THAT TIM]- THE RELATIONSHIP WENT 
7 DOWNHILL, AND THEY STARTED FINDING ALL SORTS OF THINGS TO FIND 
8 WRONG W J Tii HIS WORK . 
9 THIN ON ..i,;^  THE 30TH , BEAK RIVER ISSUED A 
0 SECOND PAYMENT, PERKINS AT THAT POINT IN TIME BECAME CONCERNED 
1 AND ASKED BEAR RIVER TO STOP PAYMENT ON IF, AND THEY SAID THEY 
2 WOULD NOT STOP PAYMENT ON IT BASED ON THE FACT THAT THEY--
3 THEIR REVIEW 0! THE A (; : K , HE HAD DONE IT, AND IT WAS WORTH AT 
LEASI THAT MICH "! r NO': MwRE . 
:
 INT i :•. AS; , Nv/L'. ENCLAVE, fiir. 1\E W A S A CLAIM IN 
52 
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1 THERE--] WON'T GO INTO THEIR CLAIMS; YOU'LL HEAR ENOUGH ABOUT 
2 THAT--THAT IN FACT THEIR ACCOUNTANT HAS CONTRIBUTED $30,000. 
3 MR. CAMPBELL: THAT'S PURE ARGUMENT. IF WE 
4 WERE IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, YOU WOULDN'T HEAR ANY MORE THAN WHAT 
5 COUNSEL IS NOW DOING. WE'RE ON THE BORDER OF A MISTRIAL, AND 
6 I WANT TO MAKE A MOTION AFTER COUNSEL IS THROUGH, BUT THIS IS 
7 TOTALLY IMPROPER ARGUMENT, NOT WHAT THE EVIDENCE IS GOING TO 
8 SHOW. 
9 MR. HEATH: WELL, I GUESS MR. RASMUSSEN CAN 
0 RESPOND TO THAT. YOU CAN HEAR HIS TESTIMONY. 
1 MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, I'VE MADE AN 
2 OBJECTION. 
3 THE COURT: AND I WILL ALLOW HIM TO CONTINUE. 
4 MOVE OFF FROM IT AND CONTINUE, COUNSEL. 
5 MR. HEATH: THE RESULT OF THAT IS THAT THE 
6 CONTRACT WITH FIRST GENERAL WAS TERMINATED. BEAR RIVER THEN 
7 HAD TO DEAL KITH A LOT OF OTHER CONTRACTORS. 
o THEY MADE PAYMENTS DIRECTLY TO ZANDRA PERKINS. 
9 MADE PAYMENTS TO OTHER CONTRACTORS, AND HERE'S THE TOTAL 
0 AMOUNT OF PAYMENTS THAT BEAR RIVER HAD MADE. 
1 BEAR RJVER HAS PAID THESE AMOUNTS DIRECTLY TO 
2 ZANDRA PERKINS, $44,000; THESE ARE AMOUNTS THEY PAID TOWARDS 
3 THE DWELLING, $f>4,(>09. THAT'S WHAT THEY ALLOCATED TOWARD:. THE 
4 DWELLING WHICH WAS MORE THAN THE ORIGINAL SCOPE SHEET 
r; SUBMITTED BY TIES; ., E N E v A L SERVICE. 
J -J 
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1 ON THE CONTENTS, THEY HAVE PAID—THIS IS FOR 
2 PROPERTY IN THE HOME, $35,953. THEY PAID FOR SOME ITEMS IN 
3 THAT THAT IN FACT WERE NOT REPLACED, WERE CLEANED AND RETURNED 
4 TO THE HOME. 
5 MR. CAMPBELL: THAT'S REPETITIVE, YOUR HONOR, 
6 AND ALSO ARGUMENTATIVE. I DON'T THINK COUNSEL KNOWS HOW TO 
7 MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT. 
8 MR. HEATH: AND I OBJECT TO THE CONTINUAL 
9 INTERRUPTIONS. 
0 - THE COURT: NO, NO, YOU ARE REPEATING, COUNSEL. 
1 PLEASE MOVE ON. 
2 MR. HEATH: THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I'VE 
3 REFERRED TO THAT FIGURE, YOUR HONOR. 
4 THE COURT: MAYBE THE riGURE BUT THE CONTENTS. 
5 MR. HEATH: THE ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES, THE 
6 FULL AMOUNT BEAR RIVER HAS PAID, $91,002 iS THIS EIRE WHICH WE 
7 HAVE DEMONSTRATED FOR YOU. 
8 THERE V, ;LI BE TESU'E ABOUT DELAY, ABOUT WHY 
9 THIS HAS i>i<AGGED ON, UE;; v L ' RE HERE IN CuURY . il'S BEAR 
0 RIVER'S POSITION THAT THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW CLEARLY THAT THEY 
1 TRIED, IN THE FACE Or ALE FHE LYIDENCL TiU . COULD, IN THE 1 ACE 
2 OF ALL THE OPPOSITION TliEY HAD, TO TRY TO Rl SOLVE THIS CASE. 
3 THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TN BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE 
02853 
1 AMOUNT BEAR RIVER HAS PAID IS MORE THAN THE VALUE OF THE 
2 CLAIM. THANK YOU. 
3 THE COURT: MR. SMITH0 
4 MR. CAMPRELI : YOUR HuNOK, IVTSL ME, T IU\ E 
5 TWO MOTIONS I WANT 10 MAKE ON COLNSIL'S STATEMENT. 
6 THE COURT: YOU MAY RESERVE THEM, COUNSEL. 
7 MR. CAMPBELL: AND--. 
8 Till COURT: YOU XA\ RL31.RM I HEM, COUNSEL. 
9 MR. CAMPBELL: THANK YOU, VOIR HONOR, THAT'S 
10 ALL 1 WANTED 10 SA^ FOR THE RECORD. 
11 (V.'HEPEUPON , FURTHER PROCEELINSS WERE HAD, BEING 
12 RtiORTLD BUI \01 iILKLxN '! RAN EC R « BLl; PIRSUANT TO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D I S T J ( J N T 0 9 1993 
IN AND FOP SALT LAKF COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH s«tr LAKE COUNTY 
1 iOUTH r-/..::.., ; :JI7H - _ SALT LAKE CITY, U T A j ^ g j g 
1 84111 TELEPHONE 5 555 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT 
2 AND THIRD -PARTY PLAINTIFF ZANDRA PERKINS. 
3 NESSERS. HENRY E. HEATH, ATTORNEY AT LAW, AND 
4 H. BURT RINGWOOD, ATTORNEY AT LAW, ZTRO^C & HANNI, ? 
5 EXGHANGE PLACE, SUITE 600, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 34\l1 
6 TELEPHONE 532-7080 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THIRD-PARTY 
7 DEFENDANT BEAR RIVER MUTUAL. 
8 DAVID K. SMITH, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 6925 UNION 
•9 PARK CENTER, ZDITE 600, MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 TELEPHONE 
10 566-3373 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF KENT L. FRAMFTON HEATING AND 




(WHEREUPON, ON THE 21ST DAY OF APRIL, 1993, 
THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED IN OPEN 
COURT, IN THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE 
JURY:) 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY ARE PRESENT. YOU MAY CALL YOUR NEXT 
U1TKZSS, COUNSEL. 
MR. PRICE: THE PLAINTIFF CALLS DARREL 
BOSTWICK. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, PERHAPS IT MIGHT 
ASSIST FIRST GENERAL FOR THE COURT TO ADVISE THE JURY, AND I 
WOULD SO MOVE, THAT WE HAVE REACHED THE POINT IN THE CASE IN 
WHICH FIRST GENERAL J IT- GOING TO PUT ON. A1Z I UNDERSTAND IT, 
TESTIMONY REGARDING ATTORNEYS* FEES, AND THAT IN THAT 
:ST:FY WITHOUT BREACHING HIS ,>iN^nu J ft ^ A rt V :_ j-,
 v .,-\ i \ 
RESPONSIBILITY AS AN ADVOCATE IN THE CASE. 
THE COURT: HAVE YGU CALLED YOUR LAST 
HONOR, WE HAVE. 
WITNESS? 
MR. 3-."-STWI0i-:: YES. YO 
THE COURT: MEMBERS 017 7-lZ JURY, MR. 
IS NOW BEING CALLED AS THEIR LAST WITNESS, AND HE HAS THE 
RIGHT TO TAKE THE STAND AND TESTIFY AS TO ATTORNEYS' FEES IN 
THE CASE, \^}UCH THAT MATTER WILL EVENTUALLY BE SUEMITTED TO 
YOLO YOU MAY PROCEED , ' rO"'"-"GIfL. 
MR. FRJCE: THANH YOU. YOUR HONOR. 
C4821 
(WHEREUPON, DARREL J. BOSTWICK, HAVING FIRST 
BEEN DULY SWORN TO TELL THE TRUTH, ASSUMED 
THE WITNESS STAND AND TESTIFIED UPON OATH AS 
FOLLOWS:) 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
EY MR. PRI« 
OU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, CLEARLY, FOR THE 
JURY? 
A: DARREL JOSEPH BOSTWICK. 
Q: WHERE ARE YOU EMPLOYED, MR. BOSTWICK? 
A: THE LAW FIRM OF WALSTAD & BA5C0CK. 
Q: WHAT IS YOUR POSITION WITH THAT LAW FIRM? 
A: ATTORNEY AND SHAREHOLDER. 
Q: HOW LONG LAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED WITH WALSTAD U 
BABCOCK? 
A: FOR OVER EIGHT YEARS, APPROXIMATELY EIGHT YEARS AS 
AN ATTORNEY AND A LITTLE LONGER THAN THAT AS A LAW CLERK AS 
WELL. 
Q: CAN YOU EXPLAIN TO THE JURY WHAT YOUR EXPERIENCE I: 
AS AN ATTORNEY? 
A: I HAVE EIGHT YEARS, WAS SWORN INTO THE BAR IN 
SEPTEMBER OF '35. I HAVE APPROXIMATELY SEVEN-AND-A--HALF TO 
EIGHT YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WORKING AS AN ATTORNEY IN 
LITIGATION AND TRIAL WORK. PRIMARILY. MOST OF MY WORK HAS 
BEEN INVOLVED FN CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES, REPRESENTING 
C43?.2 
CONTRACTORS, SUBCONTRACTORS, OWNERS, SURETY BONDING 
COMPANIES AND THE LIKE. 
Q: WHERE IS WALSTAD & BABCOCK LOCATED? 
A: SALT LAKE CITY. 
0: THE ADDRESS? 
A: 254 WEST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 200. 
Q: MR. BOSTWICK, ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH RATES CUARGED 
FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN THE LOCAL SALT LAKE CITY METROPOLITAN 
AREA? 
A: YES, I AM. 
Q: COULD YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE TO THE COURT AND JURY 
YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN THIS CASE? 
A: WE WERE APPROACHED — OR, I WAS SPECIFICALLY 
APPROACHED, BY FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, APPROXIMATELY JULY 
29, 1990 -- EXCUSE HE, NOT JULY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1990, TO 
ASSIST THEM IN THE COLLECTION OF AN ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE IN 
RELATIONSHIP TO SOME CONSTRUCTION WORK ON SANDRA PERKINS? 
HOME IN MURRAY, UTAH. 
INITIALLY, WF FILED A MECHANIC'S LIEN AND 
DISTRIBUTED A MECHANIC'S LIEN VIA THE MAIL jr, M
 Z t PERKINS A 
SEVERAL DIFFERENT ADDRESSES. 
SUBSEQUENTLY, WE "USD A LAWSUIT AGAINST MS. 
PERKINS TO COLLECT FOR BREACH OF CONTRA?"!. THERE WAS !HE 
SUM OF APPROXIMATELY ^ O - M J - OWING. AND ALSO TO FORECLOSE 
~Y\Y. MECHANIC'S LIEN c;o;:;-; OF PA.:-. -ILEP. 
C48?.3 
SUBSEQUENT TO THAT, MS. PERKINS FILED A 
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST FIRST GENERAL SERVICES AND A THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST BEAR RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY AND 
SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPAL OF FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, EUGENE PETERSON. 
SINCE THAT TIME THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL 
AMOUNT OF LITIGATION EFFORT REQUIRED THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF 
VARIOUS COUNSEL, INCLUDING OUR FIRM. A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL 
DEFENDANTS IN THE THIRD-PARTY ACTION WERE DISMISSED, 
INCLUDING MR. PETERSON, AND THE TRIAL IN THIS CASE HAS BEEN 
SET FOR TRIAL FOUR TIMES, THIS BEING THE FOURTH TIME. 
THREE OF THOSE TIMES HAVE INVOLVED 
SIGNIFICANT TRIAL PREPARATION. THERE'S BEEN APPROXIMATELY, 
I BELIEVE, 16 OR 17 DEPOSITIONS, ALL OF WHICH WE, AS 
R E P R E 5ENT A11VL S 0F rIR ZT GENE R A L SERVICES, WE R E REQU IR ED T 0 
ATTEND, SINCE FIRST GENERAL SERVICES' CONDUCT OR LIABILITY 
OR RIGHTS IN THIS LAWSUIT WERE COMMENTED ON BY ALMOST EVERY 
WITNESS. 
AND -OUR EFFORTS CULMINATED IN THIS TRl^L 
THROUGH THIS WEEK AND INTO NEXT WEEK. 
Q: SO I MAY HAVE LOST TRACK OF YOUR EXPLANATION, BUT 
COULD YOU TELL ME OVER WHAT PERIOD OF TIME, WHAT THE TOTAL 
AMOUNT OF TIME IS THAT YOU'VE BEEN INVOLVED WITH THIS CASE. 
SINCE SEPTEMBER 29. 199Q? 
C4SM 
A: SOMETIMES WE HAVE BEEN MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN 
THE CASE AND SOMETIMES THERE HAS BEEN LESS ACTIVITY, BUT 
IT'S BEEN APPROXIMATELY TWO-AND-A-HALF YEARS, 
Q: IN THIS CASE, FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, AS PART OF 
THEIR CLAIM, IS CLAIMING THE RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES? 
A: IT IS. 
Q: DOES THAT CLAIM ALSO INCLUDE COSTS? 
A: IT DOES. 
Q: AND THOSE CLAIMS ARE IN ADDITION TO THEIR CLAIMS 
FOR DAMAGES; IS THAT CORRECT? 
048?.5 
1 A: CERTAINLY. I CAN IDENTIFY IT. IT IS MY AFFIDAVIT, 
2 WHICH WAS PREPARED BY MY OFFICE YESTERDAY. I HAVE REVIEWED 
3 THAT AFFIDAVIT TODAY AND EXECUTED IT WITH REGARD TO THE 
4 AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS INCURRED. 
5 I MIGHT NOTE THAT THE COSTS --. 
t MR. CAMPEELL: SHOULDN'T WE TAKE THIS 3Y 
7 QUESTION AND ANSWER? I UNDERSTAND COUNSEL IS TESTIFYING, 
8 BUT I THINK IT STILL OUGHT TO BE BY THE SOCRATIC METHOD. 
9 THE COURT: YES, IF YOU ARE GOING TO 
0 QUESTION. COUNSEL, TAKE IT BY QUESTION AND ANSWER. I DIIN'T 
1 THINK YOJ WERE GOING THAT FAR OFF, BUT POSE YOUR CUESTICNU. 
2 Q: O.K. COULD YOU PLEASE TAKE THE DOCUMENT AND TURN 
? TO PAGE TWO, MR. E 3STWIC-? WOULD YOU PLEASE READ FARAGFrF1-' 
4 NUMEER ?CJRr 
5 A: YES. PARAGRAPH NUMBER FOUR --. 
€ '"P. C/MPEELL: THE DOCUMENT IS NOT IN 
7 EVIfENCE, YOUR HONOR. AND I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO IT. 
8 MR. PRICE: I APOLOGIZE. THAT WAS /W 
O OVE.HSiG'T <^\T M\ PART. T WOULD OFFE* THE DOCUMENT INTO 
0 EYIDE^E. 
1 THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION? 
MR. CAMPBELL: NO. 
3 THE COURT: ME. HEATH, ANY :3JE( 
C48?.6 
THE COURT: PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 35 IS 
ADMITTED. 
Q: AGAIN, MR. BOSTWICK, WOULD YOU PLEASE READ FOR THE 
JURY PARAGRAPH NUMBER FOUR OF THE DOCUMENT? 
A: PARAGRAPH FOUR STATES: 
$50,627.35 IS A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES TO BE AWARDED, THROUGH 
APRIL 20, 1993, TOGETHER WITH FEES 
THROUGH COLLECTION IN THE ABOVE-
CAPTIONED MATTER CONSIDERING THE TYPE OF 
ACTION, THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY, THE 
LENGTH OF THE LITIGATION, THE NUMBER OF 
DEPOSITION;: TAKEN BY OTHER PARTIES, THE 
DIFFICULTY OF OPPOSING COUNSEL, AND ALL 
OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS. ADDITIONAL FEES 
WILL ACCRUE FOR TRIAL PARTICIPATION PAST 
APRIL 20, 1993. LEGAL SERVICES PROVIDED 
THROUGH APRIL 20, 1993 ARE SHOWN ON THE 
MONTHLY BILLING STATEMENTS ATTACHED 
HERETO AS EXHIBIT B'\ 
fl48?/7 
A: THROUGH YESTERDAY. 
Q: THERE'S ALSO AN AMOUNT SET FORTH IN THE DOCUMENT 
RELATING TO COSTS? 
A: THERE IS. 
Q: COULD YOU EXPLAIN THAT? 
A: IN PARAGRAPH SIX, THERE IS A LISTING OF THE COSTS 
WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPENDED BY FIRST GENERAL SERVICES AND 
BILLED BY MY FIRM, AND TO FIRST GENERAL SERVICES FOR THE 
COSTS INVOLVED IN THE CASE, INCLUDING THE MECHANIC'S LIEN, 
FILING THE COMPLAINT, THE LIS PENDENS IN THIS ACTION, 
SERVICE OF PROCESS, DEPOSITIONS, AND OTHER ALLOWABLE COSTS 
IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,895.18. 
Q: DO YOU KNOW WHETHER THAT INCLUDES ALL OF THE COST; 
THAT WILL BE INCURRED IN THIS CASE OTHERWISE ASSERTED 3Y 
FIRST GENERAL0 
A: AS STATED IN THE LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPH SIX, COSTS 
ACCRUED AS STATED IN THE AFFIDAVIT THROUGH MARCH 25TH, 199: 
COULD YOU PLEASE TURN TO PAGE THREE? 
A: I'M THERE. 
Q: IS THAT YOUR SIGNATURE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE? 
A: IT IS. 
YES 
CAN YOU DESCRIBE WHAT IS ON PAGE FO; PLEASE 
I O 
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A: THAT'S THE NOTARY JURAT WHERE I WAS SWORN TO THE 
ACCURACY OF THE INFORNATION CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT. 
Q: THIS IS A SWORN STATEMENT, THEN? 
A: THAT'S MY AFFIDAVIT. 




YOU INDICATED I THINK TO THE JURY JUS 
THAT YOU WERE A SHAREHOLDER IN THE FIRM. 
A: YES. 
Q: IN YOUR AFFIDAVIT THAT YOU SIGNED UNL 
SAYS THAT YOU'RE A PARTNER IN THE FIRM. WHERE 
REFERENCE? 
Q: PARAGRAPH 1: 
"I AN AN ATTORNEY LICENSED TO PRACT! 
THE STATE OF UTAH ANT; T AX A ]-.'-.--'• 
FIRM OF -A: S""P.'" •"- ::.;..:••• 
A NOMENi A 
OATH 
WOULD THAT BE AGREEABLE WITH YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: THAT'S FINE. 
A: COULD I ALSO MAKE THE INTERLINEATION ON THE 
'EXHIBIT fAf:T TO CORRECT THE DOCUMENT IN THE PARAGRAP 
048 
Q: YOU WOULD NOT SAY THAT IS A TYPICAL ARRANGEMENT Hi 
CONNECTION WITH THE FORECLOSURE OF A SPECIFIC AMOUNT OF 
MONEY BY THOSE THAT HANDLE MECHANIC'S LIEN FORECLOSURES IN 
THIS STATE? 
A: IT'S NOT AN UNUSUAL ARRANGEMENT, BUT IT CERTAINLY 
IS NOT TYPICAL. 
Q: BUT IT CERTAINLY IS ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT A 
LAWYER MUST CONSIDER IN CHARGING A CLIENT A FEE FOR WORK 
DONE, IS THE AMOUNT OF THE CLAIM THAT IS INVOLVED; ISN'T 
THAT TRUE? 
A: THAT DEPENDS ON WHAT THE CLIENT WANTS. 
C: LET ME JUST ASK YOU: DO NOT THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT REQUIRE YOU, AS A LAWYER, TO REVIEW, A'l 
AN ELEMENT OF THE AMOUNT OF WHAT 1^, A REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' 
FEE, THE AMOUNT INVOLVED0 
A: CERTAINLY. 
Q: YOU RECOGNIZE THAT RULE I.E. OF THE PROFESSIONAL 
RULES OF CONDUCT REQUIRES YOU TO LOOK AT THAT FACTOR? 
A: CERTAINLY. 
Q: NOU THE AMOUNT 0^ MO*TY THAT YOU ARE - THAT YOUR 
CLIENT IS SEEKING IN THIS CASE IS THE SUM OF $10,627 AND 
SOMETHING? 
A: APPROXIMATELY $10,600 AND CHANGE, CORRECT. 
Q: AND IS IT YOUR JUDGMENT THAT A SUM OF £50,027 IS A 
C4832 
A: IN THIS CASE, YES. 
Q: THE DEPOSITIONS THAT YOU INDICATED YOU HAD TO 
ATTEND, MOST OF THOSE DEPOSITION WERE EITHER NOTICED AND 
SCHEDULED BY MR. HEATH'S FIRM OR BY MY FIRM, CAMPBELL, MAACK 
& SESSIONS, OR PREDECESSOR COUNSEL; ISN'T THAT TRUE? 
A: I BELIEVE ALL OF THEM WERE. 
Q: YOU REALLY ATTENDED AS KIND OF AN ANCILLARY PARTY? 
A: I ATTENDED TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF MY CLIENT. 
Q: BUT AS AN ANCILLARY -- YOU DIDN'T NOTICE THE 
DEPOSITIONS YOURSELF, DID YOU? 
A: I DID NOT. 
Q: AND YET YOU HAVE — YOU HAVE SHOWN ON PAGE THREE OF 
EXHIBIT NUMBER 35, YOU HAVE SHOWN THE SUM OF THE NUMBER OF 
DEPOSITION COSTS, IS THAI NOT CORRECT'? YOU SHOW A 
DEPOSITION OF SMITH, THORUP £ PERKINS, $60S.76; THEN THERE 
ARE SIX DEPOSITION EXPENSES THAT FOLLOW? 
A: I BELIEVE THERE ARE 16 IN TOTAL, 16 OR J 7 IN TOTAL. 
Q: BUT YOU HAVE THEM — I AM TALKING ABOUT THE NUMBERS 
THAT YOU HAVE SHOWN; YOU HAVE SEVEN SEPARATE ENTRIES. DOES 
THE COURT HAVE A COPY OF THIS? 
THE COURT: YES, 
Q: WERE THOSE TOTAL DEPOSITION EXPENSES OF THOSE 
DEPOSITIONS INVOLVED OR WAS THAT YOUR PROPORTIONATE FART OF 
THE EXPENSES FOR GETTING A COPY OF THE DEPOSITION? 
C4S33 
1 A: I BELIEVE THERE ARE EIGHT ENTRIES, AND THE ANSWER 
2 TO YOUR QUESTION IS THAT THAT REPRESENTS MY COST TO THE 
3 COURT REPORTER TO PURCHASE A COPY OF THE DEPOSITION. 
4 Q: AND SINCE YOU DIDN'T TAKE OR NOTICE THE DEPOSITION 
5 PROPER, YOU DIDN'T HAVE TO THEN PAY THE REPORTER'S FEE? 
6 A: I DID NOT PAY THE REPORTER'S FEE. 
7 Q: THESE ARE JUST COPY COSTS? 
8 A: THAT'S CORRECT. 
9 Q: IS IT NOT TRUE, SIR, THAT IN ORDER FOR YOU TO 
0 RECOVER DEPOSITION COSTS IN A COURT ACTION. THAT YOUR COSTS 
1. MUST FIT UNDER RULE 54 OF THE UTAH ROLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE? 
2 A: THEY DO, AND I BELIEVE THESE DO AS WELL. 
3 0: BUT WOULD YOU ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT IN ORDER 
4 TO RECOVER DEPOSITION COSTS, YOU MUST SHOW THE COURT THAT 
5 THE DEPOSITION EXPENSES WERE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE 
6 PROSECUTION OF THE CASE? 
7 A: I'M NOT COMFORTABLE WITH SAYING "ABSOLUTELY 
8 ESSENTIAL." YOU H^VE TO SHOW SOME RELEVANCY TO YOUR CASE. 
9 Q: THAT THEY WERE ESSENTIAL TO THE PROSECUTION OF YOUR 
0 CASE. 
1 A: I'M NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE WORD "ESSENTIAL." 
2 Q: ALL RIGHT. WOULD YOU ACCEPT THE WORD, THEN, 
3 "NECESSARY"? 
4 A: C E R T A I N I Y . 
C4S-4 
Q: AND WITH REGARD TO THE -- YOU FINISHED YOUR CASE IN 
CHIEF, AND YOU HAVE NOT USED ANY WITNESS'S DEPOSITION AS 
PART OF YOUR CASE IN CHIEF, HAVE YOU? 
A: NOT AT THIS POINT, NO. WE'VE REFERRED TO MANY OF 
THEN DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL, BUT NOT USED THEM IN 
OPEN COURT-
Q: YOU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DEPOSITIONS — THE RECOVERY 
OF DEPOSITION COSTS ARE GENERALLY A MATTER WITHIN THE 
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE; ISN'T THAT TRUE? 
A: I BELIEVE THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q: NOW THE RATE THAT YOU CHARGED WAS A HUNDRED DOLLARS 
AN HOUR; IS THAT RIGHT? 
THAT 'S CORRECT. 
FROM A CERTAIN DATE TO A CERTAIN DATE, AND THEN Q 
$ 1 1 0 VEAFTER° 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
IS THAT YOUR PRESENT RATE? 
£110 AN HOUR IS 11Y GOING BILLING RATE, YES-
AND MR. PRICE --IS THAT YOUR ASSOCIATE0 
HIS TIME IS BEING BILLED AT --- WAS BILLED AT $90 AN 
HOUR? 
A: YES. 
0: AND ST; 
.17 
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A: THAT'S -- HE'S BEEN WITH OUR FIRM AS AN ATTORNEY 
SINCE MARCH OF LAST YEAR. 
Q: THEN STEVEN CRAWLEY HAD A BILLING RATE OF $115. 
WHO IS HE? 
A: HE'S ANOTHER SHAREHOLDER IN THE FIRM AND HAD A 
FAIRLY MINOR ROLE. BUT DOES HAVE SOME TIME IN THE CASE, SO 
WE INCLUDED THAT. 
Q: HOW MANY HOURS, APPROXIMATELY? 
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Q: CAN YOU TELL THE COURT AND JURY, PLEASE, 
APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY HOURS — YOU GET TO THIS BILL OF 
$50,627.35, HOW MANY HOURS OF YOUR TIME IS INVOLVED? 
A: AGAIN, I HAVE NOT ADDED THAT UP, BUT IT IS INCLUDED 
IN THE DOCUMENTS. 
Q: CAN YOU GIVE US AN — 
A: WELL -
Q: — ORDER OF MAGNITUDE ESTIMATE? 
A: I COULD PROBABLY DC A PERCENTAGE ESTIMATE OF THE 
TOTAL AMOUNT THAT COULD BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MY EFFORT. 
Q: SO I TAKE WHAT YOU'RE TELLING US TO BE, TELLING 
THIS COURT AND JURY, THEN, IS THAT FOR PROSECUTING A CASE 
WORTH $10,600, THAT $50,600 IS A REASONABLE FEE FOR THAT? 
A: IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE. YES. IT WOULDN'T BE IN 
EVERY CASE. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, I THINK I HAVE NO 
r,4337 
Q: YOUR CLIENT'S CONTRACT WAS WITH PERKINS NOT BEAR 
RIVER. 
THATrS THE BASIS OF LAWSUIT HERE. 
MR. HEATH: THANK YOU. 
MR. SMITH: NO QUESTIONS. 
MR. PRICE: EXCUSE ME, YOUR HONOR; COULD I 
C 4 8 3 8 
Q: WHAT HAPPENS, MR. BOSTWICK, IF A PARTY TO AN ACTION 
DOES NOT ATTEND A DEPOSITION OR AN ATTORNEY DOESN'T ATTEND A 
DEPOSITION WHEN ISSUES RELATING TO THEIR CASE ARE DISCUSSED? 
A: WELL, IF THERE ARE ISSUES THAT ARE DISCUSSED, OR 
MATTERS THAT ARE RAISED THAT ARE OBJECTIONABLE TO YOUR 
CLIENT'S POSITION, AND YOU'RE NOT THERE TO DEFEND THAT 
INFORMATION, YOU WAIVE THOSE OBJECTIONS. 
IT'S AS IF YOU WERE THERE AND ACQUIESCED TO 
THE POSITION ASSERTED IN THE DEPOSITION OR THE TESTIMONY IN 
THE DEPOSITION WITHOUT REGISTERING ANY OBJECTION OR THE 
ABILITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESS. 
AND IT CAN BE VERY DAMAGING TO A CLIENT IF 
ONE DOES NOT ATTEND DEPOSITIONS. 
Q: AS AN ATTORNEY, IF YOU DON'T ATTEND A DEPOSITION, 
DO YOU KNOW WHETHER LATER YOU'RE ALLOWED TO RECALL THAT 
WITNESS IN ORDER TO TAKE U1S DEPOSITION? 
A: TECHNICALLY YOU'RE NOT -- SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO, 
]F YOU HAVE RECEIVED PROPER NOTICE OF A DEPOSITION AND HAD 
/\N OPK;KTUNITY TU ATTEND. SOMETIMES WITNESSES AND PARTIES 
WILL AGREE. TO DO THAT, BUT THEY ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO. YOU 
MAY SIMPLY WAIVE THE RIGHT TO CALL THAT WITNESS AT A LATER 
DATE IF YOU RECEIVED PROPER NOTICE. 
Q: IS IT REQUIRED THAT AN ATTORNEY REPRESENTING A 
CLIENT NOTICE THE DEPOSITION BEFORE HE OR ^llE IS REGUIRED TO 
ATTEND THE DEPOSITION? 
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Q: HOW MANY JURY TRIALS HAVE YOU BEEN INVOLVED IN? 
A: THIS IS MY FIRST. 
Q: AND YOU ARE AWARE THAT IF A RECOVERY IN THIS CASE -
- IF THE JURY FINDS, AND THE COURT DETERMINES BY JUDGMENT, 
THAT BEAR RIVER OWES MONIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT OR BAD 
FAITH BREACH OF CONTRACT, THAT PERKINS ' POSITION —- AND SOME 
MONEY ACTION IS STILL OWING TO FIRST GENERAL -- THAT MONIES, 
THAT BEAR RIVER IN THAT INSTANCE, WOULD PAY MONIES TO FIRST 
GENERAL; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A: THE UNDERLYING --- . 
MR. HEATH: THAT CALLS FOR LEGAL CONCLUSION. 
MR. CAMPBELL: ABSOLUTELY, HE'S A LAWYER. 
MR. HEATH: THAT'S NOT THE SCOPE OF THIS 
EXAMINATION, AND I THINK THAT'S HIGHLY IMPROPER, AND I WOULD 
OBJECT Tu THAI ON THE BASIS THAT THAT'S SOMETHING THE COURT 
IS GOING TO HAVE TO DETERMINE, AND IT'S CERTAINLY PREMATURE 
FOR THIS WITNESS TO CONJECTURE AS TO WHAT LIABILITIES ARE. 
OUK POSITION WILL BE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT THAN THAT. 
MR. CAMPBELL: HE ASKED - JUDGE, HE ASKED A 
QUESTION HIMSELF AS TO WHETHER OR MOT MR. BGSTWICK EXPECTED 
TO LOOK TO BEAR RIVER FOR ANY RECOVERY IN THIS CASE. 
MR. HEATH: YOUR HONOR, THERE IS NO WAY --. 
TUE COURT: I'M READY TO RULE, COUNSEL. I'M 
GOING TO ASK YOU »• - I'M GOING TO ZVS^AI^ THE OBJECTION. AND 
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A: NO, IT'S NOT, AS LONG AS THE ATTORNEY WHO RECEIVES 
PROPER NOTICE FROM THE PARTY CALLING THE WITNESS FOR THE 
DEPOSITION, THEY'RE OBLIGATED TO ATTEND IF THEY WANT TO 
PROTECT THEY'RE CLIENT'S INTEREST. 
Q: DO YOU EXPECT TO GET A TRANSCRIPT OF THE DEPOSITION 
TAKEN IN THIS CASE DURING THE PROCEEDINGS HEREAFTER? 
A: I BELIEVE WE WILL, YES. 
Q: IN CROSS-EXAMINATION, I BELIEVE MR. CAMPBELL 
REFERRED TO THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF TIME, ASKED QUESTIONS 
REGARDING THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF TIME YOU HAD INVOLVED IN THIS 
CASE. THAT TOTAL AMOUNT OF TIME IS SPREAD OUT, AND I WANT 
TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND YOUR PREVIOUS TESTIMONY. 
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MAYBE AT A LATER TIME WITH MORE GOING INTO IT, BUT RIGHT NOW 
I WANT TO STAY AWAY FROM IT. 
MR. CAMPBELL: ALL RIGHT, THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. DO YOU HAVE ANY 
FURTHER QUESTIONS, COUNSEL? 
MR. PRICE: MO, WE DON'T, YOUR HONOR. ONE 
THING WE WOULD LIKE TO DO, FIRST GENERAL SERVICES WOULD 
RESERVE ITS RIGHT TO SUPPLEMENT MR. BOSTWICK'S AFFIDAVIT TO 
INCLUDE FEES AND COSTS INCURRED FROM YESTERDAY FORWARD 
THROUGH THE END OF THE TRIAL, AND WE WOULD SUBMIT THAT AT 
THE APPROPRIATE TIME. 
C4842 
PETERSON:: CONT DIP EXAM B\ B05T<nc* 
RESTORATION PROJECTS, HOW LONG HAVE > OU BEEN DOING THOSE T\ PES 
OF PROJECTS PERSONALLY"' 
A SINCE lc/84„ 
O FROM 1*84 TO THE TIME OF THE H P E , APPROXIMATELY HOW 
MAN\ PROJECTE HAVE \OU BEEN INVOLVED IN, LM TERMS OF INSURANCE 
REPAIR-
A WE H A D — 
MR. CAMPBELL: I REALLY THINi- THE WITNESS HAS 
GOT TO—I MEAN IF HE WANTS TO USE THE WORD, "WE," THAT S FINE, 
BUT WE THEN NEED TO \ NOW WHO "WE" IS. 
THE COURT: YES, I WOULD ADMONISH THE WITNESS— 
AND 1 UNDERSTAND MAYBE IT S JUST H FORM \jF SPEECH-
MR. CAMPBELLS YES. 
THE COURT: — B U T THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO f NOW 
WHO YOU'RE TALI- ING ABOUT. IF YOU'RE TALI- ING ABOUT OTHER 
INDIVIDUALS, STATE THAT., IF IT S JUST YOURSELF, SAY "I." 
0 WITH REGARD Tu YOURSELF, HOW MANY PROJECTS HAD YOU 
BEEN INVOLVED IN IN INSURANCE RESTORATION PROJECTS FROM 84 TO 
THE TIME OF THE FIRE, APPROx iMATEL\ ""' 
A APPROX1MAT EL > 1.SOU. 
Q OUT OF THAT 1,500, HOW MAN Y RELATED TO ^IRE DAMAGE"" 
A ABOUT A FOURTH OF THEM. 
0 MR. PETERSON, WAS FIRST GENERAL SERVICES BONDABLE 




PETERSONS CONT DIR EXAM BY BQSTWICK 
MR, CAMPBELL: OBJECTION TO THAT QUESTION, YOUR 
HONOR. WHETHER THEY WERE BONDABLE, THAT'S AN IRRELEVANT 
QUESTION. THE QUESTION IS: WERE THEY BONDED AT THE TIME OF 
THIS EVENT, AND I ASSUME COUNSEL IS GOING TO LAY FOUNDATION 
FOR THE DATE, BUT I ASSUME IT'S IN MAY OF 1990. 
THE COURT: I WOULD ALLOW THAT QUESTION TO 
STAND, BUT OF COURSE THE PERTINENT QUESTION WILL B E — . 
MR. BOSTWICK: AND THAT'S—WE WILL TIE IT IN, 
YOUR HONOR. WE APPRECIATE SOME LATITUDE THERE- WHAT TYPE OF 
BONDS—WHEN WE TALK ABOUT BONDS, WHAT TYPES OF BONDS ARE THERE 
WITH RELATIONSHIP TO A CONSTRUCTION PROJECT? 
A THERE ARE BONDS THAT ARE A SURETY TYPE OF BOND THAT 
WILL GUARANTEE PERFORMANCE, OR LET ME CALL IT A PERFORMANCE 
BOND THAT GUARANTEES THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACTOR. 
THERE ARE OTHER KINDS OF BONDS FOR INDIVIDUALS 
WHO DO CLEANING, A CLEANING CONTRACTOR, IN SUBSTANCE A 
SUBCONTRACTOR. WE USE SOME OF THOSE SOMETIMES THAT ARE BONDED 
PEOPLE. 
Q ARE THERE BONDS HAVING TO DO WITH PAYMENT OF SOME 
CONTRACTORS AND SUPPLIERS? 
A THAT WOULD BE A PERFORMANCE BOND. 
Q AND WHO PAYS FOR THE BOND ON THE CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECT? 
A THE OWNER. 
Q THAT WOULD SIMPLY BE ADDED TO THE PRICE OF THE 
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PROJECT^' 
A YES. BOND?. ARE NOFMALL- FIVE TO SEL'EN-ANP-A-HALF 
PERCENT ABO^E WHAT THE COST [j- THE PROJFC1 ib. 
0 ARE THERE CONSTRUCTION PONDS THAT ARE PERFORMANCE 
BQNDE THAT ARE WHA1 YOU MIGHT CALL BLANKET BOMDE: IN OTHER 
WORDS, COVER A NUMBER OF DIFFtPENl PROJECTS POP A CONTRACTORS 
A NO, SIP. THEY RE VER ,' SPECIFIC FOP INDIVIDUAL 
PROJECTS. 
9 SO A CONTRACTOR WOULD BE USED TO GETTING A 
PARTICULAR BOND FOR EACH PARTICULAR PROJECT"* 
MR. CAMPBELL: VOUR HONOR, THAT S LEADING AND 
SUGGESTIVE, IF THE COURT PLEASE- 3 OBJEC" TO IT. 
THE COURT: I WOULD SUSTAIN, COUNSEL. 
o IN YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH INSURANCE COMPANIESM WILL 
THE/ PAY FOR CONSTRUCTION BONDS AS PART OF THEIR REIMBURSEMENT 
OF THE INSURED"* 
A TO THIS DATE—. 
MR. CAMPBELL: OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE 
QUESTION. THE QUESTION WAS, "IN YOUR EXPERIENCE DOES AN 
INSURANCE COMPANr PAY FUR. " 11 S AMP.JGUOUS., A NUN SEOUlTuP, 
AND I OBJECT TO IT. 
MR. BOSTWIO : MP. PETERSON HAS TESTIFIED--. 
MR. CAMPBELL: THE COURT HASN T RULED ON IT. 
MR. BOETWia : I HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
RESPOND. MR. PETERSON MAE TESTIFIED THAT HE HAS A GREAT DEAL 
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PETERSONS CONT DIR E>AM BY BOSTWICI-
OF EXPERIENCE IN THIS AREA, AND I'M ASKING HIS Ex'RERIENCE AS 
TO WHETHER DR NOT INSURANCE COMPANIES ON PROJECTS HE S MOW EL 
ON HAVE BEEN WILLING TO PA\ FOR CONSTRUCTION PONDS-
MR. CAMPBELL: WELL, \ OUR HONOR, I DON T 
BELIEVE THIS WITNESS IS QUALIFIED Ac, ANY SORT OF INSURANCE 
ANALYST OR EXPERT., HE S A CONTRACTOR, HE CAN SPEAI- ON THAT. 
BUT CERTAINLY' HE CAN T SPEAI- AS AN Ex'RERT WITH REGARD TO WHAT 
AN INSURANCE COMPANY WOULD DO- I THOUGHT THEY WERE LEADING TO 
QUESTION^ AS TO WHMI HE DID IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE. I 
WOULD OBJECT TO THAT. 
THE COURT: I WOULD OVERRULE THE OBJECTION. HE 
MAY ANSWER TO HIS EXPERIENCE. 
A EVEN UP UNTIL THIS DATE, I HAVE NEVER CEEN AN 
INSURANCE COMPANY PAY A PERFORMANCE BOND. 
O LET 5 TURN NOW BAO TO THE SPECIFICS OF THIS 
PARTICULAR PROJECT. DIP YOU INITIATE THE CONTACT WITH MS. 
PER} INS ON JULY 21, 1^90^ 
A NO, SIR. 
0 HAD YOU HAD ANY CONVERSATIONS WITH ANrONE AT REAR 
RIVER ABOUT THE FIRE, ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR PROJECT, OR ABOUT 
THE FIRE BEFORE MS. PERI- INS CONTACTED YOU ON THE 21ST"4 
A NO. 
MR. CAMPBELL: OBJECTION TO THAT. THAT ASSUMES 
THAT SHE CONTACTED HIM. THE WITNESS SAID HE- D1DN T. 
MR. BOSTWICI-
 : NO. 
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PETERSON: CONT DIR ExAM BY BQSTWIO 
THE COURT; I LL LET IT STAMP. YDU MAY 
PROCEED. 
0 I VE JUST BEEN INFORMED i MISITATED. I SAID JUL\ 
215TS 1 MEPNT TO SAY MAr 2 1ST. 
A MAY 21ST. THE ANSWER IS STILL THE SAME* 
O YOUR MEETING WITH MS. FERI INS ON MAY 22ND., YOU 
TESTIFIED YESTERDAY ABOUT 1 HAT„ WERT THERE MNI DISCUSSIONS 
ABOUT BONDING""* 
A NO. 
0 DID YOU TELL MS. PERI INS THAT FIRST GENERV.L SERVICES 
WAS BONDED""' 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HC'NuR\ IF THE COURT PLEASE, 
THAT S LEADING AND SUGGESTIVE. WE VE GOT--THIE I- DIRECT 
EXAMINATION. HE S GOT TO BRING THE ANSWERS FROM THE WITNESS. 
NOT TESTIFY HIMSELF. 
THE COURT: IT IS LEADING, COUNSEL. I WOULD 
AS* YOU TO REPHRASE THE OUESTJQN. 
0 WAS BONDING AT ALL DISCUSSED" 
A NO. 
MR. CAMPBELL: AND HE ANSWERED THAT. 
O WAS THERE ANY DIECUSSION ABOUT FIRST GENERAL 
SERVICES' ABILITY TO BE BONDED"' 
A NO. 
0 DID MS. PER! INS EXPRESS ANY CONCERN THE POTENTIAL 
FOR UNPAID SUBCONTRACTORS AND 3UPP-IER3 ON THIS PROJECT"' 
S 
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A THAT DISCUSSION NEVER WAS ENTERED INTO. 
Q WERE ANY OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE POTENTIAL 
FOR MECHANIC'S LIENS BEING FILED ON THIS PROJECT"1 
A NO. 
0 WERE THERE ANV DISCUSSIONS WITH MS. PER}- INS ABOUT 
THE TIME TO COMPLETE THE PROJECT ON MMV ZTND"' 
A NO. 
Q WERE THERE ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH MS. PERI- INS ABOUT 
THE TIME TO COMPLETE ANY PORTION OF THE PROJECT"1 
A NO. IT HAD BEEN ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DO THAT AT 
THAT POINT OF TIME. 
MR. CAMPBELL: THAT S A VOLUNTEERING STATEMENT, 
AND I OBJECT TO IT. 
THE COURT: IT IS, BUT I LL A L L O W IT TO STAND. 
Q WILL VOU EXPLAIN WHY THAT WOULD BE NEAR IMPOSSIBLE 
AT THAT TIME-* 
A THE FIRST THING, THAT WAS THE VERY FIRST DAY I SAW 
THE PROJECT. I HADN'T HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT WITH THE 
SUBCONTRACTOR TO SEE WHAT THEIR SCHEDULING WOULD BE. J DIDN T 
hNOW WHAT M\ OWN COMMITMENTS FROM MY OWN COMPANY WOULD BE. 
IT S ONE OF THOSE THINGS, YOU CAN'T—JUST AS A 
MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY, I NEVER TALI- ABOUT SCHEDULING. IT S 
JUST TOO PREMATURE. 
Q WERE THERE ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH MS. PEPI- INS ON MAY 
22ND REGARDING FIRST GENERAL SERVICES QUALIFICATIONS TO DO 
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THE QUESTION. 
A THE CONTENTS AND CLEANING CAME FROM A DOCUMENT THAT 
WAS PREPARED EARLIER. 
Q DID YOU PREPARE OTHER DOCUMENTS? 
A I DID NOT. 
Q BUT DID YOU PREPARE EXHIBIT NO. 14, THIS STATEMENT? 
A I PREPARED EXHIBIT NO. 14, YES. 
Q YOU TOOK THE NUMBER FROM THAT EARLIER DOCUMENT AND 
INSERTED IT IN EXHIBIT NO. 14? 
A YES, 1 DID. 
Q WHAT;S THE NUMBER? 
A $824.92. 
Q AND THE NEXT ENTRY, PLEASE? 
A WALL PAPER DEPOSIT PAID TO LA BRETT'S, $2,000. 
Q THE NEXT ITEM? 
A PAYMENT RECEIVED QN JUNE 12, $10,000 
Q THE NEXT ITEM? 
A PAYMENT RECEIVED ON JULY 31, £10,000. 
Q DO THOSE TWO PAYMENTS OF $10,000 EACH REPRESENT ALL 
THE PAYMENTS THAT FIRST GENERAL SERVICES RECEIVED FOR WORK 
DONE ON THE PERKINS RESIDENCE? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT'S THE BALANCE DUE SHOWING? 
A $10,658.47. 
Q THAT'S THE AMOUNT OF YOUR CLAIM HERE, IS IT NOT? 
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WOULD SUBMIT TO THE COURT BY WAY OF A JURY INSTRUCTION. 
THE COURT: THE BURDEN OF PROOF CAN BE 
DIFFERENT. 
MR. HEATH: THAT'S TRUE. WE'RE PREPARED TO 
ASSUME THAT WE HAVE TO MEET THAT BURDEN OF PROOF AND TO HAVE 
THE COURT SO INSTRUCT THE JURY- BUT WE RE ARGUING, AND WE 
BELIEVE, THAT THERE IS INSURANCE FRAUD WHENEVER YOU SUBMIT A 
FALSE OR FRAUDULENT—AND IN THIS CASE WE'RE CLAIMING IT'S 
FALSE5 WE DON'T HAVE TO MEET THE BURDEN OF COMMON LAW FRAUD AS 
THEY CLAIM. THAT'S NOT THE STANDARD. THERE A MYRIAD OF CASES 
FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS THAT HOLD SUCH. 
NOW IN THIS CASE, THEY CITE THE WILLIAMS CASE, 
AND THEY WERE NOT PRESENTING A FALSE AND FRAUDULENT CLAIM. IT 
HAD TO DO WITH VOIDING A POLICY. STATE FARM TRIED TO VOID IT 
ON THE BASIS OF FALSE INFORMATION APPARENTLY CLAIMED IN THE 
APPLICATION FOR LIFE INSURANCE, AND THE STANDARD THERE IS 
DIFFERENT THAN THIS. THAT GOES RIGHT TO THE STATUTE. 
MR. CAMPBELL: JUDGE, MY LEARNED FRIEND HAS 
JUST THE MADE THE VERY POINT THAT WE HAVE RAISED WITH THE 
COURT. HE COULDN'T—I COULDN'T HAVE SAID IT BETTER IF I HAD 
WRITTEN IT OUT IN A SCRIPT. YOU RECALL WHAT HE IS CLAIMING 
HERE IS THAT MY CLIENT HAS BEEN GUILTY OF A CRIME, A CRIME 
THAT REQUIRES AN ALLEGATION FOR DUE PROCESS, MUCH LESS RULE 
9(B) AND CIVIL RULES, THAT REQUIRES A VERY SPECIFIC, 
PARTICULAR12AT ION OF FACT: WHAT HAPPENED, AT WHAT TIME, AND 
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LUL.LUL'UY KL : hKriUU LLhin •: viutumri: 
NOW IN THAT CASE- THEY SAID THEY VOIDED THE 
WHOLE POLICY. THERE ARE OTHER CASES, AND I DON T HAVE THEM 
BEFORE ME, WE LL ARGUE THEM LATER IF NEED EC, BUT WHICH SAY I "r 
ONLY VOIDS THE PART OF THE POLIO IT REFERS TO. IF YOU F3ND 
FRAUD JH THE CONTENTS PORTION. YOU VOID THAT PART OF IT. IF 
YOU FIND FRAUD IN THE ADDITIONAL LIVING ExFENEEE FGPTION, YOU 
VOID THAT. BUT THIS CASE, YOUR HONOF, WE HAVE PLED IN OUR 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ELEMENTS OF INSURANCE FRAUD SET FORTH IN 
THE STATUTE. 
THE COURT: YOU DIDN'T SA> FALSE OR FRAUDULENT. 
MR. HEATHs AND YOU DON T HAVE TO SAY IT. YOU 
CAN SAY EITHER OR. IT DOESN T HAVE 10 BE DOTH. 
THE COURT: YOU SAID FALSE. 
MR. HEATH: THAT S CORRECT. IT CAM BE A FALSE 
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE. 
THE COURT: LEAVING NOW THE TERM "FRAUDULENT," 
TAfE IT OUT OF THE INSURANCE FRAUD—. 
MR HEATH: THE THING IS IF IT S FALSE, BY 
DEFINITION, IT 5 INSURANCE FRAUD. THMT S THE CRIME, INSURANCE 
FRAUD. THAT S THE SECTION. THAT S WHAT THEY'RE CONVICTED OF. 
IN THIS CASE, IT DOESN T HAVE TO BE FALSE AND 
FRAUDULENT, IT'S FALSE O R — . 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU RE SAYING. 
MR. HEATH: IT HAS TO BE INTENTIONALLY AND YOU 
HAVE TO HAVE IT BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING, WHICH IS WHAT WE 
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HELD, AND THE INSURANCE COMPANY IN THAT CASE—NOT LIKE BEAR 
RIVER—BUT THE INSURANCE COMPANY IN THAT CASE REFUSED TO PAY 
ANYTHING AND SAID, "LOOK, YOU'VE VOIDED THE POLICY BY YOUR 
FRAUD." 
AND THE JURY FOUND BAD FAITH BECAUSE THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY DIDN'T PAY ANYTHING. AND THE BASIS FOR THE 
FINDING OF BAD FAITH DN THE PART OF THE JURY WAS THAT THE 
AMOUNT OF THE POLICY LIMITS FOR COVERAGE WERE SATISFIED BY THE 
PROVABLE ITEMS^ THEREFORE THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE TO THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY BECAUSE THE ITEMS ABOVE THE LIMITS THAT WERE 
MISSING DID NOT PREJUDICE THE INSURANCE COMPANY BECAUSE THERE 
WAS STILL ENOUGH JUST TO GET TO THE LIMITS. 
AND AS A RESULT OF THAT„ THE FINDING OF BAD 
FAITH WAS ENTERED AND THEY SAID THAT THE INSURANCE COMPANY WAS 
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING FRAUD—EXCUSE ME, FROM ASSERTING A 
CLAIM OF FALSE AND FRAUDULENT CLAIM FILING BECAUSE THEIR 
LIMITS WERE COVERED. 
ANYWAY, THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON, IN 
REVIEWING THAT, OVERTURNED THE JURY VERDICT AND SAID, FIRST OF 
ALL, ESTOPPEL WAS NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE A PERSON WHO IS GUILTY 
OF FRAUD DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASSERT ESTOPPEL. YOU HAVE 
TO HAVE CLEAN HANDS BEFORE YOU CAN ASSERT ESTOPPEL. 
AND THEY FURTHER FOUND THAT THE FILING OF THE 
FALSE OR FRAUDULENT—AND I USE THE TERM OF ART, FALSE OR 
FRAUDULENT INSURANCE CLAIM—IS SUFFICIENT TO VOID THE POLICY. 
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REFERRING TO. THE WILLIAMS CASE HE S REFERRING TO DOES NOT 
REFER TO INSURANCE FRAUD AS A CRIME. IT REFERS TO FRAUDULENT 
REPRESENTATION IN AN APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE SUFFICIENT TO 
DEFEAT THE APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE-
WE'RE NOT TALI- I NO ABOUT THAT. WE RE TALI- ING 
ABOUT THE SPECIFIC ACT OF PRESENTING A FALSE INSURANCE CLAIM, 
AND THERE IS A SPECIFIC STATUTE THAT APPLIES TO THAT, AND I 
DON'T THINI- WE CAN GET CLOSER ON POINT THAN WE HAVE IN THIS 
CASE. THE VERY LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE IS WHAT WE HAVE CITED 
IN OUR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, AND THEREFORE WE DON T HAVE TO SET 
FORTH, IN OUR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, ALL OF THE FACTS AND ALL OF 
THE ACTS WHICH CONSTITUTE THE FALSIFY. WE DON'T EVEM HAVE TO 
SHOW THAT IT'S COMMON LAW FRAUD-
AND I VE CITED TO THE COURT THE COX CASE, A 
VERY INTERESTING CASE OUT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, IN WHICH 
A DOCTOR BY THE NAME OF COX HAD AN EXPENSIVE HOME THAI BURNED 
DOWN. HE FILED A CLAIM FOR CONTENTS THAT TURNED OUT EXCEEDED 
THE POLIO LIMITS. 
WHEN THE INSURANCE COMPANY SENT OUT THEIR 
PEOPLE TO DO A VALUE ON SALVAGE, THEY COULD FIND SOME ITEMS HE 
HAD CLAIMED. BUT THEY COULD NOT FIND SOME REMNANTS OF ITEMS, 
AMD THE\ STARTED TO SUSPECT THAT PERHAPS HE D INCLUDED IN HIS 
INVENTORY ITEMS THAT WERE NOT IN EMSFTENCET OR AT LEAST NOT 
DAMAGED IN THE FIRE. 
AS A RESULT OF 1 HAT „ THERE WAS A TRIAL THAT WAS 
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MOST CLOSELY IN POINT IS A CASE INVOLVING A FIRE, A CASE 
INVOLVING THE VERY SECTION OF THE CRIMINAL CODE RELATING TO 
INSURANCE FRAUD AND ELEMENTS SET FORTH IN SECTION 76-6-52(1), 
THAT A PERSON HAS TO PROVE, IN ORDER TO SHOW INSURANCE FRAUD, 
IN RELATIONSHIP TO REPRESENTATIONS RELATING TO A CLAIM FOR 
FIRE DAMAGE. 
IN THIS CASE, iIAJE_VJL__NICHOLSH STATE_VJL 
NIQHQLS, THAT CASE, THE COURT HELD THAT, BY QUOTING THIS 
CITATION OF THE STATUTE, AND THIS IS LANGUAGE THAT WE'VE 
INCLUDED IN OUR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, THAT "EVERY PERSON WHO 
PRESENTS OR CAUSES TO BE PRESENTED ANY FALSE OR FRAUDULENT 
CLAIM." AND SO IT'S IN THE ALTERNATIVE. 
"EVERY PERSON WHO PRESENTS OR CAUSES TO BE 
PRESENTED ANY FALSE OR FRAUDULENT CLAIM, OR ANY PROOF IN 
SUPPORT OF ANY SUCH CLAIM, UPON ANY CONTRACTS OF INSURANCE FOR 
PAYMENT OF ANY LOSS, OR WHO PREPARES, MAKES OR SUBSCRIBES TO 
AMY AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SURVEY," ETCETERA, ETCETERA, WHICH 
WOULDN'T REALLY APPLY; BUT THOSE PROVISIONS ARE SUFFICIENT TO 
SHOW AND DID FIND IN THIS CASE INSURANCE FRAUD- NOW THE CRIME 
"INSURANCE FRAUD"—. 
MR, CAMPBELL: WHAT'S THE STATUTE? 
THE COURT: 76-6-52< 1 ) . 
MR. HEATH: THAT'S IT. 
MR. CAMPBELL: THANK YOU. 
MR. HEATH: THAT'S THE CITATION THAT WE'RE 
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HAPPY TO HAVE YOU LOOf AT IT. E WOULD SUBMJT TO THE COURT 
THAT, UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE. THAT INSURANCE FRAUD IE NOT 
BEFORE THE COURT. THAT THE JURY NEEDS TO BE ADVISED OF THAT. 
AS I SAID, I THIN!- IT WAS SO SERIOUS AND PREJUDICIAL IT 
JUSTIFIES A MISTRIAL, AND AT THE VERY LEAST A RATHER SPECIFIC 
DIRECTION TO THE JURY TO DISREGARD THOSE ASPECTS OF MR. 
HEATH'S OPENING STATEMENT IN WHICH INSURANCE FRAUD W H S 
REFERRED TO, AND TO DISREGARD ANY ASPECT OF THE POSITION OF 
BEAR RIVER AS CONSTITUTING A CLAIM FOR INSURANCE FRAUD. 
MR. HEATH: IF THE COURT P L E H E E , I HAVE ANOTHER 
CASE I WANT TO CITE, BUT i WOULD LlfE TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY, 
WHEN THE COURT FINISHES, TO LOOf AT THAI CASE. IF I MAY- I 
WON'T TAfE FURTHER TIME. I THIMf THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT 
DIFFERENCES- THIS IS A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY AND HAS TO DO 
PARTICULARLY WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE LIFE INSURANCE— 
EXCUSE ME, YES, LIFE INSURANCE APPLICATION RELATING TO ANSWERS 
GIVEN CONCERNING THE MEDICAL CONDITION OF THE INSURED. IT HAS 
TO DO WITH ALLEGATIONS THAT THE APPLICATION CONTAINS FALSE AND 
FRAUDULENT INFORMATION. 
I HAVEN T HAD A CHANCE TO REALLY ANALYZE THIS. 
1 WOULD AS* THE COURT FOR THAT OPPORTUNITY BUT ON A CURSORY 
REVIEW, IT APPEARS, YOUR HONOR, THERE MRE SIGNIFICANT 
DIFFERENCES, AND I WOULD ASf THE COURT, BEFORE RULING ON THAT, 
TO GIVE US AN OPPORTUNITY TO ANALYZE THE MOPE FULLY, AND FOR 
THE COURT TO ANALYZE IT, BECAUSE I THINI THAT THE CASE THAT IS 
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AND WE SUBMIT—I'M GOING TO LEAVE THIS; I'VE 
HIGHLIGHTED A PORTION OF IT, AND I'M HAPPY TO LET—I HAVEN'T 
GOT ANY NOTES ON IT, I JUST HIGHLIGHTED SECTIONS QF IT. I'M 
GOING TO LEAVE THIS CASE WITH THE COURT. 
BUT YOUR HONOR, I THINK THAT IT IS WHOLLY 
IMPROPER TO TALK ABOUT INSURANCE FRAUD AS COUNSEL DID AND HAS 
AND UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD, BECAUSE IT DOES NOT—THAT SORT OF A 
CASE—AND I'M NOT PREPARED TO SHOW THAT IF THE JURY ACTUALLY 
FOUND INSURANCE FRAUD WITHOUT A CAUSE OF ACTION, IT WOULD BE 
TRYING AN ISSUE THAT ISN'T BEFORE YOUR HONOR. 
AND THE STATE_FARM CASE WAS THE PREDECESSOR TO 
A FURTHER CASE IN WHICH ELEMENTS OBVIOUSLY OF FRAUD—AND YOUR 
HONOR KNOWS WHAT THOSE ISSUES ARE—BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF AN 
INSURANCE CASE, THE BEST CASE I CAN FIND, AND THE ONE THAT I 
THINK IS ON POINT, IS WILLIAMS_VJL_STAIE„FARM. 
THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL CASE OF UNION_BANK_V_._ 
SWENSON IN WHICH THE ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD IN RESPONSE IN 
PLEADING WERE APPLIED IN THE DEFENSE OF SUIT BY A BANK, WHICH 
IS NOT AN INSURANCE COMPANY, BUT I SUBMIT PROBABLY IT HAS SOME 
RELEVANCE. 
IN ANY EVENT, I BELIEVE THE WILLIAMS CASE IS 
CONTROLLING, AND WE WOULD SUBMIT IT, IF I MAY APPROACH THE 
BENCH. 
MR. HEATH: DO YOU HAVE A COPY OF THAT FOR US? 
MR. CAMPBELL: I DON'T HAVE A COPY, BUT I'M 
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WEEKEND, OR OVER THE EVENING, >OUR HONOR, AND I THIN* THE 
LEADING CASE ON THE ISSUE It-- l±lLLlAMS_V^_STAT^ 
COMPANY, A 1982 CASE, IN WHICH STRONG V HANN1 WERE COUNSEL—I 
DON T HOLD THAT AS SUCH, BUT Al LEAST IT S NOT A NEW ISSUE— 
AND THE GUESTI ON THERE WAS WHETHER OR NUT FRAUD AS ALLEGED BV 
STATE FARM COULD BE PLED AND TRIED WHEN I "I HAD NOT BEEN PLED 
SPECIFICALLY. 
AND THE SUPREMr COURT„ THROUGH JUSTICE OAr5, 
CONTAINS MERELY A BROAD AND GENERAL STATEMENT THAT A FALSE 
AFFIDAVIT AND FALSE PLEADINGS WERE FILED, BUT WHICH CONTAINED 
NO ALLEGATION WHATEVER OF CONTENTS, NATURE OR SUBSTANCE OF ANY 
SUCH STATEMENTS, ARE INSUFFICIENT. THE PLEADING MUST DESCRIBE 
THE NATURE OR SUBSTANCE OF THE ACTS OR WORDS COMPLAINED OF. 
AND I'M CITING, IF THE COURT PLEASE, THIS IS 
WIL:UIdLli^v^_STATE_FARM, 65D.P2D ^too, A lr-'S2 CASE-
THE COURT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE BASIC FACTS 
MUST BE SET FORTH WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY, CITING RULE 
vi'B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND THAT THERE IS 
MORE ELABORATE DISCUSSION AS "i HE NATURE OF FRAUD IN THE 
CONTEXT OF IT BEING PLEAD BY AN INSURANCE CARRIER. 
AND WHAT THE COURT DOES SAY, PUOTING A COMMENT 
ON THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, YOUR HONOR', IS THAT WHAT 
PARTIES ARE ENTITLED TO IS A NOTl.CE OF THE ISSUES RAISED AND 
AM OPPORTUNITY TO MCE! THEM- AND 1 THINI- P'HEN THIS IS 
ACCOMPLISHED, THAI IS ALL THAT IS REC'U I RED. 
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AND IT IN FACT IS OFTEN REFERRED TO IN THE 
CONTEXT OF CRIMINAL ISSUES AND REQUIRES THE SAME SHOWING OF 
ELEMENTS OF FRAUD THAT COMMON LAW FRAUD DOES-
THE COURT WILL RECALL THE THE POSITION OF MR. 
HEATH, AND JUST LOOKING AT THE DATE I HAVE, I THINK THE MORE 
RECENT ANSWER TO THE AMENDED COMPLAIN WAS BEAR RIVER-—BEAR 
RIVER SIGNED IT, BY MR. HEATH, ON THE 16TH OF SEPTEMBER, 
1992—IS THAT THE MOST RECENT ONE, HENRY? 
MR. HEATH: THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. CAMPBELL: AND THAT PROVIDES, JUDGE, AS A 
SIXTH DEFENSE, THAT PERKINS KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY 
SUBMITTED OR CAUSED TO BE SUBMITTED FALSE INSURANCE CLAIMS 
PERTAINING TO THE TYPE AND VALUE OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 
DAMAGE. 
IT'S A VERY GENERAL STATEMENT, GENERIC-TYPE 
STATEMENT, AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, AS CONTAINED IN A DEFENSE, WE 
SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT THERE IS NOT AN ISSUE OF INSURANCE 
FRAUD BEFORE THIS COURT. 
AND YOUR HONOR, AFTER HEARING ARGUMENT 
YESTERDAY, ASKED COUNSEL FOR ANY AUTHORITY THAT MIGHT BE OF 
ASSISTANCE TO THE COURT ON THE MATTER, AND I THINK THAT'S 
REALLY WHERE WE WERE. 
SO I COME INTO THE ISSUE WITH THAT BACKDROP, WE 
HAVING ALREADY STATED THE MATTER TO THE COURT. 
AND WE HAVE DONE SOME HOMEWORK OVER THE 
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OUR NOON RECESS. I AGAIN ADMONISH YOU YOU ARE FREE TO GO 
ABOUT YOUR ACTIVITIES AS YOU SEE r I "\ PL_EMEE RETURN TIJ THE 
COURTROOM TODAY BY 1:30, PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS THIS MATTER 
AMONG YOURSELVES OR WITH ANYBODY YOU MAY DC TALI- 1NG TO. 
COUNSEL, COULD YOU RETURN TO THE COURTROOM BY 1:Oo O ' C L C O AND 
WE LL TAf-E CHRE OF NAT"! ERS "i HAT WE .NEED lu. COUP! MILL BE IN 
RECESS. 
(WHEREUPON, AT THE HOUR OF 1 U NOON, COURT STOOD 
IN NOON RECESS: rtFTER WHICH, AT THE HOUR OF 
IsOo P.M., THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD 
OUT OF THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JUPY:* 
THE COUPTc THE RECORD MAY SHOW THE JURY IS NOT 
PRESENT. COUNSEL, YOU HAVE MOTIONS" 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR. THE MATTER I WISH TO 
BRING BEFORE THE COURT IS A CONTINUATION OF THE MOTION THAT I 
MADE BEFORE YOUR HONOR AT THE CLOSE OF THE OPENING STATEMENT 
DF BEAR RIVER S COUNSEL r'ESTEPDAY , YESTEPDAY AFTERNOON, AND IT 
RAN TO THIS QUESTION OF WHETHER THE INSURANCE FRAUD THAT 
COUNSEL CONTINUALLY REFERRED TC UiAS FRAMFD BY THE ISSUES AND 
BEFORE THE COURT FOR TPIAL. 
AND AS THE COURT WILL SIMPLY RECALL, BRIEFLY, 
IT 3 5 THE POSITION OF PERT INS THAT THE C'UEJTlfiN OF INSURANCE 
FRAUD IS A DISCRETE TERM, IT IS A TERM WELL I MOWN TO THE 
COURT, A TERM OF ART., AND IT RELATES TO A VERY SPECIFIC TYPE 
OF CAUSE OF ACTION.. 
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WHEN DID IT TAKE PLACE, AND WHO DID IT? 
AND A GENERIC CLAIM, YOUR HONOR, IS JUST WHAT 
THE SUPREME COURT SAID IN WILLIAMS_V^__STATE_PARM: YOU CAN'T 
DO THAT. I HAVEN'T BEEN PREPARED TO COME IN HERE AND RIGHT AN 
INSURANCE FRAUD CLAIM CLAIMING THAT MY CLIENT HAS VIOLATED 
SECTION 76-6-52(1) OF THE UTAH CODE- I DON'T ANYTHING ABOUT 
THAT CLAIM. 
THEY HAVE NEVER RAISED IT. THEY HAVE NOT 
PARTICULARIZED IT, AND THERE ARE NO ELEMENTS SHOWING WHAT THEY 
CLAIM THAT ZANDRA PERKINS DID, WHEN SHE DID IT, WHAT THE 
NATURE OF THE ACT WAS, WHAT THE AMOUNT OF GOODS WERE, OR THE. 
AMOUNTS THEY CLAIM THEY WERE DEFRAUDED. 
AND I JUST SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT THIS IS ONE 
OF THOSE ISSUES THAT COUNSEL HAS CONCEDED BY HIS OWN ARGUMENT. 
WE CANNOT—IF THIS IS WHAT MR. HEATH IS AFTER, WE'VE GOT TO 
START THIS CASE OVER SO THAT I WANT TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT IT 
IS, BECAUSE IF MY CLIENT, JUDGE, IS IN THIS CASE, IS BEING-
CHARGED WITH COMMISSION OF A FELONY IN THIS STATE, WE'VE GOT 
FIFTH AMENDMENT PROBLEMS, WE HAVE DUE PROCESS PROBLEMS THAT WE 
HAVEN'T EVEN BEGUN TO ADDRESS HERE. 
AND I'M NOT SAYING ON THE ONE HAND, JUDGE, THAT 
MR. HEATH ISN'T ENTITLED TO DO THIS; HE IS. BUT HE HAS NOT 
PLED IT. WE HAVE NOT KNOWN THIS. THAT'S THE PROBLEM. 
IT'S A QUESTION OF NOTICE, AND THAT'S WHAT THE 
SUPREME COURT HAS CONTINUALLY SAID. THAT'S WHAT RULE 9(B) IS 
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ABOUT, AND FILING OF A RESPONSIVE PLEADING AND PILING OF AN 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. 
HE HAS THE SAME OBLIGATIONS IF HE'S GOING TO 
TALI- ABOUT A SECTION, A VETR\ SPECIFIC SECTION—AND HE READ THE 
SECTION TO THE COURT AS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE—THEN WE VE GOT THE 
RIGHT TO PREPARE FOR THAT, AND WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION NOW, 
AND THEY HAVEN T PLED IT, AND THEY'RE NOT ENTITLED TO RAISE 
IT. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, LET ME INDICATE TO YOU, 
1 VE LISTENED TO YOUR ARGUMENTS, 1 HAVE A PRETTY GOOD POSITION 
OF WHAT I'M THINI- ING. I WOULD LIFE" YOU, WITH WHAT YOU'VE 
GIVEN ME, TO GIVE ME TO TOMORROW MORNING TO GIVE YOU A 
DECISION ON THIS, AND TO READ THESE CASES, AND BY THAT TIME 
I'LL HAVE IT FOR YOU AND i NOW WHERE WE RE GOING. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, THAT 5 FINE- I 
WOULD JUST INDICATE TO YOUR HONOR THAT IF IT'S—IT IS A VERY 
SERIOUS PROBLEM, AND THE LONGER WE LET IT LAV, THE MORE THE 
JURY MIGHT BECOME—IT MIGHT BECOME INGRAINED IN THE JURY S 
M1ND. 
THE COURT: I COULD MAI- E A DECISION RIGHT NOW, 
BUT I WOULD FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE IN TAI- ING A LOOI- AT THESE 
CASES. Of AY. THE SECOND ISSUE, MR. HEATH, YOUR VIDEO-
MR. HEATH: WELL, YOUR HONOR, IT'S OUR POSITION 
THAT WE ARE ENTITLED TO PUT A VIDEO ON FOR THE REASONS WE VE 
STATED OFF THE RECORD. WE LL MAI- E A RECORD OF IT NOW. THAT 
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1 (WHEREUPON, ON THE 21ST DAY OF APRIL, 1993, THE 
2 FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD IN CAMERA, OUT 
3 OF THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
4 THE COURTs LET ME GIVE YOU MY DECISION ON THE 
5 QUESTION THAT YOU'VE ARGUED TO ME ON FRAUD- AS THE COURT 
6 UNDERSTANDS IT, BEAR RIVER HAS NOT FILED ANY COUNTERCLAIM IN 
7 THIS ACTION, REALLY HAS ADMITTED THEIR LIABILITY UNDER THE 
8 POLICY, AND HAS MERELY TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THEY DD NOT OWE 
9 AS MANY AS THE CLAIMS AS THE PERSON IS CLAIMING; THAT THEY— 
10 THEIR DEFENSE IS THAT SHE MADE CLAIMS FOR MATTERS THAT ARE 
11 NOT—THAT SHOULD NOT BE PAID. 
12 NOW THE QUESTION IS: IS THERE A DISTINCTION AS 
13 TO WHETHER THEY'RE PLEADING INSURANCE FRAUD KNOWINGLY AND 
14 INTENTIONALLY OR UNKNOWINGLY OR MISTAKENLY THAT THEY MADE 
15 THESE CLAIMS- THE COURT, AS FAR AS I'VE REVIEWED THIS MATTER, 
16 DOESN'T THINK IT MAKES MUCH DIFFERENCE EITHER WAY. WE GO ON, 
17 AS FAR AS THIS DECISION THE COURT IS GOING TO GIVE. 
IS IT BOILS DOWN TO WHETHER BEAR RIVER DID PLEAD 
19 WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY THE FRAUD- IF I HOLD THAT THEY 
20 DID, THEN OF COURSE THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF FRAUD IS CLEAR AND 
21 CONVINCING. I'M CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO PUT AN INTERROGATORY 
22 ON A SPECIAL VERDICT FORM AS TO WHETHER THEY FIND THAT THEY 
23 FRAUDULENTLY MADE CLAIMS, BECAUSE THERE IS NO CRIMINAL ACTION. 
24 AND SO IT DOESN'T MATTER WHETHER THEY DID OR 
25 NOT. IT'S JUST MERELY A MATTER AS TO WHETHER THEY'RE 
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CONVINCED Tl-iAT THEIR DEFENSE IS SUFFICIENT NOT TO NAVF TO PA\ 
THE AMOUN1 THE PERSON CLAIMS. 
REALLY ALL IT AMOUNTS TO IS THEIR BURDEN IS 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
NOW IF I RULED THAT THEY D1DN T PLEAD WITH 
PARTICULARITY, THEN wE COULD COME BACK TO THE SAME THING. THE 
BURDEN IS STILL PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, AND WHETHER 
THEV CAN PROVE THAT PERK INS I- NOWINbLV AND INTENTIONALLY MADE 
THESE CLAIMS OR UNKNOWINGLY AND MISTAI-ENLY MADE THE CLAIMS. 
IT S STILL A DEFENSE TO THE CLAIM OF PERK INS AND STILL THEV 
HAVE THAI RIGHT. 
SO AS 1 SAY, I DON'T THINK IT MAKES A HECK OF A 
LOT OF DIFFERENCE HOW I RULE ON THIS MATTER, EXCEPT THAT MAYBE 
THE CONNOTATION OF THE WORD "FRAUD" BEING USED DISTURBS 
PERK INS AS FAR AS THE CASE IS CONCERNED. 
THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION, AND I SO RULE, 
THAT THERE HAE NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT PLEADING OF PARTICULARITY 
FOR A FRAUD ACTION. I THINK THAT THE STATEMENTS ARE MADE 
THERE SUFFICIENT FOR THE FRAUD, BUT I DON'T THINfr THAT IT 
RECITES THE INSTANCES AND SUFFICIENT ALLEGATIONS FOR PERK INS 
TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE FRAUD IS. 
IT DOES NOT IN ANY WAY DETRACT FROM WHAT THEY 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO PROVE; THEY STILL CAN GO IN AND PROVE 
KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY OR UNKNOWINGLY AND MISTAKENLY, 
THAT SHE MADE THESE CLAIMS, AND IT WOULD STILL GO AS A 
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DEFENSE. 
SO I AM GRANTING THE MOTION THAT THE TERM 
"FRAUD" IS NOT TO BE USED. 
THE COURT WOULD ENTERTAIN ANY SUGGESTION OR ANY 
MOTION THAT EITHER PARTY HAS AS FAR AS ANYTHING ON MR. 
CAMPBELL'S MOTION AS TO ANYTHING WE NEED TO DO FURTHER. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT 
THE COURT ADVISE THE JURY AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS MORNING'S 
SESSION TODAY WHAT THE TERM "INSURANCE FRAUD" IS, THAT THE 
COURT HAS DETERMINED., AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAI" THAT HAS—THAT 
IT IS MOT AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE, "INSURANCE FRAUD" AS IT WAS 
USED BY ONE QF THE PARTIES RELATIVE TO THE CONDUCT OF MS. 
PERKINS. 
THE COURT: NO, I WOULDN'T DO THAT, BECAUSE IT 
IS AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
NOW LET ME EXPLAIN MYSELF. THE TERM "INSURANCE 
FRAUD" IS NOT AN ISSUE, BUT I THINK THEY STILL HAVE THE RIGHT 
TO PUT ON EVIDENCE THAT SHE KNOWINGLY DID THIS, IF THEY CHOOSE 
TO DO THAT. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I AGREE, BUT NOT WITHIN THE 
VERNACULAR—. 
THE COURT: I CAN'T SAY THEN THAT THEY CAN'T 
PROVE IT. THAT'S WHAT I'M ASKING MR. HEATH. IF I TELL THEM 
THERE'S NO INSURANCE FRAUD, THAT GIVES THEM AN INDICATION THAT 
THERE HAS BEEN NO CLAIM FILED. 
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MR. CAMPBELL: NO, THAT'S MY POINT—. 
MR. HEATH: LET ME SEE IF MAYBE MR. CAMPBELL 
AND I CAN WORK IT OUT. 
MR. CAMPBELL: LET ME FINISH FOR A MINUTE. I 
THINK HENRY AND I WILL NOT BE VERY FAR APART ON IT AS A RESULT 
OF THE RULING. I AGREE WITH THE COURT THAT IF THERE IS 
EVIDENCE OF INTENTIONAL, THAT'S WHAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT, 
INTENTIONAL MISLEADING OR INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENT OF A CLAIM 
AGAINST AN INSURANCE COMPANY, THEY'RE ENTITLED TO PROVE THAT. 
BUT WHAT I SUGGEST TO THE COURT WAS—AND THE 
WAY, WHAT I THINK NEEDS TO BE DONE HERE, WE HAVE TO AVOID A 
MISTRIAL, AND I THINK THAT THE JURY NEEDS TO BE ADVISED THAT 
THERE IS NOT A CLAIM-, THAT IS TO SAY, A CLAIM IN THE SENSE OF 
A CAUSE OF ACTION, A CLAIM OF INSURANCE FRAUD, BY ANYONE 
AGAINST—I DON'T CARE WHETHER YOU MENTION BEAR RIVER OR N O T — 
BUT I DO THINK THAT THE COURT HAS TO ADDRESS THE OPENING 
STATEMENT OF HENRY ON MONDAY AFTERNOON. THAT'S WHAT GAVE RISE 
TO THIS ISSUE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. 
MR. HEATH: MY POSITION IS, YOUR HONOR, THAT 
THE COURT WOULD ADDRESS IT IN SEVERAL WAYS. ONE WOULD BE AT 
THE POINT OF INSTRUCTION. IT CAN BE ADDRESSED THROUGH 
ARGUMENT, BUT PERHAPS THE EASIER WAY TO DO IT IS IF WE CAN 
REACH AN AGREEMENT THAT WE COULD STIPULATE TO THE LANGUAGE OF 
INFORMATION THAT YOU COULD GIVE TO THE JURY AT THIS TIME SO 
THAT THERE'S NO MISUNDERSTANDING. YOU COULD SAY AS A MATTER 
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OF LAW THAT THERE IS NO ISSUE OF INSURANCE FRAUD FOR THEIR 
DETERMINATION- HOWEVER, THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THERE IS STILL 
A REMAINING ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM, ANY PARTS OF 
THE CLAIM, WERE INTENTIONALLY FALSIFIED OR WERE 
MISREPRESENTED. 
BECAUSE WE STILL BELIEVE THAT WE CAN USE THE 
TERM THAT THIS IS A "FALSE CLAIM," AND WE CAN USE THE TERM 
"SUBJECT TO PROOF," THAT THEY HAVE NOT MET THEIR BURDEN OF 
PROOF AS TO—THEY HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF ESTABLISHING THE 
AMOUNT OF THE CLAIM, AND WE HAVE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES FOR 
RECOUPMENT, AND WE'RE ENTITLED TO PUT ON EVIDENCE THAT 
PORTIONS OF THE CLAIM THEY HAVE MADE, WHICH BEAR RIVER HAS 
PAID, WERE FALSIFIED, AND FOR THAT PURPOSE ONLY. 
SO THERE'S NO "INSURANCE FRAUD," TO AVOID THAT 
PROBLEM, BUT FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING FALSIFICATION IN 
SUPPORT OF OUR DEFENSE OF RECOUPMENT, AND ALSO TO COUNTER 
THEIR UNDERLYING CLAIM. 
THE COURT: YOU MADE A BIG STATEMENT THERE. 
MR. HEATH: I"M RAMBLING. 
THE COURT: I DON'T WANT TO COMMIT ERROR IN 
WHAT I SAY TO THE JURY HERE. I'M GOING TO ASK YOU TO DO THIS. 
I'M GOING TO ASK THE TWO OF YOU TO SIT DOWN AT A RECESS THIS 
MORNING AND ARRIVE AT SOME LANGUAGE WHICH YOU THINK IS 
ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH OF YOU, AND I'LL SEE IF IT'S ACCEPTABLE 
TO—IF IT IS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH OF YOU, I'LL READ IT AND—. 
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MR. HEATHs AND WE'LL FIND OUT IF HE'S WILLING 
TO A P P R O M . IT THAT WAY. 
MR. CAMPBELL: JUDGE, I AM HAPPY TO DO WHAT 
YOUR HONOR WANTS ME TO DO. I THINK THE LONGER WE NOW—IT'S 
NOW WEDNESDAY MORNING, AND THE LONGER WE ALLOW THE CONCEPT OF 
INSURANCE FRAUD, WHICH CAME FROM MR. HEATH'S OPENING 
STATEMENT—AND I DON'T SAY THIS WITH ANY PEJORATIVE INDICATION 
AS FAR AS MR. HEATH'S CONDUCT IS CONCERNED, BUT I THINK THIS 
COULD BE GRAVE ERROR DONE HERE. I THINK THE SOONER WE RECTIFY 
IT, THE BETTER IT'S GOING TO BE. 
IT MAY ONLY RESULT—IF WE WAIT ANY LONGER, WE 
MAY WIND UP AGGRAVATING OR EXACERBATING THE PROBLEM. 
THE COURT: I DON'T THINK THERE'S THAT URGENCY 
MYSELF, BECAUSE HIS CASE IS NOT ON. BUT I WOULD DEFER TO YOU. 
IF YOU FEEL THAT WAY, IF YOU WANT ME TO SAY IT RIGHT NOW, THAT 
THE OPENING STATEMENT THAT BEAR RIVER MADE, ANY STATEMENTS OF 
"INSURANCE FRAUD," THERE'S NO CLAIM FOR INSURANCE FRAUD 
AGAINST HER, AGAINST PERKINS; HOWEVER, BEAR RIVER DOES HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO PROVE THAT SHE INTENTIONALLY AND KNOWINGLY OR 
UNINTENTIONALLY AND MISTAKENLY, CLAIMED ITEMS THAT THEY SAY 
WERE NOT COMPENSABLE. 
MR. CAMPBELL: INSURANCE FRAUD IS NOT AN ISSUE 
IN THIS CASE. THAT WOULD BE THE WAY THE JURY WOULD UNDERSTAND 
IT, BECAUSE BEAR RIVER IS GOING TO SAY THAT WE DO CLAIM—. 
THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU SAY? 
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MR. HEATH: WE DON'T CLAIM FRAUD FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF VOIDING 1 HE POLICY. 
MR. CAMPBELL: AND WE RE NOT TALI- ING ABOUT 
THAT. THEY D1DN T DO THAI. THE BTATE_FA_RM AND THE WILLIAMS 
CASE, THEY DIDN T—A VOIDANrE OF THE POLICY WrtSN x AN ISSUE. 
THE COURT: THE WILLIAMS CASE IS ALTOGETHER 
DIFFERENT. I THIN* IT S CONTROLLING AS FAR AC MY DECISION 
HERE, BUT THE WILLIAMS CASE, THEY DID NOT ADMIT LIABILITY. 
THEY WERE SETTING ASIDE THE WHOLE POLICY BECAUSE OF FRAUD. 
MR. HEATH: THAT S CORRECT. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YES, BUT THE ISSUE RELATING TO 
FRAUD WAS ONE THAT WENT TO BOTH THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AS 
WELL AS THE/ ALSO SAID THE CONTRACT WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE. 
MR. HEATH: THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WAS TO VOID 
THE POLICV. BUT ANYWAY, I THINF , YOU fNOW. WE WANT THE RECORD 
TO SHOW THAT—-. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I M WILLING TO SIT DOWN AND WORI-
WITH MR. HEATH. 
THE COURT: WHY DON'T YOU DO THAT. I DON T 
THINf IT'S GOING TO MAI- E THAT MUCH DIFFERENCE AS FAR AS AN 
HOUR, AND THEN I'LL HAVE TO DO WHAT I HAVE TO DO THEN. 
MR. CAMPBELL: WE'LL REPORT BACI-—IF YOU GIVE 
US 15 MINUTES MID-MORNING, WE'LL DO IT. 
THE COURT: BRING THE JURY IN. 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD 
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Q WITH PRICES INCLUDED? 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, LET HER FINISH HER ANSWER. 
MR- BOSTWICK: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. DID THE 
DOCUMENTS YOU RECEIVED FROM FIRST GENERAL—-
MR. CAMPBELL: AND MAY HE LET HER FINISH? 
MR. BOSTWICK: I THOUGHT SHE HAD. 
A I HADN'T SEEN ANYTHING AT ALL TO SCOPE UNTIL I—AS I 
STATED BEFORE, I HAD TOLD MR. PETERSON I WOULD NEED TO SEE 
WHAT HE PLANNED TO BE DOING TO MY HOME. I DIDN'T SEE ANYTHING 
REGARDING PRICE UNTIL I HAD INDICATED THE STATEMENT TO MR. DIO 
AND HE WAS GOOD ENOUGH TO FINALLY GIVE ME A COPY OF WHAT MR. 
PETERSON HAD GIVEN TO BEAR RIVER MONTHS PREVIOUSLY. 
Q SO YOUR TESTIMONY IS THAT THE DOCUMENTS YOU 
RECEIVED, YOU RECEIVED ON JUNE 28TH, DID NOT CONTAIN ANY PRICE 
FOR WORK THAT WAS PROPOSED BY FIRST GENERAL SERVICES? 
A I BELIEVE WHAT I SAID WAS THAT I HAD RECEIVED IT ON 
THE 28TH OR LATER OF JUNE, AND YOU KNOW, THERE WERE NO PRICES 
ON IT. 
Q THERE WERE NO INDIVIDUAL PRICES; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A NO PRICING INFORMATION WHATSOEVER. 
Q THERE WAS NO LUMP SUM, BOTTOM-LINE PRICE? 
A NO PRICES WHATSOEVER. 
THE COURT: ANSWER HIS QUESTION, MA'AM. 
A NO, THERE WERE NO PRICES WHATSOEVER. 
Q MS. PERKINS, YOU HAD A FIRE IN YOUR HOME ON 
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HILLSDEN, THE HOME YOU OWN ON HILLSDEN DRIVE IN SALT LAKE 
CITY, DIDN'T YOU, IN OR ABOUT 1987? 
MR. CAMPBELL: OBJECTION TO THAT. THAT DOESN'T 
HAVE ANY RELEVANCY TO THE ISSUE BETWEEN FIRST GENERAL AND 
PERKINS AT ALL. THE COURT'S BEEN VERY CLEAR ABOUT THAT 
THROUGHOUT.. WE'LL BE QN THE VERGE OF AM ABSOLUTE MISTRIAL 
RIGHT NOW IF W E — . 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, MAKE YOUR OBJECTION. 
MR. OBJECTION: YOUR HONOR, THIS ISSUE WAS 
ADDRESSED AT LENGTH IN THE MOTION IN LIMINE, AND YOUR HONOR'S 
RULING IS VERY CLEAR, THAT THERE I S — . 
MR. CAMPBELL: AS TO BEAR RIVER. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, APPROACH THE BENCH. 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD 
OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
MR. BOSTWICK: YOUR HONOR, THERE'S NO 
DISTINCTION WHATSOEVER MADE IN THE RULING THAT DISCUSSED 
SPECIFICALLY FIRST GENERAL'S ABILITY TO SHOW MS. PERKINS HAS 
HAD OTHER FIRES. SHE'S HAD OTHER RESTORATION CONTRACTOR WORK; 
SHE'S FAIRLY EXPERIENCED IN THIS AREA. 
THE COURT: YOU CAN SHOW THAT SHE'S HAD OTHER-
FIRES, SHE'S HAD OTHER—HAD OTHER FIRES, HAD OTHER RESTORATION 
WORK, BUT I WOULD NOT ALLOW YOU TO GO INTO ANYTHING AS FAR AS 
HER SETTING THE FIRE. 
MR. BOSTWICK: I'M NOT GOING TO. 
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THE COURT: AND I DIDN'T SAY YOU WERE, BUT I'M 
SAYING I THINK THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO DO THAT, NOTHING 
THAT—JUST THAT SHE HAS HAD EXPERIENCE THAT SHE'S HAD. 
MR. CAMPBELL; IT SEEMS TO ME THAT FIRST 
GENERAL'S POSITION HERE IS FOR SERVICES RENDERED- THE 
QUESTION IS WERE THOSE SERVICES RENDERED? THEY DON'T REALLY 
HAVE A THING TO DO WITH THE CLAIMS THAT MY CLIENT MADE TO BEAR 
RIVER. THESE PEOPLE ARE TRYING TO PIGGYBACK AND VIRTUALLY TRY 
THIS CASE TWICE, ONCE THROUGH THEM AND THEN THROUGH BEAR 
RIVER, WITH REGARD TO WHAT SHE DID IN CONNECTION WITH HOW SHE 
REVIEWED, HOW SHE LOOKED AT CLAIMS. 
THE ONLY ISSUE WITH THESE PEOPLE IS: DID THEY 
DO WORK THAT WAS REASONABLY WORTH WHAT THEY CLAIM IT WAS? 
THAT'S THE ONLY FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION. 
MR. BOSTWICK: YOU'RE MISSING THE ISSUE, BOB. 
THE ISSUE IS THAT HER PRIOR EXPERIENCE BEARS DIRECTLY ON THE 
CREDIBILITY OF HER CLAIMS AND THE DEFENSES BETWEEN FIRST 
GENERAL AND PERKINS. 
MR. CAMPBELL: BEAR RIVER, YOU'RE EXACTLY 
RIGHT. 
THE COURT: HO, I WILL ALLOW—I'M NOT GOING TO 
STOP THEM FROM SHOWING WHAT EXPERIENCE SHE MAY HAVE HAD, AND 
THAT SHE MAY HAVE HAD THAT EXPERIENCE. 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD 
IN THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
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MR, BOSTWICK; WOULD YOUR HONOR LIKE TO MAKE A 
RULING ON THE OBJECTION? 
THE COURT- THE OBJECTION IS OVERRULED. YOU 
MAY PROCEED, COUNSEL. 
MR. BOSTWICK: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: RESTATE THE QUESTION. 
Q (BY MR. BOSTWICK) IN OR ABOUT 1987, YOU HAD A FIRE 
AT YOUR HOME THAT YOU OWNED ON HILLSDEN DRIVE IN SALT LAKE 
CITY, UTAH, DIDN'T YOU? 
A IT WAS THE FALL OF '86. 
Q THE FALL OF '86, EXCUSE ME. YOU HIRED A CONTRACTOR 
TO RESTORE OR REPAIR THAT HOME, DIDN'T YOU? 
A YES. 
Q AT THAT TIME YOU DID NOT REQUEST OR OBTAIN AMY 
CONSTRUCTION BONDS FROM THAT CONTRACTOR, DID YOU? 
A I'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION. 
Q YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT A CONSTRUCTION BOND IS, DON'T 
YOU, MA'AM? 
A YES, I DO. 
Q AT THE TIME OF THE RESTORATION OF THE HOME ON 
HILLSDEN DRIVE, DID YOU REQUIRE OR OBTAIN ANY CONSTRUCTION 
BONDS WITH THE CONTRACTOR YOU HIRED FOR THAT PROJECT? 
A I WOULD—I DON'T RECALL THAT THERE WAS ANY 
DISCUSSION OF ANY BOND AT THAT TIME. 
Q DO YOU KNOW IF ANY WAS PROVIDED? 
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PERKINS: ADV CRS-EXAM BY BOSTWICK 
A I DON'T RECALL, 
Q YOU HAD A FIRE IN YOUR MURRAY HOME, THE HOME THAT'S 
THE SUBJECT OF THIS LAWSUIT, APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS PRIOR TO 
THE FIRE WHICH IS THE SUBJECT QF THIS LAWSUIT, DIDN'T YOU? 
A YES, THERE WAS. 
Q YOU HIRED A CONTRACTOR IN RELATIONSHIP TO THAT FIRE, 
DID YOU NOT? 
MR. CAMPBELL: IF THE COURT PLEASE, THAT 
MISSTATES THE RECORD. IT WAS NOT HER HOME, IT WAS IN 
CONNECTION WITH A SHED OUT IN THE BACKYARD. 
MR. BOSTWICK: AND THE SHED WAS ATTACHED TO 
YOUR HOME, MA'AM? 
A NO, IT WAS NOT. 
D IT WAS INDEPENDENT FROM YOUR HOME? 
A YES. 
Q WAS THAT WHERE THE FIRE WAS LOCATED? 
A IN THE SHED, YES. 
Q DID IT DAMAGE YOUR HOME IN ANY WAY? 
A THE GABLE END, THERE WAS SOME DAMAGE. 
Q THERE WAS SOME FIRE DAMAGE FROM THE FIRE TO YOUR 
RESIDENCE? 
A TO THE END OF THE CARPORT. 
Q WITH RESPECT TO THAT FIRE, YOU HIRED A CONTRACTOR, 
DID YOU NOT? 
A FOR SOME CLEANUP. 
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PERKINS; ADV CRS-EXAM BV BC3TWICK 
Q IN FACT YOU OBTAINED A BID FROM A CONTRACTOR FOR THE 
ENTIRE SCOPE OF PERLACT: 7HAT SHED AND REPAIRING THE GABLE 
END, DID YOU MOT? 
A I DID NOT. DEAR RIVER HAD ASKED THAT THE CONTRACTOR 
PREPARE A BID. 
Q DID THE CONTRACTOR THAT YOU HIRED ULTIMATELY PREPARE 
AND SUBMIT A BID TO BEAR RIVER? 
A I BELIEVE HE DID. 
Q DID YOU HIRE HIM TO DO ANY PART OF THE WORK? 
A AS I STATED BEFORE, HE DID CLEANUP-
D DID YOU REQUIRE OR REQUEST A CONSTRUCTION BOND WITH 
RELATIONSHIP TO THAT WORK? 
A NO, I DIDN'T. 
Q SHORTLY AFTER THE FIRE, BEFORE YOU FIRST SPOKE WITH 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, I BELIEVE YOU SPOKE WITH A FELLOW BY 
THE NAME OF BLAKE OSTLER OF RESTORATION UNLIMITED, DIDN'T YOU? 
A HE WAS AT MY HOME. I SPOKE WITH HIM BRIEFLY. 
Q DID YOU DISCUSS THE PROSPECT OF MR. OSTLER 
SUBMITTING A BID TO DO THE RESTORATION WORK FOR THE FIRE 
THAT'S THE SUBJECT OF THIS LAWSUIT? 
A I WOULDN'T SAY DISCUSS. HE ASKED ME IF HE COULD, 
AND I SAID, "SURE, GO AHEAD." 
Q DID YOU DISCUSS THE PROSPECT OR THE REQUIREMENT THAT 
HE WOULD HAVE TO SUBMIT A CONSTRUCTION BOND FOR THE WORK? 
A OUR DISCUSSION WAS SO BRIEF I THINK I GAVE YOU THE 
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PERKINS: ADV CRS-EXAM BY BQSTWICK 
SUM TQTAL OF IT. 
Q SO THE ANSWE-' IS NO? 
A NO, THAT S CORRECT. 
Q AFTER FIRST GENERAL SERVICES WAS FIRED BV YOURSELF, 
YOU HIRED A CONTRACTOR BY THE NAME OF CPH RESTORATION TO 
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL RESTORATION WORK AT YOUR HOME IN MURRAY, 
DIDN'T YOU? 
A YES-
Q AND YOU DID NOT REQUEST OR REQUIRE CPH CONSTRUCTION 
TO SUBMIT TO YOU OR PROVIDE TO YOU ANY CONSTRUCTION BOND IN 
RELATION TO THEIR WORK, DID YOU? 
A MY SISTER HANDLED THAT. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE 
DISCUSSION WAS. I WAS OUT OF TOWN. 
Q WITH RELATIONSHIP TO THIS FIRE THAT—AT YOUR MURRAY 
HOME, YOU ALSO HIRED A CONTRACTOR BY THE NAME OF LEO THORUP, 
DIDN'T YOU? 
A YES. 
Q YOU DID NOT REQUEST OR OBTAIN ANY CONSTRUCTION BONDS 
FROM MR. LEO THORUP, DID YOU? 
A I DON'T KNOW. MY SISTER AGAIN HANDLED THAT. 
Q MS. PERKINS, IF I COULD APPROACH THE WITNESS, YOUR 
HONOR— 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
Q — W E SEEM TO BE MISSING 11 AND 12. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, CHECK TO SEE IF YOU HAVE 
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SUBMIT TO THE COURT A PLETHORA OF AUTHORITV IN THIS 
JURISDICTION THAT SHOULD KEEP BOTH OF THESE EXniBITS OUT AND 
STRIDE THE TESTIMONY OF LEAVITT. 
THE COURTs THE COURT'S READY TO RULE, COUNSEL, 
I WOULD RESERVE THE MOTION- I WOULD ALLOW COUNSEL TO 
ESTABLISH THROUGH THE WITNESS THAT THE ExACTIMATEs AS THAI-
RELATES BACK TO THE TIME THAT THE BID WAS PREFARED BY FIRST 
GENERAL—. 
MR. BCSTWICK; IF I COULD ADDRESS A CGLFLE OF 
OTHER ISSUES., 
THE COURT- NO, WE'RE TAKING A RECESS, COUNSEL. 
I'VE MADE MY DECISION. COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 
(WHEREUPON, AT THE HOUR OF 12 NOON. THE 
PROCEEDINGS STOOD IN NOON RECESS- AFTER WHICH, 
AT THE HOUR OF 2=00 P.M8, THE FOLLOWING 
PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD IN CAMERA GUT OF THE 
PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
THE COURT: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT THE JURY 
IS NOT PRESENT. 
MR. HEATH: YES, YOUR HONOR, DURING THE NOON 
RECESS, WE HAVE PRESENTED TO THE COURT, IN VIEW OF THE COURT'S 
RULING THIS MORNING ON THE ISSUE OF INSURANCE FRAUD, A 
SUGGESTED AND AGREED-UPON INSTRUCTION THAT THE COURT CAN GIVE 
THE JURY PERTAINING TO THE MATTER OF INSURANCE FRAUD, THE 
OPENING STATEMENT, AND HOW THE JURY SHOULD VIEW THAT ISSUE. 
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NE, ON BEhA_~ OF BEAP R I V E H , TAi- E E^CEF^IGN TO 
THL COURT S R U L I N G AND wQuLE AT THIS TIME MM E *-  MO"10rJ TQ 
AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO Cut FORM TO THE EVIDENCE-
AND OUR BASIS FOP THAT., WITHOUT AFGAIN'S IM H 
LENGTH/ FASHION, MIME REPEATING MATTERS THAT WE VE :,TATEE IN 
OPPOSITION TO COUNSEu S MOTION FOP MISTRIAL, DP TN THE 
ALTERNATIVE TO ADVISE THE JUR^' OP INSUR-INCE FFAUD ISSUES AS 
THE COURT DECIDED.. WE WOULD ADD TO THAT, rGvR HONOR, IN THE 
LANGUAGE OF THE WJ^L 1 A^S_V^_SJATE_ F^R^ <TA5E - WE HAVE GIVEN 
SUFFICIENT NOTICE P L E A I N G THAT ISSUES AS PuEAD TN THE EIx'Th 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AS WELL AS I THIN* THE SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE—EXCUSE ME, THE EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE DM 
RECOUPMENT, THOSE ISSUES SUFFICIENTLY PLACE ~'EP|- INS OiM NOTICE 
OF CLAIMS THAT WE HAVE REGARDING FALSITv OF CERT-U-M H S F E C T S OF 
HER CLAIM. 
AND WE THEREFORE WOULD AS* THE COURT, IF THE 
COURT FEELS THERE S DEFICIENCIES IN OUR ANSWEP TO THE THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINT, FOP LEAVE TO AMEND THE ANSWER TO THE THIRD-
PART/ COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE ON THAT ISSUE. 
THE COURT: WHAT WOULD YOU DO DIFFERENT IF I 
ALLOWED YOU TO DO THAT'-1 
MR. HEATH: WE WOULD BE MORE PARTICULAR IN 
SETTING FORTH THE ANSWER. I MIGHT POINT OUT NOW, FOR THE 
RECORDs SOME OF THIS ONLV COMES TO US WITHIN IN THE LAST I 
BELIEVE TWO WEE1- S „ SINCE WE'VE RECEIVED THE REPORT FROM THEIR 
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EXPERT CONCERNING THE PINAL. CLAIM THEY'RE MAKING IN THIS CASE, 
BUT IT CONTAINS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION, SUPPORTING CLAIMS 
THAT IN PACT ARE FALSE„ AND W E — . 
THE COURT; YOU CAN STILL. USE THAT. 
MR, HEATHr WE CAN STILL USE IT, THAT - 5 
CORRECT. BUT WE WOULD DC THAT, mD WE WOUL_D ALSO, YOUR HONOR, 
SEEK TO REMEDY THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE APPLY TO SPECIFIC 
AREAS WHICH WE HAVE PLEAD; THAT IS, THE AREA OF THE DWELLING, 
THE AREA OP CLAIMS RELATING TO CONTENTS OR UNSCHEDULED 
PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND CLAIMS RELATING TO ADDITIONAL LIVING 
EXPENSES, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR THOSE 
ISSUES. THAT'S THE WAY I WOULD PLEAD THAT, 
THE COURTs IF I ALLOWED YOU TO DO IT. WOULD 
YOU HAVE ANY HIGHER BURDEN? 
MR. HEATH: WE WOULD. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT., 
AND IN FACT, WE PREPARED JURY INSTRUCTIONS APPROPRIATE TO GIVE 
THE COURT ON THAT, ON THAT ISSUE. 
WE'RE NOT SAYING, HOWEVER, THAT THAT IS THE 
ONLY DEFENSE THAT WE HAVE, BUT I THINK THE JURY OUGHT TO BE 
ALLOWED TO CONSIDER THAT ISSUE AS ONE OF OUR ALTERNATIVE 
DEFENSES. 
THE COURT: I ASSUME YOU'RE OPPOSING IT? 
MR. CAMPBELL: YES, YOUR HONOR, WE ARE. THE 
DIFFICULTY WITH THAT ISSUE IS THAT OBVIOUSLY IT'S A QUESTION 
THAT THE COURT HIT ON, AND THE COURT HIT THE BULL ON THE HEAD 
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1 UN THE MATTER TWO DAYS Ab'U WHbN IT WAS ^'IRST ARGUED, AND THAT 
2 IS NOTICE TO US TO BE ANSWERING AN AFFIRMATIVE CLAIM OF FRAUD 
3 SO THAT WE COULD PREPARE, SO WE KNEW SPECIFICALLY WHAT THE 
4 ALLEGATIONS WERE, WHICH ONES THEY WERE* 
5 THE FACT THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME EXPERT 
6 TESTIFY THAT WOULD BE PUT TOGETHER BY THE WITNESSES FOR 
7 PERKINS DOESN'T AT ALL MEAN THAT THERE IS—THAT THAT'S 
S ATTRIBUTABLE TO HER; THAT IS TO SAY, IT'S ATTRIBUTABLE TO HER 
9 AT THAT EXISTING STATE OF FACT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IN 
10 1990. 
11 BUT APPARENTLY ONLY THAT THEY HAVE DISCOVERED 
12 WHAT THE POSITION MIGHT BE AS OF 1993. SO, YES, YOUR HONOR, 
13 WE WOULD OPPOSE FOR THE PRINCIPAL REASON THAT TO AMEND IT, TO 
14 ALLOW THE AMENDMENT OF THE PLEADINGS NOW AND ALLOW THEM TO QQ 
15 FORWARD ON FRAUD CHANGES THIS CASE, YOUR HONOR.. IT UPSIDE-
16 DOWNS IT, AND WE WOULD HAVE A DIFFERENT ISSUE. 
17 THE COURT: I WOULD DENY THE REQUEST. BRING 
IS THE JURY IN. 
19 MR. CAMPBELL;:. WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO READ THIS 
20 TO THEM RIGHT NOW? AND I'M SPEAKING ABOUT NOW WITH THE 
21 OPENING SESSION THIS AFTERNOON AND—IN ADDITION TO THAT, YOUR 
22 HONOR, WE HAVE TWO CASES IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISSUE ON THE 
23 MOTION TO STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF THE LAST WITNESS. WHAT'S 
24 HIS NAME? I'M SORRY. LEAVITT, MR. LEAVITT. 
25 I HAVE TWO CASES FOR THE COURT. ONE IS A UTAH 
113 
f3?.1f) 
CASE, ONE IS A STATE OF NEW YORK CASE WIT'H REGARD TO USING 
MATHEMATICAL—SIMPLV MATHEMATICAL. CALCULATIONS WITHOUT 
INDIVIDUAL VARIATION. 
THE COURTs DID YOU SUBMIT THEM TO COUNSEL" 
MR. CAMPBELLS NO, I HAVE JUS"7" KICKED THEM UP 
JUDGE, WE ONLY HAD A MATTER OF ABOUT—"HERE HAVE BEEN A LOT 
OF THINGS GOING ON THIS AFTERNOON, AND I HAVE JUST HAD ABOUT 
30 MINUTES TO DO THIS- MAY I SUBMIT THEM TO THE COURT? 
THE COURT- IS THIS MAN STILL. HERE" ARE WE 
GOING TO ASK HIM THOSE QUESTIONS? 
MR. BOSTWICKs THAT'S RIGHT. 
MR. RINGWOGD: I'M NOT GOING TO QUESTION HIM 
REGARDING THESE EXHIBITS, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: MO, BUT—. 
MR. RINGWOODr. NO, I'M NOT GOING TO QUESTION 
HIM REGARDING THE EXHIBITS. 
THE COURT: I KNOW THAT, AND THAT'S WHAT I 
SAY—. 
MR. RINGWOOD: DO YOU WANT TO POSTPONE THIS? 
THE COURT: IF YOU WANT TO GIVE THEM TO ME, 
I'LL READ THEM, AND YOU'LL PUT ON THE EVIDENCE. 
MR. BOSTWICK: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
MR- CAMPBELL: FOR THE RECORD, I WOULD READ 
INTO THE RECORD THE NAMES OF THE CASES WE BELIEVE ARE 
CONTROLLING: THE UTAH CASE IS STATE_V^_PENDERGRASS FOUND AT 
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803P.2D 12- '. • A UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CASE, 19^0. 
THE SECOND CASE IS LATHAM_HCLDI^ 
xiBiy§_iI6II^QL^Li^_lQ0!< :PHONETIC) . AN EMINENT DOMAIN CASE 
FOUND AT—WELL, IT'S A NORTHEASTERN CITATION, WHICH WOU__D BE 
THE WES'!" CITATION OF 290 NORTHEAST 2D 542, A lv65 CASE. I 
WOULD HAND THEN TO THE COURT, IF I MAY. 
MR. BDSTWICK: AND WILL COUNSEL PROWIDE COPIES 
OF THOSE" 
MR. CAMPBELL: I WILL, YES. 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED 
IN THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
THE COURTS THE RECORD MAV SHOW THAT ALL 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY ARE PRESENT. IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH 
COUNSEL, AND OUR ARGUMENTS, WE HAVE RESOLVED ONE MATTER WHICH 
WE WOULD LIKE TO CALL TO YOUR ATTENTION. I AM GOING TO READ A 
STATEMENT TO YOU AND ASK YOU TO LISTEN CLOSELY TO IT, AND 
YOU'LL THEN BE CONSIDERING THIS STATEMENT WITH ALL OF THE 
OTHER THINGS WHICH YOU CONSIDER AS FAR AS THE CASE IS 
CONCERNED. 
IN THE OPENING STATEMENT OF COUNSEL OF BEAR 
RIVER, ON MONDAY AFTERNOON, REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE 
POTENTIAL OF SHOWING INSURANCE FRAUD ON THE PART OF THIRD-
PARTY PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT PERKINS. 
I INSTRUCT YOU THAT THE COURT HAS DETERMINED AS 
A MATTER OF LAW THAT INSURANCE FRAUD IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS 
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THAT IS AN ISSUE WHICH YOU M^Y CONSIDER IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF i_AW GIVEN TO YOU AFTER ALL 
OF THE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED- THANK YOU. IS THE 
WITNESS HERE? 
MR. BUSTWICK- HE IS. 
THE COURTs MR. FULLMER, ASK THE WITNESS TO 
COME IN. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, AS I UNDERSTAND THE 
STATE OF THE RECORD NOW, THERE HAS BEEN A MOTION TO STRIKE 
THIS WITNESS' TESTIMONY, THE EXHIBITS, AND THE COURT IS TAKING 
IT UNDER ADVISEMENT SUBJECT TO FURTHER EXAMINATION. 
THE COURTs IT MAY SHOW AS I INDICATED, 
COUNSEL. 
SIR, YOU WERE PREVIOUSLY SWORN AND I WOULD 
ADMONISH YOU THAT YOU'RE STILL UNDER OATH. 
(WHEREUPON, JEFF_LEAV1TT, HAVING PREVIOUSLY 
BEEN DULY SWORN TO THE TRUTH, RESUMED THE 
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EXAM BY BOSTWICK 
1 TOTAL OF $110,000, $111,000 YOU'RE CLAIMING AGAINST FIRST 
2 GENERAL SERVICES; IS THAT CORRECT? 
3 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
4 Q MS. PERKINS, YOU TESTIFY THAT YOU WERE OUT OF STATE 
5 FROM I BELIEVE IT WAS THE DAY AFTER MEMORIAL DAY OF 1990 INTO 
6 AUGUST OF '90; IS THAT CORRECT? 
7 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
8 Q LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS PLAINTIFF'S 
9 EXHIBIT NO. 61. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THAT DOCUMENT, MA'AM? 
10 A THE FIRST PAGE AND SECOND PAGE DOWN TO MY SIGNATURE. 
11 Q DOWN TO THE SIGNATURE? 
12 A YES. 
13 Q WHAT IS THAT DOCUMENT? 
14 A IT'S A POWER OF ATTORNEY, SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY. 
15 Q DIDN'T YOU SIGN THAT DOCUMENT? 
16 A YES, I DID. 
17 Q LOOK AT THE SECOND PAGE FOR THE NOTARY JURAT. 
18 A YES. 
19 Q WHERE IT'S ALL IN CAPITAL LETTERS? STATE OF UTAH, 
20 CAN YOU READ THAT? 
21 A STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT 1AKE. 
22 Q THERE'S ALSO A NOTARY PUBLIC, SOMEONE'S NAME. 
23 WHITTENBACH? AND IT STATES WHERE THAT PERSON RESIDES? 
24 A YES. 
25 Q WOULD YOU READ THAT, PLEASE? 
^ r " n 5 C ° S 
EXAM BY BOSTWICK 
1 A RESIDING IN SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
2 Q AND THAT'S A NOTARY PUBLIC AND THE JURAT STATES THAT 
3 YOU APPEARED BEFORE THE JURAT ON THE 12TH OF JUNE, 1990, 
4 DOESN'T IT, IN SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
5 A THAT'S WHAT IT SAYS. 
6 MR. BOSTWICK: WE WOULD SUBMIT PLAINTIFF'S 
7 EXHIBIT NO. 61 INTO EVIDENCE, YOUR HONOR. 
8 MR. CAMPBELL: I DON'T HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO 
9 IT. 
10 THE COURT: EXHIBIT 61 IS ADMITTED. 
11 Q MA'AM, EARLIER IN YOUR TESTIMONY THIS MORNING, I 
12 BELIEVE YOU STATED THAT THE ENTIRE HOUSE WAS CARPETED EXCEPT 
13 FOR THE KITCHEN. LAUNDRY AND STORAGE ROOMS DIDN'T HAVE CARPET. 
14 DID THEY? 
15 A I BELIEVE I INDICATED THEY DID NOT HAVE A CARPET. 
16 Q I MAY HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD. WITH REGARD TO THE TIME 
17 BETWEEN WHEN YOU FIRST CAME TO SALT LAKE UNTIL YOU SPOKE TO 
18 MR. PETERSON OF FIRST GENERAL SERVICES ON THE 22ND, I BELIEVE 
19 YOU INDICATE YOU SPENT A LOT OF TIME IN THE HOME DURING THAT 
20 TIME. 
21 A I DON'T BELIEVE I SAID THAT. 
22 Q WERE YOU IN THE HOME DURING THAT TIME PERIOD. IN 
23 YOUR HOME IN MURRAY? 
24 A AT THE TIME PERIOD OF WHAT? 
25 Q BETWEEN THE TIME YOU ARRIVED IN SALT LAKE ON MAY 
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1 THE COURT: MR. BOSTWICK, LET ME CLARIFY THAT 
2 FOR YOU. I DID NOT RULE IN ANY WAY--YOU FILED ALREADY A 
3 SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
4 MR. BOSTWICK: YES. 
5 THE COURT: THE COURT IS NOT CONSIDERING THAT 
6 AT THIS TIME. WHAT I'M DOING IS ENTERING A JUDGMENT AS 
7 GRANTED BY THE JURY. 
8 MR. BOSTWICK: DO WE NEED TO MAKE--. 
9 THE COURT: MR. BOSTWICK, LET ME FINISH. 
10 MR. BOSTWICK: I'M SORRY. 
11 THE COURT: WHAT THE TWO OF YOU DO AFTER THE 
12 JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IS UP TO YOU. THEN I WILL ENTERTAIN 
13 MOTIONS AS FAR AS ATTORNEYS FEES, AND THE CASE MR. CAMPBELL 
14 CITED WILL BE APPLICABLE TOWARD THAT, POSSIBLY APPLICABLE 
15 TOWARD ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED TO YOU. BUT RIGHT NOW, I WANT 
16 A JUDGMENT ENTERED AS FOUND BY THE JURY, AND THEN DO WHAT 
17 YOU HAVE TO DO AS FAR AS POST-TRIAL MOTIONS. 
18 MR. BOSTWICK: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
19 MR. CAMPBELL: THANK YOU, JUDGE. 
2 0 THE COURT: IS THAT CLEAR? 
21 MR. PRICE: YES, IT'S CLEAR. 
22 MR. RINGWOOD: WE HAVE ONE MORE ISSUE WITH 
23 RESPECT TO THE JUDGMENT. I DON'T BELIEVE THERE'S ANYTHING 
24 IN THERE REGARDING THE $5,4 00--. 






























IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





ZANDRA PERKINS, an Individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an Individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT OF 
PERKINS7 JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT; OBJECTION TO 
FORM OF JUDGMENT RE: 
COSTS TO BE APPORTIONED 
BETWEEN BEAR RIVER AND 
PERKINS; PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
REGARDING ATTORNEYS FEES; 
DEFENDANT FRAMPTON'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. C900906000 
(Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson) 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 5th day of 
August, 1993, commencing at the hour of 8:00 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing in Courtroom No. 
502 of the Courts Building, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 
240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge in the Third Judicial 
District, State of Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
MESSRS. PARREL J. BOSTWICK, Attornev-at-Law; 
and JEFFERY R. PRICE. Attorney-at-Law, Walstad & Babcock, 
1 Temple View Centre, 57 West South Temple, Eighth Floor, 
2 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, telephone 531-7000, appearing on 
3 behalf of Plaintiff First General Services. 
4 MESSRS. ROBERT S. CAMPBELL. JR., Attornev-at-
5 Law; and JON C. MARTINSON, Attornev-at-Law, Campbell, Maack & 
6 Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main 
7 Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215, telephone 537-5555, 
8 appearing on behalf of Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
9 Perkins. 
10 MESSRS. HENRY E. HEATH, Attornev-at-Law; and 
11 H. BURT RINGWOOD, Attornev-at-Law, Strong & Hanni, Sixth 
12 Floor, Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, telephone 
13 532-7080, appearing on behalf of Third-Party Defendant Bear 
14 River Mutual. 
15 DAVID K. SMITH, Attornev-at-Law. 6925 Union 
16 Park Center, Suite 600, Midvale, Utah 84047, telephone 
17 566-3373, appearing on behalf of Kent L. Frampton Heating & 
18 Air Conditioning. 
19 (Whereupon, the following proceedings were had 
20 in open court:) 
21 THE COURT: The matter before the Court is the case 
22 of First General Services v. Perkins and, of course, their 
23 action against Bear River Mutual. Counsel, I have four 
24 motions before the Court today, it looks like; one by each 
25 party. How do you want to proceed? 
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1 MR* CAMPBELL: I would suggest, Your Honor, that we 
2 proceed with Perkins7 judgment NOV, Rule 59 motion for new 
3 trial• If those are granted, others will become moot. 
4 THE COURT: You may proceed first on your motion. 
5 MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, 
6 may it please the Court, the issues that are before the Court 
7 this morning are grave and most substantive. While this case 
8 was tried just about three months ago, the result which the 
9 jury brought back into this courtroom ought to still be 
10 ringing in the ears of everybody who attended this trial, and 
11 the conscience of this Court. 
12 I think the Court instructed the jury, and as the 
13 jury retired, based upon the evidence of two weeks, it was 
14 two weeks, and we ran very long days. The Court worked hard 
15 and the parties and counsel hard to get the case to the jury 
16 on Thursday of the second week. 
17 But, Your Honor, the evidence in this case was 
18 simply overwhelming with regard to the breach of contract of 
19 First General and the breach of contract of Bear River. The 
20 evidence — I'm not going to argue this morning, take the 
21 Court's time to review specifically what that evidence is in 
22 great detail. The Court knows it. We've laid it out in some 
23 respects in our brief. 
24 But it is important. I'm not here, as I say, to 
25 give a further closing argument; that's not the function 
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1 under Rule 50(b) and 59(a) of a motion for judgment 
2 notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial. 
3 But rather it is, Judge, to give some balance and 
4 weight and integrity to the evidence which Your Honor heard 
5 as well as everybody else in this courtroom, and there were 
6 perceptions that the evidence far weighed in favor of 
7 Ms. Perkins at the close of that testimony. 
8 Now, I submit to the Court that the evidence of 
9 breach, First General's breach of contract, was so manifest 
10 that for the jury to come back in this courtroom and find a 
11 breach on the part of my client, and award this man $10,000 
12 and $52,000 in attorneys fees is the best exemplar of passion 
13 and prejudice and bias on the part of the panel. 
14 There is no other way you can explain that. There 
15 is no expert testimony underlying their claim for attorneys 
16 fees; none at all. Certainly, Mr. Bostwick can't classify, 
17 can't qualify as that, and there is no apportionment; and 
18 I'll get to that in a minute. 
19 As to the questions as to Bear River, the evidence 
20 was very clear about a breach of contract. The real question 
21 was, in that case, was there a bad faith breach? But as to a 
22 breach of contract, the evidence was stacked up in this 
2 3 courtroom, Your Honor, about the fact that Bear River didn't 
24 properly adjust this claim; 120 to 150 days out there, and 
25 there had only been a matter of $20,000 paid. And that was 
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1 to their pal First General who they had recommended to be 
2 placed on as the contractor to repair the fire in the first 
3 place, 
4 But we found examples, Your Honor, of not only 
5 paying $20,000 without the consent of Perkins to First 
6 General, Bear River's contractor, they disputed virtually 
7 every item of property. When they did get the personal 
8 property settled, they used that then as a wedge to force a 
9 settlement on the dwelling. 
10 On top of that, they failed to adjust the property 
11 timely, and we had, as the Court knows, by December, six 
12 months afterwards, there had only been paid a fraction of 
13 what this woman admittedly suffered by way of contents and by 
14 way of dwelling. 
15 Dio, as the Court will recall, the adjuster for 
16 Bear River, discounted everything that had — that this woman 
17 submitted to him 50 percent. He didn't have any formula, he 
18 just did it. He just chopped it off. 
19 And the breach of contract, Judge, for failure to 
20 adjust the fire — because there's one thing, and I'm about 
21 to get to that, that underlies all of the evidence, as to 
22 Bear River's breach of contract, Judge, as well as the 
2 3 evidence of First General, they piggybacked this whole issue. 
24 These two have been together, and they will be this 
25 morning; they have been together throughout the two weeks of 
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this trial. It was very clear. 
First General played off the same evidence that 
Bear River did, and that was that this woman tended to 
develop habits of burning down houses* 
And this other home, the evidence was some of the 
most prejudicial evidence that could possibly have come in. 
And what was astonishing, not only to Perkins but to me, and 
also perhaps to the Court, was that after we had argued the 
motion in limine prior to the time — of course the time of 
trial, at the pre-trial stage, I understood Bear River to 
claim that this evidence was very relevant to their position. 
It turns out, Judge, as the Court — as Mr. Heath 
addressed the Court, and as he made statements ultimately in 
connection with the Hillsden fire, it didn't have anything to 
do with Bear River's adjustment of this case. It was totally 
irrelevant to their position. 
So how could it possibly, then, have come before 
this Court as admissible evidence, particularly under 
Rule 402 and Rule 403, which gives this Court not discretion 
but encourages the Court to reject questionable evidence, 
particularly if it has — if it's going to be inflammatory. 
And the second area or issue that was going to 
cause bias or prejudice on other substantive and totally 
unrelated issues — and that's what happened — is that this 
woman, this case was not so much about what Bear River did to 
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4 Mr. Heath, in good faith — and I don't charge improper 
5 conduct on the part of Henry in this matter; and the Court 
6 knows it — but once that evidence came in, Judge, it was 
7 impossible to erase it from the minds of the jury. 
8 And if they saw this woman as a potential 
9 arsonist — and you have the Fire Chief of Murray sitting in 
10 here, and they wanted him to just start salivating a little 
11 over himself attempting to say that the fire at the subject 
12 property was also arson-caused, and that came before the 
13 jury. 
14 And in light of that testimony, it was very clear 
15 that this jury, and by reason or by virtue of it, returned 
16 the judgment based upon the evidence that was stacked up 
17 against it, and they really quit preponderating evidence, and 
18 in First General's case the overwhelming evidence of a 
19 breach; nevertheless, they came back and found against Zandra 
20 Perkins on virtually every issue except for one. 
21 And $5,100 was the recovery against Bear River for 
22 what admittedly was the fair rental value of the house during 
23 the time that the property was vacant. 
24 Now, the difficulty, Judge, that that evidence, the 
25 prejudiciality of that evidence, and frankly I fault counsel, 
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2 believe that this evidence on the prior fire was going to be 
3 relevant. But it wasn't. And nobody used it. 
4 1 And it sat there. I couldn't mention it, for 
5 obvious reasons, but it sat there before this jury; and when 
6 this woman took the witness stand and questions were asked 
7 her about what she testified in her deposition about having 
8 set the fire at Hillsden, the damage had all been done. 
9 And the difficulty with it was that First General 
10 got the benefit of that prejudice and bias and played off of 
11 it and encouraged it as well. 
12 And as the Court has seen, there has not been, 
13 there has not been an issue in this case in which First 
14 General has not fully concurred with Bear River and Bear 
15 River has reciprocated fully with regard to First General, in 
16 the face of what are clear breaches of contract by First 
17 General. 
18 And we have laid them out. I don't want to go into 
19 them in any depth. But the Court recalls what it was. They 
20 didn't install the air conditioner in the right place, they 
21 were told where it was before the fire, they said, "No, it 
22 wasn't there, it was in the attic of the garage." 
23 They refused to put in the chimney. Now, Judge, if 
24 that isn't a breach of contract, I don't know what is. I 
25 mean, a chimney is something that generally is fairly 
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ll indispensable to the operation of a fireplace in a home. 
2 They said it wasn't there. They had to be shown a 
3 photograph, not by my client, but by a neighbor, before they 
4 would believe my client. 
5 Their contract wasn't with my client, as it was 
6 supposed to be, it was with Dio and Bear River, and the 
7 evidence was clear as to that. 
8 The ridge vents, they had by July 31st not even 
9 done any cleaning of the lower portions of the house. And 
10 what was left was charred wiring. 
11 What was left was water-soaked sheetrock. What was 
12 left was a living room ceiling that was sacked, and those 
13 1 were material breaches of contract. 
14 And once these breaches took place, Your Honor, my 
15 client had no obligation to perform. 
16 1 And now, the case law in this jurisdiction is clear 
17 on that. But the problem, Judge, that drives this whole case 
18 is the fact that Mr. Bostwick is down here asking for $51,000 
19 in attorneys fees to prosecute a $10,000 claim. And he wants 
20 an additional $20,000 to $25,000 again this morning by way of 
21I this motion. 
22 And I submit to the Court that the law will not 
23 allow this travesty to take place. It is very clear that you 
24 have to have opinion evidence on areas in which it is not 
25 within the lay knowledge of the ordinary juror. 
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1 And legal fees are not, and Mr. Bostwick is not an 
2 expert witness. He couldn't qualify as an expert witness. 
3 He didn't testify as an expert witness. He testified just as 
4 another lawyer did in a case that went to the Supreme Court, 
5 ' and we've cited that in our brief to Your Honor, the Kerr 
6 case and the Cox case, Kerr particularly where the Supreme 
7 Court said that you have got to lay out by qualified, 
8 competent testify the attorneys fees that are due and owing. 
9 If you don't do that, you can't have it. We know, 
10 Judge, that a property owner cannot, in this state, testify 
11 as to the fair market value of his property. He used to be 
12 able to do that, but the law clearly now is you can't do 
13 that; whether it's an eminent domain matter or a house in 
14 which a fire has occurred, you have to have competent, 
15 qualified evidence. And First General didn't have that. 
16 And then they top that, Your Honor, by clearly 
17 showing that most of the time they spent in this case was in 
18 defending the counterclaims of my client, counterclaims for 
19 fraud, for breach of contract, for slander of title, for 
20 negligent misrepresentation as well. 
21I And there was no apportionment between those 
22 attorneys fees as to which they claim that they're due for 
23 the performance of the contract. The $10,000 — . 
24 THE COURT: Why do you say that they don't come 
25 under the contract with First General? 
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1 MR. CAMPBELL: I'm sorry? Why — . 
2 THE COURT: Why do you say the defense of the 
3 counterclaim doesn't come under the provisions of the 
4 attorneys fees entered into under the contract with First 
5 General? 
6 MR. CAMPBELL: Because, if the Court please, that 
7 contract was quite specific, that even if you assume that 
8 contract was what's being enforced — and that is that the 
9 attorneys fees that are to be allowed are in connection with 
10 the work to be performed — but it's not in connection with 
11 the defense of the counterclaim. My client didn't agree that 
12 if they were to proceed by way of a counterclaim for fraud, 
13 which is a completely separate and independent cause of 
14 action from breach of contract claim of First General, that 
15 they were going to pay their attorneys fees, that they were 
16 First General's attorneys fees for that. 
17 Judge, there has not been — if there's any 
18 question about this, there hasn't been a case cited to the 
19 Court on that issue, as far as I can know, that would allow 
20 them to do that. 
21 The case law is fundamentally against them, and 
22 that is that counterclaims are not a basis upon which 
23 attorneys fees can be awarded, and you don't apportion — you 
24 I can't recover anything. 
25 THE COURT: You're saying that if I have a contract 
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1 which awards attorneys fees, and I sue you, and you 
2 counterclaim against me under the same contract, that that 
3 provision doesn't apply to the attorneys fee provision? 
4 MR. CAMPBELL: That is exactly what I'm saying, 
5 Your Honor. And indeed in addition to that, I'm saying that 
6 if the cause of action that we're talking about is a breach 
7 of contract, and for fraud, there is no allegation of fraud 
8 on the part of First General with regard to my client that 
9 would allow attorneys fees on that issue. If you — if the 
10 Court allows these attorneys fees, you're allowing, apart 
11 from the question, "Are they reasonable?,11 the Court would be 
12 allowing attorneys fees for recovery of a defense against 
13 fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and slander of title. 
14 And those are certainly not covered by any sort of 
15 an alleged contract in which they say that First General is 
16 entitled to attorneys fees if an action is needed to be 
17 brought in connection with the enforcement of the contract. 
18 I submit to the Court that there is no basis for 
19 that. But there is no basis for any attorneys fees on the 
20 part of First General, because there isn't any qualified, 
21 competent evidence on that, and the jury simply took whatever 
22 it was — I mean, there was no showing that you had to spend 
23 $51,000 and now $72,000 to defend the judgment in a $10,000 
24 claim. 
25 Now, that's reprehensible. That is what brings 
05123 12 
1 courts and lawyers in disrepute in the eyes of the public. 
2 It's offensive even to think about that sort of claim. 
3 And I submit to the Court that there isn't any 
4 evidence that will stand review on appeal, if this Court were 
5 to allow Mr. Bostwick to walk out of there with $75,000 in 
6 his pocket in connection with prosecuting a claim for 
7 $10,000. 
8 And clearly, it's got to proceed by statute or 
9 contract. 
10 Let me turn to Bear River. I think Bear River's 
11 problem, the problem with Bear River is a more difficult one 
12 than it is with First General. Bear River, the breach of 
13 contract with Bear River, it was very clear, I think the 
14 Court was concerned about the bad faith breach. It certainly 
15 was concerned about the breach of contract on the part of 
16 First General. 
17 The Court inquired of counsel while the jury was 
18 out just before they returned right in the courtroom, "What 
19 would we do on punitive damages, that phase of the hearing? 
20 Would we start it tomorrow, the following day, or on 
21 Saturday, or when would it be?" 
22 But the Court was genuinely concerned about what I 
23 think the Court perceived the weight of the evidence was. 
24 And I don't ask this Court to substitute its judgment where 
25 there is questionable evidence, but I submit to the Court 
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1 that the weight of the evidence in this case was overwhelming 
2 by the end of the case, and there was a collapse of Bear 
3 River's case with one of their experts who got on the stand, 
4 and then he left, and Bear River decided not to call him. 
5 The other witness had great difficulty. He was a 
6 person that didn't know anything, except adjusting fires for 
7 insurance companies, had never done one. 
8 He was from Phoenix and is now retired, or Sun 
9 City; the Court will recall that line of examination. 
10 And Bear River's case stood in shambles at the 
11 close of the evidence. I think the Court had a sense of 
12 that. This Court cannot simply look in the jury box and say, 
13 "This is what the jury found, I have to be bound by that." 
14 This Court has an obligation under the law to 
15 review, to see what a jury did, and if the Court finds it 
16 fundamentally is against the weight of the evidence, the 
17 Court can't let that judgment stand. 
18 1 Otherwise, there would be a travesty, Judge, in 
19I this courtroom of untold proportions. This woman, who has a 
20 fire in her house, and who everybody in the courtroom agrees 
21I did not have anything to do with setting that fire, is now 
22 faced, Judge, with recovering a $5,100 judgment against Bear 
23 River for rental. 
24 But apart from that, if the judgment stands, and 
25 the Court doesn't award a judgment NOV or a new trial, 
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against First General, they7re going to wind up with a 
$75,000, $85,000, $90,000 judgment against this woman. 
Her home will be forced to be sold to pay that. 
Frampton is in here asking for some money. You're going to 
hear about that in a few minutes. 
And that is equally offensive, because Frampton's 
position was in here to defend a claim, he wants $9,400 for 
defending a claim by way of attorneys fees. It's one of the 
most despicable claims I've run across in seeing what has 
happened to this woman, in attempting to request only one 
thing: fair adjustment of a fire, and a dispute between a 
contractor over $10,000. 
She's going to lose her home. She will have to 
clearly sell it. She has no other proceeds. She's going to 
wind up in bankruptcy over a fire of which she has no 
position or control or responsibility for. 
Now, those are the problems that weigh upon the 
conscience and position of this Court. It is a Court of 
equity, it is a Court of law, but it is also a Court that 
heard the evidence. 
And I submit to Your Honor that a judgment NOV is 
most proper in connection with First General and also with 
Bear River, particularly as to the breach of contract. 
The bad faith problem, I think that's a problem on 
judgment NOV. I think it is not with regard to the motion 
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z I tne contents settled and resolved and use that as a hammer, 
3 as a sledge hammer against my client to force a settlement of 
4 the household — or, of the dwelling itself. 
5 That is an act of bad faith. But I think I can't 
6 argue that as a matter of judgment NOV, but I certainly can 
7 as a matter of breach of contract. 
8 And I submit to the Court that we've either got to 
9 go back and re-try this case before a jury that was fair and 
10 was impartial and didn't hear this inflammatory evidence with 
11 regard to this woman having set a fire on a previous home and 
12 her expertise in therefore trying to gerrymander a fire 
13 settlement; if that evidence hadn't been before this Court, 
14 we couldn't be here arguing this motion this morning. 
15 But I think the problem, Judge, as far as the 
16 practical aspects of this case, the problem that drives this 
17 whole problem, is Mr. Bostwick's claim for $75,000 in 
18 attorneys fees for prosecuting a $10,000 claim. 
19 And I don't know of any evidence that allows this 
20 man to recover for the defense of a fraud case and slander of 
21 title and negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. 
22 The contract itself doesn't say that, and this Court knows 
23 that the Supreme Court has been very clear about this 
24 question: You don't recover attorney's fees unless they're 
25 precisely set out. 
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1 And they are not, and Mr. Bostwick hasn't cited a 
2 case to the Court that would even come close to allowing 
3 that. 
4 So we submit as to the motion for judgment 
5 notwithstanding the verdict, Your Honor, Rule 50(b), it is 
6 well-taken and should be granted; or, in the alternative, if 
7 the Court feels it can't enter judgment in our favor for the 
8 amount that we had requested, that the Court has an 
9 obligation to, I submit, enter judgment of an order setting 
10 this case back for a new trial. 
11 THE COURT: Counsel, I have a trial starting at 
12 9:00. It's 8:30 now. I'm going to have to ask you to be as 
13 concise as possible. Mr. Campbell took about 25 minutes. 
14 You have about 12 minutes. 
15 MR. BOSTWICK: We'll be much shorter, Your Honor. 
16 With regard, Your Honor, to the issues on the Hillsden fire, 
17 we heard those again and again, and I'm not going to 
18 reiterate the arguments. 
19 We just believe that the Court's prior ruling was 
20 sound. At this stage in the litigation, it would be unjust, 
21 unfair to go back and change that after a two-week trial 
2 2 where there was much disputed evidence and ample evidence to 
23 support a verdict, even if that evidence turns out to be 
24 somewhat prejudicial. 
25 With regard to the motion for judgment 
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1 notwithstanding the verdict, the standard is clear: If 
2 there's any substantial evidence in the record which supports 
3 the verdict, the Court must uphold the verdict. The Court 
4 must ignore all the evidence that tends to go against the 
5 verdict, 
6 In this case, every issue that Mr. Campbell has 
7 addressed was disputed. It was disputed vigorously, and the 
8 issues came down to one of credibility. 
9 1 And Ms. Perkins' witnesses didn't support the day. 
10 The jury did not believe Ms. Perkins' version, her story, for 
11 the reasons that her credibility was questioned and shown to 
12 be lacking. 
13 The jury did not believe Ms. Smith for the same 
14 reasons. The jury did not believe the neighbor because on 
15 cross-examination, the neighbor recanted his testimony and 
16 indicated he had not been told what he had previously 
17 testified he was told, and on and on and on. 
18 This was simply a case of credibility. 
19 Ms. Perkins' witnesses simply did not hold the day. 
20 With regard to attorneys fees, perhaps that is what 
21 is driving this case, Your Honor. In fact, I'm certain of 
22 it. The attorneys fee issue is driving this case because it 
23 is a significant financial obligation imposed upon 
24 Ms. Perkins by the jury, and rightfully so. 
25 Mr. Campbell indicated he believes that there are 
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1 no cases that support our position. The very cases they cite 
2 support our position. The Stubbs case, there were two bases 
3 for the court not awarding attorneys fees. One was that the 
4 plaintiff wasn't successful in a defense of the counterclaim. 
5 And, No. 2, their counterclaims did not relate to the 
6 principal cause of action. 
7 The case I have cited, the language — and Your 
8 Honor has read it — the attorneys fee issue, with regard to 
9 the contract, the contract is clear in its language: ffI 
10 agree that if it's necessary for First General Services to 
11 pursue legal action to collect these amounts, I assume 
12 liability for any and all attorneys fees and court costs." 
13 It's very simple, very straightforward, and broad 
14 enough to cover attorneys fees requested here. 
15 Granted, if Your Honor — if Ms. Perkins had agreed 
16 to submit the issue of attorneys fees to Your Honor after 
17 trial, Your Honor may have come down with a different result 
18 than the jury did. 
19 Your Honor may have awarded a smaller amount of 
20 attorneys fees. But the bottom line is that the jury was 
21 presented evidence, and ample, competent evidence of 
22 attorneys fees and the reasonableness thereof. 
23 The jury deliberated. That was one of the issues 
24 that they considered, and they came back with an award. And 
25 this Court should not disturb that award. 
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Mr. Campbell has indicated through his brief and 
through his oral argument that it's his opinion that expert 
testimony on attorneys fees is required in every case. That 
simply is not the case. Rule 4-505 allows affidavits of 
attorneys fees. The cases that Ms, Perkins cited in the 
memorandum allow attorneys fees. 
In the cases that are cited therein, an affidavit 
of attorneys fees of the kind that were submitted at trial, 
Exhibit No. 35, as well as the testimony of myself, and 
vigorous cross-examination of Mr. Campbell, of myself, on the 
issue of reasonableness, as well as Mr. Campbell's testimony 
on Ms. Perkins' fees and cross-examination therein, and the 
stipulation of counsel, Bear River, and Ms. Perkins all 
support and provided adequate and ample foundation and all 
the evidence for an award of attorneys fees by the jury. 
And we believe that Your Honor should uphold that, 
because there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. 
The fact Ms. Perkins wishes it otherwise is not relevant. 
The fact Ms. Perkins stands to bear a large financial burden 
is not relevant. 
My client has borne a large financial burden and 
will do so if he fails to recover as the jury has clearly 
awarded him. 
With regard to apportionment, one last item, in the 
Dixie State Bank case, the court did award attorneys fees for 
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1 successful defense of a counterclaim, a tort counterclaim, 
2 because it related to the principal cause of action. 
3 Every one of Ms. Perkins7 counterclaims was 
4 integrally involved in and related directly to the 
5 counterclaim, slander of title, related to the foreclosure 
6 action. 
7 The fraud claim and other claims went directly to 
8 the heart of making an enforceable contract. If First 
9 General failed to prevail on those, they simply would not be 
10 able to prevail or be awarded attorneys fees under the 
11 provisions, but they were 100 percent successful on the 
12 defense of their counterclaim. 
13 So we believe the law and the facts support an 
14 award of attorneys fees that were awarded by the jury, and we 
15 request that the Court deny the motion for judgment 
16 notwithstanding the verdict as well as the motion for new 
17 trial. Neither one are well-taken, and we ask the Court to 
18 affirm the order as indicated by the jury. 
19 MR. HEATH: Henry Heath on behalf of Bear River, 
20 Your Honor. Responding, first of all, to Mr. Campbell and 
21 Perkins7 argument that the fire history prejudiced the jury 
22 in this case, let me address that issue first, Your Honor. 
23 The Plaintiff Perkins takes a position — and as I 
24 refer to "the plaintiff" I'm referring to the plaintiff as 
25 regarding Bear River; she is actually a defendant and 
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third-party plaintiff — but Perkins takes the position that 
when Bear River states that the fire history did not affect 
the manner in which it handled her claim, that that is the 
same as Bear River saying it was irrelevant to them. 
And that's not the case. It was not irrelevant to 
Bear River nor to the issues of this case. 
The material fact at issue, as the Court properly 
perceived in the argument and consideration and deliberation 
on the motion in limine, and again when it came up during the 
course of the trial on evidentiary rules, the Court properly 
perceived that as long as the issue of bad faith is before 
this jury, Bear River has an opportunity to present evidence 
of its good faith. 
Now, the evidence of what good faith is, and the 
materiality of it, is not only what was done by Bear River, 
but what it didn't do. And that's where Mr. Campbell has 
failed to perceive, all the way through this, in every 
argument, on every level, that what Bear River didn't do in 
this case was important, because of the knowledge it had of 
the prior fire. 
That was significant to show that they approached 
this claim with good faith. Let me point out the good things 
they could have done but did not do because of the fire. 
First of all, they didn't claim that she caused the 
fire. They never went to her and said, "You caused the fire 
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1 in issue here, and therefore we're denying the claim," 
2 They didn't delay payment while they conducted an 
3 exhaustive investigation to see if she had caused the fire, 
4 neither did they delay payment while Murray City conducted 
5 its investigation. 
6 But perhaps most significantly, they never once, 
7 they never once held the fact of the Hillsden fire over her 
8 head in saying, "You know, you may be an arsonist, you're a 
9 suspect, therefore we're not going to pay your claim." 
10 Those are things that they didn't do which is 
11 evidence, and material evidence, of their handling of this 
12 claim in good faith. 
13 And that's why the evidence on the issue of bad 
14 faith of the Hillsden fire, as limited as it was by the 
15 Court, and limited by the evidence, and limited by our 
16 handling of it, and by our comment on it — and we were very 
17 careful, Your Honor, not to suggest to the jury that she 
18 caused or had the fire set as a result of any conduct of her 
19 own or her family. 
20 We pointed that out in our closing argument 
21 carefully, and throughout the case. And for them to say that 
22 therefore it's not relevant and doesn't qualify under 
23 Rule 402 as admissible evidence is absolutely wrong. 
24 And the Court has properly perceived that twice. 
25 We've heard that argument over and over again, and 
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Mr. Campbell just absolutely refuses to understand it. 
I think he understands it, but it's the only thing 
he has to talk about; and therefore, he continues to bring it 
to the attention of the Court as a desperate attempt to get 
this Court to agree with him one last time in support of his 
motion for a new trial or for judgment NOV. 
In order for that to be significant to the jury's 
consideration, Your Honor, and by virtue of their own 
statements in their memoranda in support of these motions, 
the jury would have to have concluded that in fact she did 
have something to do with causing her home to burn. 
In order for that evidence to be prejudicial to 
Ms. Perkins, they would have had to have made that 
conclusion, that she was an arsonist, or she had part in a 
conspiracy to have her home set afire, and they suggested 
that that's why we introduced this evidence and that it was 
lying around there and in the jury's mind, that that must 
have been what they concluded; otherwise, they couldn't have 
come to this result. 
Well, the evidence and the result of the verdict 
just don't support that. The jury did not believe that she 
was an arsonist. Had that been the case, they would not have 
awarded her anything. They would have not have given her 
$5,100 for the fair rental value of her home while it was 
being under repair. 
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1 So the jury did not think that Ms, Perkins was an 
2 arsonist or that she caused the fire or that the Hillsden 
3 property evidence suggested that, 
4 Rather the jury believed that Bear River, 
5 notwithstanding that evidence, believed Ms. Perkins on the 
6 issue of that, that she didn't have anything to do with the 
7 fire, and attempted to adjust this claim. 
8 Now, obviously the Court is bound to consider the 
9 evidence at this point in the light most favorable to 
10 upholding the jury verdict. 
11 The jury didn't need to rely upon the fire history, 
12 the prior fire history of Ms. Perkins, in order to reach its 
13 verdict and to attack the credibility of Ms. Perkins. 
14 I'm somewhat amused by Mr. Campbell's 
15 characterization of Bear River's position at the close of the 
16 evidence, that their case was in shambles. That's a 
17 characterization that is absolutely myopic. He refuses to 
18 evaluate this evidence the way the jury did. 
19 He made the same statement to the jury, statements 
20 that were rejected by the jury and should be rejected by this 
21 Court. 
22 1 The reason Ms. Perkins' case did not succeed is 
23 because of her own credibility problems, and that has nothing 
24 to do with the Hillsden fire. It rather has to do with the 
25 whole phony claim that she filed for the additional living 
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1 expenses, which even Mr. Campbell recognized was phony and 
2 withdrew it, to his credit, prior to going to trial. 
3 Nevertheless, that was before the jury, that the 
4 reason Bear River hadn't successfully adjusted this claim is 
5 because the claim had never been properly presented to it; 
6 that even though the claim had never been properly presented 
7 to Bear River, they nevertheless bent over backwards and paid 
8 over $91,000 to her on portions of the claim that were not 
9 properly documented. 
10 Mr. Campbell makes the statement that Bear River 
11 was in bad faith because Bear River would not — or, held 
12 this, breached the agreement on the contents claim, and held 
13 that over her head in settling the dwelling claim. 
14 It was just the reverse, quite frankly: The 
15 dwelling claim, Bear River attempted to settle it, and they 
16 advanced money on it. They advanced money to contractors as 
17 bills came in. 
18 You heard the testimony of Leo Thorup that there 
19 were double payments, there were overcharges, there were 
20 kickbacks coming to Ms. Perkins that were improper, there 
21 were claims by Ms. Perkins that clearly were beyond the scope 
22 of the damages. 
23 And most telling was perhaps — if you want to look 
24 at one part of the trial and attack her credibility, it is 
25 the testimony of Mr. Peterson that, in fact, Ms. Perkins 
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1 approached him prior to her terminating him and asked him to 
2 include things that were improper. 
3 And when he advised her that he would not do so, 
4 then two weeks later he was terminated. That's the reason 
5 . the jury believes, in my opinion, that she breached her 
6 contract with First General, that she could not control 
7 Mr. Peterson and First General Services to cause them to make 
8 claims against the insurance policy that were not justified: 
9 the concrete claims, the garage, and other things that the 
10 Court heard. 
11 Well, I'm not going to comment on all the evidence, 
12 but I think the Court remembers the whole replacement cost 
13 issue. 
14 Mr. Campbell's argued strenuously to the Court in 
15 support of the jury instructions, and he argued strenuously 
16 to the jury that she was entitled to replacement cost. 
17 Bear River stood on the policy. The jury heard the 
18 evidence and held that Bear River was not in breach of the 
19 contract on any particular aspect of the contract. 
20 The only reason that Ms. Perkins recovered anything 
21 is because Bear River acknowledged, in fairness — and this 
22 shows again their good faith — that had she made a claim at 
23 the appropriate time for fair rental value, rather than this 
24 phony claim for additional living expenses, renting her 
25 mother's house, renting rooms there, et cetera, et cetera, 
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1 Bear River acknowledged that had she made, in the proper 
2 course, a claim for fair rental value, they would have paid 
3 her, and the jury said, "Yeah, okay, now she's making that 
4 claim, therefore she's entitled to $5,100." 
5 That, to my way of thinking, is the most credible 
6 evidence, the most credible evidence of the jury's 
7 conscientious approach in this case. They were not 
8 prejudiced. They listened to the evidence. They accepted 
9 Bear River's position, because that was the overwhelming 
10 weight of the evidence. 
11 There was no delay on the part of Bear River, but 
12 the delay was occasioned by Ms. Perkins and her agents. 
13 In fact, Your Honor, the best evidence of that is 
14 Derk Rasmussen, the economist, who came in here, and 
15 Mr. Rasmussen had been purposefully hired to sort out the 
16 value of her claim. 
17 He gave a deposition within two weeks of trial in 
18 which he prepared an exhibit saying, "This is what her claim 
19 is worth." 
20 And when we get to trial, it was changed again. We 
21 didn't know, even at the time of trial — in fact, even today 
22 we don't know what that documented evidence is for the full 
23 value of her claim. 
24 So Bear River made the best judgment that it could. 
25 They paid her $91,000 on a home that she had up for sale for 
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1 $78,500. 
2 They paid her the contents, in some cases they paid 
3 her the replacement of the contents when the contents were 
4 cleaned and still for the repair for the contents, the actual 
5 cash value of the contents when those contents are still in 
6 her home, and she is still using them. 
7 The Court heard all of that. Quite frankly, we7re 
8 to the point now where much more could be said, but it would 
9 be a clear abuse of discretion of this Court, and with all 
10 due respect, I have great confidence in this Court that this 
11 Court cannot ignore the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
12 and either grant an NOV or to order a new trial on any of the 
13 issues of the case as they relate to Bear River. 
14 It's true that the consequences of the outcome of 
15 this lawsuit will have serious results to Ms. Perkins, but 
16 she's got to pay the price for her own greed. She was the 
17 one who was claiming things she wasn't entitled to. She was 
18 the one that was wrongfully terminating her contract, and as 
19 a result Bear River got thrown into the middle of a situation 
20 where they didn't know which contractor to pay. 
21 She was the one that brought this on herself. She 
22 was the one that incurred her attorneys fees, attorneys fees 
23 that we can't recover. 
24 And Bear River's in a situation where it had to 
25 spend not only $91,000 to adjust this claim, but considerable 
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1 attorneys fees to defend it against actions which I think, 
2 Your Honor, boarder on abuse of this court system. 
3 I don't think the Court can countenance this kind 
4 of conduct- I don't know what her problems are, but she's 
5 brought them on herself, Your Honor, and I submit the verdict 
6 is supported by the overwhelming evidence and must stand. 
7 MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, I'll be brief in my 
8 response, because what you've heard from both counsel, now 
9 for First General and for Bear River, is — and I'm not going 
10 to engage in ad hominem ad nocumentum as to what I have done 
11 personally. That isn't what is before this Court. 
12 It's a great deal more than that that is before the 
13 Court. It isn't me personally or what I have done that 
14 counts in the Court's equation of justice at all. 
15 But what they both recognized is the fact that this 
16 Hillsden fire was inflammatory, it was sensational, and it 
17 1 was prejudicial. 
18 And as both counsel have said, this was a trial of 
19 credibility. That's why that issue, Your Honor, was so 
20 important, and it lays out there, and I can't touch it, 
21 because it's so sensitive. And they let it be used, and it's 
22 what they have said is that this is irrelevant testimony, 
23 that it didn't have anything to do with their adjusting of 
24 this claim, so let it sit there. 
25 And they want to let the jury use it in whatever 
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1 way they want. And the Court clearly advised the jury that 
2 they can take into consideration all the admissible evidence, 
3 give whatever weight they think is appropriate to it. I 
4 can't bring jurors in here and parade them; it would be 
5 improper to take — to attack a jury verdict by doing that as 
6 to what they considered. 
7 But we know that, we've talked to them, and I 
8 submit to the Court that their service — . 
9 MR. HEATH: Your Honor, I object to that on the 
10 record, when he says he's talked to the jury. That is 
11 inappropriate, and it's clearly inappropriate argument. 
12 MR. CAMPBELL: My credibility has been attacked by 
13 this man just now, and it has been suggested to me — . 
14 THE COURT: Don't get into anything else, unless 
15 there's an affidavit — . 
16 MR. CAMPBELL: And that's right. And I understand. 
17 I don't rely on that. I'm talking about plain, common, 
18 ordinary sense. Mr. Heath has attacked my good faith as a 
19 lawyer in his argument just a moment ago, and I don't know 
20 why he thought he had to do that, but that offends the system 
21 as well, and that's the same sort of trash, Your Honor, that 
22 the Hillsden fire is involved with, because it has nothing to 
23 do with any of the issues. 
24 But it taints the case, and it makes it turn upon 
25 personalities, and that is a real problem, Your Honor, that 
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1 Bear River cannot overcome, and neither can First General. 
2 And Mr. Bostwick just argued to the Court, even if 
3 this evidence were prejudicial, even if it were erroneous, 
4 the Court shouldn't overturn the judgment. That was his 
5 opening statement to the Court. 
6 With regard to what Mr. Bostwick has to say, Judge, 
7 the cases he cited didn't — I want the Court to look at 
8 that, if there's any question about it, the issue of 
9 apportionment, because the Supreme Court never touched in 
10 either Dixie State or in the other case that was cited, they 
111 did not even discuss the question of apportionment. 
12 1 There is no case on apportionment, Your Honor, 
13 before the Court. Judge, just two years ago there was a huge 
14 case tried by Judge Hanson just across the hall, and Judge 
151 Hanson — it was a case against Sydney Horman, which 
16 Mr. Misuraca tried for Kimball, and it went to the Supreme 
17 Court. It was for 13 weeks, tried up in the Summit Court, a 
18 case which the Court knows of. It was well-known. It was a 
19 rather notorious case. 
20 And Mr. Misuraca did not apportion his attorneys 
21 fees, and Judge Hanson wouldn't allow any and granted a 
22 judgment against Kimball for not apportioning the attorneys 
23 fees between those that related to the causes of action as to 
24 which the contract provided and the counterclaim that was 
25 being defended and other issues as to which attorneys fees 
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1 were not involved. 
2 THE COURT: If I'm going to make an apportionment 
3 or a judgment as far as attorneys fees, what are you saying I 
4 should do, eliminate them all? 
5 MR, CAMPBELL: There isn't any competent evidence 
6 before the Court at all. 
7 THE COURT: If I don't see fit to eliminate them 
8 all — . 
9 MR. CAMPBELL: I think the Court should eliminate 
10 them all. 
11 THE COURT: If I don't see fit to, what should I 
12 do? 
13 MR. CAMPBELL: Well, because I don't believe there 
14 is competent evidence before the Court, the Court would 
15 either have to — you cannot enter judgment. You can't enter 
16 judgment against First General for attorneys fees, and if the 
17 Court thinks it wants to hear a new trial, to be limited to 
18 the question of attorneys fees, the Court may be able to do 
19 that by bifurcating a portion of it. 
20 THE COURT: If I arbitrarily, as a court of equity, 
21 adjust the attorneys fees, am I within my realm and power? 
22 MR. CAMPBELL: I most respectfully suggest it is 
23 not — I think it is not within the Court's realm, but 
24 attorneys fees — the $75,000 is the difficulty that brings 
25 this case to the point where it is. And we submit to the 
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1 Court that with regard to the evidence that Bear River — and 
2 I'm not going to personalize it by talking about Mr, Heath — 
3 Bear River submitted to this Court with regard to that 
4 Hillsden fire, that over shadows everything else that took 
5 place in this courtroom. I couldn't do anything about it 
6 regardless of whether the advocacy was vigorous or not. It 
7 was something that couldn't be touched because of the very, 
8 very sensitive — the more you talk about it, the more 
9 difficult it becomes as far as lay people were concerned, lay 
10 jurors, to explain why it has anything to do with the case. 
11 We submit that the judgment NOV should be granted, 
12 Your Honor, both as to — or, a new trial, both as to First 
13 General and Bear River. We'd be happy to answer any other 
14 questions, Your Honor. I think the balance of the issues can 
15 be taken quickly. With respect to the entry of judgment — . 
16 THE COURT: Let's let these parties address their 
17 own. Mr. Heath, yours first, you have an objection to the 
18 form of the judgment as far as the costs? 
19 MR. HEATH: Yes, Your Honor. I think I can get to 
20 that quickly. The question is Rule 55(d) allows costs to the 
21 prevailing party. As between Bear River and Perkins, Bear 
22 River clearly prevailed on all of the issues. Perkins 
23 prevailed on one issue. She got $5,100 as a mere reflection, 
24 and as we indicated before, that when the testimony finally 
25 got to trial, Bear River acknowledged that $5,100 would have 
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1 been the fair rental value had it been claimed properly, and 
2 presented in a proper claim. 
3 It was not properly presented. Bear River has not 
4 taken the position, Your Honor, as perhaps it could have, to 
5 have argued that, "Well, we're going to deny that claim 
6 because it wasn't timely made.11 At least there was no 
7 finding of breach of contract because Bear River didn't pay 
8 anything on the additional living expenses. The Court has 
9 instructed the jury and the jury properly found that Bear 
10 River did not breach its contract, so it prevailed on every 
11 point in defending the third-party complaint of Ms. Perkins. 
12 Now, they're going to argue that under some cases, 
13 and they have cited authorities of the Highland case, 
14 Highland v. Stevenson, and Brown v. Richards, that there the 
15 attorneys fees can be awarded to a party who prevails 
16 partially, but they don't have to prevail on every point. 
17 Both those cases, they involved claims and 
18 counterclaims where attorneys fees were awarded to both 
19 parties under the contract, and one party who prevailed as a 
20 contractor by virtue of prevailing on its claim and 
21 counterclaim, where the counterclaimant prevailed on its 
22 claim. 
2 3 They were both awarded attorneys fees. They are in 
24 no way analogous to the case we have here. In fact, Perkins, 
25 the fact that Perkins got any money at all cannot be 
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1 suggested to the Court that she prevailed. Rule 54(d) allows 
2 the Court discretion on this matter, Your Honor, 
3 I think we're not asking for a lot; we're asking 
4 for approximately — I think whatever the cost bill states on 
5 that — $4,000 or approximately $4,000 to $5,000, Your Honor. 
6 It appears to me clear that in court Bear River 
7 prevailed on every issue, every claim that Perkins made 
8 against it on bad faith, and costs were incurred in defending 
9 the bad faith and the breach of contract. 
10 There were no costs incurred on the fair rental 
11 value. It wasn't even raised until at the time of trial. 
12 Therefore, Your Honor, the Court should exercise 
13 its discretion and grant Bear River its motion for costs, and 
14 that's the only objection we have to the form of the judgment 
15 that Perkins — in her form of the judgment, she said that 
16 neither party would recover costs. 
17 MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, quickly. Perkins did 
18 prevail and is the prevailing party in the case. The law in 
19 this case, for this issue, is not in doubt. It is in the 
20 Highland Construction Company case, and we stand on it. And 
21 Mr. Heath has not distinguished that for the Court, and that 
22 is that the fact that a party doesn't prevail on all counts, 
23 and doesn't prevail on the amount they ask for, but had 
24 prevailed on an amount less than that, does not mean they're 
25 not the prevailing party under 54(d). 
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1 And the jury found — if what Mr. Heath for Bear 
2 River now says is correct, why did that even go to the jury? 
3 That is to say, "Did Perkins sustain any damage? 
4 What are the damages sustained from the May 19th house fire 
5 . for which Perkins — for which Bear River is obligated to 
6 reimburse Perkins?" "Answer: $5,100." 
7 Now, if Bear River was willing to stipulate to 
8 that, that wouldn't even have gone to the jury. The jury 
9 found in Perkins' favor on that issue and is the prevailing 
10 party, and therefore Bear River is not entitled to its costs 
11 on any aspect of the case, even though they prevailed on 
12 other issues. 
13 There is a valid claim for $5,100, and they don't 
14 object to that being a judgment. What they want is a 
15 judgment entered against them for $5,100, then $4,500 for 
16 costs in connection with the defense of the case. 
17 That simply is inconsistent with Rule 54(d), and 
18 also with the Highland Construction case, and the precedent 
19 for this Court. 
20 MR. HEATH: We would submit it, Your Honor. The 
21 Court has discretion. If the Court feels that Perkins 
22 incurred any costs on that aspect of the case, or that that 
23 was really material, the Court can make some apportionment of 
24 costs accordingly, and we can have a hearing on what the 
25 costs are that are appropriate. But as to the prevailing 
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1 party, the case law, I'll submit the cases to the Court, and 
2 I think the Court can see that the memorandum law is very 
3 clear under the circumstances that Bear River was the 
4 prevailing party. We wouldn't be here with motions for new 
5 trial and judgment NOV and all of the arguments we've heard 
6 today if, in fact, they didn't think Bear River was the 
7 prevailing party, 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Bostwick, you have a motion to 
9 amend the j udgment. 
10 MR. BOSTWICK: Very briefly, Your Honor; most of 
11 the issues have already been covered. 
12 With regard to the supplemental attorneys fees, 
13 Your Honor, unlike the $52,000 and the jury verdict, the 
14 supplemental fees that we have submitted to the Court are 
15 essentially wide open for the Court's determination of 
16 reasonableness. 
17 However, Your Honor sat here through the last seven 
18 days of trial. You saw active participation in the case that 
19 we had in the trial. We made efforts to not have Mr. Price 
20 here during the times he wasn't needed. We made efforts to 
21 minimize those things. 
22 If Your Honor feels a need to reduce those 
23 supplemental fees on the basis of reasonableness, I don't 
24 think it needs to be on an arbitrary basis; there are 
25 guidelines and cases that allow the Court to do so based upon 
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1 what would normally be charged for that service. 
2 If the Court has an opinion that the last seven 
3 days of trial and post-trial efforts in dealing with 
4 objections to the judgment, post-trial motions and et cetera, 
5 are unreasonable, then it's within the Court's prerogative to 
6 reduce those. 
7 We do not believe that it is unreasonable. The 
8 efforts were required. There is no time during the trial 
9 that we would have slipped out and not been present; 
10 virtually every witness attacked the credibility or facts 
111 that dealt with First General, and simply there was no way we 
12 could have avoided incurring those fees. 
13 In addition, there was no instruction to the jury, 
14 and it was only raised after the trial with regard to this 
15 apportionment. If it was an issue of Ms. Perkins, it should 
16 have been addressed with the jury at that time. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Bostwick, you took the stand, you 
18 testified, you were examined on the witness stand on these 
191 fees. Why didn't you bring up the total amount of your fees, 
20 projecting what your fees were going to be, as far as the 
21 conclusion of the case was concerned? 
22 MR. BOSTWICK: We could have done that. We chose 
23 to — . 
24 THE COURT: You say you could have done it. You 
251 could have done it. 
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1 MR- BOSTWICK: Mr. Campbell refused to allow it to 
2 be submitted to — . 
3 THE COURT: By any affidavit. Why didn't you get 
4 that evidence into the jury? 
5 MR. BOSTWICK: It was an unknown. We simply did 
6 not know. We made it as clear as possible to the jury that 
7 $52,000 we were claiming was through the second day of trial. 
8 There was no objection by Perkins or any other party to the 
9 submission by supplemental affidavit of the remaining fees 
10 during trial and subsequent thereto, and on that basis we 
11 felt we were entitled to that. If the Court feels that a 
12 detailed apportionment is necessary, affidavits are clearly 
13 detailed enough to do so. The cases hold that that's 
14 appropriate if the Court feels it's necessary. Thank you. 
15 MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, there wasn't any 
16 statement or question asked or request made with respect to 
17 supplemental attorneys fees during the course of the trial. 
18 It didn't even come up. And we objected to attorneys fees, 
19 that admission of attorneys fees, and what I thought was 
2 0 going to happen was that after the — after First General put 
21 on its testimony for attorneys fees, they were going to call 
22 a witness, an expert, a lawyer, to come in and say, "These 
23 fees are reasonable." 
24 But that never happened, and with regard to the 
25 supplemental attorneys fees of $19,708, that comes too late 
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1 in the day in any event, because the matter has already been 
2 submitted to the trier of fact, and there was no indication 
3 that — I mean, not even any estimate. 
4 But the problem, Judge, with this position is the 
5 same problem, the same flaw, that underlies the entire 
6 problem with Mr. Bostwick: He hasn't apportioned anything of 
7 this $19,708. That makes a total, then, of $72,000, a little 
8 over $72,000, in a claim for attorneys fees in connection 
9 with prosecuting a $10,000 claim. 
10 I don't know of any cases, Judge, that ever stood 
11 with scrutiny of a trial judge or Supreme Court of Utah under 
12 similar circumstances where there has been that sort of 
13 attorneys fees awarded where there has been no apportionment 
14 in connection with a major, serious problem of fraud, 
15 negligent misrepresentation, slander of title, and breach of 
16 contract in which they were defending — they were in defense 
17 in a good portion of this case, and they can't recover, 
18 either under the lien statute or under the contract. 
19 The Court allowed them recovery of attorneys fees 
20 in connection with the prosecution of their contract claim 
21 against Perkins, so we submit that the $19,708 is improper 
22 for both reasons: There is no competent evidence, and 
23 secondly, Counsel didn't apportion it. The Court has no idea 
24 as to what the allocation there would be between the 
25 counterclaim and the defending on the fraud issues, and those 
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issues that relate to the prosecution of the contract claims 
against Perkins. 
MR. BOSTWICK: We'll submit it, Your Honor. 
Mr. Campbell refuses to remember several times that we did 
reserve our right, and he doesn't remember that at this time. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I didn't — . 
MR. BOSTWICK: And now is an inappropriate time to 
say anything, Mr. Campbell. I believe it's my opportunity. 
We did reserve those rights. There were no objections, and 
supplemental fees are appropriate, and again were required. 
They're reasonable under both the Mechanic's Lien Foreclosure 
Statute, as well as other provisions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I 
believe my motion is moot in light of the Court's execution 
of the supplemental judgment after my filing a motion, 
together with a memorandum. 
THE COURT: Let me indicate on that that, yes, that 
was signed, but I noted — and I don't want to pass any 
fault, but it seems like it's the fault of the system here. 
Papers come up to me, and as soon as a judgment is filed, 
they come up to me, and I hold it for eight days, and many 
times papers come in downstairs and they do not get it up to 
me. And you may have noted that the judgment was signed on 




2 MR. SMITH: I'm happy to address that. 
3 THE COURT: I would set the judgment aside and hear 
4 that matter. 
5 MR. SMITH: And I'm happy to address the issue, 
6 Your Honor. I'd like to point out to the Court that 
7 originally — and this is not new in court — but originally 
8 we filed this claim separate from any and all other claims 
9 before the Court here in the Circuit Court. Ours was to 
10 foreclose on the mechanic's lien for the amount that was due. 
11 That case was subsequently — . 
12 THE COURT: That case was filed against — . 
13 MR. SMITH: It was filed both against Perkins and 
14 against First General Services in the Circuit Court. We're 
15 an involuntary participant in this particular action. We 
16 never wanted to be particularly active in this particular 
17 action because it involved so much more than simply our 
18 claim. 
19 But nevertheless, we were brought in; and the 
20 Court, as it awarded judgment, summary judgment — . 
21 THE COURT: Who was that judgment against? 
22 J MR. SMITH: It was against Zandra Perkins on our 
23 mechanic's lien. Now at that point, we would have been happy 
24 1 to have been put out of the case, except that there was a 
25 claim for setoff by Zandra Perkins which, several times, the 
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1 Court asked counsel whether or not they were still going to 
2 pursue that, and they were very certain that that 
3 counterclaim should be pursued. They felt that they had a 
4 good-faith counterclaim for offset. So we had no choice. We 
5 were drawn into the — . 
6 THE COURT: Under what provision are you asking for 
7 attorneys fees being brought into it? 
8 MR. SMITH: Under the Mechanic's Lien Statute. We 
9 think that under that statute, we're entitled, where they're 
10 claiming an offset against the mechanic's lien, to attorney's 
11 fees for having to defend on the claim for offset. 
12 And I believe our claim is well-taken. We had to 
13 respond, had to spend the better part of two weeks here in 
14 defending, and you'll recall the Court found, even after the 
15 testimony was in, that there simply wasn't enough testimony 
16 to even take it to the jury. 
17 So we were here reluctantly and had no choice but 
18 to defend. They were claiming over $13,000 in offsets, and 
19 my client is charged for the time spent in defending that. 
2 0 I think our claim for offset is — they're entitled 
21 to their attorneys fees in defending against that, and we 
22 should be granted it. 
2 3 I'll submit it based upon the Mechanic's Lien 
24 Statute. I think we're entitled to attorneys fees for 
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That was reserved, Your Honor. 
That's what I was thinking. 
That was reserved against First 
those issues are outstanding but — . 
All the attorneys fees were 1 
Against Zandra Perkins. 
To you? I guess against Perkins? 
Yes, against Perkins for me on this 














How much? 1 
The total judgment was about $4,500. J 
Your principal was around $400, wasn't 
CAMPBELL: $426.26. 
COURT: And the attorneys fees were $4,000? 
CAMPBELL: Around $4,000. 
COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
CAMPBELL: Your Honor, this claim is really the 
on what is a very black hour in this court. If this 
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1 Court were to award another $9,464 for attorneys fees for 
2 this — for Frampton to come in by way of defense, this was a 
3 separate cause of action. Somehow, as the Court knows, this 
4 case started out in Murray City Court. It was transferred 
5 here to this Court without this Court's consent. 
61 Mr. Smith acknowledged that the case probably 
7 shouldn't be here and wasn't quite sure why it was. Perhaps 
8 it was because he had a claim also against First General. 
91 But it's very clear that the Mechanic's Lien 
10 Statute, its position on that is for prosecuting a claim of 
11 $426. And for him to claim $9,464 atop of what the Court has 
12 already awarded by way of attorneys fees is not only an abuse 
13 of process, but it is something the Court can't do. I mean, 
14 this was for defense, for defense of a separate cause of 
15 action upon the part of my client. 
16 You call it a setoff, but it was a counterclaim, 
17 raised properly initially in Murray City Court. It was 
18 raised here in counterclaim. Mr. Smith said, "I'm not going 
19 to sit through all of the trial involving Bear River, and 
20 I'll come in when it involves my client." 
21 But it was a defense. If it wasn't in connection 
22 with foreclosure of the mechanic's lien, that's the only 
23 basis for attorneys fees, and that $9,464, Your Honor, cannot 
24 stand as a matter of law. We submit it. 
25 MR. SMITH: Can I respond to that? I think if the 
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1 Court will review the pleadings, the pleadings filed 
2 originally in this case raised the issue of the water damage 
3 as a defense, as an affirmative defense. It is not 
4 specifically set out as a counterclaim. So these issues, the 
5 • water damage, was part of a defense against a mechanic's 
6 lien. 
7 By way of an offset — and I think under the 
8 Mechanic's Lien Statute, the cases under that, they say that 
9 attorneys fees are properly awardable where you have to 
10 defend an offset on a claim for foreclosure of a mechanic's 
11 lien. I think that's properly what the law is in this case. 
12 MR. CAMPBELL: And there's not been a case cited, 
13 Your Honor, to support that. We submit it. 
14 THE COURT: Counsel, I sit here today and have 
15 heard arguments on this case, and I sat through two weeks of 
16 trial and heard arguments, and I shook my head every night as 
17 I left the bench of what a mess this is and where it was 
18 going, why it wasn't disposed of. 
191 When I see a situation going down where the parties 
20 simply — and I'm not going to try to recall or restate all 
21 the evidence — but First General coming before this Court on 
22 a $10,000 claim and asking for $75,000 in attorneys fees, 
23 it's just, as Mr. Campbell stated, the bar or the Court 
24 cannot tolerate things of that sort. 
25 Where I read the affidavits of Mr. Bostwick as far 
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as the number of attorneys and legal paralegals that have 
worked on the case, I don't know what took place in his 
office. I'm certainly not here to criticize you, 
Mr. Bostwick, except to say that I — it was just 
inconceivable to this Court of how, on a $10,000 claim, you 
can get $75,000 into it. It's just not there. 
I see First General suing on this matter, and none 
of the parties come before this Court with clean hands, where 
they've made mistakes as far as the restoring of the 
property. 
I'm not going to recall them all, but they made all 
kinds of mistakes that were testified to, of where Zandra 
Perkins comes in and claims that she made were absurd as far 
as the insurance company, and her attempts to get the 
contractor to do things that were improper. 
The way she handled the entering into the contract 
and the attempt to set the contract aside, it was just so 
bad. 
And Bear River, here they pay $91,000, on which it 
appears to be about a $40,000 to $60,000 fire, yet their 
adjustor in this Court's opinion just goofed in many areas as 
far as the way he handled the claim, and in trying to use the 
settling of one part of it to force the other. 
Well, the jury brought back a verdict, a verdict 
which this Court would not — if I had been giving the 
05159 48 
1 verdict, and in hearing the evidence I heard, it would not 
2 have been the verdict. I would not have given the verdict 
3 which First General prayed for. 
4 I would not have given the verdict that Zandra 
5 Perkins prayed for. I would not have given the verdict Bear 
6 River prayed for. 
7 So — and of course, you'll never know what my 
8 verdict would have been. But I'm saying that we have here a 
9 homeowner who is — has her home burn down, or burned, and 
10 she attempts to get that fixed; walked out of Court with a 
11 $65,000 judgment against her, and she was not all clean. She 
12 was not all good. 
13 Of course, Mr. Campbell makes a great deal as far 
14 as the Court's ruling, allowing into evidence on the first 
15 fire. I don't know what impact that had on the jury. I do 
16 know that, as it came in, the impact it had on the Court was 
17 a lot less than this Court anticipated it would be, the way 
18 Mr. Heath went at it and passed over it; that it almost, to 
19 this Court — this Court did not have — it did not have any 
20 impact at all. 
21 And certainly, it was not the impact, in this 
22 Court's opinion, that Mr. Campbell argues that it had. 
23 I would probably state that I'm still of the 
24 opinion that under the claims brought, it was admissible; but 
25 I probably also would state that under the small area that it 
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1 was brought in on, if I had known that that's all they were 
2 going to use it for, I probably wouldn't have allowed it, 
3 because to me it was just not significant. 
4 I have other reasons as well, and some of which 
5 have been stated here, as to what happened in this trial. I 
6 don't know that I — but I have reasons, but they're not 
7 material. 
8 Now, the questions at hand and some of these are 
9 awfully tough. Of course, Mr. Campbell asks the Court the 
10 major thing, which is his motion for judgment NOV and a new 
11 trial. He argues that the Court has broad discretion. 
12 I will agree with him that the Court has 
13 discretion, but I guess I agree — and maybe not disagree; 
14 disagreeing isn't quite it as far as what he says before this 
15 Court. 
16 But in this Court's opinion, and before I can 
17 overturn a jury of a verdict, I have to find good grounds to 
18 do it, so there's no basis for the jury to find the verdict 
19 which they did; or, of course, if there was significant error 
20 that was prejudicial. 
21 I do not find that error — I'm not saying that it 
22 was reversible error, allowing in the testimony of the 
23 Hillsden fire, that that was significant prejudice enough to 
24 overturn the jury's verdict. 
25 I'm also of the opinion that there was sufficient 
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1 evidence for reasonable minds to differ, and the jury defined 
2 the verdict which they did. 
3 However, except as to the area of attorneys fees: 
4 I asked Mr. Campbell the question, "If I arbitrarily set the 
5 attorneys fees, whether it would stand, would I have the 
6 authority?" He says, "No." 
7 I certainly question it. But I don't know how else 
8 to approach the situation. 
9 Mr. Campbell argues that there should be an 
10 apportionment, and his argument may be good. I'm not 
11 persuaded by it. If it were just the — there were two areas 
12 of attorneys fees, the mechanic's lien, if it were just for 
13 that area, for the foreclosure of the mechanic's lien, I 
14 would say, yes. 
15 But with the provision of the contract for 
16 attorneys fees, and by statute that becomes reciprocal, then 
17 I think the issues is raised relating very directly to that 
18 contract. 
19 And I may be wrong, and I may find out, and I 
20 certainly will be the first to acknowledge if I have made a 
21 mistake. 
22 But I'm not persuaded. But yet I'm looking for a 
23 way to adjust the attorneys fees. 
24 I just cannot allow attorneys fees of $52,000 to be 
25 awarded on a $10,000 claim. I cannot. And I will address 
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1 that right now, to Mr. Smith. 
2 I tried my best, my best to get Mr. Smith out of 
3 this case. I looked at it and I didn't find it in pretrial 
4 and before that they had — that anybody had any cause of 
5 action against Mr. Smith. Fine, if they did, but they left 
6 him in. 
7 And of course, the expenses ran up on it. And I'm 
8 still of the opinion that he had no business being in it. 
9 You know that, because I sustained his motion for a directed 
10 verdict as soon as it was made. 
11 But yet, I'm also of the opinion that the 
12 Mechanic's Lien Statute on the attorneys fees is not broad 
13 enough to cover the alleged water damage that was caused by 
14 your client as far as the property was concerned. 
15 And even if the statute is that broad, I cannot 
16 award attorneys fees of $13,000, in the neighborhood of 
17 $13,000, on a $426 claim. That's what I'm saying: I shook 
18 my head and asked, "Where's this case going? What are they 
19 doing? Why can't we get some reasonableness in these 
20 attorneys fees? They're just not reasonable." 
21 I don't know. I'm still thinking, and I guess I'm 
22 going to do something that I think is subject to being 
23 overruled. But I guess this case is going up. I wish I 
24 could do something to end it, make everybody happy, but I 
25 don't have those magic powers. 
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l| I am going to — I don't think — and the only 
2 basis I'm doing this on is that I don't think the attorneys 
3 fees which were testified to, or which were awarded by the 
4 jury, were reasonable attorneys fees. 
5 But the trouble is: I don't have a real basis, 
6 through evidence or otherwise, to base a measure of 
7 reasonableness on the attorneys fees. 
8 Therefore, I'm going to award attorneys fees in the 
9 amount — the same amount as the judgment which the jury 
10 awarded to First General against Zandra Perkins, which is 
11 $10,658. 
12 MR. BOSTWICK: Plus interest? 
13 THE COURT: I'm not allowing any interest on the 
14 principal judgment. 
15 Now, I'm also of the opinion that First General had 
16 the obligation of paying their subcontractors. They paid, 
17 the testimony was, all subcontractors but one. Why they saw 
18 fit not to pay this subcontractor, I don't know. At this 
19 time that's why I asked Mr. Smith this morning to refresh my 
20 memory, because that's the way I remembered it. 
21 I'm of the opinion that First General Services 
22 isn't responsible for the judgment taken by Frampton. I 
2 3 would deny, of course, additional attorneys fees, and I am 
24 also of the opinion — and this is what I remember at the 
25 time, when I signed that judgment, "Why isn't somebody 
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objecting to the amount of attorneys fees when they were 
being awarded to Mr. Smith for $4,000 on a $426 judgment?" 
Nobody objected. I signed the judgment. I don't 
even know now that I could set that aside. I don't think I 
can. I don't think it's reasonable. I'm not saying you 
didn't put that time in; it was just unreasonable. 
But Mr. Bostwick to make a motion, and you 
stipulated to it, and maybe there was a stipulation and then 
a motion was made, but as I reviewed the file this morning, 
to take this case from the Murray Circuit Court up here, it 
had nothing to do with this. It could have been adjudicated 
there. All it was there for was the question of whether the 
reasonable work was done by him in the installing of that 
cooler. But anyway, it came up here. The attorneys fees 
went boom, boom, boom, and that's why I say I should have — 
when I saw it, I should have stuck it back to the Murray 
Circuit Court. 
But I didn't review the file at that point, so I 
was not really aware of it. 
So as I say, I'm — I don't know how I can set 
aside those attorneys fees now, but I'm of that opinion. 
MR. BOSTWICK: Your Honor, as a clarification, are 
you indicating then that First General is responsible for the 
underlying judgment as well as the attorneys fees? 
THE COURT: Yes, but I'm saying the attorneys fees 
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1 are unreasonable. Again, I'm not inferring that you didn't 
2 do that work- I think it was forced on you, but I mustn't 
3 allow them to stand. 
4 Now, as far as the additional attorneys fees, I'm 
5 denying those additional attorneys fees on two grounds: I 
6 don't think they're reasonable, and the main basis there is 
7 that this went to the jury and Mr. Bostwick may be absolutely 
8 right; he said he was reserving it. I can't say if he did or 
9 didn't. I don't remember. 
10 If he says that's the case, I certainly am not 
11 doubting his word; but I think when it goes to the jury, he 
12 has an obligation to project what the attorneys fees are 
13 going to be and to allow that to be brought out before the 
14 jury, for the jury to consider an award, which it did not do, 
15 and therefore I think the issue is moot. 
16 MR. BOSTWICK: Your Honor, as a clarification 
17 again, that supplemental fees figure was including the post-
18 trial efforts as well, or — are you denying those? 
19 THE COURT: I am. 
20 MR. BOSTWICK: On the same basis, that we should 
21 have projected those? 
22 THE COURT: Yes. Now, the question of the 
2 3 apportionment of costs between First General and Bear 
24 River — 
25 MR. BOSTWICK: And Bear River and Perkins. 
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1 THE COURT: — sorry, Bear River and Perkins, I use 
2 the term "apportionment," and that's what Mr, Campbell 
3 argues, that there shouldn't be any, and Mr, Heath says if 
4 there's going to be any, they should be apportioned. 
5 I don't — I'm not of the opinion that Perkins 
6 completely prevailed in this case pursuant to the rule. I'm 
7 also of the opinion, and I absolutely know that a judgment 
8 was rendered against Bear River; therefore, I am going to 
9 order that the costs be apportioned in this matter as far as 
10 the judgment is concerned between Bear River and Perkins. 
11 And, of course, the Court has not been called upon 
12 to tax the costs completely; I think that maybe some have 
13 been filed, and I would have to review that. 
14 But if counsel cannot get together on that, I'm 
15 going to state the guidelines for you. 
16 MR. HEATH: Could you give us a guideline of a 
17 percentage? 
18 THE COURT: No, I don't think I can give you a 
19 percentage. I guess that what you argued, Mr. Heath, was 
20 that it would be apportioned as far as the two were concerned 
211 as to what part of it was for reasonable rental value of the 
22 home and what their claim was for the other. No, I just say 
231 arbitrarily — . 
241 MR. HEATH: Are you saying that we should then come 
25 back to court to apportion costs if we can't agree on it, on 
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1 a motion to tax costs? 
2 THE COURT: Yes, Let me state this: I'm looking 
3 probably at something about 25-75, or 40-60 as a percentage. 
4 I would also give you some direction; I will allow costs for 
5 . witness fees, for filing charges, for depositions taken of 
6 other parties' clients or experts, if they're absolutely 
7 necessary. 
8 I will not allow expert witness fees, I will not 
9 allow all the deposition fees of all the people taken. 
10 MR. HEATH: That could be an issue. Tell us again 
11 the deposition fees you will allow. Other parties? 
12 MR. CAMPBELL: The Court told you, and we can get 
13 the record. 
14 THE COURT: Let me state this: But you'll have the 
15 right to bring this before me if you want to, and I'll look 
16 at it then. But here's the way I generally look at these 
17 matters. And I'm not saying I would rule out any argument, 
18 and I'm not absolutely ruling now, but I would allow any 
19 filing fees. I would allow deposition costs for opposing 
20 parties or opposing parties' expert witnesses. I would not 
21 allow expert witness fees. 
22 I would not allow copying costs, things of that 
2 3 sort. Now, I say that's the general guideline which I more 
24 or less follow. If you bring it before me, I would have to 
25 take a look at it and make my decision on an individual case. 
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1 MR. BOSTWICK: Your Honor, one more clarification, 
2 with regard to First General's fees of $10,658, included in 
3 the costs for First General are costs according to these 
4 guidelines that — . 
5 THE COURT: No, the costs — now what did the jury 
6 do on costs on that? I guess they weren't asked, 
7 MR. CAMPBELL: They weren't asked. 
8 MR. BOSTWICK: They were included in the affidavit 
9 of $52,000 including the costs. 
10 THE COURT: I would award taxable costs to — . 
11 MR. BOSTWICK: According to these guidelines? 
12 THE COURT: Yes, to First General. 
13 MR. HEATH: I take it — . 
14 MR. CAMPBELL: Excuse me. 
15 MR. HEATH: I understand, then, the Court is 
16 denying Perkins' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
17 verdict? 
18 THE COURT: Yes, I'm denying the judgment 
19 notwithstanding the verdict or the motion for new trial on 
20 the grounds as stated, which are already in the record. 
21 MR. CAMPBELL: Except as to attorneys fees of First 
22 General, and what you find there is that the attorneys fees 
23 ought to be $10,000? 
24 THE COURT: Yes. 
25 MR. CAMPBELL: Whatever it is. 
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1 THE COURT: That's on the basis that they were just 
2 not reasonable attorneys fees in view of the amount claimed. 
3 MR. CAMPBELL: So the judgment is really remitted 
4 to that extent? 
5 THE COURT: It is. 
6 MR. CAMPBELL: I think the Court has the right, 
7 inherently has the right to remit a judgment. 
8 MR. HEATH: The only remaining thing, Your Honor — 
9 and I don't mean — was the Court going to make a statement? 
10 THE COURT: No. 
11 MR. HEATH: Would the Court direct one of us to 
12 prepare the judgment? 
13 THE COURT: That was my statement. Who is going to 
14 prepare it, the order of the hearing? And I'm talking about 
15 an order of the hearing here today. 
16 MR. HEATH: Your Honor, I'd be happy to do it, 
17 except I'm not — . 
18 MR. CAMPBELL: Let him do it. He has all the 
19 money. 
20 MR. HEATH: I think I would prefer, Your Honor, 
21 that Mr. Bostwick or Mr. Campbell do it. 
22 MR. CAMPBELL: I'll prepare a form of the judgment, 
23 Your Honor, as to the order denying the motion for judgment 
24 NOV, new trial, except as to attorneys fees for First 



























there a reason for a bifurcated judgment? 1 
THE COURT: I would rather have one order with 1 
everything included. J 
MR. CAMPBELL: I can do — we can get it around to 
counsel. 1 
THE COURT: Get it agreed to. Let's don't make 
another $5,000 in attorneys fees on this. 1 
MR. CAMPBELL: Right. 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 1 
(Whereupon, at the hour of 9:35 a.m., the 1 
proceedings came to a close.) 1 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




ZANDRA PERKINS, an 
individual, 
Defendant. 




BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Third-party defendant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PERKINS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT OR 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 900906000 
Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson 
District Judge 
Consolidated 
Defendant and third-party plaintiff Perkins, through her 
counsel of record Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Tracy H. Fowler, and 
Jon C. Martinson, of and for Campbell Maack & Sessions, pursuant 
to Rule 4-501 and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59, 
herewith submits her reply memorandum in response to both the 
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Answers of Bear River and First General in connection with 
Perkins1 motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) 
and alternatively for new trial, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The answering memoranda of First General and Bear River, 
in light of the clear weight of the evidence and the issues of law 
involved (which this Court plainly recognized at the close of 
trial), clearly mandate that JNOV or alternatively a new trial as 
to both First General and Bear River be granted to avoid what 
otherwise will be an extraordinary abuse and miscarriage of 
justice. 
As the Supreme Court of Utah has consistently stated, 
there is: 
broad discretionary power of the trial court 
in the granting or denying of new trials 
. • . This is necessarily so to allow the 
court an opportunity to cause re-examination 
or correction of jury verdicts or findings 
which it believes to be in error or where 
there is substantial doubt that they were 
fairly tried. 
Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 391 P.2d 290, 292 (Utah 1964). 
This Court heard the evidence for two weeks and 
recognized where the weight of the testimony lay. The material 
breach of contract by First General was manifest. The material 
breach of contract and, indeed, bad faith of Bear River, was 
manifest. The Court spoke with counsel, while the jury was out, 
about the time in which a bifurcated punitive damage hearing would 
be heard, assuming, arguendo, a verdict for Perkins. This Court 
01757 
has unquestioned authority to find that the jury verdict returned 
was against the weight of the evidence; such authority must be 
exercised to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. As stated 
in Holland v. Brown, 394 P.2d 77, 79 (Utah 1964), 
. . . the trial court is indeed endowed with 
a wide latitude of discretion in granting a 
new trial when he thinks the jury's verdict 
results in manifest injustice. This power is 
necessary to fulfill his function of 
maintaining general supervision over 
litigation to guard against miscarriages of 
justice which sometimes occur at the hands of 
juries. Allowing this broad discretion in 
the trial court to grant new trials does not 
deprive the parties of a fair trial by jury, 
but on the contrary, assures it. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The errors at law were few in number but enormous in 
impact. They were errors as to which Bear River and First General 
clearly led the Court. 
The first is, of course, the prejudicial evidence that 
Perkins had set fire to her earlier home on Hillsden Road. The 
pivotal aspect of that line of examination pursued by Bear River 
and concurred in by First General was that the moment the evidence 
was introduced, Bear River then announced to the Court and jury 
that such evidence had nothing to do with the way or time in which 
Bear River adjusted the Perkins fire and contents claim. How, 
then, the Court must query, was the evidence relevant in the first 
instance? The prejudice to Perkins from this "now it is relevant, 
now it is not", was massive and irreparable. No amount of 
argument, rationale or instruction could erase what Bear River and 
First General attempted to paint--the picture of a scheming 
3 
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unmarried woman who made a regular habit of burning houses and 
dealing with insurance companies, and then used the proceeds to 
build another house at which there were two other fires, first the 
shed and second, the subject home. First General, as with all of 
the other evidence, shared in the responsibility for and sponsored 
this incendiary evidence and then argued to the jury that it 
affected the credibility of Ms. Perkins' entire testimony, 
including that involving First General's performance of its 
contract. 
A judgment notwithstanding the verdict against First 
General and alternatively a motion for new trial is patently 
required as to First General. The breach of contract was 
unmistakable—it viewed its duty of contractual loyalty to be with 
Bear River, not with its contracting party, Perkins. It refused 
to put on a chimney, it refused to do painting, it refused to 
carry out ordinary and routine orders, it received two $10,000.00 
payments from Bear River over the objection of Perkins, and it did 
its bidding at the request of and for the benefit of the insurance 
company who recommended it to Perkins in the first place. 
The jury either misunderstood or ignored this 
uncontested testimony, or both. But the fact is that the brazen 
breach of contract by First General was the foreseeable result of 
almost all of the ensuing problems which this woman encountered in 
the fire loss. 
In any event, the testimony of First General on 
attorney's fees simply cannot stand—not one penny of it. The law 
4 
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of this State plainly requires that evidence as to the value of 
services which are not readily calculated by the lay public, must 
be supported by opinion testimony of experts* See Utah Rule of 
Evidence 702; Paul Mueller Co* v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 
P. 2d 1279, 1287-88 (Utah 1982). There was no expert testimony on 
attorney's fees submitted by First General. In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 
P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980), plaintiff's counsel took the stand [as did 
First General's counsel herein] and proceeded to testify without 
any supporting evidence or foundation of reasonableness. The 
Supreme Court rejected the evidence and reversed, stating: 
In the instant case, counsel for 
plaintiff took the stand and set forth the 
number of hours dedicated by himself and an 
associate to the case, the hourly rate 
charged by each ($90 for the attorney 
himself, $50 for his associate), together 
with a rough tally of expenses incurred 
during the action. On the basis of this 
calculation, the attorney asserted a fee of 
$10,628. The trial court, without making a 
finding of fact thereon, refused this figure, 
but awarded $8,500 in attorneys' fees. 
* * * 
Neither does the evidence reflect any 
attempt to characterize the requested award 
as reasonable. 
Id. at 1384. 
There clearly was not testimony of an expert on the 
reasonableness of attorney's fees to sue for the breach of a 
$10,000 agreement and the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. First 
General's claim of $52,523.20 (which First General since has 
sought to increase to $75,404.63) was specious and absurd--there 
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are no other words to candidly express the outrage. None of the 
First General's attorney's fees can stand. 
But there is a further flaw that undoes all of First 
General's claim for attorneyf s fees. It did not apportion, as 
absolutely mandated by Utah Supreme Court precedent, those 
attorney's fees incurred in connection with prosecuting the 
contract claim and lien foreclosure on the one hand, and defending 
against the counterclaim of Perkins for breach of contract, fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, and slander of title, on the other 
hand. Without that allocation, the application for attorney's 
fees is impertinent and unsupported, as a matter of law, and must 
be denied. 
As the Supreme Court unequivocally stated in Utah Farm 
Production Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981): 
It is crucial to note that there was no 
distinction drawn between fees associated 
with plaintiff's complaint on the debt owed 
and those associated with defendant's 
counterclaim. In the case of Stubbs v. 
Hemmert, this Court ruled that the plaintiff 
was not entitled to reimbursement for fees he 
had incurred in defending a counterclaim in a 
foreclosure action. A party is therefore 
entitled only to those fees resulting from 
its principal cause of action for which there 
is a contractual (or statutory) obligation 
for attorney's fees. 
Because plaintiff failed in its proof, the 
court was left without a means to determine 
the portion of plaintiff's fees spent in 
prosecuting its complaint and the portion 
spent in defending the counterclaim. Based 
upon the evidence presented, we are not 
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convinced that the trial court abused its 
discretion in ruling as it did. 
The case is hereby reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. No costs awarded. (Emphasis 
added.) 
After all is said, the result reached by the jury as to 
both First General and Bear River shocks the conscience of this 
Court. The verdict mocks justice and does a disservice to the 
many and careful rulings of the Court in sorting out the 
admissible from the inadmissible. The verdict is outrageous and 
can be explained only by the jury's passion and prejudice, along 
with a wholesale disregard of the evidence. The passion and 
prejudice were substantially premised upon the admissibility of 
evidence of the previous fire at the Hillsden home. 
Nothing must stand in the way of this Court's discretion 
and, indeed, mandate to set aside a verdict and enter judgment for 
Perkins against First General for breach of contract and against 
Bear River for breach of contract and bad faith breach of 
contract. Alternatively, the Court is empowered to and must grant 
a new trial. Were the Court to turn against the motions of 
Perkins, she will plainly lose all that she has, her house and her 
contents. Bankruptcy will be inevitable. That is not the sort of 
stuff that justice in this Country and State is all about. 
The Court, being the ultimate conscience of the 
community, must intervene by granting the judgments NOV and 




THE JURY WAS MANIFESTLY UNABLE TO REACH A 
FAIR VERDICT ONCE BEAR RIVER INJECTED 
INFORMATION "REGARDING PERKINS' FIRE HISTORYty 
INTO THE FOREFRONT OF THE TRIAL 
In its Memorandum in Opposition, Bear River itself--
inadvertently to be sure--gives the best evidence of the 
insurmountable obstacle to a fair trial Perkins faced when Bear 
River injected evidence of the Hillsden fire. In its own words, 
Bear River claims that it acted in good faith "in light of all the 
information they had regarding Perkins' fire history . . ." Id. 
at p. 6 (emphasis added). Clearly, in Bear River's view, this 
trial was not so much about breach of an insurance contract as it 
was a public parade of "Perkins' fire history." This is the 
precise danger which prompted Perkins' pre-trial attempts to 
exclude this evidence. The Court was misled by Bear River's 
assurances that the evidence would have only the benign, 
antiseptic effect of contradicting Perkins' claim of Bear River's 
bad faith conduct. As the trial starkly demonstrated, such 
limited, "surgical" use of patently prejudicial, inflammatory 
evidence was altogether impossible. 
Responding to Perkins' motion, Bear River utterly failed 
to address the patently absurd logic of its rationale for using 
evidence of the Hillsden fire: to introduce evidence of a fact 
that was irrelevant to Bear River's conduct in order to prove its 
irrelevance. Were this evidence otherwise harmless, Bear River's 
8 
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dance would merely have been a waste of time and resources. But 
that evidence was as wildly prejudicial and irredeemably damaging 
as any could possibly be: it was evidence that a homeowner who 
sued her insurance company for fire-related damages had previously 
set fire to another residence. This, and the arson investigator's 
(Capt. Keith Hall) eager testimony that the cause of the May 19, 
1990 fire was arson, ineluctably became center stage in the juryTs 
deliberation. To suggest that it did not occupy a central part of 
the jury's decision is to ignore human nature; what normal juror 
would not speculate in that direction after hearing such 
testimony? 
Bear River dismisses this landmine by commenting 
casually that "[t]he lack of prejudicial effect of the Hillsden 
evidence to Perkins is underscored by Perkins1 own admission that 
during trial Bear River never in fact used the evidence of the 
Hillsden fire to contradict Perkins1 claim of bad faith." Id., 
pp. 7-8. Of course, that is precisely the point. Without 
carefully circumscribed boundaries--which the trial demonstrated 
would have been impossible at any rate--the "peripheral" nature of 
"all the information [Bear River] had regarding Perkins* fire 
history" in fact subsumed the entire focus of the trial. A 
clearer example of evidence "dragged in by its heels for the sake 
of prejudicial effect" is difficult to imagine. State v. Bartley, 
784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
For its part, First General contends (at least in the 
portion of its argument it has standing to make—see footnote 1, 
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infra) that evidence of the Hillsden fire was relevant on the 
issue of Perkins' prior dealings with contractors. While evidence 
that Perkins had dealt with contractors in the past may have been 
relevant, the fact that the prior dealings arose from a fire First 
General wanted the jury to know that Perkins herself set has no 
relevance whatsoever. Noticeably absent from any pretrial motion 
practice was any offer by First General for a stipulation that 
Perkins had had prior dealings with contractors. If this in fact 
was First General's intent, why did it oppose, tooth and nail, 
Perkins' attempts to exclude evidence of the Hillsden fire (not 
merely the damage or the dealings with prior contractors)? The 
answer can only be that First General assumed--correctly--that 
evidence of the Hillsden fire would draw the jury's attention away 
from First General's fundamental breach. In fact it did.1 
II. 
THE JURY'S PREOCCUPATION WITH INADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE OBSCURED BOTH FIRST GENERAL'S AND 
BEAR RIVER'S FUNDAMENTAL BREACHES 
The jury's preoccupation with Perkins' fire history is 
the only rational, credible explanation for the jury's total 
disregard of compelling evidence of the breaches by Bear River and 
In its Memorandum in Response, First General Services 
devoted several pages to Bear River's alleged right to introduce 
evidence of the Hillsden fire. First General has absolutely no 
standing to make such arguments in Bear River's behalf. Perkins 
respectfully urges the Court, as it has in the past, to strike or 
at the least disregard these argument on which First General has 
no right or standing to be heard. 
10 
<:17G5 
First General detailed in Perkins1 earlier Memorandum in Support 
(see pp. 8-10 and 13-15 thereof). 
Moreover, First General's breach was itself fundamental, 
going to the very heart of its contract with Perkins• The essence 
of that contract was that First General restore Perkins' home to 
pre-fire condition within a reasonable amount of time and in a 
workmanlike manner. The overwhelming evidence at trial was that 
First General did not do this. First General's own witnesses 
conceded that several areas of Perkins' home hadn't been cleaned, 
repaired, replaced or finished. Having materially breached in the 
first instance, First General, as a matter of law, "cannot be 
heard to complain of a subsequent breach." Fisher v. Taylor, 572 
P.2d 393, 395 (Utah 1977) (footnote omitted). 
Bear River's breach was no less egregious. Although 
contractually and statutorily bound to adjust Perkins' loss timely 
and in good faith, Bear River used an exhausting combination of 
delay, intimidation, demand for repetitious documentation, 
arbitrary discounting of values, refusal to pay reputable 
contractors for work done and documented, holding settlement of 
one portion of the policy hostage to settlement of the other 
sections, and exploiting Perkins' economic and emotional 
vulnerability occasioned by the fire and aggravated by First 
General's breach. Perhaps most disturbing, despite its contract 
duty to indemnify Perkins against the kind of injury inflicted by 
First General, Bear River instead joined forces with First General 
against its insured, Zandra Perkins. 
11 
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While the overwhelming danger of this evidence may not 
have been entirely evident before trial, the jury's verdict has 
conclusively established its existence. The only appropriate 
remedy to this is to recognize its result and grant Perkins JNOV 
or a new trial. 
III. 
FIRST GENERAL HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN 
OF PROVING BOTH THE REASONABLENESS AND THE 
APPORTIONMENT OF ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The balance of First General's response is a futile 
attempt to prove (a) that it somehow is excused from the black-
letter requirement to present evidence on which the Court can 
allocate attorney's fees between those incurred in prosecution of 
its claims and those incurred in defense of Perkins counterclaims; 
and (b) that its evidence on the reasonableness of attorney's fees 
is sufficient. 
A. Apportionment 
As to point one, First General's principal arguments are 
that, because its prosecution of its claims and its defense of 
Perkins' counterclaims were "coterminous," it is excused from the 
requirement to apportion, and, anyway, it was just too hard to 
apportion. 
First General's "coterminous" theory entirely ignores 
the basis of the Utah cases unilaterally holding that only fees 
incurred in prosecution of a claim--not those incurred in defense 
of counterclaims--are recoverable. That basis is this: 
12 
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[a] party is therefore entitled only to those 
fees resulting from its principal cause of 
action for which there is a contractual (or 
statutory) obligation for attorney's fees, 
Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 
1981) (emphasis added). First General entitlement to attorney's 
fees arises from its contract (Access and Authorization card) or 
the mechanic's lien statute. Both these bases apply only to First 
General's prosecution of its breach of contract/mechanic's lien 
foreclosure claims. First General has idnetified no contractual 
or statutory basis on which it can claim entitlement to attorney's 
fees incurred in defending against Perkins' counterclaims. 
The very case First General musters to support its 
"coterminous" theory illustrates this crucial distinction 
perfectly. In Graco Fishing v. Ironwood Exploration, 766 P. 2d 
1074 (Utah 1988), both statutes under which the plaintiff claimed 
entitlement to attorney's fees contained express attorney's fees 
provisions. See, Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-3 (since repealed) and 
§ 38-1-18. Graco therefore merely holds that where two statutory 
bases exist for attorney's fees, and both statutory theories are 
"coterminous," an award of attorney's fees can be made under 
either or both statutes. It does not remove the burden of 
apportioning its attorney's fees to prosecution of its claims.2 
2
 Since neither the contract nor the mechanic's lien statute 
grants First General the right to collect attorney's fees for 
defense of counterclaims, the fact that First General has two 
alternative bases for attorney's fees adds nothing to its overall 
entitlement. 
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First General also complains that "the counterclaims of 
Perkins are intertwined with the foreclosure action of First 
General so as to be virtually inseparable." First General's 
Response, p. 30. First General's difficulty in distinguishing 
efforts spent on claims vs. efforts spent on counterclaims was no 
more difficult than Perkins' difficulty in separating efforts 
expended against First General and those against Bear River. Yet 
Perkins did just that by stipulation. First General's "hardship" 
complaint has no merit. 
Having disposed of First General's arguments, what 
remains is a total failure by First General to cite any Utah case 
that dispenses with the requirement of apportionment.3 
Accordingly, Perkins' argument that no fees are allowable in favor 
of First General is uncontravened. 
B. Reasonableness 
During testimony at trial, counsel for First General 
essentially offered his own non-expert opinion that the amount of 
fees incurred as of that point was "reasonable." First General 
subsequently has attempted, piece-meal, to address other factors 
in its successive affidavits. However, although the post-trial 
affidavits are proper to amend the amount of hours ultimately 
expended and the dollar amount finally incurred, it is improper 
3
 In neither of the other cases cited by First General, Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P. 2d 985 (Utah 1988) and Wallace v. 
Build, Inc., 402 P.2d 701 (Utah 1965) was the issue of 
apportionment raised or contested. Neither case, therefore, is 
authority on the proposition. 
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for First General to adduce by post-trial affidavit, for the first 
time, evidence to support its claim of attorney's fees. If First 
General were allowed to do so, any party could supplement an 
inadequate evidentiary showing at trial regarding attorney's fees 
with broader and broader affidavits; this would render any claim 
of insufficient evidence a meaningless technicality.4 First 
General failed at trial to adduce sufficient evidence; its 
supplemental affidavits are allowable only on the issue of total 
amount of hours and total amount of fees, 
SUMMARY 
Where, as here, "there is no reasonable basis in the 
evidence, or lack of it, to justify the verdict given," the Court 
is compelled to grant JNOV. Holland v. Brown, supra-, 394 P.2d at 
79. Accordingly, Perkins respectfully asks the Court to grant 
JNOV in favor of Perkins and against First General and Bear River 
and award damages as proved at trial5: 
First General Services Bear River Mutual 
Compensatory Compensatory 




 First General claims it "reserved the right" to supplement 
its trial testimony regarding attorney's fees with affidavits. 
That may be proper where such evidence was unavailable at trial. 
But where a party could have and should have--but did not—adduce 
evidence at trial, it is manifestly unfair to give it second and 
third bites at the apple. 
5
 These amounts are derived from Defendant's Exhibit 117 and 
Perkins' and Bear River's stipulation as to attorney's fees. 
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In the alternative, where a judge is "satisfied that the 
verdict that the verdict or decision in question is not in fact 
supported by the evidence, or that it is contrary to the weight of 
the evidence, he is not only authorized, but it is his bounden 
duty to grant the motion for new trial ." Brown v. Johnson, 472 
P. 2d 942, 944 (Utah 1970) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Perkins 
respectfully asks the Court alternatively to grant Perkins a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither First General nor Bear River has effectively 
contradicted the glaring fact that the jury rendered an aberrant, 
insupportable verdict fueled by passion and prejudice. Because of 
this, Perkins was deprived of her day in court. She can be 
recompensed only by this Court granting JNOV in her favor against 
First General and Bear River as to all issues, or in the 
alternative by granting her a new trial. 
DATED this Af**" day of August, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. C; 
of and for 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Zandra Perkins 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PERKINS1 MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. C900906000 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Zandra 
Perkins ("Perkins") by and through her counsel of record, Robert 
C1G17 
S. Campbell, Jr. and Jon C. Martinson, submits the following 
Memorandum in support of her Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, or in the alternative Motion for a New Trial. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case was tried to a jury on all claims. At the 
conclusion of trial, the jury rendered a special verdict which 
found Perkins had breached her contract with First General and 
which denied Perkins relief on all her counterclaims against 
First General and on all but one third-party claim against Bear 
River. This verdict is outrageous and shocking to the 
conscience. It can be explained only by an impermissible resort 
to passion and prejudice, and a wholesale disregard of the 
evidence. This passion and prejudice in turn were the result of 
an erroneous evidentiary ruling regarding a previous fire at 
Perkins1 Hillsden home. Bear River unfairly and detrimentally 
capitalized on this improper evidence and swung the jury's 
attention away from the real issues to conduct by Perkins that 
was entirely irrelevant to the matter before the jury. First 
General no less benefitted from the jury's morbid preoccupation 





Where it is clear that a jury verdict is outside the limits 
of what the evidence will support and cannot stand, the Court's 
alternative remedies are to grant a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and thereby bring the verdict within the evidence, or to 
grant the moving party a new trial. Bodon v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 
826, 829 (Utah 1958). In the instant case, the jury verdict 
cannot stand. Perkins therefore asks that judgment in her favor 
be granted notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, 
that a new trial be granted. 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE HILLSDEN FIRE 
As this case approached trial, it became evident that Bear 
River would attempt to escape its liability by turning the jury's 
attention away from Bear River's bad faith conduct to a fire that 
occurred in Perkins' Hillsden home in 1987. The rationale for the 
introduction of such evidence is clear: forcing the jury's focus 
on such improper evidence would detrimentally affect Perkins' 
credibility as a witness and would virtually compel the inference 
that Perkins herself was responsible for the May 19, 1990 fire. 
Accordingly, Perkins timely filed: (i) a motion in limine to 
exclude any evidence of the Hillsden fire; and (ii) a motion for 




In response, the Court ruled, in pertinent part, that 
evidence that the 1987 Hillsden fire had been intentionally set 
by Perkins would be admissible as a defense to Bear River to 
disprove Perkins1 claim of bad faith. This ruling depended, in 
substantial part, on Bear River's representation that the only 
purpose for which Bear River would introduce evidence of the 
Hillsden fire would be to show that Bear River did not act in bad 
faith. This ruling, Perkins respectfully submits, was in error, 
and this error was aggravated by Bear River's disingenuous 
failure to use the evidence in the manner in which it assured the 
Court it would. 
A. Evidence of the Hillsden Fire Was Irrelevant 
The threshold of admissibility of any piece of evidence 
is its relevance: "Evidence which is not relevant is 
inadmissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence in turn is 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 401. Bear River assured the Court that it would 
use evidence of the Hillsden fire only to contravene Perkinsf 
claim of bad faith failure to settle. 
The Court's ruling allowing Bear River to inject this highly 
prejudicial evidence was error for the plain reason that, even 
delimited as Bear River represented, the evidence did nothing to 
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make the existence of the fact Bear River claimed at issue--that 
it exercised good faith in adjusting Perkins' loss--any more or 
less probable. 
Bear River claimed that it had knowledge of the Hillsden 
fire during the time it adjusted the May 19, 1990 fire, yet, 
despite this knowledge, Bear River nevertheless proceeded fairly 
to adjust Perkins1 loss. This argument is circular and totally 
nonsensical: Bear River essentially says that the fact of the 
Hillsden fire was immaterial to its conduct, and, to prove this, 
it ought to be allowed to introduce irrelevant evidence. If 
knowledge of the prior fire in fact played no part in Bear 
River's adjustment of Perkins' subsequent claim, then such 
knowledge, for that very reason, is irrelevant. 
Bear River's rationale would allow every litigant in a case 
where the litigant's good faith is at issue to introduce any kind 
of damaging evidence against an opponent in order to show that 
such evidence played no part in the litigant's conduct. The 
absurdity of this proposition is obvious when one considers that 
Bear River, in essence, sought to introduce evidence of a fact 
that was irrelevant to their conduct in order to prove its 
irrelevance. This "logic" entirely eviscerates the protection of 
Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. For this 
5 
C162 1 
reason, Perkins respectfully submits that the Court's ruling on 
the relevance of the Hillsden fire was in error.1 
B. Bear River Never In Fact Used Evidence of the Hillsden 
Fire to Contradict Perkins' Claim of Bad Faith 
The Court relied heavily--if not exclusively--on Bear 
River's argument that evidence of the Hillsden fire was 
admissible to show absence of bad faith conduct by Bear River. 
For the reasons set forth above, the evidence had not probative 
value whatsoever on that issue. But even accepting Bear River's 
claim that the evidence was relevant to the issue of bad faith, 
Bear River never in fact tied the evidence to its good faith 
defense. Instead, Bear River elicited the damaging, prejudicial 
testimony from Ms. Perkins only to let it sit before the jury 
without explanation or limitation of any kind. Lacking any clear 
guidance as to the proper application or use of this incendiary 
evidence, the jury used it to support highly unfair and fatally 
prejudicial inferences concerning Ms. Perkins' credibility; more 
damaging still, Bear River's disingenuous injection of the 
1
 The irrelevance of this evidence is underscored by the 
fact that Bear River's claims adjustor testified both in 
deposition and at trial that the fact that Ms. Perkins had been 
involved in the Hillsden fire played no part in his adjustment of 
the loss claim. 
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evidence into the trial virtually compelled the jury to infer 
that Ms. Perkins herself started the May 19, 1990 fire.2 
What transpired at trial is precisely what Perkins feared, 
predicted and counselled the Court against: the use of 
irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence to obscure the clear 
liability of Bear River and First General Services. 
It is exceedingly difficult to imagine evidence more 
unfairly prejudicial to a claim against an insurer under a 
homeowner's policy than evidence that the insured previously had 
intentionally set her own home on fire. The undeniable inference 
the jury confronts is that something similar happened in the 
subsequent fire. In this case the Court properly ruled that 
there was absolutely no evidence that Perkins had anything to do 
with the May 19, 1990 fire. But the protection of this ruling 
was emasculated by Bear River's introduction of evidence of the 
Hillsden fire without adequate explanation of what precisely the 
evidence should go to prove. 
Predictably, the jury used this evidence to draw any of a 
host of unwarranted, insupportable, inflammatory conclusions: 
that Ms. Perkins herself had set the May 19, 1990 fire (but no 
2
 Bear River thus was able to circumvent the Court's ruling 
that no evidence or testimony regarding Ms. Perkins1 involvement 




one could prove it); that Ms, Perkins had someone else set the 
fire for her (but no one could prove it); that Ms. Perkins was 
lying about the cause of the May 19, 1990 fire and therefore 
could not be trusted on any other issue; that Ms. Perkins was an 
arsonist and therefore lacking any credibility whatsoever; that 
Ms. Perkins1 sister, Marsha Smith, was part of a conspiracy with 
Ms. Perkins and both therefore lacked credibility. 
When prejudicial evidence of this magnitude is allowed in 
without any limitation or control, the jury is left to speculate, 
conjecture and opine in an unchecked and improper manner. The 
combination of extremely volatile and suggestive evidence and 
unfettered speculation ineluctably results--as it did in this 
case--in a party being deprived of the right to a fair trial. 
Preoccupation with the Hillsden fire forced the jury to 
disregard clear and compelling testimony that Bear River breached 
its obligations in bad faith in the following ways: 
a. Bear River paid $20,000 in Perkins1 behalf without her 
knowledge or authorization for work that First General 
acknowledged had not been done. 
b. Despite exhaustive, on-going documentation by Perkins, 
Bear River disputed virtually every bit of information it 
received and demanded that Perkins provide the same 
information time and again. 
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c. In almost every case, Bear River's adjustor, Dick Dio, 
arbitrarily and without reasonable explanation discounted 
Perkins' replacement costs by 50%. 
d. Dick Dio removed personal property from Perkins' 
residence and later disputed its very existence when Perkins 
asked for reimbursement* 
e. When Bear River was forced to admit that Perkins' 
description and estimate of the value of her personal 
property was accurate, Bear River nevertheless refused to 
pay her that amount, insisting rather that Perkins settle 
all her claims at that time. 
f. Bear River failed and refused to adjust the loss within 
a reasonable time; over 120 days after the fire, Bear River 
had paid only $500 to Perkins, $20,000 to First General, and 
approximately $5,000 to another subcontractor. 
g. Bear River arbitrarily and without justification refused 
reasonable reimbursement to contractors and subcontractors 
Perkins was forced to bring on after First General breached; 
in this regard, Don White, Bear River's claims manager told 
Perkins that the best way for her to get her claim settled 
was to put First General Services back on the job. 
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h. Despite its obligation to defend and indemnify Perkins, 
Bear River instead squared off with First General and 
against Perkins in First General's baseless suit. 
i. Bear River exploited Perkins' economic and emotional 
vulnerability occasioned by the fire by refusing in bad 
faith to settle the claim and by assisting First General in 
the prosecution of its claims against Perkins. 
The only rational explanation for the jury's wholesale 
disregard of this, and other, compelling evidence is that they 
were blinded by the smoke and mirrors Bear River erected when it 
intentionally led the jury to believe that Perkins was an 
arsonist, and an individual lacking any credibility at all. 
C. The Court Erred in Applying the Balancing Test Required 
By Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows the trial 
court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence if there is a danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the 
jury. These considerations require the trial court to undertake 
a balancing test. "The balancing test of rule 403 thus excludes 
'matter [sic] of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in 
by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.'" State v. 
Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation 
omitted). A better description than this of evidence of the 
Hillsden fire would be difficult to imagine. 
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The probative value of evidence of the Hillsden fire was, as 
shown above, zero. Balanced against this was the danger of 
enormous, incurable prejudice. The Utah Courts have held that 
evidence must be excluded if it "'appeals to the juryTs 
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to 
punish' or otherwise '. . . cause[s] a jury to base its decision 
on something other than the established propositions in the 
case.'" :id., quoting State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 
1989). The only rational explanation of the jury's aberrant, 
bizarre and unjustifiable verdict in this case was the incendiary 
evidence of the Hillsden fire, "dragged in by its heels for the 
sake of its prejudicial effect." Where improper evidence is 
admitted "and there is a reasonable likelihood that in the 
absence of such error a different result would have eventuated, 
the error should be regarded as prejudicial and relief should be 
granted." Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital, 318 
P. 2d 330, 333 (Utah 1957). 
The admission of this inadmissible evidence was reversible 
error that can be remedied only by granting judgment 




REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER AS TO THE FACT THAT FIRST 
GENERAL MATERIALLY BREACHED ITS CONTRACT WITH PERKINS AND AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THIS BREACH EXCUSED ANY FURTHER PERFORMANCE OR 
SUBSEQUENT BREACH BY PERKINS. 
The prejudicial effect of Bear River's injection of the 
Hillsden fire into the case unfairly benefitted First General no 
less than Bear River, Indeed no other explanation can account 
for the jury's total disregard of the evidence against First 
General. 
Under the Special Verdict, the jury found that Perkins 
breached her contract with First General by either improperly 
dismissing First General from the job on July 30, 1990, or by 
failing to pay First General the reasonable value of the cleaning 
and restoration services it performed. (See Special Verdict of 
the Jury, attached hereto as Exhibit A.) Neither of these bases 
is supported by substantial evidence; rather, judgment must be 
rendered in Perkins' favor on both counts as a matter of law. 
Perkins' dismissal of First General was a breach only if 
First General had not materially breached its obligations with 
Perkins. It is settled law in Utah--and in virtually every 
jurisdiction in this country--that a material breach on the part 
of one party to a contract excuses performance by the non-
breaching party. Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 150 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons v. Magna Water, 613 
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P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980); Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 
P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). 
There was uncontroverted evidence that in fact First General 
did materially breach in the following particulars: 
a. First General did not begin any restoration work until 
at least two weeks after the fire. 
b. First General consistently argued with Perkins about the 
nature and quality of fixtures and furnishings in her home 
before the fire. 
c. First General refused to re-install a swamp cooler where 
it had been located before the fire--on the roof--and 
instead argued that it should be installed in the attic. 
only after talking to a neighbor did First General agree to 
follow Perkins' instructions as to the proper installation. 
d. First General refused to re-install a chimney that led 
from a functioning fireplace to the roof, but rather 
installed shingles over the existing chimney location; 
uncontroverted testimony established this as a safety hazard 
and a code violation. Only after talking to a neighbor did 
First General agree to follow Perkins' instructions and re-
install the chimney. 
13 
C1629 
e. First General refused to re-install ridge vents; only 
after talking to a neighbor did First General agree to 
follow Perkins' instructions and re-install the vents. 
f. By July 31, 1990, First General had failed even to 
clean--let alone restore--several areas of the Perkins home, 
yet by this point First General had represented to Bear 
River that the work was essentially completed by invoicing 
Bear River for the full bid amount. 
g. Although as of July 31, 1990, First General had 
represented that it had essentially done all it had 
contracted to do, the following work had not in fact been 
done: (i) charred and burnt wires remained behind sheetrock 
in the kitchen, upper bathroom and attic areas; (ii) water-
soaked insulation was left behind sheetrock in the living 
room; many areas of the house still smelled strongly of 
smoke due to First General's failure to apply KILZ to the 
affected areas; (iv) water-soaked and smoke-permeated 
sheetrock had not been replaced; (v) sheetrock that was 
replaced was installed and finished in a substandard manner; 
(vi) a post supporting the carport had been improperly set; 
(vii) the living room ceiling was finished in a substandard 
manner and had to be refinished; (viii) a brace supporting 
the patio roof had been improperly installed and had to be 
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reinforced to prevent the patio roof from caving in; (ix) 
areas in tt le sub-basement had not even beei 1 cleaned and were 
essentially untouched. 
i\s late as September, 199( • * * General was still 
i i«((| in iii,i i R j vi»r ( i •» i - nao not been done, or 
that had been inadequately done. 
This compell :I ng evidence establishes that reasonable minds could 
no t: d i sagi: ee as I:• D t: 1 1 e f a c I: t: 1 :ia t: F :i i: s I: < *^  - d i d bi: each i t s 
contractual obi i gations to Perkins, 
In determining what constitutes a "material" breach, the 
U tal i Supreme Coi n t: 1 las 1 leJ d 1:1: la I: 
certainly a failure of performance which "defeats the 
very object of the contract" or "is of such prime 
importance that the contract would not have been made 
if default: ii I that particular had been contemplated" is 
a materia] breach. 
Polyglycoat, supra , 591 P. 2d. at 451 (footnote omitted), The 
esseiu-t' (if rr-r bins' r.nnt r .ii :t with First General was that First 
General restore Perkins" home to pre-fire condition within a 
reasonable amount of tl me and :i i I a workmanlike manner, 
TTIP (iv*% i win * I in 11 lg e \ ? :i d e i ice.,, detad ] ed abo v e is that First 
General fs laundry list of breaches materially defeated the very 
purpose of Perkd ns' agreement with First General. Accordingly, 
a s e a i: -1 y a s J \ 11 • ::: o i I c I i I d i n g 
that First Generalf s non-performance mean t that the agreement was 
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at an end and she consequently was excused from further 
performance. Moreover, it is critical to note that, as of this 
time, Perkins herself, through Bear River, had already 
substantially performed by paying First General $20,000.00 on the 
contract. For these reasons, there is insufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict that Perkins breached the contract 
either by dismissing First General, or by failing to pay First 
General an additional $10,658.47. To the contrary: the great 
weight of evidence shows that First General in fact materially 
breached its obligations to Perkins. 
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that there was 
substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict that Perkins 
breached her contract with First General, any such breach 
occurred well after First General's initial, material breach. It 
is equally well-settled in Utah that a party who is guilty of the 
first material breach "cannot be heard to complain of a 
subsequent breach." Fisher v. Taylor, 572 P.2d 393, 395 (Utah 
1977) (footnote omitted). Having so materially breached through 
its non-performance, First General cannot, as a matter of law, 
complain of any breach by Perkins. 
For these reasons, as a matter of law, First General's prior 
material breach excused either Perkins' further performance, or 
any subsequent breach by Perkins. Accordingly, the jury's 
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verdict of breach contract by Perkins cannot stand and 
i'.-^j.-;- in liivnr M I Vt • i k i iv1-; and against Final 
General. 
I X I . 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW AS TO THE 
REASONABLENESS OF FIRST GENERAL fS A T T O R N E Y S FEES 
Apart from the considerate ons raised above First Gener a 1 : s 
claim of attorney's fees cannot stand as a matter of law. I t is 
hoi: nbook " ' ' - oar ty seeking attorney fees "must support its 
claim i i i the tr i a.l court wi th evidence O-F their amount and 
reasonableness Commerce Financial v. Markwest Corp., u!» _o 
• • < \ * - ' * - ' • • 
Supreme Coui * a.-i - held thcit wheir ' :.*- - ^ienoc . s • ' :.uit;.:iuni 
to support a fi ndi ng that the attorney fees were reasonable, the 
awai • :i • TI.H ist be i : eversed ' ' Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, ) 
; M 266, 269 (I I tah 1 ,Jl-
Although counsel iui r±.: General did test! fy as to his 
i nvolvement i n thi <? nase. HI O ti »i>I i IIK >ny did i x vt pi: ov :i de 
sufficient evidence ,fs : .?e reasonableness of the fees being 
requested. The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar situation 
i n Kerr v. Kerr, dlfi I1 <!<] Mill) MM: :: 
In the instant case, counsel for p] a intiff took 
the stand and set forth the number of hours dedicated 
by himself and an associate to the case, the hourly 
rate charged by each . . . together with a rough tally 
of expenses incurred during the action. 
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* * * 
[T]he evidence [does not] reflect any attempt to 
characterize the requested award as reasonable. 
Testimony regarding the necessity of the number of 
hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged 
in light of the difficulty of the case and the result 
accomplished, and the rates commonly charged for 
[similar] actions in the community, is conspicuously 
absent. 
Id. at 1384. In the case of First General, as in Kerr, testimony 
by counsel for First General was insufficient to establish the 
factors which must be considered before a finding of 
reasonableness can be upheld. See also, Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 
supra, 830 P. 2d at 269 (the factors that must be considered 
include, in addition to those mentioned by the Kerr court, "the 
expertise and experience of the attorneys involved"). First 
General's conclusory statements that its fees were "reasonable" 
are insufficient as a matter of law. In Kerr, these factors were 
not satisfactorily addressed by the trial court and the Supreme 
Court consequently found the evidence insufficient to support an 
award of attorney's fees. This Court for the same reason must 
hold the same.3 
The Court in Kerr also offered "some observations about 
the method of proof of the value of attorneys' services." Id., 
610 P.2d at 1385. These observations included the fact that the 
value of an attorney's services often must include: 
his background of learning and experience, his ability, 
his integrity and his dedication to the causes with 
which he identifies himself. Also to be considered is 
18 
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More critical still is First Generalfs absolute failure to 
d.i s t i nfjui. :.'h '• \\'< p< u t inr '..it I he at torney'ft f e e s ir.miv rfui in 
prosecution of its claim from the portion incurred in defense of 
Perkins1 four counterclaims, Under settled Utah law, a plaintiff 
in a 1 oi eelusuic iiri IIIII may nut n/p ses i i ICUI i: ed i n 
defending a counterclaim to the foreclosure action. Stubbs v. 
Hemmert, 567 P.^d 168 (Utah 1977). As the Utah Supreme Court has 
held: 
[a] party is therefore entitled only to those fees 
resulting from its principal cause of action for which 
there is a contractual (or statutory) obligation for 
attorneyf s fees. 
Utah Farm Production Ci edit Assf n v. QUA, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 
1981) (emphasis added). 
In 1:1 le present case, First General " 3 onl y clai m to 
at" t o r i'u»y f s f o o s rler i v e s I re HIII t hi» " A c c e s s ai id A\ I thoi i za !:::I en I" card 
which contains a provision for attorney's fees. Accordingly, 
First General can claim attorney's fees only as to its efforts to 
foreclose mi it / 111 * * < " 11 * i 11 i i'' i lien I t: 1 i a s i I c e n t i 1: ] e in e i I 1: a s a 
the reputation he has acquired, the nature and 
importance of the matter, and the amount of money or 
value of property involved, 
With the exception oi his experience at jur y trials and the 
amount of money involved, counsel for First General offered no 
evidence on any of these factors. In contrast, counsel for 
Perkins addressed virtually all of them during testimony in 




matter of law, to any fees expended in defense of Perkins' four 
counterclaims• 
In Cox, because "the plaintiff failed in its proof, the 
court was left without a means to determine the portion of 
plaintiff's fees spent in prosecuting its complaint and the 
portion spent in defending the counterclaim." Cox, 627 P.2d at 
66 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the trial court properly 
ruled that each party must pay its own attorneyT s fees. The Utah 
Supreme Court upheld the ruling. ^d. As a matter of law, 
therefore, because First General likewise has failed in its proof 
regarding the portion of fees spent in prosecuting its case, no 
attorneyf s fees can be awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
The injection of irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence 
concerning the Hillsden fire neutralized the Court's best efforts 
to insure all parties had a fair trial. Rather, the evidence-
particularly as introduced by Bear River--unavoidably and 
predictably induced the jury to ignore the clear weight of the 
evidence in Perkins' favor on her claims against both Bear River 
and First General. Perkins was deprived of her day in court and 
can be recompensed only by the granting of judgment 
20 
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notwithstanding the verdict in her favor as to all issues, or in 
the a ] tei: i la t:i v e by gi: ai it a i ig 1 lei a i lew !::i: i a l . 
DATED this (fc^day of July, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CAMIM.IKU, MAAl'K It- SESSIONS 
\Y CAMPBELL, JR. 
ION d. MARTINSON 
Attorneys for Zandra Perkins 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by 
the law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, 
Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PERKINS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL was hand-delivered to the following this tig ^  day of 
July, 1993. 
Henry E. Heath, Esq. 
H. Burt Ringwood, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. 
Waistad & Babcock 
254 West 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and served upon: 
David K. Smith, Esq. 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
by mailing a true and correct copy thereof by first-class mail, 
postage prepaid, on the day of July, 1993. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR MAI.T LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 











Third-party plaintiff, : 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE : 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Of I'M I'1"!!! . M . 1 H K 
00906000 




We the Jury, duly impaneled, in the above-entitled action 
1 inil t hi'-" issues of fact and return our special verdict as follows: 
I. CLAIMS OF FIRST GENERAL SERVICES AGAINST PERKINS 
AND CLAIMS OF PERKINS AGAINST FIRST GENERAL SERVICES 
First General services* 
1. Did Perkins breach her contract with First 
General Services by terminating its work on 
July 30, 1990 or by failing to pay the 
reasonable value of cleaning and restoration 
services performed by First General Services 





2. Has Perkins been unjustly enriched, as 
defined in the Courts Instructions, by 
restoration and cleaning services performed 
by First General Services on the Perkins 
residence? 
Mx*x>cjtJK * J~ 6 
Yes 
No 2t 
If vour answer to Question 1 or 2 was ves, then you should proceed 
to answer Questions 3 and 4. If your answer to Question 1 and 2 
was no, then you should proceed to answer Question 5. 
3. What is the reasonable value of the 
restoration and cleaning services actually 
performed by First General Services at the 
Perkins residence for which it has not been 
paid by Perkins? 
KXXXXXXX $0 $ jfi tfS. ££ 
4. What is the reasonable value of attorneys1 
fees and costs to be paid to First General 
Services as a result of its filing of and 
foreclosure on its mechanic*s lien on the 
Perkins home? 
*x*vxx*x f*~e $ £2?.j>3,*£ 
Perkins9 Claims: 
Did First General Services breach its con-
tract with Perkins, as defined in the Court's 
Instructions, by failing to provide a 
performance bond, by performing work in a 
substandard, dangerous, or deficient manner, 
or by failing to complete the work by July 1, 
1990? 
* Yes 
X y<*X * * X No JC 
If vour answer to Question 5 is yes, then vou should proceed to 
answer Questions 6. 7 and 8. If your answer to Question 5 is no. 
then vou should proceed to answer Question 8. 
2 
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6. What is the amount of damages Perkins has 
sustained as a result of First General 
Services1 breach of its contract with 
Perkins? 
What is the reasonable value of attorneys' 
fees and costs to be paid to Perkins as a 
result of First General Services1 breach of 
contract? 
Did First General Services commit negligent 
misrepresentation against Perkins, as defined 
in the Courtfs Instructions, by misrepre-
senting that it had a performance bond or 
that if Perkins signed the "Access and 
Authorization" card First General Services 
would commence removal of debris only until 




 No • 
If your answer to Question 8 is yes, then you should proceed to 
answer Questions 9 and 10. If your answer to Question 8 is no. 
then you should proceed to answer Question 10, 
9. What are the damages Perkins has sustained as 
a result of First General Services1 negligent 
misrepresentation? 
10. Did First General Services commit fraud 
against Perkins as defined in the Court's 
Instructions, by misrepresenting that it had 
a performance bond ? 
Yes 
^ — C No X 
3 
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if your answer to Question 10 is yes, then vou should proceed to 
answer Questions 11, 12 and 13 . If vour answer to Question 10 is 
no, then vou should proceed to answer Question 13« 
11. What are the damages Perkins has sustained as 
a result of First General Services1 fraud? 
12. Should First General Services pay punitive 
damages to Perkins as a result of its fraud? 
Yes 
No 
13. Did First General commit slander of title 




 N o ^ 
If your answer to Question 13 is ves, then you should proceed to 
answer Questions 14 and 15. If vour answer to Question 13 is no. 
then you should proceed to Section II hereof. 
14. What are the consequential damages Perkins 
has sustained as a result of First General 
Services1 slander of title against Perkins? 
15. Should First General Services pay punitive 




II. CLAIMS BY PERKINS AGAINST BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
1. Did Bear River Mutual breach its express or 
implied covenants or obligations under the 
insurance contract with Perkins, as defined 
in the Courtfs Instructions? ^ 
^ Yes 
C1G42 
If your answer to Question 1 was ves, then you should proceed to 
answer Questions 2 and 3, If vour answer to Question 1 was no. 
then vou should proceed to answer Question 5. 
2. What is the amount of damages Perkins has 
sustained as a result of Bear River Mutual1s 
breach of its insurance contract with 
Perkins? 
3. Did Bear River act in bad faith in breaching 
its express or implied covenants or obliga-




If vour answer to Question 3 was yes, then you should proceed to 
answer Question 4, If your answer to Question 3 was no, then you 
should proceed to answer Question 5. 
4. What is the amount of consequential damages 
Perkins has sustained by Bear River Mutual1s 
bad faith breach of its insurance contract 
with Perkins? 
5. Did Bear River Mutual overpay to or in behalf 
of Perkins monies in this case under its 
policy? 
Yes 
^ - a *°^L 
CJG43 
If either Questions 1 or 3 have been answered ves, then you shall 
proceed to answer Question 6 as to Bear Rivey. If vou have 
answered Questions 1 and 3 no, then you shall not proceed to 
answer Question 6, but will proceed to Question 7. 
6. Did Bear River Mutual promise to indemnify 
Perkins for losses associated with the May 
19, 1990 house fire, including expenses 
incurred in defending against First General 
Services1 claims and for expenses incurred in 
restoring her home to pre-fire condition? 
Yes 
No 
If vour answer to Question 6 was yes, then you should proceed to 
answer Question 7. If vour answer to Question 6 was no, then you 
should proceed no further, sign vour Special Verdict as instructed 
and notify the Bailiff that vou are ready to return to open court, 
7. What are the damages Perkins has sustained 
from the May 19, 1990 house fire for which 
Bear River Mutual is obligated to reimburse 
Perkins? 
K teo 
DATED this SO day of April, 1993. 
\*U *% JLC***./ 
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S ' u l L A A E COUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




ZANDRA PERKINS, an 
individual, 
Defendant. 




BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Third-party defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
OP THE JURY 
Civil No. 900906000 
Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson 
District Judge 
Consolidated 
We the Jury, duly impaneled, in the above-entitled action 
find the issues of fact and return our special verdict as follows: 
I. CLAIMS OF FIRST GENERAL SERVICE8 AGAINST PERKINS 
AND CLAIMS OF PERKINS AGAINST FIRST GENERAL SERVICES 
First General Services' Claims: 
1. Did Perkins breach her contract with First 
General Services by terminating its work on 
July 30, 1990 or by failing to pay the 
reasonable value of cleaning and restoration 
services performed by First General Services 




2. Has Perkins been unjustly enriched, as 
defined in the Court's Instructions, by 
restoration and cleaning services performed 




If your answer to Question 1 or 2 was yes, then you should proceed 
to answer Questions 3 and 4. If your answer to Question 1 and 2 
was no, then you should proceed to answer Question 5. 
3. What is the reasonable value of the 
restoration and cleaning services actually 
performed by First General Services at the 
Perkins residence for which it has not been 
paid by Perkins? 
w^ 
4. What is the reasonable value of attorneys1 
fees and costs to be paid to First General 
Services as a result of its filing of and 




5, Did First General Services breach its con-
tract with Perkins, as defined in the Court's 
Instructions, by failing to provide a 
performance bond, by performing work in a 
substandard, dangerous, or deficient manner, 




If your answer to Question 5 is yes, then you should proceed to 
answer Questions 6, 7 and 8, If your answer to Question 5 is no, 
then you should proceed to answer Question 8. 
01400 
6. What is the amount of damages Perkins has 
sustained as a result of First General 
Services' breach of its contract with 
Perkins? 
What is the reasonable value of attorneys1 
fees and costs to be paid to Perkins as a 
result of First General Services1 breach of 
contract? 
8. Did First General Services commit negligent 
misrepresentation against Perkins, as defined 
in the Court's Instructions, by misrepre-
senting that it had a performance bond or 
that if Perkins signed the "Access and 
Authorization" card First General Services 
would commence removal of debris only until 




If your answer to Question 8 is yes, then you should proceed to 
answer Questions 9 and 10. If your answer to Question 8 is no, 
then you should proceed to answer Question 10. 
9. What are the damages Perkins has sustained as 
a result of First General Services' negligent 
misrepresentation? 
10. Did First General Services commit fraud 
against Perkins as defined in the Court's 
Instructions, by misrepresenting that it had 




If your answer to Question 10 is yes, then you should proceed to 
answer Questions 11, 12 and 13 . If your answer to Question 10 is 
no, then you should proceed to answer Question 13. 
11. What are the damages Perkins has sustained as 
a result of First General Services' fraud? 
12. Should First General Services pay punitive 
damages to Perkins as a result of its fraud? 
Yes 
No 
13. Did First General commit slander of title 




If your answer to Question 13 is yes, then you should proceed to 
answer Questions 14 and 15. If your answer to Question 13 is no, 
then you should proceed to Section II hereof. 
14. What are the consequential damages Perkins 
has sustained as a result of First General 
Services' slander of title against Perkins? 
15. Should First General Services pay punitive 




II. CLAIMS BY PERKINS AGAINST BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
1. Did Bear River Mutual breach its express or 
implied covenants or obligations under the 
insurance contract with Perkins, as defined 




If your answer to Question 1 was yes, then you should proceed to 
answer Questions 2 and 3. If your answer to Question 1 was no, 
then you should proceed to answer Question 5. 
2. What is the amount of damages Perkins has 
sustained as a result of Bear River Mutualfs 
breach of its insurance contract with 
Perkins? 
Did Bear River act in bad faith in breaching 
its express or implied covenants or obliga-




If your answer to Question 3 was yes, then you should proceed to 
answer Question 4, If your answer to Question 3 was no, then you 
should proceed to answer Question 5. 
4, What is the amount of consequential damages 
Perkins has sustained by Bear River Mutualfs 
bad faith breach of its insurance contract 
with Perkins? 
5. Did Bear River Mutual overpay to or in behalf 





If either Questions 1 or 3 have been answered yes, then vou shall 
proceed to answer Question 6 as to Bear River. If you have 
answered Questions 1 and 3 no. then you shall not proceed to 
answer Question 6. but will proceed to Question 7. 
6. Did Bear River Mutual promise to indemnify 
Perkins for losses associated with the May 
19, 1990 house fire, including expenses 
incurred in defending against First General 
Services1 claims and for expenses incurred in 
restoring her home to pre-fire condition? 
Yes 
No 
If your answer to Question 6 was yes, then vou should proceed to 
answer Question 7. If your answer to Question 6 was no. then you 
should proceed no further, sign your Special Verdict as instructed 
and notify the Bailiff that you are ready to return to open court. 
7. What are the damages Perkins has sustained 
from the May 19, 1990 house fire for which 
Bear River Mutual is obligated to reimburse 
Perkins? 
$ <sik&£ 
DATED this ''j{? day of April, 1993. 
X^ ^ /f C 
FOREPERSON OF THE JURY 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
MICHAEL T. ROBERTS (5538) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
2 01 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Zandra Perkins 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
AMENDED ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM 
AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
(JURY DEMAND) 
qoo^oQ ooo 
Civil No. C9006000 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
ANSWER 
Defendant Zandra Perkins ("Perkins"), an individual, answers 
plaintiffs Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
By way of answering the number paragraphs of plaintiff's 
Complaint, this answering defendant admits and denies as follows: 
r v. •J j i 2 
1. This defendant admits the allegations contained in para-
graphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 10 of plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. This defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29 
and 31 of plaintiff's Complaint. 
3. This defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient 
to form a belief as to the truth of the averments contained in 
paragraphs 2, 11, 24, 25, 26 and 30 of plaintiff's Complaint and 
therefore denies the same. 
4. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 7 
of plaintiff's Complaint, this defendant admits that on or about 
May 21, 1990, plaintiff and Perkins entered into a contract under 
which plaintiff agreed to perform certain obligations, including 
but not limited to the cleaning, remodeling and renovation work to 
repair and restore the Perkins' property to its pre-fire condition 
by July 1, 1990. 
5. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 9 
of plaintiff's Complaint, this defendant admits that she had an 
insurance policy with Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, and this 
defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a 
belief as to each and every other averment contained in paragraph 
9 of plaintiff's Complaint and therefore denies the same. 
6. This answering defendant specifically denies each and 
every allegation contained in plaintiff's Complaint that has not 
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Pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
this defendant asserts the following affirmative defenses and 
reserves the rights to assert additional affirmative defenses as 
established through discovery or further investigation. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims against defendant are barred for lack or 
failure of consideration. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims against defendant are barred for fraud 
and/or negligent misrepresentation. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendant has made payments in full for the fair and reason-
able value of plaintiff's services. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendant's claims against plaintiff far exceed plaintiff's 
claims against defendant; therefore, defendant is entitled to an 
offset in an amount to be determined at trial. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Defendant Zandra Perkins requests that the Court grant relief 
as follows: 
1. That the Court grant judgment in favor of this defendant 
and against plaintiff for no cause of action. 
2. That the Court grant judgment in favor of this defendant 




and such other and additional relief as the Court shall deem just, 
necessary or appropriate in accordance with Rule 54(c), Utah 
R.Civ.P. 
COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13 and 14, defendant 
Perkins counterclaims and alleges against plaintiff First General, 
a Utah corporation ("First General"), and alleges against third-
party defendant Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, a Utah 
corporation ("Bear River Mutual") as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Perkins is a resident of Salt Lake County, and owns 
certain real and personal property located at 5510 South 64 0 West, 
Murray, Utah. 
2. First General is a Utah corporation whose principal place 
of business was or is in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
3. Bear River Mutual is a Utah corporation which has 
substantial business operations in Salt Lake County and elsewhere 
within the State of Utah. 
4. Venue is properly laid in Salt Lake County pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-4 and 78-13-7 because both First General 
and Bear River Mutual reside here, the obligations under the 
contracts in question were to be performed here, and because 




5. A fire on May 19, 1990, damaged and partially destroyed 
Perkins1 real and personal property located at 5510 South 640 West, 
Murray, Utah ("Perkins1 property"). 
6. Perkins1 property was insured under a homeowner's policy 
that had been issued to Perkins in August 1989 by Bear River 
Mutual. The policy was in full force and effect at all times rela-
tive to this action. The policy, a copy of which is attached and 
incorporated herein as defendant's Exhibit "A", included the 
following limits of liability: 
Dwelling: $85,000 
Appurtenant Structures: $8,500 
Unscheduled Personal Property: $59,500 
Additional Living Expenses: $17,000 
7. Perkins reported the fire on the same day of its occur-
rence to Bear River Mutual. Perkins filed a timely notice of claim 
and took all steps and fulfilled all conditions required to submit 
the claim for proper and timely resolution. 
8. On May 21, 1990, Perkins went to the her property to meet 
with Bear River Mutual's claims adjuster, Dick Dio ("Dio11). Dio 
referred First General to Perkins and strongly encouraged Perkins 
to hire First General to undertake the repairs to the property 
damaged by the fire. 
9. On or about May 21, 1990, Eugene Peterson ("Peterson"), 
president of First General, inspected the Perkins' property with 
Perkins. Peterson represented to Perkins that he could clean, 
repair and/or replace items which had been damaged or affected by 
-5- C0576 
the fire and place the subject property in the same condition, in 
terms of quality and quantity, as prior to the fire. 
10. During the inspection, Perkins informed Peterson that she 
would consider hiring First General to undertake the repairs but 
that she would require First General to submit a written repair-
proposal or bid to her first. Peterson represented to Perkins that 
he would submit a written bid to Perkins within three days. 
Peterson also assured Perkins that he had a payment bond. Peterson 
told Perkins that if Perkins ever wanted to terminate First 
General, she would be allowed to do so and First General Services 
would only require her to pay for work completed up to that point. 
11. During the inspection, Peterson showed Perkins an "Access 
and Authorization" card and told Perkins to sign it so he could 
begin clearing away debris. Relying on Peterson's assurances 
regarding the written bid and the payment bond, Perkins signed the 
Access and Authorization card so Peterson could begin clearing away 
the debris. 
12. Because Perkins had previously intended to leave Utah for 
a period of time, and in order to facilitate the settling of the 
claim in her absence, Perkins gave to her sister, Marsha Smith 
("Smith"), power of attorney on or about May 21, 1990. Perkins 
informed First General and Bear River Mutual that during Perkins1 
absence, First General was required to seek Smith's approval and 
authorization regularly during the repair process. Perkins 
instructed Bear River Mutual that no monies were to be disbursed to 
First General without Smith's authorization. 
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13. Soon after May 21, 1990, First General began to undertake 
repairs to the Perkins1 property beyond removal of debris. 
Contrary to agreement, First General did not submit a written bid 
to Perkins within three days of the walk-through inspection on May 
21, 1990 and did not provide documentation to either Perkins or 
Smith until mid-June 1990. 
14. Between May 21 and July 30 of 1990, Smith inspected First 
General's work and found the repairs, alterations and restoration 
to be of poor quality, substandard and well below the pre-fire 
condition of the subject property. 
15. Between May 21, 1990 and July 30, 1990, Perkins and Smith 
repeatedly protested to Bear River Mutual regarding First General"s 
poor workmanship and failure to submit a written bid. Perkins and 
Smith instructed Bear River Mutual not to disperse funds to First 
General because of the incomplete, sporadic and substandard work 
done by First General. 
16. Notwithstanding, Bear River Mutual disregarded Perkins1 
and Smith's complaints and instructions and continued to disburse 
funds to First General without ever inspecting or questioning the 
quality of First General's workmanship. Bear River Mutual paid 
First General at least $20,000 for its substandard and inadequate 
work. 
17. On information and belief, the reasonable value of the 
work and materials provided by First General is less than $9,000. 
18. On information and belief, while part of the $20,000 
First General received from Bear River was for the payment of 
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subcontractors, First General failed to pay subcontractors, who 
subsequently filed mechanics' liens against Perkins' property. 
19. In or about mid-July 1990, First General ceased all work 
on the Perkins' property, and abandoned the repairs. 
20. In or about mid-August 1990, Perkins requested that a new 
contractor, Leo Thorup ("Thorup"), make the repairs of the damages 
caused by the fire to the Perkins' property. During his inspection 
of the Perkins' property, Thorup opined that the work performed by 
First General was undeniably below industry standards in quality. 
21. Thorup submitted a written bid to Bear River Mutual, 
which was accepted. After receiving approval from Bear River 
Mutual to repair First General's substandard work and to restore 
the property as specified under the insurance policy, Thorup 
expended funds in excess of $40,000 towards this end. 
22. Despite the fact that Thorup performed competently and in 
full compliance with industry standards, Bear River Mutual has 
refused to compensate Thorup. 
23. Bear River Mutual has unreasonably and unjustly delayed 
settlement of Perkins' claims. Bear River Mutual has unreasonably 
required Perkins to submit exhaustive and duplicative documenta-
tion. 
24. Bear River Mutual's handling of the claim has been char-
acterized by unreasonable delay, intimidation, coercion and 
arbitrariness in an effort to force Perkins to settle her claims 
for less than her actual loss. 
-8- 00579 
I. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Contract by First General 
25. Perkins incorporates into this paragraph by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 24 above. 
26. On or about May 21, 1990, First General and Perkins 
entered into a contract under which First General was to perform 
certain cleaning, remodeling and renovation work to repair and 
restore the Perkins1 property which had been damaged by a fire. 
27. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, this cleaning, 
repair and replacement was to place Perkins1 property in the same 
condition, in terms of quality and quantity, to its pre-fire 
condition by July 1, 1990. 
28. First General failed to substantially perform the terms 
of the contract. First General performed shoddy and negligent 
repair, restoration and cleaning work throughout the subject 
property. Such low quality work by First General failed to place 
the Perkins1 property to its pre-fire condition as expressly 
promised. First General's poor performance was below ordinary 
industry standards and failed to meet its obligation to clean, 
repair and restore the fire damaged property in a professional and 
workmanlike manner. 
29. First General further breached its contract by not acting 
with reasonable diligence to complete the repair work by July 1, 
1990 as expressly promised. 
-9-
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30. First General's material breach of contract has impaired 
the purpose of the agreement and proximately caused substantial 
economic damage to Perkins. The costs of engaging the services of 
another contractor to repair and replace First General's defective 
work and to complete the cleaning, repair and replacement of the 
Perkins1 property exceeded $40,000.00. Perkins was also damaged in 
the diminished use and enjoyment of her home. 
WHEREFORE, Perkins seeks relief as is hereinafter more speci-
fically set forth in Perkins' prayer for relief. 
II. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation of First General 
31. Perkins incorporates into this paragraph by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 3 0 above. 
32. On or about May 21, 1990, Eugene Peterson, First 
General's agent, expressly represented to Perkins that it had a 
payment or a performance bond to ensure that subcontractors would 
be paid for work done on the Perkins1 property. 
33. First General did not have a payment or a performance 
bond. Peterson knew that his representation was false. Peterson 
made this false representation to Perkins for the purpose of 
inducing Perkins to hire First General, by leading Perkins to 
believe that she would not be vulnerable to claims and mechanic's 
liens by subcontractors if Perkins hired Peterson. 
-10- 00581 
34* Peterson's misrepresentations were material. Perkins 
would not have agreed to allow Peterson to work on the property had 
Perkins known the truth. 
35. Perkins justifiably relied on Peterson's false represen-
tation. 
36. As a result of First General's fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion, certain subcontractors First General has refused or failed to 
pay have asserted mechanic's liens against the Perkins1 property. 
WHEREFORE, Perkins seek relief as hereinafter more specifical-
ly set forth in Perkins' Prayer for Relief, infra. 
III. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Negligent Misrepresentation Against First General 
37. Perkins incorporates into this paragraph by reference to 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 3 6 above. 
38. First General had a pecuniary interest in the transaction 
with Perkins. 
39. First General had experience in the building and fire 
restoration business and was in a superior position to know bonding 
requirements, costs of labor and materials, and the length of time 
reasonably necessary to effect repairs. 
40. First General's false representations includes but are 
not limited to the following: 
a. First General assured Perkins it had a perfor-
mance or payment bond, when in fact it did not have a 
bond nor did it ever acquire one; 
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b. First General promised Perkins that all work 
could and would be finished on July 1, 1990; 
c. First General held itself out as extremely 
competent, possessing considerable experience, and 
represented it would clean and repair, and replace the 
Perkins1 property damaged by the fire to its pre-fire 
condition; 
d. First General assured Perkins that it would 
submit a written bid to her within three days of May 21, 
1990; 
e. First General assured Perkins that the "Access 
and Authorization" card would authorize him only to begin 
removing debris from the property but not to undertake 
general repairs. 
41. First General's misrepresentations were material and 
substantial because Perkins would not have otherwise agreed to 
allow First General to work on her property. 
42. First General expected Perkins to rely on its misrepre-
sentations. 
43. Perkins justifiably and reasonably relied on First 
General's misrepresentations and as a result, has suffered losses, 
including but not limited to: unreasonable delays in the restora-
tion and repair of her property and settlement of her claims, the 
filing of mechanic's liens by certain subcontractors that First 
General has refused or failed to pay and who had no payment or 
performance bond against which to make a claim, and the costs of 
"
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engaging the services of another contractor to complete the clean-
ing, repair and replacement of the Perkins1 property, 
WHEREFORE, Perkins seeks relief as is hereinafter more 
specifically set forth in Perkins1 Prayer for Relief, infra. 
IV. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Slander of Title Against First General 
44. Perkins incorporates in this paragraph by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 4 3 above. 
45. First General filed a mechanic's lien on the Perkins1 
property. 
46. First General was not entitled to the money claimed 
pursuant to the lien because it had been over compensated. First 
General did not complete the job and all of its work was incompe-
tently performed. 
47. On information and belief, First General specifically 
instructed certain subcontractors to file mechanic's liens against 
the Perkins' property despite the fact that First General had 
already received the money intended for the subcontractors and was 
responsible for paying this money to them. First General's conduct 
in doing so was motivated by malice toward Perkins. 
48. Perkins desires to place the property up for sale but is 
unable to do so because of the liens. 
49. As a result, Perkins has suffered damages including, but 





WHEREFORE, Perkins seeks relief as is hereinafter more 
specifically set forth in Perkins' Prayer for Relief, infra, 
V. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Bear River Mutual1s Breach of Implied Contract, 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
50. Perkins incorporates in this paragraph by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 49 above. 
51. Bear River Mutual was obligated to deal fairly with 
Perkins and act in good faith toward settling Perkins' claim in a 
timely fashion. 
52. Bear River Mutual breached these duties in several 
particulars, including but not limited to the following: 
a. Bear River Mutual released $20,000 to First 
General without exercising proper oversight to insure 
that First General was performing competently; 
b. Contrary to industry standards and Perkins1 
express instructions, Bear River Mutual paid to First 
General disbursement checks totalling $20,000 without 
first seeking approval or authorization of Perkins or 
Perkins' representative; 
c. Bear River Mutual arbitrarily and without good 
faith justification or explanation refused to pay policy 
limits of $17,000 for living expenses despite Perkins1 




d. Bear River Mutual arbitrarily and without good 
faith justification or explanation refused to pay policy 
limits of $59,500 for loss or damage to unscheduled per-
sonal property despite Perkins1 good-faith documentation 
of such damages and loss; 
e. Bear River Mutual arbitrarily and without good 
faith justification or explanation refused to pay 
Perkins1 new contractor, Thorup, despite his competent 
performance of work in excess of $40,000; 
f. Bear River Mutual refused to pay contractors who 
were working to restore the dwelling, instructing them to 
get their money from Perkins; 
g. Bear River Mutual failed to diligently investi-
gate the facts to determine if Perkins1 claims are valid; 
h. Bear River Mutual arbitrarily and capriciously 
failed to fairly evaluated Perkins1 claims; 
i. Bear River Mutual failed to act promptly and 
reasonably in rejecting or settling Perkins1 claims; and 
j. Bear River Mutual engaged in actions likely 
designed to hinder and obstruct Perkins1 pursuit of her 
rights and remedies under the insurance policy. 
53. As a direct and proximate result of Bear River Mutual's 
breach of good faith and fair dealing, Perkins has been denied the 
just and timely compensation under the insurance policy. Perkins 
and Smith have also expended hundred of hours of personal time and 
vast amounts of personal resources including travel expenses, tele-
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phone charges, and similar costs. Moreover, Bear River Mutual's 
breach of good faith has caused Perkins to suffer great mental 
anguish. 
54. Bear River Mutual's actions were designed and specifical-
ly intended to harass and oppress Perkins and constitute outra-
geous, malicious and wrongful misconduct and flagrant disregard of 
Perkins1 rights. 
55. Bear River Mutual!s breach of good faith and fair dealing 
has proximately caused substantial damage to Perkins, including 
damages for mental anguish, in an amount to be proven at trial. In 
addition, Bear River Mutualfs breach of good faith entitles Perkins 
to an award of costs incurred in this litigation and reasonable 
attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
WHEREFORE, Perkins seeks relief as hereinafter more specifi-
cally set forth in Perkins' Prayer for Relief, infra. 
VI • 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Bear River Mutual1s Express Indemnification of Perkins 
56. Perkins incorporates into this paragraph by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 55 above. 
57. Pursuant to the express terms of Exhibit "A", the 
insurance policy issued to Perkins, Bear River Mutual agreed to 
compensate and cover Perkins1 loss as sustained in connection with 
the Perkins1 property. 
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58. All claims and causes of action asserted by First General 
against Perkins arise directly out of damages sustained by the 
Perkinsf property. 
59. Bear River Mutual has an express obligation to hold 
Perkins harmless and indemnify her for the amount of any judgment 
or settlement, expenses, costs of suit, legal fees, or other 
damages incurred by Perkins in connection with Perkins1 loss. 
60. Bear River has an express obligation to indemnify Perkins 
for the expenditures properly made to Thorup for the repair and 
replacement of First General's defective work and for the comple-
tion of the repair and replacement of the Perkins1 property. 
WHEREFORE, Perkins seeks relief as hereinafter more specifi-
cally set forth in Perkins1 Prayer for Relief, infra. 
VII. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Bear River Mutual^ Implied Indemnification of Perkins 
61. Perkins incorporates into this paragraph by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 60 above. 
62. First General's damages, if any, were the result of Bear 
River Mutualfs willful misconduct, negligence or breach of its 
contract. 
63. If liability is imposed on Perkins in connection with any 
of First General's claims, equity demands that Bear River Mutual 
hold Perkins harmless and indemnify her from the amount of any 
judgment or settlement, expenses, cost of suit, legal fees, or 
other damages incurred by Perkins in connection with this action. 
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64. Equity demands that Bear River indemnify Perkins for the 
expenditures properly made to Thorup for the repair and replacement 
of First General's defective work and for the completion of the 
repair and replacement of the Perkins1 property. 
WHEREFORE, Perkins seeks relief as hereinafter more specifi-
cally set forth in Perkins1 Prayer for Relief, infra. 
VIII. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Perkins seeks relief as hereinafter more specifi-
cally set forth in Perkins1 Prayer for Relief, infra. 
1. Pursuant to Perkins1 First Claim for Relief for 
Breach of Contract, Perkins prays the court enter judg-
ment in her favor and against First General for damages 
in an amount equal to the costs to repair and replace 
First General's negligent workmanship and to complete the 
cleaning, repair and replacement of the Perkins1 proper-
ty, plus the loss of use and enjoyment of her home and 
damages to the Perkins' property in an award not less 
than $40,000 to be proven at trial. 
2. Pursuant to Perkins1 Second Claim for Relief 
against First General, Perkins prays that the court 
render judgment against First General in an amount 
required to discharge the subcontractor mechanic's liens 
together with an award of punitive damages of $3 0,000.00. 
3. Pursuant to Perkins' Third Claim for Relief for 
Misrepresentation against First General, Perkins prays 
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that the Court render judgment against First General for 
the amount First General was overcompensated (at least 
$11,000.00), and an amount equal to the costs to complete 
the cleaning, repair and replacement of the Perkins1 
property to its pre-fire status. 
4. Pursuant to Perkins1 Fifth Claim for Relief for 
Slander of Title against First General, Perkins prays 
that the Court render judgment against First General in 
an amount required to discharge the subcontractors' 
mechanic's liens, together with an award of punitive 
damages in the sum not less than $30,000.00 to be proven 
at trial. 
5. Pursuant to Perkins' Sixth Claim for Relief for 
Breach of Implied Contract, Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
against Bear River Mutual, Perkins prays that the court 
render judgment against Bear River for the full policy 
terms of the insurance policy, all general and consequen-
tial damages, damages for mental anguish and all other 
damages resulting from Bear River's breach of contract 
commensurate with the evidence adduced at time of trial. 
6. Pursuant to Perkins1 Seventh Claim for Relief 
for Express Indemnification against Bear River Mutual, 
and Perkins' Eighth Claim for Implied Indemnification 
against Bear River Mutual, Perkins prays that the court 
render judgment against Bear River for the amount of any 
judgment or settlement, costs of suit, legal fees, 
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expenditures, or other damages incurred by Perkins in 
connection with Perkins1 loss. 
7. For such other and additional relief as the 
Court shall deem just, necessary and appropriate in 
accordance with Rule 54(c)(1) Utah R. Civ. P. 
JURY DEMAND 
Pursuant to Rule 38, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this 
defendant and third-party plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury 
in the captioned matter as to all matters above triable of right 
under the common law and Constitution of Utah. 
DATED this / y f ? day of August, 1992.  ./£ 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
ROBERT S. CAMP 
MICHAEL T. ROBERTS 
of and for 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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